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
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RICHELIEU

FRANCE UNDER MAZARIN

WITH A REVIEW OF THE

ADMINISTRATION OF RICHELIEU

BY

JAMES BRECK PERKINS



WITH PORTRAITS.

VOL. I.

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PREFACE.

THE period covered by the administrations of Richelieu and Mazarin is one of both interest and importance. Yet I am not aware that any full history of this time has been written in English. The career and character of Richelieu are, to a certain extent, familiar, but, perhaps, most have a general idea of his administration, rather than a familiarity with what he actually did. Both the character and administration of Mazarin are, I think, little known to most English readers. Yet eighteen years which embraced the Fronde, and the treaties of Westphalia and the Pyrenees, cannot be deemed unimportant. If the policy of Richelieu is worth studying, the man who was his legitimate successor should not be ignored by students of history.

The accuracy of modern scholarship demands, also, the examination of authorities which, until recently, have been largely inaccessible and wholly disregarded. There are a great number of contemporary memoirs covering this time. Many of the leading political characters have left their own records of their careers. It is upon such authorities, chiefly, that any works treating of this period have been based, with the exception of a few recent French publications. The ideas entertained of the Fronde, for example, and of the characters of Mazarin and Condé, have been principally derived from various contemporary memoirs, of which those of Retz are best known and have been most used. Many of these memoirs furnish much information that is accurate and valuable, and a study of them is indispensable. But it is impossible,

with such data alone, to describe the events of the time with any degree of accuracy or justness.

The most satisfactory historic materials are the letters and documents of the principal actors, and only by a careful study of these can a correct idea be obtained either of the events, or of the motives or purposes of those who took part in them. By the enlightened liberality of the French government, much has recently been done to assist students of its history. The most important letters, instructions, and despatches of Richelieu, and some of those of Mazarin and Colbert, have been published under the supervision of distinguished scholars. But a great mass of letters and despatches of Mazarin, as well as of Le Tellier, Lionne, and others who were assistants or agents of the cardinal in his long administration, still remain in manuscript, and familiarity with them is, I think, required of any one who desires to understand Mazarin's character or career. Among the most curious and valuable sources of information, are the so-called *Carnets* of Mazarin, which are among the manuscripts of the National Library at Paris. In these little memoranda-books the cardinal for over eight years jotted down his most private views and purposes, the advice he was to give the regent, the reports he heard of the plans of his adversaries, his secret hopes and fears. Rarely has any statesman left so curious and confidential a record. Yet, until recently, no one has attempted to decipher the difficult and sometimes illegible hieroglyphics in which Mazarin kept his secret memoranda. M. Cheruel, in the two works which he has recently published, "*La Minorité de Louis XIV.*" and "*France sous le Ministère de Mazarin,*" has used largely the correspondence and *Carnets* of Mazarin, and the manuscripts of the Parisian libraries and of the Department of Foreign Affairs. He has, however, confined himself entirely to the diplomatic and political history of the period of which he treats.

Another copious and valuable source of information has

recently been opened to students, and, I believe, has been used by no one, except to some extent by M. Cheruel, in the despatches of the Venetian ambassadors. The originals have been preserved at Venice, and a few years ago permission was given to make copies of those covering a period of nearly two centuries. These copies, in manuscript, are now in the National Library, and, except the correspondence and diplomatic papers of Richelieu and Mazarin, they are the most useful and accurate authorities for most of the events of this time. The occurrences of each year fill nearly two large volumes of manuscript. The reports were made at intervals of but a few days, and sometimes daily, by the representatives of Venice to their own government. More intelligent and impartial authorities than her ambassadors could hardly be found.

In the manuscripts and neglected publications of the French libraries much can also be found that throws light upon subjects quite as important as treaties or foreign wars; on the condition of the people, the manner in which they lived, the cost of what they ate and wore, the weight of taxation, the misery produced by the ravages of the soldier and of the tax-gatherer. The recent works of M. Feillet, "*La Misère au Temps de la Fronde*," and of M. d'Avenel, "*Richelieu et la Monarchie absolue*," are of much value to those who wish to investigate these interesting subjects. Several contemporary journals, one of the most important of which, that of Ormesson, has recently been published; the publications which began at this time and which answered to our modern newspapers; the official journals of the Parliament of Paris and of the States-General of 1614, must also be studied by those who wish to understand the period. I am not aware that any English history of France has been based upon the various materials to which I have referred, nor have those, which it seems to me are most important, been used except by one or two French historical writers.

In view of this, I have thought that an English history of France under Richelieu and Mazarin might not be with-

out value. As the career of Mazarin is less familiar, I have treated it with more fulness and given only a review of Richelieu's administration. The liberality with which students are allowed access, not only to the great French libraries, but also to the diplomatic correspondence which is preserved at the Department of Foreign Affairs, is known to all who have made any research in the original authorities for French history. The most of the manuscripts, which I had occasion to examine, are found at the National Library or at the Foreign Department. I should also express my personal obligation to M. Cheruel for the advice he gave me in my researches, and his valuable suggestions as to where the best information could be found. Without his aid, the labor of investigation among the great masses of manuscript and printed matter would have been much increased.

Whether the results of such investigations will possess any value, or any interest, for English readers, I cannot say. To a student of history the pleasure of being brought in close contact with the great figures of other times, of reading their thoughts and their purposes, of living for a while in intimate relations with a generation that has long passed away, sympathizing, as a contemporary might, with their adversity and their suffering, rejoicing in what gratified national pride or increased individual comfort, is such, that though what I have written should only add to the number of valueless books, the years spent in the study of French life and history under the rule of the two great cardinals will have an enduring charm in the recollection of the writer.

ROCHESTER, N. Y., March, 1886.

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FRANCE UNDER RICHELIEU AND MAZARIN.

CHAPTER I.

THE MINORITY OF LOUIS XIII.

THE reign of the House of Valois ended at the death of Henry III., and with the accession of Henry of Navarre began the two centuries during which France was ruled by kings of the House of Bourbon. Within this period we find the full development of a centralized and absolute monarchy in that kingdom, which met with no check until its final overthrow by the Revolution. The early years of the reign of Henry IV. were chiefly occupied with the establishment of his own authority against the opposition of the League and of the House of Guise, and, after the civil wars were ended, he was engaged in allaying the disorders they had caused, and in regulating the relations between the Catholics and the Protestants. It was only sixteen years after Paris received Henry as the acknowledged king of France, that he was murdered by Ravaillac. During those years the pacification of the kingdom was completed, the edict of Nantes was granted, and much was done towards improving the national finances, fostering agriculture and trade, and advancing the general welfare. The people were weary of the anarchy of civil war, and there was no disposition to interfere with the royal authority exercised by a popular king for the general good.

Henry's reign was succeeded by a weak minority, and, after that, for almost forty years, the Cardinals Richelieu and Mazarin were the rulers of France. For nearly twenty years Richelieu exercised a controlling influence in that kingdom, and the power which he gained for himself he left to a successor whom he had brought from Italy, and educated to adopt his views and follow his policy. It is during this period that the French monarchy is often said to have become absolute. The principles of Richelieu, enforced by him and adopted by Mazarin, are thought to have overthrown all checks upon the power of the French kings.

Such a view of their administration is not correct, unless it is received with many modifications. The period was, undoubtedly, one of transition. Old things had passed away, and the time for new things had come. Had Richelieu and Mazarin been men who believed that the glory and growth of France were to be sought more through her internal development than through a policy of foreign conquest, it was possible for them, and especially for Richelieu, to have turned her energies in these directions. But at that time, as so often in French history, victories in the field, new territories annexed, a recognized influence in European politics, were grateful to the people as well as to the ministers.

Had the two cardinals desired to build up constitutional checks on the royal authority and to make of France a limited monarchy, it is possible that, by changing the nature and character of the States-General, a body might have been organized which would have corresponded to the English Parliament. But it is rare, indeed, to find an absolute minister of an absolute king, who, unless compelled by popular demand, establishes popular checks upon the royal authority. Restraints upon authority are not granted by kings until they are demanded by subjects.

The cardinals failed to develop any popular tendencies in French government, although it would have been well for the king and the people that such should have been

fostered, and a form of government evolved which would have proved stable and progressive. But it cannot be said that they overthrew any checks on authority which had been established, or that they changed the nature of the French monarchy. The States-General met in 1614, before Richelieu became a minister, but, although they met at a time favorable for increasing or, at least, retaining the authority which they had at times exercised, their session was barren of results, and, in the fifty years that followed, there was no popular demand for their re-assembling.

Important changes in the internal organization of France were made under Richelieu, which tended to the centralization of power, but such changes were almost without exception advantageous. France had grown by the accession of many states and provinces which had once been independent, and from its composite character the kingdom contained a vast confusion of different customs, of petty and inharmonious officials engaged in a costly and inefficient administration of public affairs. So far as he sought to centralize the administration of the affairs of the kingdom, Richelieu led in a direction in which the French Revolution was to follow.

Both under Richelieu and Mazarin there was a long contest between the king and the nobility, and there were struggles arising from the authority which certain courts sought to exercise. The nature of these contests will appear in the history of their administrations, but they arose from no endeavor to break down any check on royal authority, which formed a recognized part of the government of France.

There existed no such check. France, like the other countries of Europe, had passed through its feudal period, and in it the feudal system had been highly developed. The two hundred and fifty years during which the House of Valois reigned, were largely occupied by wars of so serious a nature that they brought the country often to a condition of anarchy. For over a century, with little

intermission, war was waged with England to decide whether France should be ruled by a French or an English king. In such a contest, during which the French king was often a fugitive from his own capital, his power was at times little more than nominal, and great feudal lords could conduct themselves almost as independent princes. It was during this period of confusion that we find Stephen Marcel leading almost the only important and thoroughly popular movement in the early history of France. This, however, failed for many reasons, but chiefly because neither the times nor the condition of the people would allow or sustain an intelligently conducted popular government. The movement was chiefly confined to Paris, and France was not yet a centralized kingdom. Means of communication were imperfect, intercourse was comparatively slight, and the revolution at Paris had an uncertain and wavering support in the provinces.

After the wars with England were ended, the dangers that beset royalty arose from the exorbitant power of the royal dukes. The appanages granted to younger sons of kings amounted almost to a subdivision of the kingdom. The struggle was now not so much with feudal lords who could claim an authority as ancient as that of the descendants of Hugh Capet, as with great princes who were the kinsmen of the king and had received their territories as gifts from the crown. The reign of Louis XI. and the overthrow of the House of Burgundy ended these conflicts, and France soon began to take an active part in the struggles for a predominant influence in European politics, which mark the period of Francis I.

But the Reformation had come, and it gained many followers in some portions of France. The larger part of the century before Richelieu was filled with internal dissension and civil wars arising from questions of religion. In these the great nobles had played an important part, and their endeavors—not so much to preserve an independent power, as to gain large personal advantages—form one of the political phases of that period. It was such endeavors

that both Richelieu and Mazarin had to meet. But from the resistance of royal dukes or powerful nobles there had been developed no legal check on the French kings. The power of the king was restrained by turbulence but not by law.

The sixteenth century was marked also by sessions of the States-General of comparative frequency. That body was the only element which was capable of an important development in the direction of constitutional government, and it seemed possible that it might now acquire a position in which it should represent the people and restrain the royal authority. But such a result could only come from the persistent and intelligent demand of those whom the States represented for a modification of their organization and an increase of their powers. Such a demand was not made, and the great ministers of the seventeenth century never saw fit to seek for themselves a popular support or to enlist in their behalf the aid of a popular representative body. Richelieu was hated and feared by the people, and Mazarin was hated and despised. Each held his power by the royal favor and would have been driven from office by the popular will.

The death of Henry IV., in 1610, changed the aspect of French politics. While the study of any long period shows that little importance attaches to the sudden removal of any actor on the scene, yet from Henry's murder there resulted not only a considerable change in internal politics, but the influence of France in European affairs was for many years modified.

At few periods have political murders been more frequent than during the fifty years following the revolt of the Netherlands. They were favorite expedients of Philip II. The nature of the contest then raging was a justification for any act. Both in the Netherlands and in France the struggle was between opposing creeds. In order to blot out the growing heresies which rent the unity of the Church, to check the moral plague which was destroying countless souls, the violent death of any man was not only excusable, but praiseworthy. The means adopted by Philip and by the

Guises were of large advantage to the cause they espoused. The thanksgivings for the massacre of Saint Bartholomew offered by Gregory XIII. and by the Court of Spain were, from their standpoint, justified. That slaughter was a crime but not a blunder, and it permanently injured the future of the Protestant cause in France. Not only for Coligny and many thousand lesser heretics, justly punished for their crimes, could Philip II. offer fervent thanks and devout praise, but for a blow from which the Huguenot cause never recovered. That party seemed, indeed, stronger in 1575 than in 1570, but its slow decline had begun. The abjuration of Henry of Navarre immediately after the massacre, to be repeated in 1593, and to be followed by that of many others, was the evidence of a feeling of weakness and defeat which had spread among French Protestants. It was not until the capture of La Rochelle that the French Protestants ceased to be important as a political party, but the abandonment of the reformed faith by the great families which once professed it, had been in progress for over thirty years, and made easy its overthrow. A man like Henry IV. would never hesitate long at any change of religion that would largely advance his temporal interests, but even a more earnest Huguenot would have found it impossible to occupy the French throne without abjuring his creed. Crimes committed against them, as well as mistakes committed by them, had hopelessly weakened the Protestants in that country.

The murder of William the Silent had also been an advantage to the Catholic cause, for it destroyed the fair prospect of making of all the Low Countries one government independent of Spain and of Rome. Ten of the seventeen provinces were from that time lost to the insurgent cause. The death of Henry III. was, indeed, of no benefit to the League or the Catholic party, but that was because the zeal of Jacques Clement was not tempered by judgment. However little Henry's conduct suited the fierce piety of the Jesuits, his death cleared

the throne for a Protestant successor. It would have been wiser to have offered masses for Henry's life than to have given encouragement for his murder. The Duchess of Montpensier, who is said to have tempted Clement to the act by offering him her love as a reward, could have used her charms more judiciously for the interests of her religion. But in the murder of Henry IV. no mistake was made. That no one would believe Elizabeth a virgin queen, the Arch-Duke a good general, or himself a good Catholic, Henry said, jestingly, were three popular errors. There was no error in the popular belief as to himself. Antagonism to Spain and the principles she represented, had become too deeply rooted in him to be destroyed by any change in religious profession. The natural field for Henry's ambition was in augmenting the influence of France at the expense of Spain and Austria, and his natural allies were the Protestant states.

The day on which the king was murdered found him about to begin a war which might have been far-reaching in its results. The controversy had arisen from the various claims made to the territories of the Duke of Cleves, and from Henry's resolution to support the Possessory Princes. Henry's purpose, however, was not confined to deciding who should be the rulers of the duchies and lordships to which, by the death of the Duke of Cleves, all the world had become heirs. In the improbable event of meeting no resistance, he said he would content himself with insuring the quiet possession of these provinces. But should the House of Austria interfere in behalf of the Archduke Leopold, the French king meditated a war which might work great changes.

What those changes would be, what he himself desired them to be, Henry had no very clear idea. His scheme for remodelling Europe is well known.¹ As the talkative

¹ This scheme is stated in Sully's "*Oeconomies d'Etat*," vol. xvii., pp. 323-360, ed. Michaud, and Henry's plans are discussed in various parts of these memoirs. Undoubtedly it was not expected by Henry that any such scheme would be accomplished, or perhaps attempted, but men's day-dreams indicate the tenor of their more serious plans.

monarch gossiped with Sully in the gardens of Fontainebleau, he disclosed his vague dreams of a great European commonwealth, in which peace should reign and the fear of any overshadowing power should be removed. France, England, Holland, Denmark, and Sweden were to form a league, united for common purposes. The seventeen provinces of the Low Countries would compose a republic, independent of any other government. From Southern Italy and the States of the Church a Roman and pontifical republic was to be created, of which the Pope should be the head. Lombardy was to be added to the dominions of the Duke of Savoy, and the long-cherished ambition of that house to be gratified by forming a kingdom of its enlarged possessions. Sicily was to be the reward of Venice for her alliance. To Switzerland were to be added Alsace, Franche Comté, and the Tyrol. The Empire and the thrones of Hungary and Bohemia should be filled in the future by an absolutely free election, and it was intended that those three crowns should cease to be the patrimony of Austria. Not only was the House of Austria to be deprived of great possessions in Europe, but a free right to trade in both the Indies was to be granted all nations who professed the name of Christ. After these changes were accomplished, all princes were to unite in a firm resolve that they would have no further dissensions, quarrels, or strifes, but would employ the contentious and unruly humors of their states in constant war against the infidel.

These plans, however unlikely to be carried into effect, were, to the king, something more than idle talk. Henry's early career gave to his views a certain boldness and unselfishness often found in those who in mature life reach a throne which has seemed remote in their youth. A prince bred to the idea of a crown receives it as a patrimony to be enjoyed with favorites or mistresses, or to be enlarged by some neighboring province. But when one to whom the kingly office has appeared far removed, finds himself invested with it, there comes the conception of the in-

finite possibilities for the exercise of its power. The ambition of Louis XIV. was satisfied by a few provinces for himself, and a crown for his grandson. But the vision of what might be done by the kingly power, exerted by a kingly man, in one whose years abated his ambition and sobered his dreams, no more than they chilled his passions, excited Henry to undertake a course of knight-errantry for prostrate states and oppressed communions.

Henry's character was shown in its strength and in its weakness as his life drew near its close. One day, he wandered about the grounds of Mme. de Trigny, blowing kisses to the beautiful Charlotte of Condé, a gray-bearded king sighing after a girl of sixteen.¹ The next, he was marshalling a great army, exulting over the vast treasure laid up for him by a thrifty minister, and ready to command his soldiers with the same valor with which he had led the charge at Coutras and at Ivry; cherishing no selfish plans of annexation, but with a wise and far-sighted purpose to check the overweening power of the House of Austria, and insure to the Protestant communities of Germany political independence and religious freedom. Even then, he was the fickle Bearnese, and had the Archdukes surrendered the Princess of Condé, his great plans might have melted away with a jest.

War, however, seemed inevitable. Henry had an army of thirty thousand men ready to march immediately after the queen's coronation.² On the day after that ceremony, the 14th of May, 1610, he was murdered by Ra-vaillac, and the political aspect of Europe was changed. "France will fall into strange hands," said Sully, as he heard the news. "We are all lost if our good king is dead."³ Sully himself fled to the Bastille, and left that place of refuge only upon the repeated orders of the queen. He saw at the Louvre many faces which showed more joy than grief at the murder. Persons with pur-

¹ Pierre Lenet, 229, 230, ed. Michaud. Fontenay Mareuil, 6.

² *Mémoires de Sully*, 374, ed. Michaud, vol. xvii.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 382.

poses very different from those of Henry took possession of his government. Louis XIII. was then eight years old, and his mother, Mary de Medici, was proclaimed sole regent. The princes of the blood might have claimed some part in the administration, but they were absent from Paris. Soissons, the king's cousin, had left just before the coronation, because Henry insisted that at the ceremony the wife of his bastard son by Gabrielle should wear the lilies of France.¹ Soissons escaped seeing the *fleurs-de-lis* on the gowns of bastard princesses. He lost the chance of being associated in the government of France. His brother Conti was decrepit in mind and body. The Prince of Condé was absent from France. The Parliament without opposition recognized Mary as regent until her son should attain his majority. That would be in little over four years, as a king entered his majority on completing his thirteenth year. It was plain, however, that Mary's power would continue much longer. The law might deem the king of France fit to rule at thirteen, but nature would still leave him more apprehensive of his teacher's rod than of Austria's domination, more inclined to train his birds than to choose his ministers or send instructions to his ambassadors.

The government of France was thus for the second time within fifty years controlled by one of the Medici family. Mary de Medici was, however, a very different woman from Catherine. In appearance she was more German than Italian. The pictures of Rubens have made her face one of the most familiar of those of French queens. Every visitor at the Louvre has noticed the great series of paintings in which she is portrayed, and has seen that no painter's brush could make her other than a large, fleshy, blonde woman, with the expression of a commonplace nature and of a sluggish sensuality. She assumed the regency with a single desire, for peace at home and abroad. Abroad this was easily to be obtained by abandoning Henry's projected campaign and by an alliance

¹ *Mémoires de Richelieu*, ed. Michaud, vol. xxi.

with Spain through marriage. A strong Catholic, and great-niece of Charles V., Mary's sympathies were Spanish, and she disliked the Protestants with as much vigor as was consistent with her languid nature. At home her policy was to quiet the great nobles by allowing them unlimited plunder from the public treasury. Thus she trusted that she might enjoy undisturbed the pleasures of authority and turn upon her especial favorites an unceasing stream of royal favor. Like many whose only desire is peace, she was to find it in indifferent measure. The treasure hoarded by Sully was far from satisfying the thirst of the nobility, and the weakness of the regent made Louis' minority one long revolt. Later in life Mary showed a power of hatred so strong that she chose to wander a fugitive over Europe and die in exile rather than submit to Richelieu's authority. But her feeling toward him was so compounded of regret for the overthrow of her own authority, of anger at the ingratitude of the man whom she had brought from obscurity, and possibly of resentment at love grown cold and herself neglected as a woman, as well as a queen, that it overcame her fondness for quiet, for the sumptuous meals, the gaudy ceremonies, the voluptuous softness of life which she desired from royalty.

With her husband Mary had lived after the fashion of many royal households. Sully said he had never seen eight days go by without their having a public quarrel. The queen once raised her arm to strike Henry in the face, and was only stopped by Sully, and the minister was wearied by Henry's complaints of Mary's coldness and pride.¹

No experience of the king's infidelities reconciled the queen to them. Each new one caused a new bitterness, until even the easy-going Henry threatened to send her back to Florence, feeling that if the choice must be between a wife and mistresses he would not hesitate. His conduct might have irritated the most patient of spouses.

¹ *Mém. de Richelieu*, 9. *Mém. de Sully*.

After the Prince of Condé had taken his wife to the Netherlands, Henry in his distress asked Mary for her assistance. "You have already thirty go-betweens," she said, "and I will not be the thirty-first."

Still Henry's second marriage was more fortunate than his first. He and the queen preserved those moderately friendly relations that are consistent with frequent bickerings, and she bore him in nine years a blooming family of three sons and three daughters. The voice of slander had not spared the queen herself. It had been charged that an Italian named Concini had gained her affections. It appeared after Henry's death that Concini possessed great influence over the queen, and her favor raised him to an extraordinary position. Titles, wealth, and offices were profusely showered on him, and for a time his political influence was as great as that of Richelieu or Mazarin. He had, however, a strong hold upon the queen, independent of any personal feelings she may have had towards him. The relations of the Concini with Mary de Medici were much like those of the Marlboroughs with Queen Anne. However inferior was the marshal who received his baton without ever fighting a battle to the conqueror of Blenheim and Ramillies, and the Italian serving-woman to the imperious Mrs. Freeman, their power arose from similar causes. Leonora Dosi, the daughter of a carpenter, was the foster-sister of Mary de Medici. She was brought up in the palace, and her fidelity and zeal gained her the strong affection of the princess. With the taste for inferiors often found in persons of high birth and low mind, Mary chose Leonora as her confidante and friend. Her name was changed to the aristocratic one of Galigai. To her menial duties Galigai added the entire control of the mind and desires of her mistress. The marriage with Henry opened a larger field for her activity and ambition. In the meantime Concino Concini, a cadet of a good Florentine family, but so reduced in circumstances that he had been for a time cup-bearer to the Cardinal of Lorraine, had obtained Mary's favor, and perhaps her love. At all

events he accompanied her to France and there he married Leonora Galigai. His bride had neither wealth nor personal beauty to attract the handsome young Florentine. She was deformed, and so short as to be almost a dwarf. But in the queen's favor which she possessed, she brought a dowry richer than that of Mademoiselle Montpensier or the daughter of the Constable, and insured for her husband a Marquisate, the baton of Marshal of France, the Lieutenant-Generalship of Picardy, and the governments of Amiens and Normandy. The husband and wife combined their power over the queen, and exerted an influence as strong as it was unwholesome. The murder which made her regent in form made the Concini regents in fact.

Venomous enemies surrounded Henry at the end of his career, and many have believed Ravallac had accomplices in the assassination. The Jesuits were objects of popular suspicion, and the tenets of Mariana as to the lawful murder of tyrants or enemies of the faith were produced against them. More secretly, suspicions were entertained against the Concini, against Épernon, and against the queen herself. They seem to rest on no sufficient foundations. Ravallac was a fanatic into whose unwholesome mind the complaints that Henry was an enemy to the Church had sunk, until he committed his crime thinking he did God service. But no one was shown to have instigated the deed. He took no counsel save of his own gloomy and diseased mind. Épernon was in the carriage with Henry, and in the first excitement could easily have had the murderer killed. But he saved him from the fury of the soldiers in a manner which showed he had no fear of any disclosures that might be made. Ravallac was subjected to all the means then used to elicit confession. Beside physical pain, he had to endure spiritual torture. Priests refused absolution, painted heaven closed and hell open before him unless he not only repented but named those who had abetted him in the act. But through all pains of body and mind he said that he had no accomplice. The king allowed the practice of two religions and intended to

make war upon the Pope, and he thought that to kill him would be agreeable to God. The outburst of popular hatred seemed to surprise him and shake his confidence in the righteousness of his act. But he endured almost without a groan the horrible punishments inflicted upon him. He was sentenced to be tortured, his right hand burned off, and then to be torn in pieces by four horses.

For two hours and a half he was subjected to the worst tortures that a practised ingenuity could devise, but he bore all with the same constancy that had been shown by Belthazar Gerard. The warped quality of mind that led such men to foster their plans of murder, enabled them to meet the penalties with the highest courage. Their convictions rendered them superior to pain. No Christian martyrs ever met the worst form of death with more calmness, more freedom from dread or fear, than these men dying for the worst of crimes. Gerard was as triumphant in death as Justin Martyr, and Ravaillac bore his tortures as composedly as St. Lawrence. A woman called Escoman accused Épernon and Henriette d'Entragues, Henry's late mistress-in-chief, of plotting the assassination. We have little information as to the evidence she furnished. The Parliament condemned the woman to perpetual imprisonment for making false charges, but considering the danger of attacking a nobleman of Épernon's power, this judgment does not necessarily disprove them. Still Ravaillac's claim that he did the deed without advice or assistance is probably well-founded.¹

In the meantime the new government began its career. The Duke of Sully had long been chief minister under Henry IV. No court influences, no blandishments of his ladyloves, or slanders of his courtiers, could induce the king to remove the minister who collected his revenues more vigilantly and husbanded them more prudently than

¹ See her deposition and that of Dujardin, t. 15, Archives Curieuses, pp. 145-165; *Mém. de L'Estoile*, ed. Michaud, xv., 595, 6-8, 603, 652-7, 670. Michelet seems to attach credence to her story, but this brilliant historian too often rests his faith on untrustworthy evidence.

any other man he could find in France. Under his administration a great treasure of about 24,000,000 livres had been accumulated and stored in the Bastille, and there were available assets claimed to amount to almost twenty millions more.¹ The ordinary expenses of the government in the later years of Henry's reign were about 15,700,000, and in this were included large amounts for his two passions, buildings and women.² This treasure, upon which he had relied for prosecuting the war he was about to begin, and which might have insured low taxation during the regency, was looked upon by greedy nobles as an exhaustless mine for plunder, and by a feeble queen as a perpetual means of quieting discontents. It needed little acuteness to see that Sully's tenure of office would be brief. He was not in sympathy with the spirit of the new reign. He had not a friend among those in power. He was a Protestant who favored war with Austria and disapproved of the Spanish marriages. He was brusque in his manners, harsh in his speech, and unbending in his vigilance for the public interests. Though a thrifty man, who had accumulated a large fortune in the public service and husbanded it carefully, he guarded the public treasure in the Bastille more closely than his own estate. To see it divided among plunderers would have been harder than to have seen the bailiff offering for sale his château of Rosny or the enemy laying waste his park of Villebon.

The queen requested Sully to remain in office, and he consented, though he must have felt it was useless to hope for a continuance of his own policy. He soon excited renewed hostility among those from whom Henry could no longer protect him. The Count of Soissons was resolved upon

¹ *Mém. de Sully*, pp. 377-8. These figures are perhaps not entirely accurate. The other estimate made by Sully, p. 436, differs considerably, and the 20,000,000 of available assets were probably quite conjectural. There seems, however, to have been about 20,000,000 on hand in money.

² *Mém. de Sully*, pp. 436, 374, tom. 2, ed. Michaud. Owing to the complicated systems of French finance this sum would, however, represent considerably less than the entire expenses of the government, including the army and interest on the public debt.

his ruin. Concini was equally hostile, though the minister had so far unbent as to make some conciliatory advances to the new dispenser of favor. Sully opposed the Duke of Bouillon's receiving a present of two hundred thousand livres, which Bouillon claimed the late king had promised him ; he opposed an enormous allowance to the son of Villeroy, the Secretary of State, to assist him in an attack upon the rights of the citizens of Lyons. He was in chronic opposition to all the measures that were proposed and all the favors that were desired, and in January, 1611, he resigned his position as superintendent of finances and custodian of the Bastille, and retired forever from the public service.¹ In his farewell letter to the queen, Sully said : " I have this honor and glory, that my services have given satisfaction to the greatest king, captain, and statesman that has lived for several centuries, and that I have been an instrument under him to relieve ruin and desolation, and to change the want and distress of the State into happiness and abundance. His majesty has written me that when I was called to the control of his finances, poverty and need appeared even on his own table, in his chamber and his study. Nevertheless, in less than ten years he was able, partly through my industry and fidelity, to reduce the taille by five millions, to diminish certain subsidies by one half, to pay almost one hundred millions of the debts of the crown, to redeem thirty million of rentes, to increase his ordinary revenues through good management by three or four millions, to add a province to his kingdom, and leave it furnished with arms, fortresses, and over twenty millions of ready money."²

Sully's boasting was not without foundation, and he probably was also truthful in saying that he had taken nothing for himself, except what he had received from the king's liberality and a few presents accepted with his knowledge and consent. The fallen minister had not, however, neglected his own interests, even if his profits had been

¹ *Mém. de Sully*, ed. Mich., 17., 407, *et seq.*

² *Mém. de Sully*, p. 414.

open and legal. His income was six thousand livres a year when he took office, and over a hundred and fifty thousand a year when he left it.¹ The latter sum would be more than an income of seventy-five thousand dollars at the present time, and its purchasing power would be still greater.²

The great fortunes in those days were made in public office, and with little of the stigma that now attaches to large gains in places of public trust. The royal bounty created great estates like those of Luines and the Prince of Condé, which find parallels in such English families as the Bedfords or the Portlands, but yet greater wealth was acquired by the use of official position. The gains came partly through the legitimate profits of public office, which were much greater than now, partly from the sale of influence, and in a still larger degree from jobbing in public contracts and funds with varying dishonesty. Gains at the expense of the state, even by those in office, were regarded as many now regard the petty evasions of the customs, perpetrated by those who would scorn to leave unpaid a private creditor. The state had much, and much might be taken from it. The largest fortunes were gained not by commerce or banking, but by the corrupt use of official position. Sully was rich when he left office. Concini was worth millions. Richelieu had enormous wealth. Mazarin and Marlborough became the richest men in Europe.

Sully's retreat was made over a bridge of gold, and Richelieu justly says that such a retreat great men usually despise. The queen gave him three hundred thousand livres and increased his annual pension from twenty-four thousand to forty-eight thousand.³ He retired to live in the provinces as a grand seigneur. He had three country-places, but he stayed chiefly at Villebon. There he kept

¹ *Mém. de Richelieu*, 37, ed. Michaud, second series, vol. vii., or vol. xxi., complete series.

² I estimate the livre at this time as worth a little less than three francs of the French money of to-day.

³ *Mém. de Sully*, pp. 410, 411, 415.

a princely establishment. He was followed by many equerries and gentlemen-in-waiting. The duchess had a long train of maids-of-honor, pages, and attendants, and besides these a body-guard, composed of both French and Swiss, accompanied them. The duke sat at table in an immense hall filled with paintings of the great actions of Henry IV. Chairs were placed for himself and the duchess. The rest of the company had only stools. A second table was set for the younger people, and it was presided over by the captain of the guards. When the duke started on his after-dinner walk the great bell of the castle sounded, and the attendants and servants ranged themselves on either side at the foot of the staircase. He passed out of the hall preceded by his officers and esquires, with his guard following. After the promenade came supper and every one retired when the master gave the signal.¹ Thus surrounded by formal state, occupied with settling his tenants' quarrels, and in dictating the vain but valuable memoirs of his life, the best financier in France, and the man best fitted to promote the wealth and internal development of that kingdom, passed thirty long years of an existence as empty and colorless as that of the shades on the shores of the Styx.

The first question for the new regency was, how to dispose of the forces raised by Henry for the war. To prosecute the plans of the late king with any degree of vigor, would have been contrary to Mary's sympathies and to those of her chief advisers. Yet it was not deemed expedient to abandon at once and entirely the great preparations that had been so publicly made, and on which so great hopes had been built. Accordingly an army of 8,000 foot and 1,200 horse was sent under the Marshal de la Châtre, to assist Maurice of Nassau and the States-General in the siege of Juliers. No measure could have been less injurious to the nominal enemy or more embarrassing to the nominal ally. Maurice was sure to capture Juliers, and was more apprehensive of allies who

¹ *Mém. de Sully*, p. 417, ed. Michaud, vol. xvii.

should claim a share in the victory than of enemies who might in vain try to avert it. All of Henry's far-reaching plans were abandoned. The Duke of Savoy was left exposed to Spanish animosity. Hostility to the House of Austria was resumed by Richelieu twenty years later, but with a narrower purpose and with a policy that was embarrassed by his enmity to the reformed religion.

Juliers soon surrendered, and the possessions left by the Duke of Cleves continued to be held by the Elector of Brandenburg and the Palatine of Neuburg as possessory princes. Both were Protestants but Neuburg soon became a Catholic. The Spanish interfered in his behalf, and the States-General in the Protestant interest, and the Duchies remained in an anomalous condition of neither war nor peace, with no fixed ruler or form of government, until the Thirty Years' War. The desire to secure these great possessions for the Catholic or the Protestant faith, produced a condition of tension which may be regarded as one of the causes of that conflict. But the religious feeling represented by such men as Ferdinand of Styria and Maximilian of Bavaria on the one hand, and Gustavus Adolphus on the other, was certain to appeal to the sword. Whether the immediate cause was the Duke of Cleves leaving many possessions and as many heirs, or was Bohemia endeavoring to secure religious freedom by ceasing to elect its king from the House of Austria; whether contentions arose over Majesty letters or confiscated bishoprics and nunneries, the intensity and bitterness of religious feeling were always present, ready to be kindled at any time and prove active at any emergency.

France was long to delay taking any active part in the German war, and for twenty years she was occupied by internal controversies. The Marshal de la Châtre's little force rendered its superfluous assistance in the capture of Juliers and returned to France. French arms during the rest of the regency were only to be used against Frenchmen.

The years from Sully's overthrow to the murder of Concini form no honorable part of French history. They show the great nobility seeking office and money, with no desire for power except as a means for plunder, and not hesitating to plunge the country into the miseries of civil war for the gratification of the most sordid interests. They show the princes of the blood taking up arms under the guise of patriotism, and great nobles assuming to defend religious liberties, but all making their peace and abandoning their followers when the bribe offered was sufficiently great. Unscrupulous leaders ravaged the lands of their own countrymen with almost the greedy ferocity of the soldiers of Wallenstein and Mansfeld, and the internal condition of France was as squalid and miserable as was her external position sunken and contemptible. The great treasure which Sully had accumulated was squandered on rapacious parasites or wasted in pacifying rebellious subjects. The regent was controlled by an ignorant and superstitious serving-woman, and by a favorite whose elevation developed no noble qualities, whose enormous wealth produced no generous acts, whose unbounded power was used only for his own aggrandizement. The last States-General before the Revolution met, but their advice was unheeded and their sessions were unproductive. The Parliament offered counsel more judicious than sometimes proceeded from that body, but it received no answer except the reminder that the duty of judges was to decide lawsuits and not to administer affairs of state. So unimportant were the early years of the reign of Louis XIII., that the arrest of a turbulent prince and the murder of a vulgar favorite were its chief events.

"The time of the kings has gone by and that of the nobles and princes has come. We must use it well," was the saying at Court.¹ Ten years were to show the use they made of their opportunities. They were to prove, as other periods had proved, that France could never have a

¹ *Mém. de Sully*, p. 388.

constitutional or a prosperous government under the leadership of the nobility. The great barons of England led the people in almost every struggle for greater freedom or better government. But the French aristocracy never acted such a part or appreciated the well-earned power and dignity it might bring them. They sought only a turbulent freedom, or abundant public plunder, and if, for a moment, they claimed to act in the defence or for the enlargement of popular rights, it was a pretext to be abandoned whenever personal ends were attained. Such conduct brought them wealth and titles at the expense of their political power. The great nobles who sought under Mary de Medici to reëstablish the unruly power once held by free barons, were content under Louis XIV. to find themselves mere courtiers shorn of the last remnant of independent authority, so long as they still retained their immunity from taxes and their monopoly of pensions. The feudal aristocracy had become the aristocracy of the salon and had exchanged authority for social graces.¹

When the Prince of Condé married Charlotte of Montmorenci he was comparatively a poor nobleman with an income of only twelve thousand livres. In 1709 his grandson with his wife enjoyed an income of one million eight hundred thousand livres.² But Condé in the early years of Louis XIII., though possessing a less independent power than his heroic ancestor, when he fought for the Huguenot cause with Henry of Navarre, was a prince having a territorial and personal influence which could be dangerous to the throne itself. His grandson under Louis XIV. had vast revenues; he enjoyed enormous pensions, but he was only an exceedingly rich courtier. For him to assert a power independent of the crown or to lead an opposition to it, would have been as absurd as it would be for the present Earl of Derby to endeavor to levy troops or collect taxes in defiance of the Queen of

¹ Taine's "*Ancien Régime*," pp. 154-158.

² *Mém. de St. Simon*, vi., 346-347.

England. In many parts of Southern France the people would listen to the call of Henry Duke of Rohan rather than to that of Louis XIII. of France. Under Louis' son the Rohans bore the titles of princes, they received great pensions, they intrigued for precedence over other nobles, but all that they possessed of feudal powers were feudal titles and feudal immunities.

Richelieu's endeavors to break the power of the nobility were severe and were accompanied by much bloodshed, but for years he had seen the condition of France when that power was in free exercise. He overthrew not liberty but license. He left the power of the king no greater than it often had been, but it had become more uniform. The great nobles had been unruly under a weak king and submissive under a strong king. Richelieu and Mazarin so broke their independent power that, after the struggles of the Fronde, they were submissive under any king. It was not constitutional restraints that were destroyed, but unruly and petty tyrannies. The government was more centralized, but otherwise it was little changed. The process was completed by which the French king had become the ruler over many barons who once owed him no allegiance, and over many provinces which formerly had been no part of France. The change was politically beneficial, and had it been accompanied by social ameliorations, by aids to trade, by improvements in the mode of taxation, France might have become more prosperous as well as more powerful. In those directions Sully had done much, but neither Richelieu nor Mazarin followed in his steps.

The new government, under Mary de Medici, was friendly to Spain, and it wished to unite the two countries by marriage ties. No experience of the futility of such alliances ever discouraged their designers. The hope that kingly sons-in-law and brothers-in-law will be guided in their policy by those domestic influences which are of little weight even in private life, seems never to desert the projectors of royal marriages. Mary resolved to marry the king to the Infanta of Spain, while one of her daugh-

ters was in turn to marry the Prince of the Asturias, the heir to the Spanish throne. The suggestion of such alliances was favorably received in Spain. It was justly regarded as a proof that for the present the hostile policy of Henry IV. was to be abandoned. The policy of Louis XIII. after he reached maturity was, however, one of almost unceasing hostility to Spain. The Spanish soldiers suffered some of their most shameful defeats when the Infanta had herself become the regent of France. Then first the long-hidden rottenness and weakness of Spanish power was so disclosed, that the terror of that monarchy became a thing of the past. These marriages were, however, a proof that during the king's minority Spain had nothing to fear from France. In France itself they met with some unavailing opposition. The Huguenot party regarded them as a sign that a vigorous Catholic policy was to be pursued. The comrades of Henry at Ivry, the descendants of the sufferers of St. Bartholomew, regarded as monstrous an alliance between a son of Henry of Navarre and the granddaughter of Philip II. Barneveld and the States of Holland tried to prevent a step that was tantamount to abandoning their alliance. But nothing would have kept Mary from gratifying her desire to see her children married to the daughter and to the future king of what was still regarded as the greatest monarchy of the world. The marriages were announced in March, 1612, and were greeted with the usual fêtes, so magnificent, says Richelieu, that they turned night into day, darkness into light, and the streets into amphitheatres. At the Place-Royale, the Duke of Guise, the Count of Bassompierre, and three others, entitling themselves the Chevaliers of Glory, guarded the Temple of Felicity and bid defiance to all comers. Members of the greatest families, gorgeously dressed and variously styled as knights of the sun, of the lilies, of fidelity, and as the four winds of heaven, tilted with them in the presence of the regent, the young king, and eighty thousand spectators. Ingenious machines, representing giants, elephants, and sea-monsters, together with great displays

of fireworks amused the audience.¹ The marriages were not actually celebrated until 1615.

In the meantime the regent began her endeavor to obtain a peaceful tenure of power by conciliating the great nobles. The treasure of the Bastille furnished a ready means, and this enormous sum was squandered with a recklessness of which French history furnishes no other example. The greed of the princes and nobles was unbounded. No records of plebeian robbery, under Tweeds or political rings, show more thirsty absorption of the money of the state than this which was practised by those who bore the illustrious names of Condé, Vendôme, Bouillon, and Bourbon. The Prince of Condé returned from Milan when he heard of the death of Henry. He entered Paris accompanied by fifteen hundred gentlemen, and the queen was alarmed as to his intentions. He, however, was equally alarmed as to his own safety and was eager to be conciliated. The son of the heroic Henry of Condé, the father of the great Condé, the husband of the most beautiful woman in France, the Prince of Condé was a thoroughly commonplace man, alike turbulent and timid, having but one strong passion, and that was avarice. It was one he turned to good account. His father and grandfather had dissipated their property in the Huguenot wars.² He accumulated one of the largest estates in France. The golden chains by which he was held were very heavy; a pension was at once granted him of two hundred thousand livres, and besides this he was given the hotel Gondi, and received other "gratifications."³ The other princes and great nobles were quieted by similar means. Their debts were paid; they received gifts and pensions or important and lucrative lieutenantships and governments. The Count of Soissons received the government of Normandy. Épernon had Metz and the three bishoprics, and Bellegarde had the province of Burgundy. The

¹ See account of these festivities published in a quarto volume by Honore Langier.

² *Mém. de Fontenay Mareuil*, 37.

³ *Richelieu*, 31.

governments of such provinces were often dangerous gifts to bestow. Their governors in the time of a weak central authority exercised almost regal power in their provinces, and the positions which were given to quiet them furnished the means and temptation for new turbulence.

What was yielded to some from fear was bestowed on Concini from inclination. Three hundred and thirty thousand livres were given him to buy the marquisate of Ancre, one hundred and twenty thousand livres to buy the lieutenantship of Peronne, and two hundred thousand livres to secure the place of first gentleman of the Chamber.¹ This was but the beginning of his fortune. He received also the governments of Roye, Montdidier, Amiens, and Picardy.² To the scandal of all soldiers he was made marshal, the highest military rank in France except the office of constable, though he had never seen a pitched battle, and his record was as devoid of military achievements as that of William Penn. It was the ancient custom that an advocate should relate to the Parliament the feats of arms of a newly made marshal, but Concini's exploits were left unheralded.³ Offices of the value of one million eight hundred thousand livres were sold, and of these also he received the proceeds.⁴

Mary de Medici might easily have foreseen that squandering the nation's money on turbulent leaders would secure her the peace she so much desired, only until their rapacity was again excited. But her ministers were themselves interested in the spoils system, and had no desire to check it. Concini was as timid as the queen, and hoped to set faction against faction, and by alternate favor and rebuff, to keep the state well balanced.

The money freely given by the regent was as freely squandered. A sudden increase in luxury and extravagance was encouraged by the queen's example, and fostered by the enormous pensions that were so easily obtained.

¹ Pontchartrain, 304. Fontenay Mareuil, 43, ed. Michaud.

² Richelieu, 43.

³ Fontenay Mareuil, 72.

⁴ Richelieu, 75.

Henry IV. had been a frugal king, and even his tastes for women and building, so expensive to most monarchs, were managed with judicious thrift. But Mary had the luxurious tastes of a Medici and an Italian princess. The coronation of her son at Rheims was performed with such magnificence that the people said the reign of gold had returned.¹

The nobility gladly followed her example of extravagance in dress and living. Some restraint was attempted by one of the frequent edicts by which rulers still hoped that men's clothes or houses might be regulated by any thing except their tastes or their purses. By an edict of 1613 it was forbidden to have broideries of gold or silver on garments, or to gild coaches or the ceilings of houses; but such laws were inoperative, and a profusion of money created a profuse expenditure.

This increase in wealth was not shared by the mass of the people; on the contrary, their condition was worse than it had been under Henry. That king had done much to realize his famous wish that every peasant might have a fowl in his pot. After the troubles and distress resulting from the wars of religion, there had come a period of rapidly increasing prosperity. Henry and Sully had fostered the industrial and agricultural development of France. The free export of grain and wine was allowed, and every encouragement was given to Sully's favorite "Labourage et Paturage" to tilling and grazing, the plough and the cow. New roads were made, and the old were put in better condition. The natural watercourses were improved, and the beginning made of the great system of canals which has done so much for France. The cultivation of the silk-worm was largely increased. Liberal measures were taken to procure the drainage of waste lands, and mines of iron, copper, and other metals were opened in various parts. Attention was given to the planting of trees, and great elms still standing and called Rosnis bear witness to Sully's labors in this be-

¹ Richelieu, 58.

half. Assistance was given to the manufacturers of clothes, tapestries, and of silk goods, while lowering the export duties on them increased the foreign sales.¹

With reduced taxes, with improved means of communication, with the reduction or abolition of the many oppressive duties that checked free export and sale, both the husbandman and the artisan found a steadier market and a better profit. This rapid increase of wealth was checked after Henry died. The new regent began indeed with a pompous list of taxes to be abolished, but they were taxes which had been already abandoned, or which were soon restored for the benefit of some courtier.²

On the other hand, the accumulated revenues were soon dissipated, while the collectors and the farmers of the revenue were relieved from the severe contracts that Sully had made with them, and the necessary result was an increase in taxation. But the internal commotions were still more injurious to the welfare of the people. No foreign war was so exhausting as were these conflicts, where all the combatants were French, and where French territory was exposed to uniform devastation from either party. The insurrections under Mary de Medici, though carried on with feebleness against her, were prosecuted with vigor against the inhabitants of the country. The soldier who had no taste for bullets was eager against the unarmed peasant and valiant in destroying his crop, pillaging his cottage, and insulting his daughter.

The treasures of the Bastille were soon exhausted, and the nobles broke the peace which the queen had so earnestly desired. A government whose only weapon was a bribe inspired but little fear.³ In the early part of 1614, the Prince of Condé and the Dukes of Mayenne, Longueville, and Vendôme left the Court, which had become the place where a well-affected nobleman was expected to spend the most of his time. They retired to their governments or

¹ Fontenay Mareuil, 28. Various edicts on these subjects are found in Isambert, t. 15. Sully's title, as is well known, was the Baron of Rosni.

² *Mém. de Sully*, 415, ed. Michaud, vol. xvii.

³ *Mém. de Pontchartrain*, 328.

their private estates. The Prince of Condé issued a manifesto to justify himself and his associates in assuming a position of tacit rebellion. His complaint was the juggle of words that served as a conventional excuse for a movement that had none but selfish grounds. The church, said the manifesto, did not receive due honors; the nobility were poor; the people were over-burdened; the judicial offices were sold at a great price; the Parliament was not free; the queen's ministers destroyed the state to preserve their own authority; the public moneys had been prodigally given away. Condé demanded a meeting of the States-General, and that the king's marriage should be postponed. All this simply meant that the prince and his followers must have more money and more offices. It was so regarded by the Court, for after formally answering the manifesto, negotiations were at once begun, and on the 15th of May, 1614 this bloodless rebellion was ended by the peace of Sainte Menehould.

By this it was provided that the States-General should be called, not from a desire to reform the government, but because the insurgents believed that such a body could be controlled by them, and would greatly embarrass the ministers.¹

But the more material articles of the treaty were those that provided for private interests. The Prince of Condé had the government of Amboise and 450,000 livres in cash. The Duke of Mayenne received 300,000 livres with which he was married. Money and offices were given to the other leaders, and a temporary peace was bought.² The insurgents had obtained pardon without reparation, and they were rewarded for the harm they had done for fear they might do more. The rewards for rebellion were made so large that it could not be long before it would be again attempted. Though no blood had been shed in battle, this insurrection illustrated the barbarous cruelty from which the country suffered during such struggles. Husbands had been forced to purchase their wives from in-

¹ Richelieu, 67; Pontchartrain, 330.

² Richelieu, 70.

famy, and parents their daughters; the husbandman must pay to save his fields from waste or his house from burning; to those who did not readily pay, various tortures were applied, and the most obstinate were hung to the trees.¹

The bitterest complaints were against the soldiers of the Duke of Vendôme. Vendôme was the bastard son of Henry IV., and was among the haughtiest, the most unruly, and the most unworthy of the great nobles. His career, like that of many of his associates, was to be ended under Richelieu, when it was crushed by a hand as heavy, if not as cruel, as that which was laid by his soldiers on defenceless men and crying women.

¹ Richelieu, 72.

CHAPTER II.

THE STATES-GENERAL.

THE regent, in conformity with the treaty of Sainte Menehould, determined to convoke the States-General. When Condé found the States were to be summoned, he informed the queen that he no longer desired them, but the ministers were resolved to remove one pretext for future revolts. On the 27th of October, 1614, there assembled at the hall of Bourbon the last States-General of France before 1789.¹ They were the last that fairly deserved the name, for their successors were speedily resolved into a national assembly, and bore no likeness in work or constitution to the long line of States-General which they closed forever.

The sessions of that body extend over a long period of French history, though its appearance was irregular and its influence fitful and uncertain.

The history of the development of France is not to be found in the record of the States-General, nor does this show a representative body, gradually gaining in strength and working out through its deliberations and its struggles the liberties and the welfare of the nation. Their origin has been hotly debated, and especially when France was turning to her past to find precedents for a better future. As a man sought, so did he find. Long before, Hotman in his fierce republicanism, had traced back their

¹ Richelieu, 73; Pontchartrain, 336; Relation de Florimond de Rapine, contained in "Recueil des États Généraux," etc., collected by Buisson, and published in 1789, vols. xvi. and xvii. Rapine was a delegate of the third estate for the bailiwick of Saint Pierre de Moustier.

history as if there was no leap of time between the States-General of his day and the assemblies which had met under Charlemagne on the fields of May. On the other hand, the aristocratic Boulainvilliers saw the Franks, the ancestors of his own class, passing laws under the earlier dynasties, and meeting the king as equals, while the influence of the third estate, the descendants of the Gauls, became recognized under the Valois.

But a gulf over which no historian can pass separates the States-General from those earlier assemblies, which, when the weather was fine, under the open sky, heard proclaimed the orders of Charlemagne, and deliberated on them, while he asked one and another the news from distant parts, how the people prospered, and whether the Norsemen had made any new invasions. No historical continuity connects the dukes and counts who clashed together their shields at the proclamation of some German predecessor of Charlemagne with the representatives of the three estates, who, in 1614, sat in the halls of the Augustins. Nor do we find any such body under the earlier kings of the Capetian dynasty.

In times of war, or of any special need, the great nobles and the great ecclesiastics, those whose assistance would most benefit the king at a time when his own power was far from established, were summoned by him to give their counsel, and to furnish their feudal assistance.¹

By the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the cities of France had reached a considerable degree of development both in wealth and independence. Deriving their charters, for the most part, directly from the throne; rapidly increasing in wealth and influence; their relations to the king, as their direct suzerain, entitled them to a voice in such assemblages, or rather their presence was sought that they might furnish their quota to the king's needs.

¹ These meetings of the notables with an undefined authority, but possessing some varying control over subsidies, we find extending through the French monarchy. An assembly of the notables was the last endeavor of the ministers of Louis XVI., to avert the coming storm, and obviate the necessity for the States-General.

Various cities were at different times summoned to send their representatives to the royal council. In France, as in England, it was a right capriciously given and often avoided by those to whom it was granted. There are traces of such meetings earlier than Philip the Fair, but the first assembly which could claim to be a representative of the three estates of the realm was summoned by him in 1302, and this was not for the ordinary purpose of increasing the public revenues. Philip was involved in his conflict with Boniface the Eighth, the Pope who dreamed there might be a Gregory the Seventh in the fourteenth century, and the king sought such moral aid as he could draw from the expressed approval of the representatives of the nation. They met at Notre Dame, the great cathedral, whose stern and massive Gothic still excites admiration and reverence, and binds together French history for seven hundred years. The light streaming through the colored glass of the east windows upon the lofty columns of the choir and nave, shone upon the first assemblage of the French nation with the same glory that to-day carries the mind back through the events of centuries, or turns it upon the development of the religion of which this building has been so great a shrine.¹

To this assembly came, with the nobles and clergy, the representatives of the good cities of France; the municipal officers representing their corporations. The feelings of the body accorded with those of the king; the barons and commons declared their opposition to the claims of the Pope, and even the clergy expressed a mild and tempered approval of their views. No other business was brought before them, for Philip was far from desiring a representative body to interfere with his rule. The many successors of this assembly were similar in their organization. The States were composed of the three estates of the kingdom—the nobility, the clergy, and the commons, or third estate.

¹ Viollet le Duc has said that by the ideas suggested by the light coming through the east windows of Notre Dame, his own mind was first turned to the study of Gothic architecture.

In one respect the States-General were more representative than the English Parliament. The barons of England met, and still meet, not in any representative capacity, but by virtue of the king's writ, summoning them personally to attend his council. In the irregular forms which prevailed in France, we find instances of a like summons, directed to the individual, but it was the theory of the States-General and its regular organization that the nobility and clergy, as well as the third estate, should send their representatives. The nobles or clergy of a district were in the same manner as the commons summoned to send their territorial representatives to speak for them. The body of the nobles was a large one, and it would have been impossible that all should have met in one assembly. It was one of the features distinguishing the French aristocracy, that all who were noble by birth were noble by rank, but it resulted from this that the nobles and commons rarely united in important political action. Their frequent discord was one of the elements of inherent weakness in the organization of the States-General. The nobility were a caste, instead of a body of men holding certain feudal or direct relations with the king. The sons of the French nobles did not become members of the commons. The oldest son of the great local landholder did not seek the suffrages of his neighbors or tenants, nor acquaint himself with their wants, that he might serve as their representative, until he should be elevated into the higher aristocratic house, modified and broadened by his past experience.

The position of the French nobles was in another respect different from that of the English. The feudal system was highly developed in France. The great princes were almost independent in their provinces, and had little need to unite with the people in defending themselves from the royal authority. Their endeavors were rather to hold their own dominion over their subjects, and to check the independence of the neighboring cities.

But the Norman barons in England had received their

grants directly from the crown. The king had over them an authority different from the ill-defined rights of the descendants of Hugh Capet over the great feudatories of France. A strong royal power made the English barons leaders of the people. A weak central authority left the French dukes and counts the oppressors of the people.

The clergy, in the same manner as the nobles, chose from their own body those who should represent them, usually ecclesiastics holding high rank in the Church, and their sympathies were for the most part with the nobles rather than with the commons.

The distinctions between the three estates were sometimes disregarded. Such was the case in the States-General of 1484, which met at Tours; and members of the three estates sometimes united in the choice of deputies. Chance and a lack of fixed forms in a body so rarely and irregularly convened, seemed to account for this anomaly rather than any purpose to remove these distinctions. The three estates were legally entitled to their separate representation and their separate places in the assembly, and were as distinct as the lords and commons of England. The States which met in Orleans in 1560, after an interval of eighty years, declined to follow the example of the States of Tours. The opportunity was neglected for a modification of their organization, which would have changed their character and their influence.¹

The third estate had originally but little voice in such assemblies, but, as with most similar bodies, the proportion of the people entitled to representation gradually increased. In the early assemblies but few cities were requested by the king to send their delegates or officers to speak for them, nor could these be regarded as representing the body of the citizens and peasantry, though they were often mindful of their interests. But in time other cities and

¹ There met after the States of Tours, and before those of Orleans, other assemblies called States-General, but either they did not represent the whole of France, or they were assemblies of notables. Chancellor de l' Hospital, in his address in 1560, says the States-General had been abandoned for eighty years.—“*États Généraux*,” t. x, p. 323, *et seq.*

towns were included in similar calls. In 1614 the population of France was perhaps as fairly represented in the States-General as was that of England in Parliament before the reform bill.

But the whole of France as it now exists was not represented at all meetings of the States. That country slowly developed from a condition not wholly different from that of the Empire under its Austrian rulers, and the various provinces which were added to the dominions of Hugh Capet by conquest or marriage, and those in which the full sovereignty of the French king gradually came to be acknowledged, constituted governments in many respects as distinct as the States of the American Union. In many of them provincial States possessed the authority which the States-General claimed over the larger territory which they represented. Not until 1484 do we find representatives from Languedoil, Languedoc, and all the provinces of France meeting together.¹

The manner in which the deputies to the States-General were chosen was variable and uncertain. The nobility and the clergy were comparatively small bodies, and the right to a voice in them could be easily decided. But the burgesses from the cities and the representatives of the towns were elected by an uncertain constituency.

Their delegates were generally chosen by a small number, who were themselves the representatives of the local organizations. In few if in any of the districts was there an election by a large body of voters, or the strife over the result which attended the choice of a member of Parliament from London or Yorkshire.

The long intervals that often elapsed between the meetings allowed the modes of election to be forgotten. When the States-General of 1560 were summoned, the officials at Paris directed the old registers and chronicles to be examined with the greatest care to see if it was possible to find any record of the mode of choosing representatives. The

¹ This session began in Jan'y, 1483, instead of Jan'y, 1484, according to the reckoning at that time. The year did not then begin on January 1st.

States had not met for almost eighty years. If nothing could be found, it was decided that the masters and wardens of the trades, with the members of the courts, the city officials, and some discreet burgesses, should assemble to prepare remonstrances and petitions. After their adoption the delegates were to be elected who should present them. For this purpose, another assembly was called to meet at the great hall of the Hotel de Ville. This meeting was cried through the streets, and all merchants, masters, and persons of every condition were summoned. The representatives of the whole city were there elected by acclamation.¹ But a very small portion of the citizens could have obtained admission to the hall, though it was probably large enough for those who cared to attend. The city officers would have control of the organization, and practically of the election. It would be managed by a few active men, and the manner of election seems similar to that at an average American caucus. The hall was easily filled by the adherents of those who chose the place of meeting; some one was proposed for delegate and was elected by a *viva-voce* vote in which all who were in attendance joined. The election would ordinarily be without opposition, and, at the most, would only need a ready chairman to declare the result as was desired.

But however irregularly chosen, the representatives of the cities and of the third estate fairly well expressed the wishes of the people and the best interests of the country. They were largely municipal officers and prosperous burgesses, with a proportion which steadily increased of officers and members of the courts. They seem to have been men, judging from their proceedings and "*cahiers*," whose training fitted them for an intelligent appreciation of the needs of the state. They sought to reform the financial disorders in which the king was always plunged, and the wastefulness with which his revenues were always spent. They asked for frequent sessions of the States, for the right to control taxation, for a centralized and impar-

¹ "*Archives curieuses de l'Histoire de France*," t. iv., p. 416.

tial system of jurisprudence, and for the redress of the evils they found, with an intelligence which is surprising when there was so little opportunity for education in public affairs. In the "cahiers" of the commons were presented their petitions for changes in the laws, or in the management of public affairs, and they were generally marked by patriotism and sagacity. Had their remonstrances been heeded, France would not have reached the condition which made necessary the revolution of 1789, and it is strange that where public needs were seen so clearly there should have been so little success in obtaining their satisfaction.

But the history of the States-General, though marked by periods of beneficial action, is a record of failure. Their powers waned rather than waxed. Comparatively frequent and often influential under the early Valois, they grew steadily more torpid; the session of 1614 accomplished nothing, and was followed by a sleep of one hundred and seventy-five years. The causes of this failure are numerous. The division of the body into three estates was a constant check on any united action. The nobility and clergy were actuated chiefly by a desire to hold their positions as privileged classes, and they were necessarily in conflict with the rest of the nation. The nobility never sought to convert a position of privilege into a position of leadership, and the clergy is rarely, if ever, a useful part of any legislative body. A more fatal weakness was that the States-General were not properly a legislative body. They met to present the grievances and petitions of the different portions of the country; these remonstrances and demands, after they had been agreed upon by the deputies, were presented to the sovereign, with the request that they might be heeded and adopted, but there the power of the States stopped. The sovereign might grant their requests; he could answer or deny them, or any part of them, or he could send no answer, but allow them to be forgotten after the deputies had separated.

The act of the States-General was not a legislative

act, needing only the sovereign's consent to become a law. At different times the endeavor was made to assert powers of legislation as well as of petition; it was sought to have it decreed as well as requested that the desired thing should be done; but such efforts, made at great intervals and little pressed except by the third estate, were of no avail. The representatives of the three estates had originally been summoned to give their counsel to the sovereign. They remained the king's advisers and never became the people's legislators.

In the anarchy that followed the defeat of Poitiers and the capture of King John in 1356, the States that met at Paris assumed the control of the government, but at the same time the States of Languedoc met at Toulouse, and less bold than those of northern France, they continued obedient to the regent. In the northern provinces the thirty-six appointed by the States-General became the rulers of Paris, and, under the leadership of Stephen Marcel, exercised for a while sovereign authority, but it was not always exercised with wisdom, and a speedy reaction restored the control to the heir to the crown.

The States were so rarely called together that there was no opportunity for a steady increase in their power. Frequent sessions were often demanded; sessions every two years, every five years, every ten years; but they were not called, because the king's necessities did not compel him and his desires did not incline him to summon them. In 1484 the States had demanded that they should meet every two years, and the demand had been granted, but seventy-six years passed before the next session. Demands had been made that if not summoned by the king the orders should, of their own motion, elect deputies, but no such power was given them.

Had the States held firmly the exclusive power of granting supplies, then, by a refusal to grant them until their requests were answered, the right of petition would soon have grown into the right of legislation. But though this claim was sometimes made, it was never established.

The history of the States does not show that they ever possessed the control of the purse. Summoned in times of want, usually to grant additional taxes, the States-General were not needed to furnish the ordinary revenues of the government. The most important taxes were regularly levied and collected without any special grant; the revenues derived from the *taille*, from the monopoly of salt, from the sale of offices, and from innumerable sources devised by an evil ingenuity, were collected under the king's edict, with no consent from the people or their representatives. Special aids and new imposts were asked from the States-General, and were sometimes refused by them, as they were also refused at times by the provincial States. But the king was not often driven to summon the people's representatives to open the people's purse. The French law never declared that taxes were legal only when granted by the people.¹ "No taxation without representation" was never even a popular cry, much less a recognized political principle.

Some vice of organization seemed to wither the growth of every element in the French government which bade fair to grow into a check on arbitrary power. We might expect that a body representing the three estates would

¹ That taxes should be levied only by consent of the people was occasionally demanded by the *cahiers*. The *cahiers* of Blaigny at the States of 1576, asked that in the future taxes and loans should not be granted except by the consent of the people. (Cited in Thierry, "*Tiers État*," 528.) It is claimed that Philip of Valois, in 1338, agreed that no imposts should be raised unless granted by the States-General, and it was to this that the States, in 1576, made reference. Any control over taxation seems to have existed more in the early States-General than in their successors. Such a right was sometimes apparently regarded, and it was claimed to have been formally recognized in 1338.¹ But if any such control might have been obtained, the States themselves loosed the hold and could not recover it. The States of 1439, which granted a standing army, recognized the right of the king to impose the *taille* permanently and of his own will, and with this tax he could provide for his ordinary needs, without the imposition of new ones.² In regard to the *taille*, the condition of the "*pays d'états*" differed somewhat from that of the rest of the country, as will be shown hereafter.

¹ "*États de Blois*," 1576; *Cahier du Clergé*, Art. 429.

² "*Ord. d'Orléans*," Art. 44; Picot "*États Gén.*," i., 333-335.

naturally become a controlling, or at least a restraining force in the state, but this body could but petition—it could not decree,—and the lack of control over the revenues destroyed the hope of making its petition effectual.

The good qualities, the internal dissensions, the fatal weaknesses of the States-General, were to be illustrated in their session of 1614.¹ When the Prince of Condé found that body was to meet which he had so loudly demanded and so little desired, he endeavored to secure the return of members who could be used as the organs of his discontents. Even at that time the third estate was watched with the most interest. The past showed that political questions were discussed by it with a boldness that was little seen in the other orders, and from it any measures of importance would proceed. The political intriguers would, therefore, give the most attention to the burgesses of the cities, to the consuls, the aldermen, and masters of trade corporations, as those whose influence was greatest in the return of representatives. The election seemed, however, to have been little affected by Condé's exertions. The representatives that were chosen, showed rather the great influence of the judicial bodies. The magistrates of France, and especially the members of Parliament who held offices of great dignity and of great emolument, and who combined undefined political with extended judicial authority, became the leaders of the third estate. One hundred and ninety-two representatives of the commons met in the hall of the Augustins. Of these, a great proportion were officers

¹ The authorities for the proceedings of the States-General of 1614 are quite full. The *Procès Verbaux*, the official journals of the three orders, are found in vols. ix., x., xi., *Recueil de pièces originales*, etc., concernant la tenue des États Généraux; vols. vi., vii., and viii. of the collection of Barrois. *Relation de Rapine*, vols. xvi. and xvii., "*Des États Généraux*," Buisson; and there also is the *Cahier* of the third estate. The *Cahiers* of the clergy and nobles are in the *Bibliothèque Nationale*. In the same volumes, and in vol. viii., *Pièces Originales*, are found many other documents concerning this session. The *Mercur* also contains some particulars, though the official reports, etc., are more satisfactory.

and members of the various courts, and a considerable number of advocates who had been chosen as delegates, would naturally act with them. Almost all of the other delegates were officers of the king, or local officers of the various cities; two only of the delegates are described as merchants, one as a doctor, and a few as bourgeois of the various towns. The magistrates and advocates, and the officers of the king composed over three fourths of the delegates.¹

The members from Paris had been chosen by about two hundred persons, who were themselves representatives of the trades, or who were members of the courts, city officers, or prominent bourgeois.² The provincial States of Provence elected four representatives to the States-General, and the great duchy of Brittany sent seven deputies who represented it as a whole, and were not chosen from any minor division of the province. Five delegates in like manner represented Dauphiny. The number of delegates was, as always, variable. Bailiwicks, which had two members in the States-General held in the last century, returned now from one to four representatives. Irregularity in numbers was of little importance, as the vote was taken by twelve bureaux, or governments, corresponding to territorial divisions, and in the bureau a bailiwick had the same voice, whether it had one or more representatives.³

The nobility sent one hundred and thirty-two delegates. One hundred and forty represented the clergy, among whom were five cardinals, seven archbishops, and forty-seven bishops.⁴

On the 26th of October, a solemn mass was celebrated

¹ *Pièces Justif.*, 74, pp. 33-59.

² Paris seems to have delayed in electing her representatives. The States were to assemble on October 14th, and on the 13th the king sent a message to the provost and aldermen of Paris to proceed forthwith and choose their representatives. *Pièces Justif.*, 76, p. 83.

³ The list of these is given, *Rapine*, 252-4, vol. xvi.

⁴ *Pièces Justif.*, concernant la tenue des États Généraux, Nos. 73 and 75.

at the church of the Augustins, at which the entire body attended. The members of the third estate were dressed in black gowns, each with a lighted candle, and a sermon was preached by the Cardinal of Sourdis, filled with illustrations of the evils visited on the sacrilegious, drawn from the most absurd of the monkish legends. Such illustrations and arguments advanced before such a body seem a curious commentary on the religious teaching and belief of the time.¹

The session was formally opened at the great hall of Bourbon, on October 27, 1614. The jealousies between the nobility and the third estate showed themselves at once. The power and wealth of the magistracy had excited the envy of the nobles, and aroused the desire to procure for themselves the offices which their ancestors had let slip from their grasp. The orator of the nobility, in presenting to the king the wishes of that body, said: "The nobility will regain its original splendor, now so much depressed by the offices held by the members of an inferior order; the latter will learn that all cannot be treated alike; they shall see the difference between themselves and nobles—they shall see it, and they will be good enough to remember it."²

Trifling matters of ceremony also irritated the representatives of the third estate. The chancellor, speaking in the king's behalf, uncovered to the clergy and nobility, but not to the commons. When the orator of the nobles had touched his knee in beginning his address, the king bade him rise. The orator of the third estate knelt on both knees, and was allowed to speak in that humiliating position.³

The three orders retired to their separate halls to frame their cahiers or petitions to be presented to the king, and they were thus occupied until the early part of 1615. The nobility, assisted by the clergy, resolved on inflicting

¹ Pièces Just., 78-85, pp. 85-118. Procès verbal de la Noblesse, 47-57; Clergé, 59.

² Pièces Justif., 91, 136-7.

³ Pièces Justif., 87, 126. Procès de la Noblesse, 57. Rapine, 102.

a fatal blow to the power of the magistrates, by demanding the abolition of the *paulette*. This was a duty of one sixtieth of the estimated value of a judicial office imposed upon the holder, in return for which he had the right to devise the office. After procuring the abolition of the *paulette*, the nobles hoped to destroy the sale of such places, and thus render them the free gift of the sovereign, instead of objects of merchandise, to be obtained only at enormous prices.

The scandal of this system was so manifest that though its destruction would have been a fatal blow to the legists who controlled the third estate, they could not openly oppose such a measure. They not only acceded to the repeal of the *paulette*, but they themselves demanded the abolition of any sale of offices. "Though the larger portion of this company" said a deputy, "hold the most elevated and honorable offices in this kingdom, so much the more ought our consciences to lead us to abolish this right which fosters ignorance and closes the door to learning and virtue."¹

To this consent was coupled, however, the request that the king would reduce the *taille* to what it had been in 1576, and would stop the payment of all pensions. The latter proposal was aimed directly at the nobles, who enjoyed a monopoly of the pensions, and drew enormous amounts annually from a bankrupt treasury. The position of the third estate was patriotic, and if the changes which they asked could have been accomplished, they would have so altered the internal history of France that it is difficult to calculate their ultimate effects.

But such changes were so great and so sudden that even their advocates did not expect their adoption. The nobility showed no willingness to abate any thing of what it drew from the people. Its reply to this proposal was selfish and stupid as well, for it asked that the *paulette* should be first considered and the question of pensions be postponed, but the commons declined to accept so unfair

¹ Rapine, 165-168, 171-172.

a proposal. Their reply was presented to the other orders by Jean Savaron, a delegate from Auvergne, with a vigor and boldness in advance of his day. "You take from the king's coffers sixteen hundred thousand livres which he receives from the paulette, and you hold to the five million which he pays every year to buy for hard cash the fidelity of his subjects. It is not," said he, to the gentlemen, "the annual duty which keeps you from these offices, but that they are sold and that you are little fitted for them. To abolish the paulette but leave offices venal is no cure for the evil which keeps persons of merit and learning from office and gives the administration of justice to those who will pay an enormous price."¹

Savaron spoke with equal boldness to the king in presenting the requests of the third estate. The people demanded an abatement of one fourth of the taille. "What would you say, sire," said the orator, "if you had seen in Guienne and Auvergne men eating grass like the beasts? May I forfeit my position and my place if this is not true. * * * It is not the annual duty which keeps the nobility from judicial offices, but because for long years it has believed that learning and study diminished courage. By pensions kings lose more servants than they gain. What a pity that your majesty should pay each year five million six hundred thousand livres in pensions. If this sum were employed for the relief of your people how would they bless your royal virtues."²

The nobility were so enraged by this attack that a new orator, De Mesmes, was sent by the commons to declare that they had intended no offence; but his attempts at apology only fanned the flame. "The three orders," said he, "are three brothers, children of their common mother, France. The clergy the eldest, the nobility the second, and the third estate the youngest. The third estate has always acknowledged that the nobles were somewhat above them, but the nobility should recognize the third estate as its brother, not despise it, or consider it of no importance.

¹ Rapine, 173, *et seq.*

² Relation de F. Rapine, 198-203,

Many families have been ruined by the elder, and restored to honor and glory by the younger son."¹

A storm of indignation followed these utterances. The nobility waited on the king in a body to present their complaint, and the Baron Senecey was their spokesman. "The third estate," he said, "is an order composed of the people of the different cities and the inhabitants of the country; the latter usually subject to do homage to the first two orders, while the people of the cities are composed of the bourgeois, merchants, artisans, and a few office-holders. They have so forgotten their condition and their duty as to compare themselves to us. I am ashamed to use their terms. They compare your kingdom to a family of three brothers, of which they are the youngest. How lamentable our condition if this were so. Render a judgment, sire, declaring what we are by birth, and the differences that exist between us and them."

The deputies of the nobility echoed the sentiments of their orator. "We do not want," said they, "the sons of bootmakers and cobblers to call us brothers. There is as much difference between them and us as between the master and the valet."²

Such feelings were probably equally bitter in most of the nobles. Bred to regard arms as the one honorable pursuit, imbued with the narrow traditions of a caste, deeming the great question of life to be whether he or some rival marquis should march first at the king's coronation, or the dauphin's christening, whether his wife should sit in the queen's presence, and whether he should take off his hat at the king's audience, the French nobleman saw between him and the roturier a gulf no man could pass. The expressions of their feelings were sharpened by the attack that had been made on their pensions. The people discover a king's tyranny, and nobles the people's baseness when the purse is attacked. However prodigal of its money, the nobility was vigilant in seeing

¹ Relation de F. Rapine, 203, 216, 223-225.

² Relation de F. Rapine, 228, Procès verbal de la Noblesse, 100-102.

that its pocket should be filled, no matter how soon it was emptied. The pensions drawn from the public not only replenished the waste caused by extravagant living, but they were the badge of the inferiority of those who paid, and an admission of the superiority of those who received. Because a man was a gentleman, he paid no *taille*; because he was a gentleman, he received from the royal bounty; base were those who paid, and noble those who received.

Nor were the nobles wrong in thinking the pensions essential to their order. A poor nobility cannot long possess either power or dignity. Without trade to enrich it, with ostentation and recklessness to impoverish it, pensions and sinecures alone kept the French nobility from becoming as poor as their descendants of to-day.

The ministers promised the suppression of the *paulette*, and that the pensions should be reduced by one quarter, but stated that the needs of the government would not allow any reduction in the *taille*. All the orders professed to be contented with a promise that was never fulfilled.¹

Early in their session a demand had been made by the clergy for a mode of procedure by which the States-General might have rendered their work far more effective. Instead of spending months in the preparation of lengthy *cahiers*, and presenting no requests until they were completed, the clergy suggested that while these were under consideration the three estates might agree on certain matters that were for the common benefit, present them forthwith to the king, in behalf of all three orders of the realm, and pray for his response.² Such a course would have compelled an answer from the king during the session of the body. It would have brought before him one by one the matters of special importance instead of presenting a vast mass of requests at the end of a long

¹ Rapine, 242-243.

² Procès verbal du Clergé, p. 99. Recueil de pièces, etc., concernant les États Généraux, t. ix. ed., in Bibliothèque Nationale. Procès verbal du Tiers État, 32, vol. xi.

session, when the delegates were eager to go home, and the king could reasonably demand as many months for their examination as had been taken in their preparation. It was, however, either from a well-founded distrust of the other orders, or from a lack of good judgment, coldly received by the third estate.¹ The ministers were informed of the proposition, and they at once endeavored to defeat so important a change in the procedure of the body. The procureur-general said this was but a device of the clergy to have first considered a proposition for establishing in France the Inquisition and the decrees of the Council of Trent. The president announced the queen had said to him that such a course showed a fear that the king would not answer the articles of the States until long after they had been prepared; but she would assure them that, on the contrary, they should have a favorable response before the deputies departed. Great joy, says the chronicler, followed this declaration, and the third estate and the nobility decided forthwith to proceed in conformity with the king's wishes, and to prepare their cahiers after the ancient fashion.²

But another grave quarrel arose between the orders, instigated perhaps by the Prince of Condé, who desired to make a covert attack on some of the Court. The king was asked by the third estate to declare, as a fundamental law of the kingdom, that as he held his crown from God alone, no other power had any right over his kingdom, nor could any spiritual authority deprive its kings of their rights, or release their subjects from allegiance.³ To this all the members of the estates, and all persons who should receive any office or benefice, were bound to declare their adherence.

Such a measure was suggested by the murder of Henry IV., and was aimed at the tenets of the Jesuits, which held that a tyrant or an heretical king might be mur-

¹ Rapine, 134-136, 142-145. Procès verbal du Tiers État, 33-35.

² Rapine, 142-145. Procès verbal de la Noblesse, Nov. 8, p. 66.

³ Relation de Rapine, 281-285; Procès verbal du Tiers, 85, *et seq.*

dered without offence, and it was aimed also at the doctrines which had sought to justify the League in claiming the right to change the royal succession. It was bitterly opposed by the clergy, and in this opposition the nobility joined, more perhaps from hostility to the third estate than from any interest in the doctrines attacked.

The French clergy were less Gallican than they became in the latter half of the century. The influence of Richelieu, the leadership of Bossuet, and the quarrels of Louis XIV. with the Pope, strengthened the Gallican feeling, and especially among the higher clergy. But in the wars of religion during the sixteenth century, the church was often in conflict with the head of the state, and it bore a cold and sceptical allegiance to Henry IV.

The independence of the royal authority, as it was declared by the commons, was not in advance of the actual condition of Europe; it hardly trenched on the views held by strong churchmen, and it might have seemed useless to contend for a doctrine that Hildebrand and Innocent had been unable to enforce. But the proposition aroused a vigorous opposition. The clergy said that all the church agreed that it was not permitted to assassinate kings; they admitted also that kings had entire temporal sovereignty in their kingdom, yet, though this doctrine was certain and indubitable, it was less so than the first, which was an article of faith. But the third proposition, that subjects could never be absolved from their allegiance, was disputed in the church, and the better opinion was that if a king violated his oath to live and die a Catholic, as if he should become an Arian or a Mahometan, he might be deposed as guilty of felony against Christ, and his subjects released from their oath of fidelity. Rather than make oath to such a proposition, the archbishops and bishops, two thousand priests, and all good Catholics would leave the kingdom.¹

The clergy continued firm in their position, and the

¹ *Mém. de Richelieu*, 79, 80; *Rapine*, 102, 2d part.

third estate were equally firm in demanding such a declaration. But the king's advisers quieted the matter by directing it to be considered in his council, and ordering the States to discuss it no further. Notwithstanding the king's order, it was only after much debate that it was decided by a majority of the bureaux, to strike the article from the cahier, and a great number of deputies entered a formal protest against this action.¹

Once brought before the council, the debated question was laid in eternal rest. The third estate revenged themselves by refusing to request the adoption of the decrees of the Council of Trent, which long remained causes of religious contention in France.²

The hostile feeling between the orders was increased by the various manifestations of lawlessness which then prevailed. A soldier had been arrested for some brawl and confined in the prison of Saint Germain des Prés. The Duke of Épernon was colonel-general of the infantry, and he claimed jurisdiction over the man. Among the great nobles of France, Épernon stood prominent in power and preëminent in pride and disregard of authority. His life had been long and varied. He had been raised to wealth and power by the diseased affection of Henry III. He was so dear to the king that Henry danced all night at Épernon's wedding. He had held many governments, and his pride and cruelty had made him the most hated of governors. Suspected of the murder of Henry IV., he still possessed the great power he had abused, and the great wealth he had not earned. Despising any authority but his own, he now sent two companies of soldiers, forced the prison, and released the prisoner.

¹ Procès verbal du Tiers, 124-126. Detailed accounts of this controversy are found in the Procès verbaux of the Clergy and third estate and in Rapine.

² Procès verbal du Tiers, 195-199; du Clergé, 93-95. Richelieu, in behalf of the clergy, asked for their adoption. Pièces Just., etc., xii., 237-239. The clergy themselves, in their request, asked that the decrees of the council be received, without, however, any prejudice to the rights and liberties of the Gallican church. The French kings had steadily refused the demands made by the Popes for the adoption in France of the decrees of the Council of Trent.

The Parliament of Paris began to investigate this high-handed outrage upon justice. Thereupon Épernon and a troop of gentlemen stationed themselves at the Palace of Justice, and opened upon the judges as they came out a running fire of insults and impertinence. Some of his followers managed even to tread on the long robes of the members of the court and caught and tore them with their spurs.

A court less conscious of its dignity than the Parliament would have been excited by this insult; the judges resolved to postpone all other business and investigate what was called the matter of the Faubourg St. Germain. Épernon was now alarmed by their vigor, and he appealed to the regent. His influence was so great that Mary feared to alienate him, and thought her authority would be best maintained by showing the powerful nobles they could safely defy the royal courts. The Parliament was therefore ordered to consider the matter no further, as the king would see that reparation was made. Thereupon the Parliament suspended its sittings, but it soon resumed them, and Épernon appeared before it to make his apologies.

He took his seat in the body of which, as a peer of France, he was a member, and murmured that only misunderstanding his motives caused the belief that he was lacking in respect for the court, the most illustrious of the kingdom. If his style was not agreeable to delicate ears, it must be excused in an old captain, whose beard had grown white in the king's service. And with such an apology the first president was fain to be content.¹

Another instance of the contempt felt for royal authority was brought to the notice of the States-General. A treasurer of the district of Chalons made complaint that while he was endeavoring to prevent the Duke of Nevers from raising money to assist in the late revolt, the duke had seized him, and sent him through his duchy, in a

¹ *Mémoires de Mathieu Molé*, i., 5-17. See also a slightly different account of the affair in *Mémoires de Richelieu*, 75.

fool's dress, mounted on an ass. But, says the chronicler of the States-General, there was no great hope of getting justice against a prince.¹

A still more gross affront was offered to one of the deputies of the third estate. As he passed from the session he neglected to salute one Bonneval, who was a deputy of the nobility. "You pass by me without saluting, you little gallant," cried Bonneval, "I will teach you your duty." Thereupon he broke his cane over the head of the offending plebeian. Such open violence excited the fury of the third estate. Within an hour the whole body of deputies had gone to the Louvre to ask justice of the king. The other orders claimed that the offending deputy could be made to answer for his act only before the States-General, but the king sent the matter to the Parliament, where, as Bonneval did not choose to appear, he was condemned to be beheaded for contumacy. This harmless punishment was performed on his effigy on the bridge of St. Michel.²

The orders were united, however, on the question of finance. The abuses committed by the farmers of taxes and the enormous wealth they gained, exposed them to the hatred of every class. Most of the French taxes were farmed. The enormous profits that could be gained above the sums usually paid the government were increased by the merciless rapacity with which the taxes were collected. The system of collection was the chief defect in the French finances. Sully estimated that when he assumed office, of 47,000,000 livres collected from the people only 27,000,000 reached the king's treasury.³ The families of the great farmers of taxes, the Zamets, the Paulets, were notorious for the enormous wealth they had gained. Frequent outbursts of public zeal compelled many of the farmers to turn over to the state some portion of their unconscionable gains. But the ruinous

¹ Relation de F. Rapine, 151. Procès verbal du Tiers, 38, 39.

² Relation de F. Rapine, 3-10; 144, 147, vol. xvii., Col. Buisson; and Procès verbaux of all the orders.

³ Oec. Royales 50, t. i., 291, ed. Michaud.

practice of selling the public revenues continued, and apparently no reformer even suggested a change. No modern civil service, however inefficient and corrupt, can compare in badness with the methods by which the French revenues were collected.

The number of officers who collected the *taille* was almost fourfold the number of those who now collect the vastly larger revenues of France. All these offices were sold, so that the creation of new ones was a constant resource, but in turn it constantly increased the burdens of the government. No heir ever sold post-obits with more recklessness than the French king gained present relief at the cost of future embarrassment.

All the orders united in demanding the creation of a chamber which should investigate the malversation of the financiers, and compel a restitution of their unjust gains.¹ The zeal of the third estate led them to desire a full examination of the finances of the government, but the clergy hesitated at such a step. It was a principle of the French government, down to the time of the Revolution, that mystery should veil the public finances. The "Compte Rendu" of Necker not only showed the bankruptcy of the government, but its exposure of the national finances to the public gaze, of itself began the overthrow of the old régime.

Said the Bishop of Bellai, in 1614: "The finances are like the mysterious sanctuary of the Old Testament, which should not be penetrated." But the president of the third estate answered, that they lived no longer under the Old Testament, but under the Gospel, by which the secrets of the old law had been brought to light.² Jean-nin, who was Sully's successor, at last consented to make a financial statement, but upon the condition that it should be kept secret by the members of the States-General. The report thus secretly made was garbled and inaccurate. We can, however, gather from it and from other

¹ See especially *Procès verbal de la Noblesse*.

² *Relation de Rapine*, 2d part, 12, 13.

papers the revenues and expenses of the government at that time.¹ Reckoning in money of our day, the entire taxes collected were about \$16,000,000, of which sum \$9,000,000 reached the royal treasury. The rest was absorbed in the cost of collection, and in those expenses of the provinces which were kept separate from the treasury accounts. The *taille*, the direct tax levied on the non-privileged classes, yielded annually one half of this. The other taxes were farmed, and consisted of various duties and imposts and the remains of feudal rights. The *gabelle*, the tax on salt, was the most productive, and amounted to nearly \$3,000,000. These duties were imposed with varying severity. The countries of the States, those whose taxes were regulated by provincial assemblies, escaped very lightly. Brittany, Burgundy, Languedoc, Provence, and Dauphiny, the wealthiest portions of the country, paid but one eighth of the *taille*. Normandy, also indeed a country of the States, but where closer relation to the central power had deprived them of their independence, paid almost twice as much as those five great and rich provinces.²

The expenses of the government amounted to over \$10,000,000, of which \$3,000,000 were paid for pensions, and we must multiply all these sums over threefold to represent their relative purchasing power at this time. The pensions had increased to this amount from \$1,000,000 under Henry. All these reports led to the conclusion that the government was spending more than it received, and could and would submit to no reduction in the taxes.

Debates upon these questions occupied the States till February of 1615, and the Court was heartily anxious to be rid of them. "If the States will not close their *cahiers* for the sake of the public good," wrote the secretary of

¹ The statement is found in "*États Généraux*," Col. Buisson, t. 17, 185-227. Another statement has been printed in "*Revue Retrospective*," 1834, 159-184.

² The reports are so confused and inaccurate that it is impossible to give the figures exactly. Those I have given are approximately correct, reckoning the *livre* as worth a little less than three francs of the present day.

state, "let them do so out of regard for the king's sister, who wishes to prepare for a superb ballet in the hall in which the king must receive the deputies."¹

The States endeavored to obtain some definite promise of the reforms they had asked, before the final presentation of the cahiers. That act was usually followed by their dissolution, and what little influence belonged to the States while in session then vanished. They could, however, obtain nothing but vague promises, and these were coupled with frequent requests for the speedy presentation of the cahiers.

On February 23, 1615, these were at last presented with formal speeches by the orators chosen by each of the orders. Richelieu, then Bishop of Luçon, and a man of twenty-nine, was the spokesman of the clergy. His long address gives us little indication of the future statesman, except his elaborate appeal for the employment of the clergy in political offices. The priest was sometimes obscured in Richelieu, but it was never effaced.

The harangue of Miron, the provost of the merchants, in behalf of the third estate, is the most interesting, and is the more noticeable from the boldness of the attack upon the nobility. "As to the nobility," he said, "there have been among them such excesses, such contempt of justice and of the judges, so many illegal acts, duels, such oppression of the poor, and violence against the weak, that some of them no longer belong where the virtue of their ancestors has placed them. Their fiefs and privileges were given the nobles that they might preserve the health and repose of the state, and protect it from the violence of its enemies. But to-day their chief actions are excessive gambling, debauchery, useless extravagance, and violence, both public and private." He found grounds for complaint among the clergy as well. The curés were so poor, he said, that a man of moderate learning would feel in-

¹ If we may judge by the *Mercure François*, the ballet was by far the more important event of the two. The *Mercure* for 1615 devotes two pages to the States-General, and thirteen pages to a description of the ballet. *Mercure François*, 1615, 9-22.

sulted by the offer of such a place. More lucrative charges were held by those of ecclesiastical dignity, and the duties were entrusted to some poor and ignorant vicar, to whom they paid less wages than to the lowest of their domestics. More than one half of the abbeys in the kingdom were held by laymen and by those who performed no duties except to collect the income. "Without the labor of the poor people," he continued, "where would be the tithes and great possessions of the church, the fair lands and great fiefs of the nobles, the houses and rentes of the third estate? Who would furnish the means to your majesty to support your dignity, or pay the necessary expenses of the state? The *tailles* which the people pay support the soldiers, who in turn treat them in such a way that words cannot describe the cruelties they suffer. The invasions of the Saracens were milder than the brutalities of these men-at-arms. If your majesty does not attend to it, it may be feared that despair will make the people see that a soldier is but a peasant bearing arms. Forbid also those *corvées*, which are a burden as grievous as the *taille*. The poor man must leave his crop at harvest time to labor at the *corvées* for the gentleman. How many gentlemen have sent soldiers among their neighbors, and even into their own villages, to inflict punishment for some *corvées* that have not been worked, or some contributions that have not been paid. There is no health among us; gangrene has seized us, and who will take heed of all these disorders if not your majesty?"¹

After this vigorous address, the *cahiers* were presented. Those of the third estate were of the most interest, and they covered almost every field of legislation, containing over six hundred and fifty requests.² The deputies showed great sagacity in pointing out the needs of France, however inefficient they were in obtaining them. It seems strange that a nation whose representatives saw so clearly its wants,

¹ *Recueil de Pièces*, vol. xi., 240-276. *Relation de Fl. Rapine*, 54, 79-117.

² "États Généraux," 17, 1st part, 229-366, 2d part, t. i., 1-138.

should let over one hundred and seventy years pass before they were satisfied. But the desires grew cold with lack of opportunity to express them, and the iron rule of Richelieu, the great industrial development under Colbert, the glory and power of Louis XIV., turned the national thought to other subjects. They found utterance again in the reaction that followed the disastrous end of that long and glittering experiment in absolute power.

The third estate began by demanding what alone could make its supplications of any avail, that the States-General should be summoned at least once every ten years. Great embarrassment to trade had resulted from the confusion of internal duties which then existed. The cahiers asked that the regulations of commerce should be remodelled; the interior duties which existed between provinces should be abolished, and the customs collected at the frontiers of the kingdom.

The countries of the States were mostly free from restraint in their trade with other nations, but subject to duties when they sent goods into the other parts of France. This degree of free trade had increased the prosperity of the favored provinces, but it embarrassed the internal relations of the country. The city of Lyons was a port of entry for all goods arriving at Mediterranean ports, and had the monopoly of this trade. Changes were asked in this, and it was asked also that all monopolies held by individuals in France and its colonies should be destroyed, that there might be liberty of commerce, traffic, and manufacture. In like manner, the regulation of trades and trades-unions and the examination of goods were to be modified so there would be little left of them except such visitations as should insure the honest fabrication of the products.

In the principles of foreign trade, the cahier showed, however, no signs of increasing liberality. Not only was the entry of manufactured goods to be forbidden, but, in accordance with the protective tenets of the day, raw materials used for industrial purposes were not to be exported.

The reduction of taxes was asked, and that all *tailles*, *aids*, and *gabelles* imposed since 1576 should be abolished; and it was demanded also that where provincial States regulated the *taille* of any province, the third estate should have double representation, and the exemptions of the nobility and clergy should be diminished. The *gabelle* was especially complained of, and it was stated, even in the *cahiers* of the nobility, that this tax and the cruelties of its collectors were a thousand times more feared by the common people than war, famine, or pestilence.

The *cahiers* demanded that the expenses of criminal prosecutions should be borne by the government and not thrown upon the injured citizen, and that offices should no longer be sold. A uniform system of weights and measures was requested—a change which, however much demanded by public convenience, was slow in coming.

The abolition was asked of the petty feudal rights and servitudes which still existed: of the tithes and *aids* due the seigneur, his rights of toll and wine-press, of forced labor and parish oven, which long continued to oppress the laborer and husbandman; but it was asked in vain. The third estate asked also that the castles and fortresses which were not on the frontier should be destroyed, and that in the future no one should be allowed to build a castle strong enough to resist cannon. The clergy were not overlooked in these petitions. The *cahiers* required that the election of bishops should be made free, and that the bishops should be at least thirty years of age; that they should reside with their flocks, and that the accumulation of benefices should be discouraged. Those who for three years had been Jesuits should neither inherit property nor acquire it by devise. The poverty of the lower clergy was also deprecated. A priest should not be appointed, it was said, until he was assured of at least sixty *livres* of income, and the village *curé* ought to have as much as two hundred *livres* for his revenue. A demand for the better observance of Sundays and *fête* days was added to these

requests. On them no merchants should carry on their business and no carriers begin their carriage of goods, under pain of confiscation of property. Judges and notaries were forbidden to frequent taverns, and the inhabitants of cities and villages were ordered not to go to saloons for eating and drinking.

The cahiers of the clergy joined in many of the requests of the third estate. They demanded also the reception of the decrees of the Council of Trent, the reëstablishment of the Catholic faith in Béarn, that the Jesuits should again be allowed to open schools and take part in education, and that the Spanish marriages should be celebrated. But the cahier of the nobles showed the greedy spirit that had characterized their conduct. It demanded for the gentlemen, in substance, the monopoly of the offices and the pensions; it asked for them one third of the judgeships, and to this was to be added freedom from the few duties to which they were subject; it also asked that nobles might participate in wholesale trade without impairment to their nobility. Their gains were to be emphasized by the degradation of the commons; those who were not gentlemen were not to be called "messire" or "chevalier," nor were their wives to be addressed as "madame"; they must not hunt nor assume armorial bearings nor the title of squire, nor be married to noble maidens without the consent of the relatives of the latter; they must not dress in velvet or satin. Such requests were fitly accompanied by a petition for the swift punishment of witches.

Mary de Medici had no thought of giving a full answer to these cahiers. Her only desire was to be rid of the States without more delay, while the deputies of the third estate were desirous of continuing their session until they had received an answer to their petitions. On the day after presenting the cahiers the representatives of the commons met as usual at the convent of the Augustins. But they found the hall which they had occupied empty of benches and furniture, and the president

announced that the king had forbidden their further session. This announcement was met with varied murmurs and emotions. Says a member: "One would beat his breast, reproaching his own remissness, and would fain atone for a session so unfruitful, so pernicious to the state and to the kingdom of a young prince, fearing the king's censure when age should teach him the disorders which the States had not removed, but had rather fomented and increased. Another planned his return, abhorred his stay at Paris, and desired to see his house, his wife, and friends, and to forget in their tenderness the memory of his grief at expiring liberty."¹ "What shame," said another, "what confusion for France to see those who represent her so little esteemed, that they are not recognized as deputies, and hardly treated as Frenchmen. Are we other than those who yesterday entered the hall of Bourbon?"² When the hall in which they had assembled was closed on the next States-General, Siéyès said: "We are to-day what we were yesterday; let us deliberate." But no one made such a proposition in 1615. The deputies, however, continued in Paris. "Day after day," says one of them, "they beat the pavement of the cloister of the Augustins to learn what was to be done; they asked the news of the Court; they wished to be formally dismissed, and they were eager to leave a city where they wandered idly about, having no business either public or private."³

Paris had then few business relations with the provinces, nor could it furnish the pleasures which would now make a stay there far from irksome to a belated deputy. He could not then talk with his business correspondents and watch the fluctuations of the Bourse in the morning, drive

¹ Relation de Rapine, 3d part, 117-119, vol. xvii.

² *Ib.*, 119.

³ *Ib.*, 118, 124. The third estate found, however, some employment. The expenses and wages of the deputies were paid by those of their own order in the districts from which they were chosen, but the nobles now endeavored to have theirs paid from the salt tax, a duty which fell chiefly on the non-privileged class. To this the deputies of the third estate objected, and successfully.

on the Champs Elysées in the afternoon, dine at the Palais Royal, and spend his evening at the Français.

On the 24th of March, the presidents of the orders were at last summoned to the Louvre, and there the king formally notified them that the deputies might depart. He had resolved to abolish the sale of offices, to reduce the pensions, and to establish a court which should deal with the malversations of the farmers and collectors of the revenues. As to the rest of the cahiers, they would be answered as soon as might be. This response was unsatisfactory in its terms, and still more so in its performance. The pensions continued to be paid as lavishly as before the States-General met; the offices were as freely sold; the farmers of taxes were left unmolested in their gains. The paulette was restored within two months. Fourteen years passed before any attention was given to the requests of the cahiers. The deputies went to their homes, and their session was barren of effect upon the condition of France. It was as well that the States-General should pass into the oblivion of almost two centuries which awaited them.

CHAPTER III.

CONCINI AND LUINES.

THE Parliament of Paris endeavored to prosecute the work which the States had begun. On the 28th of March the judges of the court invited the princes, peers, and officers of the crown who were entitled to a seat in that body to meet with them and consider propositions for the service of the king, the relief of his subjects, and the welfare of the state.¹ Such a step was ill received by the regent, and some members of the court were at once summoned before the king's council. After waiting an hour they were admitted. "We saw," says the procureur-general Molé, "indignation in the face of the king and anger in the countenance of the queen. She told us, 'our glory should be to obey the king.'" The court was ordered not to proceed with the proposed conference. The Parliament again waited on the king on the 9th of April, and, after hours of delay, the judges were called into his presence. The chancellor, speaking for him, said he knew their resolution for a conference had been forced only by the vote of the young members, but it was a measure displeasing to the king, and must not be executed. The Parliament abandoned the conference, but on May 22, 1615, it presented its remonstrances and petitions for reformation. These showed both patriotism and sagacity, and were expressed in plain language. The king was prayed not to trust his govern-

¹ Mém. de Molé, I, 20, *et seq.* Mercure François, 1615, 24-43, 121-160, 188-254.

ments and strong places to foreigners, by whom Concini was meant, for they could not have the same affection for the state or the same interest in its welfare as the native French; nor should such persons be kept in his council, but rather the old servants of the state, the members of great and ancient families. The remonstrance deplored the multiplication of useless offices. Three treasurers of pensions had been created within six months, during the very time when the States-General were asking for a reduction in expenses. There were now one hundred secretaries of the king's chamber, imaginary officers, whose duties no man could tell. The waste and profusion which had prevailed in the king's finances since the death of his father were declared to be incredible. Henry IV., the remonstrance continued, had spent millions in superb buildings and still had laid up 2,000,000 livres a year. But under the present king, though there had been no money spent in building, yet there had been no saving, and the treasure in the Bastille was nearly exhausted. The amount of money spent for the king's stable and silver plate had more than doubled, pensions and gifts had trebled; yet the soldiers' pay was in arrears, and new taxes would be required, which would take what little property was left the people, who already were hardly able to endure the weight of tailles, aids, subsidies, and salt duties. A narrower spirit was shown in other parts of the remonstrance. The king was prayed to search for the members of sects and for the infamous persons who had gathered in Paris, such as "Anabaptists, Jews, magicians, and poisoners," and to have them punished to the full extent of the law. He was asked to prevent the enemies of the Christian religion from establishing a synagogue in his city of Paris, a thing which could only bring malediction and the wrath of God on his kingdom.

These petitions met with a cold reception. "I do not like your remonstrances," said the boy-king; "the queen,

¹ These remonstrances are found in *Mém. de Molé*, i., 28-51. See also *Mercure François* *supra*.

my mother, will tell you the rest." "The king," said Mary de Medici, "has good reason to be offended, that in violation of his commands, the Parliament has employed itself in making complaints. It might better thank him for his prosperous government." The remonstrances received no further attention, and the Parliament had neither the power nor the courage to carry on a conflict with the sovereign. More serious troubles awaited the queen-mother. Condé, the first prince of the blood, and the leader of the nobility, was discontented, and in the summer of 1615 he assumed a position of armed hostility.¹ To undertake a rebellion was not the serious step it would have been in France a century later. For Condé to rebel against Louis XIII. was far from being so dangerous as for Somerset or Buckingham to have taken up arms against James I. No great English nobleman could then have commanded a following for a revolt which would have raised it to the dignity of a riot. A serious insurrection in England was only possible when it had support in the feelings of a great body of the people.

But the great nobles in France exercised a territorial influence which they could wield against the central government. The governors of provinces like Normandy, Champagne, and Provence could array them against the king of France. Such offices were indeed held by gift of the crown. The governor who held by a revocable tenure, had an authority far inferior to that of his ancestor who had held from God and his sword a government that had belonged to his father and would be inherited by his son. Still these modern semi-feudatories, though holding a position that was far from feudal, could, under a weak government, seize the taxes, raise troops, and wage a petty civil war. The Prince of Condé sought some justification for his course, and he issued a manifesto in which he claimed that public interests had driven him to the step. He alleged, however, nothing more definite than

¹ *Mém. de Pontchartrain*, ed. Michaud, p. 346.

that the king was controlled by a council who were enemies of the state, and who would place the crown under the control of strangers, and he adopted the novel measure of declaring all who opposed him, of whatever condition, guilty of treason.¹

The time for the celebration of the royal alliances had now been reached, but the condition of the country was such that the king of France proceeded at some peril to meet his bride in his own kingdom.² His sister was, however, safely delivered to the Prince of the Asturias, and the Infanta, Anne of Austria, was married to the king by procuration in Burgos, and she reached him at Bordeaux on the 21st of November, 1615. Among the articles of the treaty of marriage was one by which Anne expressly renounced for herself and her posterity any right to succeed to the Spanish throne.³ In the accounts of the reception of their majesties at Paris we find some information as to the city officials and the customs of the times. The procession moved from the Hotel de Ville headed by three hundred mounted archers well armed. They were led by the controller of woods and the master of the Hotel de Ville, each booted and spurred. The masters of mason work, of carpenter work, and of artillery followed; then came ten sergeants of the city, clad in cloaks of two colors. The registrar of the city wore a velvet cloak of crimson and tan color, with black velvet trappings on his horse; the provost of the merchants, four aldermen, the king's attorney, and the receivers were similarly clad. After these notable persons came the counsellors, the district police officers, the commanders of various trades, and a great number of bourgeois, who met the king at the end of the Faubourg St. Jacques. There the provost, the chief city officer, made the customary harangue.⁴

The king was only fourteen and his bride only thirteen.

¹ Molé, i., pp. 99-102. Pontchartrain, 346. *Mercur* François, 1615.

² Pontchartrain, 351.

³ Dumont *Corpus Dip.*, v., p. 215, 2d part. *Mercur*, 1615, 286, *et seq.*

⁴ Molé, i., 113-115.

The new queen acquired over Louis but a very slight influence. It was not other ladyloves that diminished her power, for Louis XIII. was a very Joseph among French kings; but his cold disposition made him indifferent to her physically, and she had no talents with which to acquire any influence over him otherwise.

During such festivities the civil war was continued, though with little vigor. The Marshal of Bois Dauphin was charged with the command of the king's forces. He had never been a great soldier. He was now old and decrepit, and, though with superior numbers, he failed to use his opportunity and force a conflict with the prince. His inferiors complained of his incapacity; he himself alleged the positive orders of the Court forbidding an engagement.¹ Both complaints were probably just. The queen and Concini feared a pitched battle, and preferred the old policy of buying a peace. The insurrection, in the meantime, increased in size. The Prince of Condé had been followed by the dukes of Mayenne, Vendôme, Bouillon, and Longueville, who were among the most powerful nobles in the kingdom. Mayenne was the son of the duke who had been the leader of the League, and he was popular with the people from having many of the qualities of the great Guises. Vendôme was a son of Henry IV. Bouillon had been the comrade of the king, and possessed a great principality in the East of France. He was a Protestant grown faint in the faith, and so eager for any revolt that Richelieu called him the demon of rebellion. Longueville was governor of the province of Picardy.

In addition to discontented nobles, a formidable ally was found in the Huguenot party. The French Protestants were entering upon that series of revolts which ended in the capture of La Rochelle, and the overthrow of the Protestant party in France, and they now decided to cast their lot with the rebellious princes. The entire party did not join in the movement. Lesdiguières restrained Provence. The wise and calm Plessis Mornay, the most judicious

¹ Fontenay Mareuil, ed. Michaud, 92-97.

of the Huguenots, as well as one of the most sincere, did not favor an alliance with those who used the Protestant party only for selfish ends. But Sully and Rohan were willing to act as their leaders.¹ The allies agreed that they would prevent the reception of the decrees of the Council of Trent, that they would check any movement resulting from the Spanish marriages, would maintain the edict of Nantes, establish a good council for the king, and make no treaty except by mutual consent.²

This agreement was hardly signed before the Prince of Condé and the leaders of his immediate party resolved to negotiate for peace. The more judicious of the king's advisers were opposed to any parley. The insurgents, they said, could only sustain themselves by exactions and pillage; no great cities had joined them; left to themselves they would be brought to ruin, while to grant their demands would give them the means to begin new revolts with larger resources. But the friends of peace replied that Condé had among his followers the most powerful princes and nobles. Of those who were loyal to the king some were jealous of the more fortunate, and some were discontented because their own merit had not been sufficiently rewarded; money and provisions were lacking; the cities were weary of disorder, and any peace was better than war.³ The ladies of the Court, to whom war brought fatigue and annoyance, threw their influence on the side of peace.

Negotiations were begun at Loudun, in February, 1616, which in May were ended by the grant of nearly everything demanded by the insurgents for themselves. The active part taken by women in public matters, which is a special feature of the Fronde, was seen here. The Countess of Soissons, the Princess of Condé, and Madame de

¹ Pont., 349, 351. Rohan, 506-507. *Mercure François*, 220-222, 1615, *et passim*, gives the declaration of various of the Huguenot assemblies.

² *Mém. de Rohan*, ed. Michaud, 507. *Mer. François*, 345-350. *Mém. de Richelieu*, 103.

³ *Mém. de Pontchartrain*, 360-361.

Longueville all took part in the conference, and voted on the terms proposed.¹

The articles concerning public interests were few and vague. The decrees of the Council of Trent were not to be received; the authority of the courts was to be respected; an investigation was to be made into the murder of Henry IV.; the resolutions of the third estate, touching the king's sovereignty, were to be considered. It was agreed also, after much debate, that the Marshal of Ancre should surrender the citadel of Amiens.² The Protestants received nothing except the recognition of edicts which had formerly been granted them. Their alliance had been sought in selfishness, and was rewarded with perfidy.³

But the important features of the treaty were those which concerned private interests. The Prince of Condé received the government of Berri and 1,500,000 livres in money for himself and for the expenses of his followers. He had been paid but 450,000 livres in the insurrection of 1614, so rapidly had the wages of rebellion risen. The other great nobles were purchased at proportionately liberal prices. The sums paid for this peace amounted to 6,000,000 livres in money, besides the offices and governments which were bestowed.⁴ The entire rebellion cost the king 20,000,000 livres, a prodigious sum for a bankrupt treasury. Besides money and provinces, Condé had insisted on a controlling power in the government. He demanded that he should be the chief of the king's council, and that his signature should be required for all decrees. To grant such a right was to

¹ For proceedings, see Pontchartrain, "Conférence de Loudun," 416-446. Mer. François, 1616, iv., 25-37, 133. Lettres, Négociations, etc., relatives à la Conférence de Loudun, Doc. Inéd. Fontenay Mareuil, 103. Pont., 359-363. Rohan, 509.

² Pont., 363. Richelieu, 107-108.

³ Mém. d'Estrées, ed. Michaud, 411. Rohan, 508. Font., 104.

⁴ Lettres de Richelieu, vol. i., p. 216. "The king," said Richelieu, "bought their faith for more than 6,000,000, which he gave them to return to their duty."

abdicate a portion of the royal authority, but it was yielded.¹

It was in June, 1616, that the Prince of Condé reached Paris. He was popular with the Parisians, and they welcomed him with a zeal that increased the fear in which he was already held by the Court.² He had at last obtained what he had long desired. He was the centre of influence, the distributor of favor, the controller of the state. The Louvre was deserted, while his palace seemed the home of royalty.³ Such a crowd surrounded the gates that they could only be approached with difficulty. All who had business at Court addressed themselves to him. He entered the council-chamber with his hands full of the petitions that had been thrust into them. The marquis who wished his pension increased, the duke who desired a tabouret for his wife, the litigant who hoped the council would set aside the decree that condemned him in costs, the farmer of taxes who wanted to check any inquiry into his accounts,—all sought the ear and favor of the prince. The Marshal of Ancre was entrenched in the queen's favor, but he was timid as to its tenure, and even he courted the friendship of the vice-king.⁴ This, at first, was freely given, but their amity was brief. Their fate was to be similar, and both Condé and Concini were in turn overthrown by an overweening prosperity. Though the prince was content with his own position, his associates were not satisfied with theirs, and men like Mayenne, Bouillon, and Guise, who exercised a great influence over Condé, desired still further changes. They complained chiefly of Ancre's wealth; but Ancre could not be attacked without exciting the animosity of the queen. To meet this peril, Condé suggested that the queen-mother herself should be removed from Court, so that her influence over her son might be destroyed. The young king's

¹ Molé, i., 131. Let. de Richelieu, i., 233. Richelieu, *Mém.*, 107-108. Bassompierre, 111. Pontchartrain, 363.

² D'Estrées, 412.

³ Richelieu, 115. Fontenay, 105. *Mercure François*, 1616, 148.

⁴ *Mém. d'Estrées*, 413.

character was well known, and it was sure that out of his sight she would soon be out of his mind.¹

Even more treasonable designs were charged against the prince. His coat-of-arms was the three *fleurs-de-lis*, with a bar across. In the meeting of his friends they drank to the toast of Barre-à-bas, down with the bar, which would leave the prince bearing the royal arms.²

Louis XIII. and his brother Gaston of Orleans were all that stood between Condé and the throne. Various pretences, it was feared, might be urged against their prior claim to the crown. The slanders upon Concini's relations with the queen could be used to question their legitimacy. Henriette d'Entragues claimed a promise of marriage from Henry IV. that would invalidate his union with Mary de Medici. The friends of Condé said, in answer to these charges, that the cry of Barre-à-bas was a joke which arose from dubbing an unpopular minister Barabbas. Condé was certainly not a man to seek a crown through revolution, but his hostility to Ancre exasperated the queen almost as much as the treasonable design with which he was absurdly charged. The favorite was present at a meeting at Condé's house, and the prince was reproached for neglecting such an opportunity to seize the Italian and dispose of him. But Condé lacked courage, and preferred the useless measure of sending a formal notice to the marshal that he was no longer his friend. Even this excited such apprehension in Ancre that he withdrew to Normandy. But the enemies of Condé now resolved on his overthrow. It is uncertain whether the queen decided on such a step, whether she acted at the suggestion of the Concini, or whether in it can be seen the first traces of Richelieu's vigor.³ The central power was so weak that the arrest of a great nobleman was a dangerous measure, and its success was uncertain. The queen dared not trust its performance to the regular officers of

¹ Richelieu, 119.

² Richelieu, 122. Fontenay Mareuil, 105-106. Molé, i., 134.

³ Rohan, 510.

the court, but she chose a hardy soldier named Thémînes to make the arrest. The prince was warned of his danger but he felt his position was above peril, and, on the 1st of September, 1616, he proceeded to the council as usual. "There comes the king of France," said the queen, "but his royalty will endure only as the grass that withers."¹ The young king, early skilled in duplicity, asked Condé to join in the chase, after he had attended to matters of state. As the prince entered the passage leading to the queen's chamber he was met by Thémînes who at once arrested him. Condé met his reverses with no more fortitude than the Italian favorite. The first prince of the blood showed the most abject fear of being killed. When he was assured of his life he offered to gain his freedom by disclosing all plots which he knew and discovering his associates, but the queen said she knew too much of them already.² The prince was confined in the Louvre, and was afterwards taken to the Bastille and then to Vincennes. He remained imprisoned three years and came out a tamed conspirator, with no passion left but avarice. Endeavors were made to seize his principal followers but they all fled. They attempted to excite an insurrection in Paris, but it resulted in nothing more serious than the sacking of the house of the Marshal of Ancre, and the destruction of some of his choice furniture and paintings, which were valued at 600,000 livres.³ Bouillon, Vendôme, and Mayenne retired to the country and there sought to excite a revolt.

The overthrow of Condé opened the last and most brilliant chapter in the fortunes of the Marshal of Ancre. The Concini had exerted a great influence since Henry's death. Yet there had been times when the queen's favor towards them had seemed to waver. The marshal had never sought a place in the council. He had been con-

¹ Richelieu, 122. Brienne, 8.

² Richelieu, 124. D' Estrées, 414. Pontchartrain, 367-368. Rohan, 510. Fontenay, 110. Brienne, 9.

³ Brienne, 9. Bassompierre, 118. Richelieu, 125. *Mercur* François, 1616, 202.

tent with having the queen's private ear, and with the wealth and dignities that were showered upon him. Apart from securing his own aggrandizement, there was no policy which he sought to establish. He favored neither Spain nor Savoy, Catholic nor Protestant, but always the Marshal of Ancre. He had gained the success which comes from a single aim. Not worth a sou when he came to France, he estimated his wealth in 1617 at over 7,000,000 livres. He was timid in danger, and had always advised the policy of buying off opposition, and rewarding insurrection. He had several times retired from the Court, and he contemplated a return to Italy. There he said he might govern the duchy which he had purchased, and enjoy his wealth, where neither the grandes nor the people of France could come to disturb him.¹

He claimed that his wife had kept him from this retreat, but it was more probably his own spirit, which was as presumptuous in prosperity as it was despondent in peril. He wished, he said, to see how far fortune could carry a man, and he hoped for things greater than he had yet attained.² Wearied of his wife, whose mind was giving way, and who devoted her time to burning magic candles and consulting the constellations, he thought of obtaining a divorce from her, that he might marry the Princess of Vendôme, the illegitimate sister of the king. Though he had fought no battles yet he aspired to be made constable, and to fill the greatest military office in France. The favors granted this foreigner, his reckless expenditure of the royal funds, and the system of espionage which he practised, excited a hostility against him which extended from the king to the galley slave.³ It had already found frequent expression. Parliaments had remonstrated

¹ Richelieu, 121. Bassompierre, 122.

² Richelieu, 153. Pontchartrain, 389. Relation, etc., de la mort du Maréchal d'Ancre, 463.

³ Richelieu, 167-170. Pontchartrain, 378-382. Lettere diplomatiche di Guido Bentivoglio, *passim*. Bentivoglio was the papal nuncio at France, and his letters to the Pope, from 1617 to 1621, mostly in cipher, contain much valuable and accurate information.

against the favors shown foreigners. Ancre's fortune had been one of the alleged causes of the frequent revolts of the great nobles. The populace had once sacked his house, and hung two of his lackeys.¹

More subtle though less dangerous weapons were used against him. Many people still believed in magical devices, and summoning Zamiel as an ally, with slow candles and melting wax endeavored to destroy their enemies. Such follies obtained followers among the upper even more than among the lower classes. Many a one lived in fear of the evil eye, or the magical mirror of an enemy. The Duke of Bellegarde, a great nobleman and courtier, was discovered using an enchanted mirror, in which the destiny of the Concini could be seen and checked. But despite all these dangers, the marshal had now obtained such power that he resolved on the political changes which he had long desired. The old ministers of the crown had divided with him the confidence of the queen. Sillery, the Chancellor; Villeroy, the Secretary of State; and the President, Jeannin, had long been in the public service. Villeroy, a cautious, moderate man of little learning, but with great experience, had been made Secretary of State in 1567, and had served under four kings. Sillery had been made chancellor by Henry IV. He was a weak man, who had, said Richelieu, a heart of wax. Jeannin had for almost half a century combined judicial and diplomatic experience.² All of them were now deprived of any influence. Sillery had been sent into the country early in 1616. Jeannin was no more consulted, and even Villeroy at last was forced into retirement.³ The chief positions in the council were filled by three men, who were freely stigmatized as the creatures of the Marshal of Ancre; men inexperienced in the affairs of state, and who had no merit except being ministers to

¹ Bassompierre, 113.

² Fontenay Marueil, 82-101. Brienne, 7. Molé, i., 119.

³ Pontchartrain, 374. Rohan, 511. Relation, etc., du M. d'Ancre, col. Michaud, xix., 451.

the passions of the marshal and his wife.¹ Two of them were soon to sink into the obscurity from which they had been drawn, but one was destined to a career far more marvellous than that of his patron. The three were Mangot, Barbin, and Armand du Plessis de Richelieu.²

Richelieu was a son of the Seigneur du Plessis, a gentleman of Poitou, of good family but small property. Being a younger son, Armand de Richelieu entered the Church, and when twenty was made Bishop of Luçon, a bishopric which had been long held in his family. It was, as he wrote, the poorest, the most squalid, and the most disagreeable in France.³

Luçon was a little city, with a population of but two or three thousand, and the diocese was very small. The country was cold and bleak, and the people were miserably poor and ground down by taxation.⁴ The diocese had suffered from spiritual as well as temporal need, and for sixty years none of its bishops had resided there. The new pastor found little comfort in his life. His lodgings were poor, and he could hardly have a fire on account of the smoke. He borrowed horses from a friend, and for five years sighed for two dozen large silver plates. "I am a beggar," he wrote Madame de Bourges, "but if I could have silver plates my position would gain much dignity."⁵ In this squalid bishopric he led a sufficiently

¹ Lettres et Instructions du Cardinal de Richelieu, vol. i., 183. Pont., 378. Brienne, 8. *Mercurius Francicus*, 130, *et seq.*, 1617. Bentivoglio writes the Pope the new ministers are wholly dependent on Ancre. The insolence of his language to them would justify such a charge. He wrote Barbin: "Par Dieu, Monsieur, je me plains de vous, vous me traitez trop mal; vous traitez la paix sans moi; vous avez fait que la Reine m'a écrit que, pour l'amour d'elle, je laisse la poursuite que j'ai commencée contre M. de Montbazou pour me faire payer de ce qu'il me doit. Que tous les diables, la Reine, et vous, pensez-vous que je fasse? La rage me mange jusqu'aux os."—*Mém. de Richelieu*. 152.

"La moglie," Bentivoglio writes the Pope of the Concini, "ha in mano la volenza della regina, ed il marito lo scettro del regno." *Let. of Mch.*, 1617. The new ministers, he says, hardly go through the form of asking any instructions from the king.

² Richelieu, 131. Font. Mareuil, 113. *Mercurius Francicus*, 1616, 209.

³ *Lettres de Richelieu*, i., 24. ⁴ *Ibid.*, 18 and 23. ⁵ *Ibid.*, 27.

obscure life, attending to the needs of his flock, making friends of those of any prominence, and showing an obsequious rather than an imperious temperament. He was chosen one of the delegates of the clergy to the States-General in 1614. Gaining some prominence there, he relaxed his zeal for his flock, and staying mostly at Paris, contrived to ingratiate himself with Mary de Medici. He so far succeeded, that he was deemed by her and by Ancre a useful man for the new ministry, as being alike able, devoted, and unscrupulous. In November, 1616, he was made secretary of state for war and foreign affairs.¹ No one imagined the career that lay before him. The Duke of Monteleone, the Spanish ambassador, wrote to his Court that Richelieu was in perfect intelligence with Spain. "In all France one could not have chosen a person more devoted to the service of God, to our crown, and to the public weal."² Opposition to Spain and the House of Austria were to be the great features of Richelieu's foreign policy; but when he began the management of public affairs, either he cherished no such views or he concealed them. Resolute in the exercise of power, his first aim was to gain it. His early letters are filled with protestations of eternal gratitude to many whom, in later life, he drove into exile or sent to the block. The queen and Ancre were friendly to Spain, and Richelieu was not a man to miss the opening into public life he had so long desired by declaring any Quixotic opposition to their views. Yet in his earliest state papers we find the traces of his future policy. He wrote to Schomberg, the French ambassador in Germany, what was true in 1616, but was not the case during the wars of religion, that "no Catholic was so blind as to esteem a Spaniard better than a French Huguenot in matters of state." Nor did France desire to advance the interests of Spain, but rather to check its

¹ Fontenay Marueil, 108; Brienne, 10; Richelieu, 131.

² Lettre du 28 Novembre, 1616. Archiv. nat. Archiv. de Simancas, A., pièce 122. This letter was written on Richelieu's appointment as ambassador to Spain, a position he did not fill, as immediately afterwards he was appointed secretary of state.

plans for obtaining ultimately the crowns of Hungary, Bohemia, and the Empire for one of the sons of Philip III.¹ Richelieu's instructions to Schomberg were, indeed, to be used with German and Protestant princes. His instructions to the ambassador in Spain would be far different. Richelieu studied the wisdom of the serpent, and when his power was uncertain, there were many windings in his course.

He advocated the election to the Empire, of Ferdinand of Styria, who was to be his chief opponent in the Thirty Years War.² Not even Richelieu had yet discovered the inherent weakness of Spain, and that Austria was the rival to be most feared. Like other great names, that of Spain awed the world long after its power was gone. It had been so strong under Philip II. that its weakness was not suspected under Philip III. The war which was soon to begin was to disclose to the world that this great kingdom was a fallen empire, that its strength had rotted away, and its inner life was deadened; that superstition and bad laws, pride and prejudice, misfortunes and misrule, had left but a palsied despotism where the world imagined a powerful state. More than a hundred years later, when Austria had in turn begun to decay and Prussia was the danger of the future, Cardinal Fleury in like manner fell into the error of attacking a traditional enemy that had grown weak, and assisting a friend that had become strong.

In the meantime Bouillon, Longueville, and other nobles had again taken up arms and carried on a languid war against the government.³ On the part of the king the contest was waged with more vigor than had before been manifested. The qualities of Richelieu were soon seen, and he was learning from constant revolts that the power of the great nobles must be curbed before a strong government could exist in France. He met them with the pen

¹ *Lettres de Richelieu*, i., 223, 224.

² *Lettres de Richelieu*, i., 224.

³ Pontchartrain, 371-374, 380-382. Rohan, 510.

as well as the sword. In the instructions to Schomberg he stated the amounts that had been sucked from the treasury by these great leeches. Since the death of Henry IV. there had been paid the Prince of Condé 3,600,000 livres; to the Count of Soissons and his family 1,500,000; to the Prince of Conti and his wife, 1,400,000; to the Duke of Guise nearly 1,700,000; to the Duke of Nevers nearly 1,600,000; to the Duke of Longueville 1,200,000; to the Duke of Vendôme, 600,000; to the Duke of Épernon and his family, 700,000; to the Duke of Bouillon, 1,000,000. Besides this, the pension list had increased by 3,000,000 livres annually.¹ Richelieu was less successful in defending the favors granted the Marshal of Ancre. "In England," said he, "all the Scotch are advanced, and no Englishman. In France, one stranger and all the French. What ground is there for complaint?"² The rebellious nobles made little progress, and the queen, with Richelieu as an adviser, was not inclined to buy their allegiance.³ Their prospects seemed hopeless when the murder of Ancre again changed the face of French politics.

Louis XIII. was now fifteen years old. He was a boy of a sluggish mind, and his mother, wishing to rule in his name, had given little care to his development. He found employment with his pets and in that passion for hunting which characterized many of the weak French kings. He was strongly influenced by the attendants with whom he was thrown, and a fit person to be his falconer was sought with care. In 1611 Luines had been chosen for this place. He was a man twenty years older than the young king, of moderate family, and yet more moderate means.⁴ The difference in years did not, however, prevent his exciting in Louis a strong attachment. He received the government of Amboise; he was sent to meet the young

¹ *Lettres de Richelieu*, i., 232. *Mémoires de Richelieu*, 143. See also *Mercure François*, 1617, 68-86. ² *Lettres de Richelieu*, i., 234.

³ Pontchartrain, 385-389. Rohan, 511. *Lettere di Bentivoglio*, *passim*. See *Let. Feb.* 1, 1617, and his account of a conversation with Ancre.

⁴ Fontenay Marueil, 43, 44. Bassompierre, 123. *Let. di Bentivoglio*, April and May, 1617.

queen when she arrived in France, and he now resolved to rid himself of Ancre and fill the place which the marshal held.¹ He found it easy to excite the king's hatred of the favorite. Louis had a jealous disposition and possessed a strong trace of malevolence tinged with cruelty.

It was claimed that he was left to amuse himself with a few low companions, was kept from taking any part in public affairs, and was even restricted in his expenses. He was not allowed to leave Paris, and was surrounded by guards who were in Ancre's service. While the marshal was living in splendor surrounded by a brilliant and fawning court, the king led an obscure life with few retainers and little display. One of his followers claimed that he asked for 6,000 livres to furnish a house the king had bought, and met with a contemptuous refusal.²

Persons were ready to suggest that Concini had probably instigated the murder of Henry IV., and would be willing to imprison or dispose of his son. Louis cared little for his mother; he hated her favorite and he was easily induced to decide that he would be his own master. The plans for disposing of Ancre were discussed between Luines, the king and a few inferior officers, and Louis ordered that the marshal should be arrested, and if he resisted he should be killed. Luines decided that Ancre should resist. The obscurity of the council that deliberated on these matters is a proof of the charges that the young king was left to unfit companions. It consisted of the falconer, a gardener, a clerk, a soldier, a priest, and two adventurers.³ Many plans were brought forward by them. The king's cabinet and the queen's chamber were both suggested as places for attacking the marshal. Louis

¹ Richelieu says in a *mém.* found in Documents Inédits sur l'histoire de France, *Mélanges*, t. iii., 757, that Luines said he formed the plan to kill Ancre as far back as the time of Louis' marriage.

² Richelieu, 153, 154. Pontchartrain, 378, 379, 383-86-88. Relation, etc., du M. d'Ancre, 451, 452. Rohan, 511.

³ Richelieu, 155. Pontchartrain, 386. Among those, however, who took part in these councils, and, if he does not overstate his activity, who took the chief part, was the Marquis Montpouillan a son of the Duke of La Force. See his *Mémoires*, 19-40.

was so excited that he said if the plan failed, he was resolved to fly from Paris, believing he could not stay there in safety.¹ The obscure conspirators, during weeks of plotting, guarded well their secret. Finally, on April 24, 1617,² as Ancre, accompanied by some fifty followers, passed over the bridge of the Louvre, which led from his residence, he was met by Vitry with a small band. Vitry put his hand on the marshal and said: "The king has commanded me to seize your person." "Me?" cried the marshal in amazement; and one or two of his followers put their hands to their swords. In an instant three or four pistols were fired at him and he was pierced with swords. No one resisted, and the body of the great favorite was plundered, stripped, and left deserted where it fell. Vitry at once proceeded to the king. "Great thanks to you," said Louis, coming out and speaking from the balcony. "Now I am king." When the queen-mother heard the news she cried: "I have reigned seven years, there is only left for me now a crown in heaven."³

In the meantime a great crowd had gathered about the young king. He was mounted on a billiard table, where he declared that Vitry had acted under his command, and he proceeded to issue various orders in a condition of great excitement, and surrounded by a tumult such as had not been seen since the assassination of Henry IV. A revolution of the palace at once followed the murder. The former ministers were summoned to a hasty council. Du Vair, Villeroy, and Jeannin were restored to power. Richelieu had of late secretly endeavored to ingratiate himself with the king. He now boldly joined the crowd at the Louvre and even entered the cabinet meeting. But he met with a cold reception.

¹ Fontenay Marueil, 119. Relations, etc., M. Ancre, 452-456. Montpouillan, 26.

² Molé says April 23d, i., 144—but though his account of the proceedings after the murder is very accurate, there is a mistake in the date he gives.

³ Relation, etc., d'Ancre, 456-464. Brienne, 12. Font. Mar., 117. Pontchartrain, 387. Rohan, 511. Mercure François, 1617, 194-198. Montpouillan, *supra*.

The king is said to have cried when he saw him: "Ah, Luçon! I am free from your tyranny now." This statement, though often repeated, is doubtful, but he certainly showed him no favor. Richelieu's ministry met a speedy end. He submitted with protestations of unwavering zeal for his master, and was presently ordered to retire to Luçon. In his own phrase, he was exiled to his bishopric. From there he was afterwards ordered to Avignon, and employed his time in writing doctrinal treatises against the errors of Protestantism. Barbin had been more odious and he was thrown into the Bastille.¹

The remains of Concini were quietly buried in St. Germain de l'Auxerrois,² the church which has witnessed so many of the horrors of the political revolutions of France. But they were to find no rest. Parisian mobs have for centuries developed a certain wild brutality, and the marshal had ruled by fear and been rewarded by hatred. The crowd overpowered the priests in the church, tore up the stone, and dug the remains from the consecrated ground. They were dragged through the city, and finally hung on the gallows by the Pont Neuf, which had been erected to awe the populace. There the body was hacked in pieces and the parts carried through the streets. One man tore out the heart and broiled it over the coals.³ His wife, who had shared his varied career, was hunted

¹ Lettres de Richelieu, 541, 551, *et passim*. Relation, etc., de M. Ancre. Pontchartrain, 387, *et seq.* Richelieu, 156. Brienne, 12. Rohan, 512. Molé, i., 145.

Richelieu claims that his retirement was voluntary. I do not think that statement is accurate. It can be reconciled neither with most of the contemporary accounts (some of which are no more trustworthy), nor with the subsequent conduct of the parties and the tone of Richelieu's letters. Bentivoglio's letters describe the situation very accurately. Luçon was not immediately disgraced, but he was soon dismissed. He says: "Il vescovo di Lusson s'e poi retirato. Il re ha voluto," June 11, 1617, 138. In November he writes, that Luçon must go to his bishopric. "He had endeavored," says the nuncio, "to do many things to the taste of the king, and these often only caused the belief that he was willing to betray both parties."

² Mercure François, 1617, 205. "Sans prières que basses."

³ Richelieu, 159, 160. Fontenay Marueil, 119. Pontchartrain, 390. Relation, etc., 466, 467. Mercure François, 206.

down with no more mercy by pursuers of higher rank. Mary de Medici showed little interest in the fate of her follower. Some one asked her to announce the murder to Ancre's wife. "I have other things to think of," said the queen. "If no one wishes to tell her the news let them sing it to her!" The mareschale herself manifested little grief when she heard it. Affection between this couple, if ever alive, had long been dead. She hid in the bed her jewels, which were of enormous value, for diamonds were then purchased for an investment as well as for ornament. The soldiers soon came to arrest her, and pillaged the room. The jewels were at last found and the unhappy woman was taken to the Bastille. She had done nothing which deserved worse punishment than banishment, and her mind had for some time been failing. But Luines and his associates were resolved to have her life and her money. She was accused of being a sorceress, and it was gravely proved that she had made a solemn offering of a cock, and that she had in her possession the nativity of the king and his brothers. The Parliament found her guilty of high treason, both human and divine, and she was beheaded at the Place de Grève. "How many people have gathered to see one unhappy and oppressed woman!" she said, as she was driven through the great crowd to the place where she courageously met her fate.¹ The great possessions of the marshal and his wife, both in France and Italy, were declared confiscated to the king. In fact, they were mostly seized by Luines.² The murderers of the Concini were all liberally rewarded. Vitry, as the leader, received the baton of Marshal of France. This great dignity had been given to Concini for pleasing the queen, to Thémynes for arresting a prince, and was now bestowed on Vitry for murdering a favorite.³ The

¹ Richelieu, 165-7. Fontenay Marueil, 122. Pontchartrain, 393. Relation, etc., du Maréchal d'Ancre, 458, *et seq.* The decree of condemnation is found in *Mercurie François*, 226-230.

² Richelieu, 159. Font., 118-120. Rohan, 512. *Dépêches Venitiennes*, May 2, 1617. Let. di Bentivoglio, ii., 292-293.

³ Richelieu, 158. Font., 121, 111. Pont., 390. Rel., etc., M. Ancre, 465.

chief rewards, however, Luines took for himself. He was made a duke, as were also his two brothers. He was made Lieutenant-General for Normandy, a peer, and first gentleman of the chamber. What Ancre had gained in seven years Luines gained in a day.¹

The overthrow of Concini was, however, hailed with general delight. The forces of the king were about to engage with the nobles in revolt when an officer from the latter rode between the armies and cried out: "Gentlemen, retire, the war is ended. The Marshal of Ancre, your master, is dead,—the king, our master, has had him killed."² The war was indeed ended, and the insurgents at once abandoned their arms. An era of good feeling seemed to have begun. The young Louis was greeted as if he had saved his country by a great battle, and the title of "The Just" was awarded him, for an act which overrode all forms of laws.

But the new master was soon found to be as greedy as his predecessor and as much devoted to his own advancement. It was evident that the change of government was only a change of favorites.³ Still the orders of Luines were given in good French, his vices were those of his own countrymen, and he never excited the bitter hatred which had been felt against Ancre.

Luines feared the influence of the queen-mother, and she was soon retired. She and her son parted with speeches that had been arranged in advance between Luines and Richelieu. "I have done what I could," said the queen, "to acquit myself well in the administration of your state, which you committed to me. Remember me, and be a good son and a good king." Louis answered with cold politeness, and when his mother departed from the agreed formalities and asked the release of Barbin, he turned away, and only said he would endeavor to content her in all things. She left Paris in a

¹ Rohan, 512. Font., 131. Brienne, 13. Rel., etc., 465-477. Pont. 388-394.

² Font., 117. Bassompierre, 126. Pont., 388. Rohan, 511.

³ Richelieu, 211.

procession that savored of funeral pomp, and found refuge in the quiet city of Blois.¹

The administration of Luines lasted over four years, and ended only with his death in 1621. Though the new favorite's chief anxiety was to accumulate honors and wealth for himself and his brothers, he also endeavored to carry out a certain policy. It would have been better if, like Ancre, he had contented himself solely with his own advancement; for Luines was an intense and narrow Catholic, and he guided the king in a manner to complicate the relations of the Huguenots with the crown. He had, however, to meet other opposition than that of the Protestants, for Mary de Medici, having for seven years tasted the sweets of power, was never again content without them.

After nearly two years of confinement in the castle of Blois, she escaped by night, descending from her window by ladders. The Duke of Épernon took the fugitive under his protection, and Richelieu presently became the prime-minister of her wandering court.² He entered her service again in an ambiguous manner, as he was sent by Luines to serve the queen, and also to restrain her from any acts which would be contrary to the interests of the king.³

A brief insurrection was followed by a brief peace. By the next year the queen was again at the head of a faction of discontented nobles, and this time there were some trifling engagements. But Luines did not desire to push the king to extreme measures against his mother, and Richelieu was anxious that she should be again on friendly terms with her son, that his own interests might be more rapidly advanced. The queen was treated in her rebellions with the same liberality she had shown insurgents against herself; amnesty was granted for the past, and she and Richelieu resumed relations of nominal amity

¹ Richelieu, 163-164. Bassompierre, 126. Relation, etc. du Maréchal d'Ancre, 473.

² Richelieu, 191-195. Fontenay Marueil, 136.

³ Richelieu, 193. Font., 138.

with Luines and the king.¹ Questions of a far more serious nature had arisen in reference to the Huguenots and especially the Province of Béarn.

The Huguenot question had become a very serious one, and the bigotry of some of the Catholics found its opportunity in the insubordination of many of the Protestants. The Huguenots had undoubtedly many minor causes for discontent. They were subjected to the occasional annoyances which are experienced when the majority of a community view with enmity a protected creed. They sometimes lost the benefit of the courts, composed both of Catholics and Protestants, which had been established for the trial of suits between members of the different faiths; a child was sometimes disingenuously drawn from the religion and control of its parents; a funeral procession was interrupted by some over-zealous mob. But on the whole the government and the majority of the people were willing to carry out in good faith the provisions of the edict of Nantes. The Protestants, within the limits there laid down, could have worshipped after their own conscience, free from persecution and subject to little molestation. It was, perhaps, all that could be expected in a country where the mass of the population were Catholic, and where religious fanaticism had recently supported the League and fostered the wars of religion.

But the Protestant party seem to have desired a separate political power, which almost justifies the charge made against them, that they sought to establish a state within a state, or even to form a separate republic. Their territorial position afforded a certain facility for such endeavors. In the northern provinces their numbers were insignificant. They were found chiefly in the southwestern provinces—Poitou, Saintonge, Guienne, Provence, and Languedoc,—while in Béarn and Navarre they constituted the great majority of the population, and they

¹ Richelieu, 219-228. Font., 148-153. The substance of the articles of peace is stated in *Mercurie François*. 1620, 338-340.

held for their protection a large number of strongly fortified cities. The pleasant fields of Languedoc, its sunny skies, its population mixing with foreign peoples, active in trade, quick in thought, ready in speech, had furnished an early developed culture—the poetry of the Troubadours and the romances of the love courts; and they had also been the scenes of the Albigensian heresies. There Simon de Montfort, at the head of northern Frenchmen, had laid waste the land and the Pope's legate had left the Lord to find his own among the slain.

No religious affinity can be traced between the doctrinal creeds and strict morals of the Huguenots and the mystic beliefs and easy morality of the Albigenses and of the subjects of the Counts of Toulouse, but the remembrance of the old hatred for the northern Catholics made the French of the southern provinces more ready to abandon the Catholic belief. Though there is nothing to show that a plan for a separate republic was seriously considered, the Huguenots had adopted an organization which naturally excited the jealousy and ill-will of the general government. They had long maintained a system of provincial and general synods for the regulation of their faith and discipline. These had, under certain restrictions, been authorized by the edict of Nantes, and they had been allowed to hold their general synods or assemblies, but only under the permission of the king. Several of these had met during the reign of Henry IV., with his permission, but they had confined themselves to dealing with matters of internal discipline. The assembly which met at Saumur immediately after Henry's death, had carried still further the organization of the members of their faith. From consistories composed of the pastors and certain of the laity, delegates were chosen who formed local consistories. These again chose delegates who met in provincial synods, and from them delegates were sent to the national synod, or general assembly of the church. Here not only matters of faith, but of state, were regulated, and the general assembly finally assumed to declare war, levy

taxes, choose generals, and act both as a convocation and a parliament: The assembly of Saumur added a system of division into eight great circles, covering the territory where the Protestants were sufficiently numerous to be important. All but two of these were south of the Loire. They were subsequently organized as military departments, each under the command of some great nobleman. Before these local and provincial assemblies, whose sessions were frequent, were brought all grievances suffered by those of their faith, all invasions on the rights which they had or which they claimed. Assemblies of the circles, or meetings of the national synod, were to be had when demanded by the needs or perils of the churches. The national assembly could not meet legally except when authorized by the king, but in 1617, 1618, 1619, and 1620, such assemblies were held without any such authorization.

The Huguenots had shown also a willingness to assist those who were in arms against the state, had joined Condé, and contemplated a union with Mary de Medici in the brief insurrection of 1620. A question had now arisen which was regarded by the majority of the party as one of vital importance. The edict of Nantes, which granted privileges to the Huguenots, had granted also to the Catholics the right to the public profession of their religion in all parts of France. This had formerly been prohibited in Navarre and Béarn, and the population of those provinces had become very largely Protestant. The Catholic clergy had long petitioned the king to enforce the rights which they claimed the edict gave them in Béarn, and to compel also a restitution of some portion of the property formerly held by their church, which had been taken by Jeanne d'Albret, and the revenues of which the Huguenot clergy still assumed to appropriate entirely to themselves.

On July 25, 1617, Louis finally issued an edict directing the free exercise of the Catholic worship in Béarn and the restitution to the clergy of the property that had been

taken from them.¹ The edict met with bitter opposition in Béarn and from all the Huguenot party. The Protestants were as unwilling to allow the rites of the Catholic Church in a province which they controlled, as the Catholics to suffer a Huguenot conventicle within the walls of Paris. The persecutions which the Huguenots suffered distressed them less than the toleration which they were obliged to grant. The restitution of the property long ago taken from the Catholics, deprived the Huguenot clergy of a large portion of their revenues, and they protested against it. They were living under the régime that had been established by the pious and heroic Jeanne d' Albret, half a century before, and they were now attacked in their interests of party, purse, and religion.

In the wars of religion the Huguenots had been controlled, not always wisely or unselfishly, by the nobles who had espoused their faith; but these were slowly drifting back to Catholicism. The promises of increased royal favor, the subtle charm of a Court in which their creed made them to some degree aliens, weakened the faith which they had embraced largely from political discontent and personal ambition.

The Condés were already Catholics. Lesdiguières was only waiting till the bribe for his conversion should be sufficiently glittering. Bouillon's religion was but a catch-weight in his political intrigues.² The grandson of Coligni was soon to receive a marshal's baton for consenting to a peace which was disastrous to his party. Sully, Rohan, Soubise, and La Force still remained; but La Force's zeal moderated when he also was made a marshal, and one hundred years later Rohans and the descendants of Sully wore cardinal's hats.

¹ The edict provided that the wages of the clergy, etc., of the Protestant faith should be paid from the royal revenues. *Mercure François*, 1617, p. 69, 711. Lettere di Guido Bentivoglio, July, 1617. The nuncio speaks with great exultation. "I vescovi, Dio lodato, hanno riportato l'arresto. Nelle cose de' Bearne finalmente abbiamo riportato vittoria."

² Rohan, 495, 496. Lesdiguières, it was said, could for some years have been made constable on condition that he would become a Catholic, but he long hesitated in abandoning the companions of a lifetime.

The party, slowly deserted by the great nobles, came more under the leadership of the clergy. However well fitted to baptize infants, to instruct youth, to advise maturity, and to furnish the last consolations to age, the clergy, from their training, and modes of thought, are not apt to be safe judges of political expediency, and especially is this true of the lower clergy. The great dignitaries are often free enough from religious prejudices to be fitted to deal with earthly questions; but the rank and file of the Huguenot clergy looked upon the overthrow of an idolatrous mass and the preaching of a pure faith as the chief objects of life. They had supported Condé, and under their guidance the party now assumed a political activity which brought on the siege of La Rochelle and which made possible the revocation of the edict of Nantes.

Béarn was not only strongly Protestant, but it claimed, with Navarre, to form no part of France, and to be governed only by its own laws. Its States met and declared their local rights were violated by the king's edict; the Parliament of Pau refused to register it, and it was not enforced in the province.¹ The General Assembly demanded its revocation. The disturbances caused by Mary de Medici had delayed any steps for the enforcement of the edict, but these troubles were ended by the peace of Ponts-de-Cé in 1620.

Luines was actuated by a fanatical hostility against the Protestants. Louis' confessor, Father Arnoux, was one of the first of the Jesuit political confessors who, later in the century, exerted so baleful an influence in France. He had already obtained from the king, permission for the Jesuits to reopen their schools and their college of Clermont at Paris, and from Luines a vow to work the ruin of the Huguenots.² Guided by these advisers, in October, 1620, Louis led his army into Béarn, removed various Huguenot officials, and reestablished the Catholic clergy.

¹ *Mercure*, 1617, 17; 1618, 210, *et seq.*; 1619, 342, *et seq.*

² Richelieu, 182; Fontenay, 121. The edict for the Jesuit schools is found in *Mercure*, 1617, 18.

The mass was celebrated in the great church at Pau, after an interval of more than sixty years. On October 20th, an edict was issued by which Navarre and Béarn were declared to be united to France, and a parliament was established for the two provinces on the same model as the other parliaments of the kingdom.¹

Navarre and Béarn were proud of their independent existence; they were unwilling to form a part of the general government of France, and they knew that their church was, by this act, placed in a different and less favored position. A common feeling actuated all those who were united in faith. A general assembly of Protestants, sympathizing with their brethren of these provinces, was called for Nov. 26, 1620, at La Rochelle. The king declared those guilty of high treason who should join in that meeting.² A sergeant notified the mayor of La Rochelle of the king's commands. "You have done your duty," was the only answer the mayor gave him, "and you can leave as soon as you are ready." The meeting was held in defiance of the prohibition, and it was there resolved to take up arms. Generals were appointed for each of the circles; the raising of money was provided for, the formation and government of the army regulated, and the assembly proceeded in all respects like the legislative body of a separate state.

The king prepared for the war with vigor. Luines, on attaining power, had pretended to abolish the *paulette*, as a measure of reform. It was again restored, and 400,000 livres of rentes, secured on the salt tax, were alienated. This method of permanently cutting off a portion of the revenue was often practised. It was in substance the creation of so much public debt, and the scanty credit of the state was assisted by the alienation of a specific source of revenue, but the terms of the advance were unfavorable to the treasury.³

¹ *Mercur*, 1620, 346-364; *Mém. du Duc de la Force*, vol. ii. A parliament already existed in Béarn, whose position was anomalous.

² *Mercur* François, 1620, 442-459.

³ *Richelieu*, 233, 237; *Mer.*, 1621, 32, 268. The principal raised by this was nominally 6,400,000 livres, or the loan was at the rate of 6½ per cent. ;

The clergy voted a million, on condition that it should be used in the siege of that great stronghold of heresy, La Rochelle. Louis was fond of war, and well versed in its rules. Not a great general, he would have made a very efficient captain. He had alike more skill and more courage than Louis XIV., but he was not fortunate enough to have generals like Condé, Turenne, and Vauban.¹ He now led his forces into southern France, and after some minor engagements he laid siege to Montauban. A three-months' siege resulted disastrously; the campaign closed, and the king returned to Paris.² The encouragement that the Huguenots drew from this success proved very brief. The king's armies proceeded again into the south of France in 1622, and met only an irregular and inefficient opposition. The effective organization of the Huguenots was neutralized by dissensions and by the failure of the cities to obey directions. Lesdiguières took an active part against those whose faith he still professed, and Bouillon declined the leadership which was offered him. "Formerly," said the Duke of Rohan, "there was zeal, fidelity, and confidence in the leaders; but it has become harder to combat the remissness, irreligion, and infidelity of the Protestants, than the hostility of their enemies."³

The Huguenots claimed to have altogether 25,000 men in arms, but they were scattered, and many districts submitted with little opposition.⁴ Chatillon and La Force each made a separate peace, and each was rewarded by the baton of marshal from the king and by charges of treachery from his associates. Such personal advantages did not necessarily involve any betrayal of the cause of which they were leaders, but it was undoubtedly thought

but there was additional loss both in the receipt and in the payment of loans incurred in this manner.

¹ Turenne gained his military education under Richelieu's administration, but his great skill came largely from experience, and developed slowly.

² *Mercur*, 1621, 817, *et. seq.* Bassompierre, 161-189. *Mém. de La Force*, vol. ii. Castelnaut, for 1621.

³ Rohan, 564. The same complaint is made in the *Memoirs of Castelnaut*, 199, 200, a son of La Force, and one of the Huguenot leaders.

⁴ *Mercur* François, 1621, 418.

that if the generals were favored they would be less zealous for the interests of their faith.

The siege of Montpellier led to the peace called by that name, but on terms that were unfavorable to the Huguenots. They abandoned all the fortified cities which they had held for their security except La Rochelle and Montauban; no assemblies could meet without permission of the king, except the local synods for ecclesiastical matters alone, and the interests of Béarn and Navarre were abandoned. In return the edict of Nantes was again confirmed, and their religious privileges left undisturbed. Rohan accepted 800,000 livres for his expenses and governments, and the king agreed that the Fort of St. Louis, which had been built to overawe the turbulence of La Rochelle, should be dismantled.¹ La Rochelle, the great Huguenot stronghold, continued hostilities for some time longer, but at last it made terms. The party was fast losing its power and its overthrow could be easily foretold. La Rochelle was now the only place capable of making a formidable resistance.

The Huguenots had much in common with the Puritans. Their creed was largely the same; they professed the same Calvinistic tenets; they favored the same strict and formal morality; they eschewed the love of pleasure and worldly amusements; they suffered oppression from a dominant church, whose members they regarded as the servants of mammon and far removed from the pure truths of God. They sought to be relieved from the Scarlet Woman, to be preserved from episcopacy, prelacy, and papacy. They took up arms against a government, which they believed was disregarding earthly laws and persecuting God's saints.

Yet the Huguenot party ended in failure and the Puritan party attained unto victory. Not only in the brief rule of Cromwell, but in the subsequent history of England, Puritan principles won the day. The established

¹ Rohan, 533-538, 539, 542. *Mercure François*, 810, *et. seq.*, 837. Richelieu, 266, 268.

church, indeed, still holds to its stately ceremonial and its ancient service. Its bishops still proclaim their apostolic succession. A peer in lawn sleeves sits in the bishop's chair at St. Paul's ; a dean with surplice and stole preaches at Westminster Abbey ; but England has become Puritan. The principles of Milton have triumphed over those of Laud. The Englishman of to-day wears a Puritan dress ; his Sunday is the Puritan Sunday ; his morals are Puritan ; his political rights are those for which the Puritans fought. The clergy of the established church, in all but manners and external address, are a Puritan clergy. The man who berates the Roundheads and believes he would have died for the Royal Martyr, has become, in all but name, one of those who brought Charles to the block.

Far different is the history of the Huguenot movement in France. The difference in the result is, of course, chiefly due to the difference in the nations. A party like the Puritans could not have gained a complete victory among a people like the French. But there were many elements of weakness among the Huguenots. The alliance of the nobles was ultimately an injury ; they acted as leaders, and when they deserted the cause, the mass of the party were incapable of guiding themselves. Not the storms of adversity, but the greatness of the temptations, took the nobles from the reformed faith. The sword of the constable, the baton of a marshal, a great government, an enormous pension, drew them back to the fold of St. Peter. The English Puritan party contained so few of noble birth, that it could have leaders only from the middle class. It is not that the latter are more above temptation, but such glittering bribes are not often offered to those of inferior position. The French Protestants lacked also that spirit of discipline, which would make them equally formidable in war, and respected in peace. They had indeed their circles and general assemblies, but division was too often found in the assemblies, and disobedience among the cities and separate circles. The Huguenots, moreover, did not seek to obtain a more

liberal government and greater protection in person and belief for all subjects, and thus gain the alliance of many who would have been in political if not in doctrinal sympathy with them. They sought rather to form a separate political body, having their own privileges, but taking no part in the general government of France. Under all these disadvantages, they were met with the whole force of the Catholic reaction. Kings sought to repress or exile them; Jesuits and Capucins overran their cities, stealing away souls from their belief; and in the mind of southern France the element was lacking that could withstand temptation, resist persecution, enforce discipline, remain firm in the good faith, and achieve victory at the last. The Huguenot movement did much in France, and it was overthrown only after a long struggle; but it was overthrown almost as entirely as the reform movement in Austria. Many influences have united in the France of to-day, but the Huguenot party has not to any large degree affected the development of the nation.¹

In the meantime the career of Luines reached its end. The great office of Constable had been for many years vacant, but the favorite, who had never led in a battle, resolved to take this dignity for himself.² He held with it the office of guard of the seals, and sealed documents with vigor during the campaign. Condé's bitter jest was

¹ The authorities on the history of the Huguenot movement under Louis XIII. which I have consulted are numerous. The memoirs and letters of Richelieu, the memoirs of Fontenay Marueil, Pontchartrain, and others, contain a version somewhat colored by their sympathies. The letters of the Papal Nuncio, Bentivoglio, are interesting as giving the impression created at the time by the events. On the Huguenot side, the memoirs of Rohan, La Force, Castelnaut, and especially the memoirs and letters of Du Plessis-Mornay, are of value. The *Mercurie François*, vols. iii.-viii., gives the contemporary history, and contains very fully the edicts and formal proceedings of the various assemblies. Besides these there is a large mass of contemporary publications and documents on both sides to be found at the Bibliothèque Nationale. Many valuable documents have been collected and published by the French Protestant Historical Society. M. de Felice has written a readable history of the French Protestants from a strong Protestant standpoint.

² *Mercurie François*, 1621, 277.

told all over France, that Luines was a good guard of the seals in time of war, and a good constable in time of peace. The repulse at Montauban was due in part to his inefficiency, and this was not redeemed by a soldier's courage. A hill, where he watched the siege at a safe distance, was nicknamed La Connétable.

It is probable that his favor was nearing its end. The young king sneered at Luines' ignorance of warfare, and was jealous of his power and display. The favorite and his two brothers had, in three years, received offices and gifts estimated to be worth over ten million livres. "There is the king," said Louis to Bassompierre, as Luines marched before the window, followed by a great retinue. "He is going to have an audience with King Luines," he said again, as an ambassador went to visit the favorite.

Luines lived in constant apprehension of a rival in the king's favor; he dismissed Father Arnoux; he opposed Richelieu's advancement; and he was jealous of Bassompierre, of whom the king was fond. He knew how easily Louis was influenced by those around him, and it is said he never allowed an hour to pass that either he or one of his brothers was not in the king's presence.

The exposures of the campaign and its disasters had worn upon him; a fever attacked him at the little town of Monheur, and on December 14, 1621, he died.¹ He left a wife who became a leader of the Fronde, and a son who became a saint of the Port Royal. The king showed little sorrow at the loss, and the question of who should succeed him in the position of favorite occupied the Court. It seemed probable that the dashing and brilliant Bassompierre might have filled the place in his master's affections, but Bassompierre preferred the baton of marshal, and leisure for his fighting, his love-making, and his gambling, to the embarrassing honors of favorite of a king. The Prince of Condé, the Sillerys, and La Vieuville in turn exercised control of the government from 1622 to 1624.

The year 1622 witnessed not only the humiliating peace

¹ Richelieu, 249; Bassompierre, 188; *Mercure François*, 1621, 130.

of Montpellier, but also the most notable defection from the Huguenot cause since the abjuration of Henry IV. The Marshal of Lesdiguières had a military record extending over half a century and said never to have been tarnished by a defeat. He had supported Henry III. against the League, had done brilliant work for Henry IV., had won victories against Savoy and Spain, and had a fame in arms unequalled by that of any other general in France. He had ruled Dauphiny almost as a separate government, even waging war like an independent sovereign, against the express orders of the king. His later days are said to have been stained by immoralities.¹ Certainly for many years he had grown cold in the faith. He finally decided on the apostasy he had so long contemplated. He was now an old man, almost eighty years of age, but the lust for place had not grown as cold as the fervor of his religious belief. It was announced that the Duke of Lesdiguières wished to receive religious instruction, and the priests found a mind prepared to see the truth.² On July 24, 1622, he was reconciled to the Catholic faith, in the Cathedral of Grenoble, and he turned from the benediction of the archbishop to receive the sword of the constable.³

No other dignity in the world has been held by such a succession of great soldiers as the office of Constable of France. The constable was originally a mere officer of the stables, but his power had increased by the suppression of the office of Grand Seneschal, and by the time of Philip Augustus he exercised control over all the military forces of the crown. He was the general in chief of the army and the highest military authority in the kingdom. The constables had for four centuries been leaders in the wars of France, and they had experienced strange and varied fortunes. The office had been bestowed on the son of Simon de Montfort, and he for this honor had

¹ Rohan, 553.

² Richelieu, 265.

³ *Mercure François*, 683-698. The Protestants reproached him for his apostasy from the faith he had professed for eighty years, but he answered he had long felt the combat going on in his soul. *Ib.*, 702-708.

granted to the king of France his rights over those vast domains which had been given his father for his pious conquests. It had been bestowed on Raoul de Nesle, who fell at Courtrai, where the French nobility suffered its first defeat from Flemish boors; on Bertrand du Guesclin, the last of the great warriors, whose deeds were sung with those of the paladins of Charlemagne; on Clisson, the victor of Roosebeck; on Armagnac, whose name has a bloody preëminence among the leaders of the fierce soldiery who ravaged France during the English wars; on Buchan, whose Scotch valor and fidelity gained him this great trust among a foreign people; on Riche-mont, the companion of Joan Darc; on Saint Pol, the ally of Charles the Bold, the betrayer and the victim of Louis XI.; on the Duke of Bourbon, who won the battle of Pavia against his sovereign, and led his soldiers to that sack of Rome, which made the ravages of Genseric and Alaric seem mild; on Anne of Montmorenci, a prominent actor in every great event in France from the battle of Pavia against Charles V. to that of St. Denis against Coligni; on his son, the companion of Henry IV. in his youth, and his trusted adviser in his age. Its holders had won victories in Spain, Portugal, Italy, Germany, and Flanders; they had defeated the English; they had led armies against the Saracens in Palestine, the Albigenses in Languedoc and the Huguenots in France; they had fallen by the hand of the Paynim, of the Flemish, the Italians, and the French, on the field of battle, and at the block of the executioner.

The sword borne by such men had been bestowed on Luines, the hero of an assassination, who could not drill a company of infantry; it was now given to the hero of many battles, and the great office was to expire in the hands of a great soldier. The power of the office was inconsistent with the monarchical tendencies of Richelieu, and it was abolished by an edict of Louis XIII.¹

¹ See the edict in *Mercure François* for 1627, abolishing this office and that of admiral.

CHAPTER IV.

THE ADMINISTRATION OF RICHELIEU.

THE steadfast favor of Mary de Medici and his own talents, both for intrigue and for affairs, made it certain that Richelieu's return to office could not be long delayed. But his abilities were feared by some, and by almost all he was deemed a dangerous and untrustworthy man. As a condition of peace with the queen-mother, Richelieu in 1620 received the royal nomination for the cardinalate.¹ But no sooner was the nomination sent than Luines saw the papal legate, and told him that under no circumstances must the Pope grant Richelieu that dignity. The nomination had been given to quiet Mary de Medici and her favorite, and his opposition must be kept profoundly secret; but the king detested Richelieu, and neither he nor his advisers dared allow to a man so uncertain and dangerous, the influence he would obtain from being a cardinal. The promotion was therefore long delayed.²

¹ *Lettres de Richelieu*, i., pp. 655, 661. In 1617 Bentivoglio wrote the Pope that the Bishop of Luçon was ambitious for a cardinal's hat.

² A curious history of all these intrigues is found in the cipher dispatches of Bentivoglio to the Pope, *Lettere*, etc., 1620, 1621, pp. 376, 391-399, 402, 408, 456. Richelieu's niece married Luines' nephew, and it was understood that they were then to become in reality allies. The nuncio, however, advises the Pope to do nothing about Richelieu's nomination until they can be sure that the alliance is any thing more than nominal. Luines afterward told the legate that Richelieu had been ungrateful to him, and though he had been willing at the time that he should receive the promotion, he was better pleased that he had not. "Se vien fatto cardinale, bene; se non fatto anche meglio." Luines and his associates impressed on Bentivoglio the danger of any discovery of their opposition, and that Richelieu would then probably stir up another rebellion. Mary de Medici in the meantime

But in 1621 Luines died and Mary de Medici continued earnest in her demands for the promotion of her minister. In 1622 he was made cardinal, and in the spring of 1624 he was invited again to take a place in the king's Council.

He sought to excuse himself. His health, he pleaded, was too infirm to endure such labors; he might, indeed, act as an occasional adviser, but he could not bear the constant visits of those having business with him; nor could he often be present at the king's levee, nor give the constant attention that public affairs required.¹ But no coy cardinal was ever more easily forced to assume the papal tiara than was Richelieu to accept the power for which he had long yearned. La Vieuville was at first the nominal head of the government, but within the year he was pushed out by the ally he had rashly called to assist him, and the cardinal's power soon became supreme.

It so continued until his death; but it was never an authority he could exercise without careful regard to his royal master. Louis XIII. was by no means a *faincant* king. Though a man of small abilities, he was ambitious to have a name in Europe, and he was tenacious in the exercise of authority. He had been jealous of the power of Concini, and he was becoming jealous of Luines when the constable died. He could not be left entirely to his birds or his hunting, nor did he, like Charles II., ask of public affairs only that they should not disturb his pleasures. At the same time he could be largely controlled by a stronger mind, but the influence had to be constantly renewed, and its impression was easily effaced. Richelieu's vigorous foreign policy, and the weight he gave France in European politics, excited the pride of the young king. The desire for an administration which should be powerful and brilliant kept the latter faithful to his minister, when his overthrow was sought by Louis'

was very earnest in pressing her favorite's promotion. Richelieu says in his memoirs—vol. xxi., p. 267—that the king afterward told him that he would not have been made cardinal if Luines had lived. In his memoirs he always speaks of Luines unfavorably.

¹ Richelieu, p. 287.

mother, wife, ladyloves, brother, friends, and courtiers and when he himself had no personal liking for the cardinal. But the ascendancy had to be preserved with unwearrying care. Richelieu had the art to conceal, as far as possible, the control he really exerted; he constantly consulted his master; he endeavored to instil the belief that his plans were but the king's own resolves. He called himself the king's shadow.¹ Even in the lesser matter of being near his sovereign, he exercised a vigilance as constant as that of Luines. Rarely did the cardinal dare to allow his master to be long out of his sight. Never, during nineteen years of power, would he have felt it safe to be absent from the king for six months. He had in Louis one of the most difficult persons with whom to deal. "Your Majesty," said the minister to his sovereign, "is extremely suspicious, jealous, susceptible to passing aversions and to variable humors and inclinations."² No more diplomatic skill was needed to manage a dozen greedy and envious petty German potentates than to retain an influence over a king who united to slight abilities, a strong desire for power, and who was impatient of the assistance which his good sense told him he needed. The devices of the cardinal to overthrow those who pleased the king, and used their favor against the minister, are among the curious features of his long administration. No modern statesman would watch more closely the varying caprices of a fickle public than he did the whims and changing fancies of his royal master.

Richelieu found embarrassments both at home and abroad when he assumed the position of chief minister. The internal condition of the country was in every way unsatisfactory. The great nobles were jealous of any vigorous authority, and he was himself looked upon by them with suspicion or with dislike. The Huguenots

¹ This expression occurs frequently in Richelieu's letters and memoirs to the king. "Je ne prétendray jamais autre gloire que de vivre à l'ombre de la vostre." Letter of Nov. 12, 1636, to the king. *Lettres de Richelieu*, v., p. 1001.

² Richelieu, xxi., p. 577.

were ready for constant outbreaks; Rohan, Soubise, and the inhabitants of La Rochelle were complaining of infractions of the peace of Montpellier, and eager to regain the power which that treaty had diminished. The finances of the government were disordered, and the administration was carried on with difficulty by means of a vast and unorganized body of officials.

The condition of Europe was also full of embarrassment for France, if she was again to exert any influence in foreign politics. In Germany Ferdinand II. had met with unbroken and extraordinary success, and his increasing power threatened to change the condition of that country, and excited the gravest apprehension.

Spain was allied with Ferdinand in advancing the interests of the House of Austria. A young king had recently ascended the throne. His father, Philip III., had his death hastened by the absurd ceremonial of that Court, where etiquette had stiffened into rigidity. Philip was infirm in health, as were all of his decrepit family. On a cold day at the beginning of Lent, a very hot brazier had been placed near him. The drops of sweat rolled from his face, but he preserved his natural taciturnity. The Marquis of Pobar told the Duke of Alva to take away the brazier which was distressing the king, but Alva said that duty belonged to the Duke of Usseda, the king's butler. Usseda was sought for, but he had gone to visit some buildings, and before he could be brought the king was so broiled that, in his diseased condition, a fever set in, which brought on erysipelas, from which he died.¹

His son resembled him in the weakness of his intellect, and followed his example in giving the charge of his kingdom to favorites. The Count of Olivarez, the new favorite, banished or beheaded those whom he found in power, and the government of the country continued with weakness abroad and misery at home.

¹ Bassompierre, 151. Bassompierre says this incident was told him by the Marquis of Pobar. It has been vigorously denied by some Spanish authorities, but I think it is substantially correct.

The old Duke of Savoy was busy with that fertility of intrigue which has characterized his versatile and untrustworthy family. In Switzerland the troubles of the Grisons threatened to lead to a general war. In Italy the approaching death of the Duke of Mantua promised strife as to his succession. From the Court of Rome moral if not material help might be expected in the event of a war with Spain. Urban VIII. was now pope, a man friendly with the French and jealous of the Spanish. The possessions of Spain in Italy made it obnoxious to popes who, like Urban, desired to create a territorial power for favorite nephews.

Complications with England seemed even more likely than with Spain. Its government was at this time weak at home and had little influence abroad; but the position of the Huguenot party furnished easy opportunities for the interference of a Protestant and maritime power.¹ In 1625, Charles was married to Henriette, sister of Louis XIII., but disputes about her servants and religious attendants soon made this alliance a cause of dissension. The policy of England was, however, most influenced by the Duke of Buckingham, and his desire to play the rôle of Lothario, with the queen of France for Camilla. There is no doubt that Buckingham, who claimed to be the handsomest and most accomplished courtier in Europe, excited a romantic interest in Anne of Austria. Her own husband was neither fond nor fair. Even if we do not credit Retz's accounts of the extent to which this romance was carried, Buckingham's devotion to the queen, and the gossip so easily excited on such a theme, annoyed both the king and Richelieu.² Buckingham was conceited enough to think he could come back to Paris as a conqueror, and frivolous enough to undertake a war to gratify his vanity.

Since the death of Henry IV. France could hardly be said to have had any foreign policy. She had abstained from armed interference in the great questions that had

¹ Richelieu, 328.

² *Mémoires de Retz*, 303.

arisen in Germany; she had exerted little or no influence in Italy. But internal dissensions and bad government had kept the country from that increase in wealth and material prosperity that should accompany a season of peace with other nations.

The government of Richelieu covers one of those transitional periods, which can be justly praised and justly blamed. We look at the fifteen years preceding his ministry, and we find an unruly nobility, plundering the state when in power, and ravaging the country when in disgrace—unfit to exercise control, and unwilling to suffer restraint. The States-General and the Parliament had accomplished little in the direction of better government; the Protestants held a turbulent and dangerous power. From a bankrupt treasury, a paralyzed monarchy, a turbulent nobility, warring religions, and a people gaining neither in wealth nor liberty, we come to Richelieu's administration, and we see a government strong at home and influential abroad. To turn from the rule of Concini and Luines to that of the great cardinal, seems like leaving the anarchy of selfish misrule for the order of a strong government.

The cardinal gained for France an influence in the affairs of Europe greater than she had before possessed. He helped to check the dangerous power of Austria; he took a great part in the struggle which gave Germany lasting relief from religious wars. The name of France carried weight and dignity from the Straits of Gibraltar to the Baltic. It is probable that only the consolidation of the king's authority which was then effected, would have enabled France to accomplish so great things.

But we look on, and we see under Louis XIV. the principles of Richelieu's government bearing their full fruit. The nobles who were restrained under the cardinal had become courtiers under the king. The Parliaments checked under Richelieu had, under Louis XIV., lost even the hope of exerting any restraint upon the royal will or the royal caprice. Taxation had grown more

grinding; the indifference to the popular welfare had become more callous; the tendencies of centralization had passed from the era of vigor to the era of decay. So also the policy which, under Louis XIII., led to war in Germany in order to preserve a just balance of power, and to the siege of La Rochelle in order to restrain an unruly sect, under his son led to wars undertaken to gratify the vanity of power, and persecutions carried on under the spur of bigotry. The strength gained in a contest to preserve the balance of power was used by Louis XIV. to overthrow the balance of power. France defended the Netherlands against the tyranny of Spain in the early part of the century, and herself became their oppressor at its close.

The capture of La Rochelle was, indeed, an antecedent rather than a cause of the revocation of the edict of Nantes. It was impossible that under any government a religious party should continue in the position which the Huguenots held in France in the early part of the seventeenth century. The result must either have been the establishment of a separate government, as in the Netherlands, or the loss of their political power, as after the capture of La Rochelle. It would have been possible after that for the Huguenots to find toleration and to continue citizens of France. But the blood of Philip II. flowed thick in the veins of Louis XIV. The Jesuits were his spiritual advisers, instilling a narrow fanaticism under the cover of the awful power and religious intimacy of the confessional. A bigoted monarch found a weakened religious party. Richelieu's victories over the Protestants made possible the dragonnades and the loss of half a million of the best citizens of France.

The doubt remains of how far the general political policy adopted by Richelieu was the only course which was open to him. He followed a part naturally suggested to a statesman who had watched the early years of the reign of Louis XIII. But it seems possible that a government could have been formed in France with a popular

support, possessing vigor, but restrained by law. In the States-General and in the Parliaments, in the nobility restrained and educated, in the burgesses and city officers, in the intelligent and patriotic middle classes, existed the elements for a great and durable government. We cannot say how far these might have been used and developed in the time of Richelieu by a great political genius; how far France might have been made alike powerful and free; how far it was possible to shape the next fifty years, so that the Revolution should not have become a necessity; how far the country might have gained, at a less price, all the glory that lay before it. It is certain that the future development of the French monarchy was settled in the reign of Louis XIII. It is the proof of a great man's work, that it survives, whether for good or evil. The tendencies of government which Richelieu established could not be changed after him.

In two things certainly he failed to show the highest order of statesmanship. He had little ability as a financier. His wars increased the burden of taxation, and he had no time to give to devising means for increasing the national wealth, in order to meet the greater demands. He adopted some measures against the farmers and jobbers of the revenue, he made some improvements in the manner of collecting it, but he devised no radical change in a vicious system.

He lacked also the ability to gain any hold on the popular affection. The cardinal mistrusted the people and despised their judgment. He held his power by the might of his own right hand, and not by the support of the nation. The qualities which excited popular admiration he did not possess, and the acts which might have endeared him to the popular gratitude he did not perform. In the prosecution of his foreign policy, which, from financial distress and a lack of great generals, was pursued through long years of exhausting warfare, the internal interests of France were left to suffer. The increase of the navy and of the merchant marine, the development of

commerce and of new industries, the improvements in the system of taxation, the things which should make France happy as well as great, and which early engaged the attention of the minister, were forgotten in the exigencies of foreign war. Respite from religious contests and from the insurrections of the nobility lessened the misery of the people, and gave opportunities for the fields to bring forth their increase and the husbandman to gather into his barns. But taxation grew heavier instead of lighter, great armies were levied in France, and foreign troops more than once laid waste her fields. The cardinal had neither the art to amuse a hungry people, nor sufficient interest in their welfare to keep them fed. When many lacked food, he lived in great state, which was supported by no ancestral wealth. A cold and inexorable man, his name was as little cherished by the bourgeois of Orleans, or the peasant of Normandy, as by the president of Parliament, whom he bullied, or by the family of the nobleman whom he beheaded.

The new minister soon showed his purpose to make France again an active factor in European politics, and the occasions for interference were numerous. Troubles in the Valteline had for some years created complications between France and Spain. The Grisons, a Protestant confederacy, had become the rulers of the Valteline, a small body of about 30,000 Catholic Swiss. They had long been allied with France, and they furnished her armies a passage through their country, which could be used as a route to enter Italy. Their alliance had lately been extended to Venice and to Spain, which could thus communicate with Germany. Complications arose from these new alliances. The inhabitants of the Valteline sought to throw off the supremacy of the Grisons, and they appealed to Catholic nations to relieve them from their dependence upon heretics. Spain interfered in their behalf, and in 1622 compelled a treaty by which a free passage was at all times to be granted to her soldiers, and

the Valteline became practically independent on condition of paying a small tribute. France thereupon threatened to interfere in behalf of the Grisons, and to prevent this, the Valteline and its forts were temporarily placed in the hands of the Pope. Richelieu's first military step was to show that he was a minister of the state, more than a cardinal of the church. In the latter part of 1624 the French troops suddenly attacked the Valteline and took the forts from the possession of the Papal soldiers. To such an insult they added the farce of returning the captured banners, in order to show the respect and reverence which the French king felt for his Holiness. The French made also an indirect attack on Spain by joining the Duke of Savoy in an invasion of the territories of Genoa, the ally and the banker of Spain.¹

These foreign complications arose largely from exertions in behalf of Protestant allies, but they encouraged fresh risings among the Huguenots. These had indeed political grievances of which to complain. It had been agreed that Fort St. Louis should be destroyed, which so commanded La Rochelle that Lesdiguières said the city must take the fort or the fort take the city. The king had failed to carry out the agreement, and it had probably been given with little intention of performance. There were disputes also about the condition of Montpellier and some other of the Huguenot cities. Still no reasons, except the position of political independence which they assumed, seem to have justified the resumption of arms by the Protestant leaders. There was little complaint of personal oppression or of interference with their faith. Rohan and Soubise, however, began hostilities, and they obtained promises of aid from England. Such a diversion interfered with Richelieu's movements in the Valteline and in Italy. But save as an embarrassment this revolt was not of serious importance, and in the early part of 1626 it was ended by a treaty which left Soubise an exile

¹ See *Lettres de Richelieu*, vol. ii. *Mercure François*, 1624 and 1625. Richelieu 21, 309-314, *et seq.*

in England, and by which the destruction of Fort St. Louis was formally refused.¹

Reluctance to cramp the hostilities against Spain may have influenced some of the Huguenot leaders, and this certainly induced England to insist upon peace. But the expectations that such hostilities would be continued were to be grievously disappointed. Peace at home was soon followed by peace abroad. Richelieu seems to have resolved that he would have his hands free to strengthen his position at home before he interfered further with foreign politics. He said that while the party of the Huguenots existed in France the king could not be master within nor be able to attempt any glorious action without.²

In his testament he has left the record of what he thought France required. "When your Majesty called me to your councils, I can truly say that the Huguenots divided the state with you. The nobles conducted themselves as if they were not subjects, and the governors of provinces as if they were independent sovereigns. Foreign alliances were despised, private interests preferred to public, and the dignity of your Majesty so abased it could hardly be recognized. I promised your Majesty to use all my industry and power to ruin the Huguenot party, lower the pride of the nobles, lead all subjects to their duty, and restore the country's name among foreign nations."³ His far-reaching plans abroad required that his power should be unquestioned at home, and that there should be no need of drawing troops from foreign service to resist domestic insurrection.

The war in the Valteline was suddenly ended by a treaty which practically abandoned the rights of the Grisons in a manner far from honorable. Without consultation with them, or with Venice or Savoy, a peace was made with Spain by which hostilities against Genoa were

¹ *Mercur* François, 1626, 119, *et seq.* *Lettres de Richelieu*, vol. ii. Rohan, 542-553. *Richelieu*, 325-346.

² *Lettres de Richelieu*, vol. ii., pp. 82, 83.

³ *Testament Politique*, part i., chap. i., 1-4.

suspended, and the sovereignty of the Grisons over the Valteline was reduced to a tribute and a shadowy right of confirmation of certain officers. Even that was subject to interference if they violated any of the terms imposed upon them by a treaty to which their consent was not asked.¹

Richelieu gave little heed to the outburst of disappointment, or to the complaints of bad faith, that followed the publication of this treaty. He had chosen to espouse the cause of Savoy and of the Grisons, and he had chosen to abandon it. Internal affairs and attempts at internal improvement were to occupy his attention for the next few years.

The enormous and fraudulent gains of the farmers of the revenues had long been known. In order to make a systematic endeavor to force a restitution of some portion of their unconscionable profits, Richelieu followed the suggestion of the States-General of 1614 and created a Chamber of Justice. It was vested with extraordinary power to inquire into the procedure, accounts, and frauds of the farmers of the revenues, to compel them to render an account of their present wealth, and how it had been obtained, and to impose such fines or other punishments as it should think just.²

The corruption had been universal, and the consternation was great at the prospect of any rigid inquiry. Even La Vieuville, Richelieu's predecessor as chief minister, was accused, and with justice, of having himself plundered the state and given opportunity to others to do the same. His father-in-law was charged with having stolen several millions with his connivance. He fled, and was condemned to be burned in effigy.³

Some of those accused fled to avoid investigation.

¹ Richelieu, 21, 369. etc. *Lettres de Richelieu*, ii., 190, *et passim*, *Mercure François*, 1626, 206, etc. Dumont, *Corps Dip.* t. v., 2d part. 487-494. Rohan, 542-553.

² *Mercure François*, 1624, 695. It excepted, however, those who had made extraordinary advances to the king.

³ *Mercure François*, 1624 and 1625.

Others, with better judgment, used all the influence possessed by a body of wealthy men to have the Chamber of Justice abolished. It was difficult to raise large sums of ready money at that time, and with plans for foreign war the cardinal felt he was not in condition to carry too far his quarrel with the financiers, who claimed to be the only men able to make large advances on the taxes for the present needs of the government. Those who farmed the revenues, and had financial dealings with the government, offered to pay 8,200,000 livres for a cessation of all proceedings against them. In 1625 the edict was revoked by which the Chamber of Justice had been created, and a full pardon was granted for all offences committed prior to that time. It was said that 11,000,000 livres were paid to the government by the various persons accused, and on those terms their offences were condoned.¹

In 1626, when the cardinal's power was not yet firmly established, he made his only appeal for popular support. Even that went no further than the calling of an assembly of notables. Twelve nobles, as many of the higher clergy, and twenty-nine representatives of the parliaments and the officers of finance, together with a few great dignitaries, were assembled.² In a small body of men, arbitrarily chosen by the king, none would be summoned who would be suspected of any tendency to pass from advice to criticism.

The measures which the cardinal proposed received, with moderate change, the support of the assembly.³ Some of them were of large importance. The navy of

¹ *Mercuré François*, 1625, 554, 576, *et seq.* Richelieu, 305, 308.

² The proceedings of this assembly are fully reported in "*Assemblée des Notables, tenue à Paris en 1626-7*," and in the *Mercuré François* for 1626-7. A curious letter of advice is prefixed (pages 1-14, *Assemblée des Notables*). The writer thinks the pensions cost the nobles more than they received, and that only the judges made any gain out of litigation. He complains bitterly, and perhaps justly, of the delay, and especially of the expense of litigation, and the desire for fees among those who had paid great prices for their offices. The Courts of Merchants, he says, are the quickest and best, because they have no emoluments.

³ Richelieu, 21, 437-438.

France had dwindled away to almost nothing. Her merchant marine was insignificant. The Dutch, English, and Italians carried the bulk of French goods, and in the approaching contest with La Rochelle, Louis was obliged to have the Dutch furnish him with men-of-war. This scanty marine was crippled also by the ravages of piracy. Pirates coming from the North African states, or refugees from European countries, haunted the waters of the Mediterranean and the Bay of Biscay. Merchant vessels endeavored to sail in squadrons, having a convoy of men-of-war for their protection. It was claimed that pirates of all nations had, in six years, robbed the French of property worth 35,000,000 livres. Richelieu made constant efforts to strengthen the navy and build up the shipping interests of France. The office of admiral, whose power at sea corresponded to that of constable on land, was abolished, and Montmorenci was paid 1,200,000 livres to surrender the dignity.¹ Richelieu assumed the entire charge of the marine, with the new title of Grand Master of Navigation and Commerce, and during his whole administration, devoted to the interests of the service a zeal which produced some, though not large, results. In 1625, a regulation had ordered the building of thirty galleys to protect those trading in the Levant. The galleys were to cost 15,000 livres each, or about \$7,500.²

The notables favored constructing forty-five vessels of war to cost 1,200,000 livres, furnishing merchant ships with proper convoys in the Mediterranean and organizing commercial companies.

Another measure was brought before the assembly for its advice, which ranks among the important changes which Richelieu effected in the interior condition of France. On July 31, 1626, an edict had been issued, which ordered the destruction of all the useless castles and fortifications which then existed in the kingdom. Only those were to be spared which were on the frontiers or possessed some

¹ Richelieu, 21, 424.

² Richelieu, Lettres, ii., 163. Molé, i., 420.

special value in case of foreign war.¹ Their destruction was left to the local governments. The hatred felt for these strongholds of rapine and cruelty furnished willing laborers, and many a local bastille and petty arsenal was torn down. It was forbidden to erect fortified chateaux or castles in the future.

While this measure was a judicious one, its political importance has perhaps been overestimated. Many of the castles destroyed belonged to the government, and they were done away with to save the expense of repairs and garrisons. The feudal castle, which had been impregnable to cross-bows, had ceased to be a sure defence against artillery. Yet though the change in weapons had changed also the importance of such retreats, the old fortress in the 17th century could defy a body of half-armed peasants, and was only in danger when its occupants had committed crimes which would bring against them the forces of the king. Their destruction affected what still remained of feudal power and modes of life.

The notables were asked to give their advice as to what castles and fortifications should be destroyed, and which of them were of sufficient value to be spared. The advice also of some of the local parliaments was presented. Those that were marked out for destruction were mostly in the southern portions of the kingdom. There civil commotions had chiefly waged, with the result that many towns had been fortified and that both the government and the nobles had erected more strong places than in northern France. It is probable also that this measure was aimed somewhat at the Huguenots, who used many of these fortresses in the southern provinces. Still the destruction of these castles and entrenchments scattered over the interior of the kingdom, though perhaps it was the result rather than the cause of important political changes, marks the close of the centuries of local and

¹ *Mercure François*, 1626, 369, *et seq.* In 1625 Richelieu entered in the private memoranda in which he blocked out the policy, which it was sometimes years before he began, a note or resolution to destroy the useless fortifications in the heart of the kingdom.

private wars, of the violences of the robber baron and of the noble highwayman.¹

A president of the Court of Aids suggested what would have been a still more important measure for the relief of the kingdom, that the *taille* should be levied alike on all lands, whether noble or not.² Few were bold enough to advocate such a change, and Richelieu seems never to have contemplated it. A statement was presented which showed the finances of the kingdom in their usual disorder.³ The receipts from the *taille*, it was said, were so far alienated for debts or consumed in the collection, that of 19,000,000 collected from the people less than 6,000,000 came to the treasury. Of 9,400,000 raised by the *gabelle* it was claimed that little more than 1,000,000 reached the treasury: 2,000,000 was consumed in the collection; 6,300,000 had been alienated for debts. The expenses of the government had now reached 36,000,000 to 40,000,000 livres per year, and there was a great deficit above all receipts. The assembly separated in February, 1627, after submitting various general suggestions for improvement. The nobles sent a separate petition, which consisted of requests for their own advancement, similar to many of those submitted by the nobles in the States of 1614.⁴

The minister followed the suggestions of the notables and his own desires, in various attempts to increase the commerce of France by the formation of great trading companies. To these Richelieu gave much attention, and they were granted liberal charters, but none of them were to become rivals of the great trading companies of England or Holland. One company was formed

¹ See *Assemblée des Notables*, 111, 119-129, *et passim*. It was some years before all the castles were destroyed which were covered by the terms of the edict of 1626.

² This was done in some of the provinces where the taxes were imposed by the local States.

³ See *Mercure François*, 12., 756, *et seq.*, 806.

⁴ *Ib.*, and *Assemblée des Notables*, etc., *supra*, at p. 229, *et seq.* In the latter are contained the amounts paid the members for their attendance. They received thirty livres each, or about fifteen dollars a day.

with a capital of 1,000,000 livres, which was to trade both East and West and build up a great commercial port at Morbihan. In 1628, the company of Canada was organized. To its proprietors were granted the city of Quebec, and all of New France called Canada, which was described with a looseness that would take it to Florida, and from Newfoundland to the great lake called the Mer Douce. They were given the perpetual monopoly of the trade in skins and furs, and of other articles for fifteen years. No duty was to be levied for fifteen years on merchandise brought from Canada to France. They were subjected, however, to religious responsibilities, for they could take to Canada only Catholics, and they were bound to keep all their trading stations liberally supplied with missionaries.¹

The charter of another company shows the minute detail with which trade was regulated, even with a friendly government. A company was organized, composed of Frenchmen and Flemish, to be called the Bark of St. Peter with the Fleurs de Lys, which was to trade in various parts, to introduce fisheries and new manufactories, improve desert land, and even add brewing to its activities. The exemptions it received from duties show how numerous were the burdens which were borne by less favored industries. The foreigners who came to settle in their towns were to have the rights of Frenchmen, and should they die in France their property was to go to their heirs, instead of being confiscated by the Crown. They were to be free from *taille*, hearth money, port duties, aids, examination of their vessels, and from having soldiers quartered on them. Should they improve desert lands, these were to be free from duties and servitudes to king or lord, save church tithes and one twenty-fifth of wheat, rye, and wine. Their shipwrecked vessels, in like manner, were freed from the barbarous rights of confiscation, which the French king and nobles still claimed over property lost upon their shores. Other privileges were

¹ Mer. François, 1628, 234, *et seq.*

granted which had a pecuniary as well as a social value. The rights of nobility were promised to thirty-two of the company at once, and to those in the future whose ancestors for three generations had been constantly in its service, "the intention of his majesty being to grant more honors than heretofore to those who embrace commerce," while those of any rank were allowed to invest money in the company, and to take part in its business, without derogation from their position. In anticipation of the rights of eminent domain granted to the great carrying corporations of the present day, this company could acquire land, buildings, and mills necessary for its purposes, at prices to be fixed by officers of the state, if the owners did not agree upon them. A right not granted to modern successors was given it, of compelling beggars and tramps, who were said to be very numerous, to enter its service and to keep them at work for six years, furnishing them only clothing and provisions.¹

Richelieu endeavored to carry out also an important measure toward simplifying and centralizing the administration, by the gradual appointment of superintendents in the various provinces. Similar officers had formerly existed, but it was under Richelieu that they were given a general superintendence by virtue of which they possessed a very extensive power. Called superintendents of justice, police, and finance, they exercised in the provinces to which they were sent a general authority over almost any question that might arise. Not holding an office which they had purchased, removed from local sympathies and affiliations, they were exclusively the representatives of the government which sent them. The collection of the *taille* in time fell largely into their hands, and this control was made more complete by the abolition, a few years later, of the local treasurers and tax-gatherers, who had collected the *taille* at vast expense and with great irregularities. By 1648 it was said that there were thirty-five of these superintendents in France. The institution

¹ Molé, i., 423-448.

of these officers, though a wise measure, was not a popular one. They interfered with the dignity and the emoluments of a host of local officers of more or less importance. Those whose interests were affected were loud in their condemnation, and the burden of the taxes increased so rapidly that even improvements in its collection received no favor from the taxed.¹

The cardinal endeavored to check another practice of the upper classes, in which they constantly indulged, and which had become a serious evil. France, almost alone of civilized nations, still clings to that custom, whose barbarity is exceeded by its absurdity; but at this period duelling was not the harmless folly of the present day.

One gentleman had fought seventeen duels and killed his opponent in every one but the first. They fought even in the streets of Paris by the light of the stars and of torches.² The Seigneur of Pontis, who was to be one of the saints of the Port Royal, tells us of a duel in which he was engaged when young, growing out of a blow one cadet gave another. So great was the desire to engage in such affrays, that one of his comrades compelled them to take him as one of the seconds, by threatening that if they did not, he would expose them to the superior officers and prevent the meeting. Principals and seconds, all of them mere lads, fought with such ferocity, that of six engaged two were killed and three were wounded.³

Edicts against duelling had been plentiful, but they were dead letters. It was as impossible to enforce them as to enforce total abstinence in New York or London. Henry IV. had forbidden the practice by his edicts, but fostered it by his approval, so that a duel for a man who desired to stand well at Court was an opening for favor.⁴

A fresh edict, in 1626, was regarded as no more likely to be enforced than its predecessors. One Bouteville, a

¹ See the commission granted various superintendents from time to time. *Mém. d'Omer Talon*, ed. Michaud. Caillet, L' *Administration sous Richelieu*, 1, 56-91.

² Richelieu, 21., 373.

³ *Mémoires de Pontis*, 453.

⁴ Fontenay, 30.

gentleman allied to the great house of Montmorenci, who had already fought twenty-two duels, defied the law and returned to Paris. There fresh provocation was given, and he insisted on fighting his twenty-third in the Place Royale. Bouteville and his cousin and second, Deschappelles, were arrested, and the cardinal resolved to check the practice by a severe example. The prayers of the greatest nobles in France, and the record of gallant conduct in the king's service, were alike unavailing. They were both beheaded by the common executioner at the Place de Grève.¹ A posthumous son of Bouteville was to be the famous Marshal of Luxembourg.

During all of his long administration, a succession of plots were laid against the power or the life of the cardinal. The first of them now gave an opportunity for Richelieu to show his merciless vigor against his enemies. An alliance had been projected between Gaston, the king's younger brother, and Mlle. Montpensier, the greatest heiress in France. The king was jealous of his brother, and hesitated about allowing him to be married. Louis was childless, with every prospect of so remaining. Gaston would have a still greater position than he already held should he become the father of a prince, probably destined to be a future king.² However, the king consented to the marriage, but opposition was raised to it among the friends of Gaston himself. These intrigues were largely conducted by some of the great ladies of France. The widow of Luines had married the Duke of Chevreuse, and she now began her life of untiring and unsuccessful political intrigue. Anne of Austria never wavered in her dislike of the cardinal. Should Gaston marry, and his wife have sons, she felt that she would be of no further account, and she did what she could to oppose the alliance.³ The Condés, the Soissons, and the Vendômes were ready to prevent this marriage of Gaston. Some of his officers, who controlled this weak lad of eighteen, with the Marshal of

¹ Richelieu, 447-451 ; *Mercur* François, 1626.

² Richelieu, 391.

³ *Mémoires de Mme. de Motteville*, ed. Michaud, t. 24, p. 21.

Ornano at their head, were the most active in these plots. Louis' health was so infirm, that his death never seemed remote or improbable. It was suggested that in that emergency Gaston could marry his widow, and Richelieu's overthrow was a part of the scheme for preventing the alliance with the Montpensiers.¹ The plot took definite shape in a design to murder Richelieu at a dinner to be given by him at his own palace. But the plans of the confederates, whose plot was styled the Conspiracy of the Dames, came to the ears of the cardinal, who owed his safety during his long administration to his unequalled system of espionage. He met it with vigor, and with the first of the frequent executions which reflect a lurid light upon his career. The Marshal of Ornano was first arrested. The Vendômes, the bastard sons of Henry IV. and Gabrielle d'Estrées, were next sought. The grand prior was at court, but his brother, the Duke of Vendôme, hesitated to entrust himself within the cardinal's power. "I give you my word," said the young Louis to the grand prior, "that your brother shall suffer no more harm than you." The brother was summoned and was warmly received, and on the next day both the Vendômes were arrested and lodged in the Castle of Amboise. Gaston demanded Ornano's release, and the plotting continued. A young nobleman called Chalais, the master of the king's wardrobe, and a lover of Mme. de Chevreuse, took an active part in carrying on these intrigues, but they ended in nothing except his own arrest. Monsieur, as Gaston was called, at first protested against these arrests, but willingness to desert friends in peril was his most marked characteristic during a life of intrigue. He soon submitted, and promised, by the memory of his father and the fear of his God, to form no further cabals, but to live in harmony with the king and in obedience to him, and to disclose all the evil advice he should hear; that there being between them but one heart and soul, no artifice could break their confidence.²

¹ *Lettres de Richelieu*, ii., 232.

² *Richelieu*, 385.

He was forthwith married to Mlle. Montpensier by the cardinal, was made Duke of Orleans, and given pensions and appanages which yielded him yearly 200,000 livres, the equivalent of an income of half a million dollars at the present time.¹

The marriage was ratified by the execution of Chalais for treason. He was tried by one of the special courts, to which Richelieu assigned most state prosecutions, for greater certainty of the result. The news of his favorite's death was brought to Monsieur as he was playing at cards, but he continued his game undisturbed.²

Madame de Chevreuse was exiled, and began her long years of intriguing and love-making in all the Courts of Europe. She left, threatening to send the armies of England to avenge her and to show that she was capable of sterner things than coquetry.³ Ornano anticipated the executioner by dying in prison, and the grand prior followed him. Charges of poison were excited by both events. Richelieu was often favored by the hand of death, but he showed too much willingness to destroy his enemies in public to need to resort to secret murder.⁴

Such Court intrigues were overshadowed by the last great struggle with the Huguenot party, and the heroic but unavailing resistance of the last Protestant stronghold. The marriage of Louis' sister with Charles I. had rendered

¹ *Mercur* François, 1627, 461, *et seq.*; 1626, 385.

² *Archives curieuses*, 2d series, vol. iii., p. 341.

³ Richelieu, 393.

⁴ Fontenay Marueil, 176-183; Rohan, 555-558; Bassompierre, 249-251; Andilly, 450; *Mém. de Gaston*, 569, 570; Richelieu, 375-399; *Mém. d'un Favori*—*Arch. cur.*, 2d series, t. iii. The whole plot and the trial of Chalais is fully contained in "*Pièces du Procès de Henri de Talleyrand, Comte de Chalais*," and in *Archives étrangères*, France, t. 38, 39, and 40. M. Cousin has analyzed them with his usual accuracy and literary skill. Richelieu's private notes show that he was not troubled by Vendôme's death. He says of the Vendômes when they were in prison, in his *Mém.*, in Sept., 1626: "S'ils en sortent ils feront le diable." Ornano's death, however, was a disappointment, as is shown by his private correspondence. He writes the king, Sept. 4, 1626: "Je suis infiniment fâché, que la mort du Mareschal d'Ornano ait prévenu le jugement de son procès. La justice de Dieu a voulu prévenir la vostre." *Let. de Richelieu*, 7, 951.

the relations with England less instead of more friendly. Richelieu and his associates so far mistook the strength of the Protestant feeling in England as to imagine that this alliance would prove of decided advantage to English Catholics. In addition to this disappointment, Charles had not yet become the model husband, whose marital virtues were to be offset against his political crimes.

The French complained that Buckingham showed too little politeness to Louis' sister and too much to Louis' wife. After coquetting with Charles, Spain made a treaty with France, by which the governments allied themselves against England. A joint invasion was suggested in the cause of the Catholic religion, a plan little less an anachronism than to have agreed on a crusade to Palestine for the recovery of the Sepulchre. Each nation was to furnish 50 ships and 10,000 soldiers, and the Marquis of Spinola was to command the united army when it was landed. The best reward for their conquests would be the reëstablishment of the Catholic religion in England, but each of the allies would retain a port of entry on the English coast.¹ The English, however, began hostilities. Under the plea of rendering assistance to the Protestants, Buckingham undertook a war which had little motive but a knight-errantry born out of season.²

On July 20, 1627, about ninety English ships appeared off the Island of Ré. Ré is the more northerly of two islands which lie outside of the harbor of La Rochelle. Though well supplied with ports it was far inferior in fertility to the larger island of Oleron, where it was feared the attack would be made.³ The possession of either island by the English would allow constant communication with La Rochelle, the stronghold of the Protestant party.

That city was one of the most strongly fortified towns

¹ *Mém. de Richelieu*, 21, 511, 512.

² *Mercure François*, 1627, 803-809.

³ *Richelieu*, 455-462. *Lettres de Richelieu*, ii., 509-521. *Mer. Fran.*, 1627, 801-835. *Archives curieuses*, 2d series, vol. iii., p. 52, say the English appeared July 22d, and with 120 sail.

of France. The land behind it was low, marshy, and only to be traversed by long causeways. Its population, of about 30,000 souls, was largely composed of mariners esteemed the boldest and most hardy of France. Trained in an active commerce on a stormy sea, not unfrequently adding the gains of piracy to the profits of trade, they were a population resolute, confident, and fitted to endure every hardship. The city enjoyed almost entire independence. It claimed to have been a walled town for five hundred years, and its patriotic services against the English had long secured to it the right to choose or nominate its own magistrates. Its mayor was vested with great authority, and boasted that his office was created by letters-patent from Queen Eleanor in 1199.¹ The city was subject directly to the king, and under the jurisdiction of the Parliament of Paris. No governor or king's lieutenant exercised over it any intermediate or delegated authority. It had the right to refuse to allow any garrison to be stationed within it, and to employ its own soldiers only in its own defence; its officials were entitled to the privileges of nobility. The citizens, strongly attached to the Protestant faith, had possessed the right to forbid any mass being said within their walls, and though this had been surrendered in the late treaty, they still enforced the supremacy of their own creed.

These religious and political privileges were protected by the strength of the city's position, with the harbor on one side, and on the other sides great morasses which were difficult to pass. These natural advantages had been fully improved. Strong forts and a large and vigorous marine protected the harbor. On the land side the city was surrounded with vast fortifications, believed to be equal to the repulse of any enemy. The great bastion of the Gospel, at the northwest angle, excited the confidence of the pious defenders, by its prodigious strength as well as by its name.

¹ Mer. Fran., vol. xiii., 51-54. The first mayor is said then to have been elected and his office recognized by the queen.

The cardinal had long meditated the overthrow of this powerful and unruly city. The English, on the other hand, hoped to make such an alliance with it, that it might become for them another Calais, and the expedition of Buckingham brought on the long-contemplated conflict. Contrary to the expectations of his enemies, the duke landed his troops on the Island of Ré. The landing was successfully made, and had it been promptly followed up, might have resulted in the capture of Fort St. Martin and the undisputed possession of the island. But before any assault was made the French had time to prepare for defence. Richelieu showed prodigious activity in his efforts to hold the fort at whatever cost. It was but poorly supplied with provisions, and Buckingham anticipated that famine would soon compel a surrender.¹ The rest of the island, except the smaller port of La Prée, was in possession of the English. The harbor was closed by a barricade formed of masts and iron chains, fastened by great anchors, so that Buckingham said that only the birds of heaven could reach the fort.²

But the boldness and vigor of the French mariners, incited by promises of great rewards, found means to escape the English ships and break through the barricades, carrying provisions to the besieged. The garrison, which had been on the verge of starvation, now manifested their relief by displaying on the battlements and the tops of their pikes, bottles of wine, capons, hams, and various delicacies.³ The arrival of supplies was followed by the arrival of reinforcements. Notwithstanding the peril of attacking such an island as Ré, in the face of a powerful enemy, 6,000 French soldiers effected a landing. Buckingham had long wearied of his expedition. He had been disappointed of any brilliant success. When his position was much stronger he had offered peace, if the French would destroy Fort St. Louis, and even these moderate terms had been refused. His military qualities

¹ Richelieu, 457. *Mercure François*, 1627, 838-863. ² Richelieu, 463.

³ Richelieu, 473 ; *Mercure*, xiii., 872, ; vol. xiv., 24-28.

were contemptible, and his patience was easily exhausted. After attempting a final assault on the fortress, which had been delayed until reinforcements both within and without made it hopeless, his troops were again embarked, not without serious loss, and on the 17th of November they set sail for England, to hide themselves, said their triumphant adversary, in the caves of their island.¹ They had been four months engaged in a fruitless siege of one poorly provided fort. But 1,200 men remained of over 8,000 who had landed.²

The retreat of the English left La Rochelle exposed to the undivided strength of the French king. That city had indeed shown little zeal in supporting Buckingham. It had long delayed making any alliance with him, and in the treaty finally agreed on it was provided that the English should not retain the Island of Ré, or any fortress on the coast. But though the city was faithful to its old traditions of opposition to any dependence on the English, whether they were commanded by Buckingham or the Black Prince, its equally bold assertion of quasi independence confirmed the cardinal in his plans for its overthrow.³

The siege was begun in the autumn of 1627, and the retreat of the English allowed Richelieu to concentrate upon this the entire force of the kingdom. Twenty-five thousand men were encamped about the city. The cardinal's zeal led him to ask the Pope to proclaim a crusade for this undertaking. Plenary indulgence was to be offered to those who would serve personally, or contribute as much as twenty sous towards the cause, and to the hopes of bliss in another life, was to be added the certainty of happiness in this, by permission to eat eggs and cheese during Lent.⁴

¹ Richelieu, 497.

² Richelieu, 484; Fontenay Marueil, 186; Archives curieuses, 72; Mercure, xiii., 892, *et seq.*; vol. xiv., 168-206. The numbers of the English had been reinforced by their French allies.

³ He said in his private memorandum of his purposes: "Faire ruiner les Huguenots."—Lettres de Richelieu, ii., 648.

⁴ Lettres de Richelieu, t. ii., 628, *et seq.*

But the Pope answered, that such things had in former times given the heretics occasion to revile, and stirred up Luther against the church. Even without spiritual assistance, a formidable force was collected. The condition of the army was very different from that of many of its predecessors. Though larger than the force that besieged Montauban, it was well fed, promptly paid, and yet was cared for at much less cost. Strict orders forbade any plunder or outrage upon the country people. It was, said the cardinal, like a well-ordered convent. It resembled one also in the multiplicity of ghostly counsellors. Richelieu was fond of ecclesiastics, both as military and diplomatic agents. Warlike bishops acted as generals in the siege; subtle Dominicans gave orders, arranged plans, and brought information to the priest who acted as general-in-chief.

The fortifications were so formidable that, though with a great advantage in numbers, it was thought useless to attempt an assault, and the slow process of starvation was chosen as the only means of reducing the town.

So long as the harbor was open the inhabitants could receive supplies by sea, and Richelieu undertook therefore the prodigious task of closing the port. The work was begun on December 1, 1627. The furious storms which prevail then repeatedly swept away all that had been done, but the work was begun again as often as it was destroyed. A dyke, built of great stones, the remains of which are still to be seen, was stretched for 4,600 feet across the harbor. The work was done by soldiers, and each one was paid for every basketful of stones he brought, so they gained at least twenty sous a day, at a time when an ordinary laborer would hardly receive nine sous. A floating stockade, composed of vessels fastened by cables and iron chains, formed in the shape of a half moon, occupied the space left between the two sections of the dyke, and whenever any of the vessels were swept away they were replaced by others. A narrow passage way in the centre was constantly guarded by the French

fleet.¹ The work on land was so pressed that by March it was impossible to enter the city.

Its defenders, on the other hand, though too weak to attempt any sallies, conducted themselves with a dogged resolution and a constant vigilance. Guiton, their most famous sea-captain, had been chosen mayor and took charge of the defence. He surpassed in resolution and boldness even a bold and resolute population. When he took his office he laid on the council-table a dagger with which to strike the first man who suggested surrender. He was seconded with equal resolution by the dowager Duchess of Rohan, the mother of the dukes of Rohan and Soubise. Though a woman of seventy, she lived for three months on horse-flesh, sending word to her son to give no faith to letters she might be forced to write in case of surrender, and to relax no efforts for the good cause on account of her miserable condition. "Let your motto be," she wrote, "an assured peace, a complete victory, or an honorable death."² There were many such women in the Huguenot party, who led men by virtue and fortitude, and not like the heroines of the Fronde, by coquetry and beauty.

In the meantime the work of the siege went steadily on, but it was confined to making the blockade constantly more perfect. In March, 1628, an endeavor was made to surprise the town, but part of the forces lost their way in the darkness of the vast morasses and wandered about nearly all the night. The day was fast approaching when they at last assembled, and the attack was abandoned, nor was any further effort made to vary the sure process of starvation. Both Louis and Richelieu were present at the siege. To the latter it was the turning-point in his career. His control over the king could only be preserved by a successful policy. Having had little that resembled glory in his early reign, Louis was pleased by the position

¹ Fontenay Marueil, 195. *Mercure François*, 1628, 585, *et passim*. *Lettres de Richelieu*, vols. ii. and iii. *Mémoires de Richelieu*, vol. xxi., 513-518.

² Rohan, 589.

which it seemed he would gain by the cardinal's efforts, and he restrained his natural fickleness, and the jealousy and impatience of the cardinal's rule, which were never long absent. A final victory like the capture of La Rochelle, would establish Richelieu beyond danger of overthrow from any slight cause.

To it therefore he gave a prodigious activity. His voluminous correspondence shows that he directed and watched even the slightest detail.¹ He borrowed money from his friends and furnished money himself.² He exhorted, encouraged, rewarded, and rebuked. The importance of success to the minister made others lukewarm even over the prospect of so great a victory for the faith. "I think we shall be so foolish as to capture La Rochelle,"³ said Bassompierre, and he himself loyally assisted in the accomplishment of his own prophecy. Others were less faithful. The queen-mother had begun to relax in her devotion to the cardinal, and she endeavored to keep the king from the siege, preferring failure to a victory won by Richelieu's endeavors. Bassompierre himself illustrated the military insubordination so often fatal to French valor. Angoulême had been appointed lieutenant-general of the army at La Rochelle, but Bassompierre and Schomberg, as marshals of France, claimed that when the king was present none but marshals could be in command. They therefore refused to act with Angoulême, and Bassompierre protested he would rather leave the field and live a bourgeois at Paris, than lower his dignity. At last the expedient was adopted of giving him the command of a portion of the army. He was to have separate artillery, provisions, camps, and to besiege the city on one side of the canal. The separate armies continued their siege of different parts of the fortifications.⁴

The siege proceeded month after month. The harbor was practically closed, and famine began to be severe.

¹ See his correspondence for the years 1627 and 1628. *Lettres*, vols. ii. and iii.

² Richelieu, 459.

³ Fontenay Marueil, 199.

⁴ Bassompierre, 261-267. *Font. Mar.*, 190.

Many of the old men, women, and children, who were rapidly dying, came from the city and asked to be allowed to escape, but the French, under Louis' strict orders, drove them back, and left them to return to the town or perish between the lines.¹ The only hope of the city was in help from England. That help was freely promised, but it was only an illusion to prolong their distress. On May 11, 1628, as the sun was setting, a fleet of over a hundred sail, English men-of-war, fire-ships, and provision-boats, sailed up to the entrance of the harbor. The besieged ran up the flags, and kept up a constant cannonade, alike from joy and for encouragement, but their joy was brief. The English lay in the bay for a few days, investigating the dyke, the forts, and the French ships, and then, almost without firing a gun, decided that it was impossible to reach the town, and sailed ignominiously away.²

The distress grew constantly more severe, and the hopes of relief more faint. As the summer of 1628 passed on, the inhabitants ate skins and boiled parchment, and some said it was better to trust to the king's mercy than meet a sure death by famine. But the mayor promptly hung those who attempted to excite a movement for surrender. "As long as there is a man left to keep the gates closed," said Guiton, "it is enough. I will decide by lot with any one which of us shall be killed to nourish the survivor with his flesh."³

And now again Buckingham held out hopes of succor, but in August he was murdered by Felton, and all his plans and ambitions were laid at rest. Charles I. persevered in the attempt to save the city, and he had written the Rochellois he would hazard his three kingdoms for their rescue. On September 30th, a fleet of 140 sail, bearing 6,000 soldiers, approached the entrance of the harbor.⁴ Louis and the cardinal watched from the shore the final effort to overthrow their plans, while those left of the

¹ Richelieu, 538; Fontenay Marueil, 206; Mercure François, 605.

² Archives curieuses, 97; Mercure, 1628, 608. It is stated they had lost 15 ships. Arch. cur., p. 100. ³ Mém. de Pontis, 546; Richelieu, 549.

⁴ Bassompierre, 281; Richelieu, 550; Mercure François, 675.

starved inhabitants of the city gazed afar off at their last hope of liberty.¹ On October 3d and 4th, the English ships engaged the French and endeavored to force their way through the barricades and into the city; but only a great admiral could have had any chance of victory, and there was no Blake to bring salvation to the town. On the 5th a storm drove the English back, and after some vain parley with the cardinal, they notified the besieged they could expect no succor from them.

Starvation had done its full work, and all hope was now abandoned. Boots, halter straps, saddles, sword belts, all that by any means could furnish even the most loathsome food, were consumed, and some had been driven to the last and most horrible resort of famine. Only skeletons were left. But 154 men-at-arms remained; more than half the population had died. It was said that 15,000 people had perished from starvation and pestilence.² Dead bodies lay thick about the houses and streets when on October 27th deputies were at last sent to propose a surrender. Even then they demanded a general treaty for all their party, and a continuance of their privileges and franchises. But the time was past for conditions. On the 28th they surrendered, receiving only the promise that the life and property of the inhabitants should be spared, and that they should have the right to the exercise of the reformed religion. On November 1st the cardinal made a solemn entry; mass was said in the Church of St. Marguerite; a long procession of Capucins marched through the streets of the city, singing the *Te Deum*, and La Rochelle forever ceased to be the Protestant refuge and sure fortress in times of danger. The French had spent 40,000,000 livres in the siege.³

The fortifications were destroyed; the ancient privileges of the place were forfeited; a solemn procession was

¹ Bassompierre, 287, 288.

² Archives curieuses, 111. *Mercure François*, 1628, at page 688, gives a long list of articles the besieged were forced to eat, and tells the miserable condition in which they were found.

³ Archives curieuses, 105, 110, 121-136.

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⁴ Bassompierre, 281 ; Richelieu, 550 ; Mercure François, 675.

your troops than ours, for yours should fear death more, being uncertain of their salvation. For yourself, I can only hope that God will not treat you according to your works, but that you will yet return to the true faith, and like your father and grandfather become a defender of the Protestant church." ¹

Hostilities were carried on without important engagements, though the most of Languedoc and Guienne was in revolt. Some towns were converted from their Huguenot errors by the familiar missionary process of quartering soldiers on them.² The fall of La Rochelle discouraged the Protestants, but Rohan still persevered, and he was encouraged by promises of help from the English, at whose instigation he had taken up arms. Charles assured him that the Protestants could rely on his protection.³ Louis, on the other hand, had been called to Italy to the relief of Casal, and an Italian war weakened the forces that could be left at home. Rohan had also expectations of aid from the Spaniards, with whom he negotiated a treaty. Notwithstanding the bigotry of the Spanish, they desired that the Huguenot party should remain a thorn in the French king's power, and a check upon his foreign expeditions. The alliance of Spain with France against England had only resulted in her sending a fleet to survey La Rochelle and return home again without striking a blow in her allies' behalf. "They have," said Richelieu, "God and the Virgin in their mouths, their beads in their hands, and only temporal interests in their hearts." ⁴

¹ Rohan, 585, 586.

² Richelieu, 496. It is curious to see the manner in which Richelieu discusses these conversions as sincere and satisfactorily obtained. His passage runs: "Il fit loger les troupes qui étaient dans la ville, chez les huguenots, en exemptant les catholiques. Incontinent quinze ou vingt d'entre eux se convertirent, et abjurèrent leur hérésie. Ils furent bientôt suivis d'un plus grand nombre: tant qu'enfin deux cent cinquante familles se convertirent en moins de trois semaines." Richelieu's course in general has gained him the reputation of much political tolerance. He was a politician first of all, but he was also a sincere and bitter Catholic.

³ See *Mercure François*, 1629, 276, *et seq.*, and Rohan's letter, p. 287.

⁴ Richelieu, 544. See *Mercure*, 1629, 455-463, for the terms between Rohan and the Spanish.

But all of Rohan's expectations failed him. The affairs of Italy had distracted Richelieu when engaged in the siege of La Rochelle. The Duke of Mantua died and left as his heir the Duke of Nevers, a French nobleman whose interests the French king was bound to protect. The Emperor, the King of Spain, and the Duke of Savoy all disliked to see these great possessions pass to a Frenchman. The Duke of Savoy possessed the restless ambition of his family, and he laid claim to Montferrat, a part of the new duke's inheritance, and the Spanish laid siege to the important city of Casal.

News that Casal could sustain the siege but a short time, and the appeal for relief of the new Duke of Mantua, reached the cardinal as he was waiting for the Rochellois to consume their last boots and saddle-bags. But nothing could turn him from his unwavering determination to complete his conquest. No sooner had the surrender been made, than, allowing little rest after the year's siege, the cardinal and Louis led an army of 35,000 men to the relief of Casal.¹

The entry to Italy was only through the Swiss passes. These were guarded by the Duke of Savoy's forces, and the snow lay thick upon the narrow paths over which the French troops struggled. The vigor of the cardinal was well sustained by the valor of the king, who was fond of military enterprises and willing to incur the risk of bold movements. Wearied of the Duke of Savoy's dilatory negotiations, on March 6, 1629, the French troops attacked his soldiers stationed at the narrow passage of Susa. A small force there ought to have been able to check a great army, but the French made the attack with such fierce valor that they captured the pass in the first onset. The capture of the pass insured the relief of Casal. On the 18th the Spanish sullenly raised the siege of the city.² Richelieu left a strong force to protect the Duke

¹ Richelieu, 604.

² Fontenay Mareuil, 214-228. Bassompierre, 295, 296. Pontis, 548-558. Richelieu, 559-613. Richelieu's *Lettres*, iii., 222-264.

of Mantua, compelled Savoy to make terms, and insisted on retaining possession of Susa. The French could thus at any time bring an army to compel the quiet of their unwilling ally.¹

Flushed with this brilliant success, Louis led back his army to Languedoc. Both Savoy and Spain were obliged to leave Rohan to his fate. A treaty made with the English, in which Charles abandoned, without a clause for their safety, those whom he had encouraged to insurrection, was publicly announced as Louis laid siege to Privas.² Further resistance was hopeless. The Huguenots were not allowed to make a treaty, as they had formerly done, but were obliged to accept the grace which the king extended to them. The fortifications of all the cities of safety were ordered to be destroyed, and Rohan was exiled from France.³ Before many years he was to continue his career, but as a general in the king's service. His days as a party leader were ended. Enlarged privileges were granted to the Catholics, and the open exercise of their religion secured. "The ark beat down the idol of Dagon," said Richelieu, "and God entered in triumph those places from which his worship had been sacrilegiously banished."⁴ The cardinal had returned from Italy, and he established missions of the Jesuits and Capucins in the Protestant towns, reopened and embellished the Catholic churches, which had long been closed, and waited to see the entire destruction of the fortifications of twenty out of the thirty-eight places which Louis had left him to superintend.⁵ Yet, though all possibility of future risings of the Huguenots was destroyed, though every appliance was established for their conversion to Catholicism, they

¹ *Mercur*, 1628, vol. xv., 1-155, 1629, 1-152. The articles of the treaty with Savoy are found 132-138.

² *Richelieu*, vol. xxii., 14; *Fontenay*, 226. This was on May 20, 1629. *Mercur*, 1629, 465, *et seq.*

³ Rohan, 590-608. The articles which closed the last Huguenot war in France were signed June 28, 1629. *Richelieu*, xxii., 7-30; *Lettres de Richelieu*, 265-360; *Mercur*, 1629, 501.

⁴ *Richelieu*, 24.

⁵ *Richelieu*, 24-30.

were left in full enjoyment of their religious privileges. Much as Richelieu wished France Catholic, much more he wished her strong and great. Better rule over no one than over heretics, had been the motto of Philip II., and was at last to be the belief of Louis XIV., but such was not the idea of Richelieu. "As subjects," said he to the Huguenot ministers, "the king makes no difference between you and Catholics." Could France have been always ruled with the toleration of Richelieu and Mazarin, and been safe from the narrow bigotry of the Jesuits and Mme. de Maintenon, the disarming of southern France, and the overthrow of the entrenched camp of La Rochelle, would have been for the Huguenots and for all of France the act of a wise statesman, and free from evil consequences.

This series of victories gave France a prominence in Europe which she had not possessed since the death of Henry IV. Richelieu passed through the country in a long course of triumph. The local parliaments, deputations from cities, nobles, bishops, students, and citizens, received him with solemn ceremonial, and addressed him with still more solemn harangues. Even the Duke of Épernon, the proudest nobleman of France, so far unbent as to present his respects to the still prouder cardinal.¹

Thirteen years of almost absolute power now lay before Richelieu. The overthrow of the Protestants, the weakening of the nobility, and his unbroken ascendancy over the king, soon enabled him to turn the undivided strength of France against the increasing power of Austria. His own eyes were not to see the complete triumph of his policy, but the peace of Westphalia was due to his unwearied persistence and energy, more than to any other one cause. The long contest checked the growth of Austrian power, and exposed the decrepitude of Spain. It left France in the position of chief arbiter of European politics, and Richelieu's name justly ranks among those who have done for France what she has always most

¹ Richelieu, 31.

esteemed—made her powerful abroad, and gained for her achievements the alluring name of glory.

The end of religious warfare in Germany, which was the most important result of the Thirty Years' War, was not one of the cardinal's aims, nor would he have deemed such a result worth fighting for. Richelieu desired the advantage which France gained from the weakening of Spain and Austria, and from the great additions to her own territory, but he was too strong a Catholic to desire the quiet ascendancy of Protestantism in any country. One who dreamed of the restoration of Catholicism in England, would not have thought it hopeless in Saxony or Hesse Cassel. Nor was immunity from the internal struggles that had been caused by religion, desired by any statesman for a neighboring people. The grandson of Philip II. was willing to favor the Huguenots, that they might keep his most Christian cousin and brother-in-law occupied at home. A French cardinal was willing that German Protestants should revile the Pope, if thereby they disturbed the peace of the Holy Roman Emperor. Richelieu's plans in taking part in the Thirty Years' War were purely political. He allied himself with Sweden and the States-General, not because they were Protestant, but because they were in conflict with the Emperor; he protected the smaller Protestant states, to preserve their political rather than their religious independence.

Formidable internal contests were still, however, to be encountered before Richelieu could devote his energies entirely to foreign politics. His successes made him only more odious to his opponents. The bitterness of the queen-mother towards the minister grew more intense as his power increased, and she now made her final effort to work his overthrow and reestablish her own influence over her son. It is not certain what were the causes of this hatred, which became constantly more fierce. Richelieu, when assured of the king's favor, was not submissive to the will of his former benefactress; but his will must have controlled, even when he was dependent on her favor.

The suspicion that he had gained her affection as well as her admiration, and had become a faithless lover as well as servant, was the explanation most favored by the scandal-mongers of the time.¹

In 1630, hostilities broke out again in Italy, and the cardinal again crossed the mountains. His absence, the continued hostilities, and the capture of Mantua by the Imperialists, all furnished occasion to injure the minister in the king's mind. Louis was attacked at Lyons by a severe illness. His health was always precarious, and both he and his chief minister seemed often to be on the brink of the grave. The king's death would have left Gaston his successor, and Richelieu exposed to his bitterest enemies. The physicians bade Louis think of his conscience. Their own zeal, if it is not exaggerated, was enough to reduce to weakness a stronger frame than his. In one year, he is said to have been bled forty-seven times, to have taken 212 medicines and 215 remedies. The cardinal returned to Lyons and watched his master's illness with a grief that was certainly sincere, while his adversaries, on the other hand, were planning the steps that should follow Gaston's accession. It was said that the Marshal of Marillac proposed to kill Richelieu, the Duke of Guise to exile him, and Bassompierre to throw him in

¹ Allowing for the love for scandal which pervades many of the memoirs of the time, the character of Mary de Medici, and the history of her relations with Richelieu, lead to the impression that her early support of him was not based solely on her admiration of his qualities as a statesman, and that her subsequent animosity had deeper grounds than political variance. Richelieu's letters contain countless references to the hostility of Mary de Medici towards him and justifications of himself (see *Lettres de Richelieu*, iv., 53-63, 82-86, *et passim*). The accounts, however, of his professing himself the lover of Anne of Austria seem destitute of any credible authority, and are, when we consider the relations and the ages of the parties, exceedingly improbable. Mme. de Motteville professes to have the queen for authority that the cardinal endeavored to deliver himself of speeches of passionate admiration to her; but though Mme. de Motteville is usually accurate, either her recollection was modified by her dislike for the cardinal, or the queen exaggerated the matter ("Mémoires de Mme. de Motteville," 23). Richelieu was not likely to commit himself to a passion that might be exposed, and destroy his influence with the king.

prison, and that the cardinal, informed of their advice, took pleasure in imposing on each the punishment he had selected for the minister.¹ The king, however, rallied from his bleedings and dosings, but there was extracted from him in his weakness the promise to dismiss the cardinal from his service. With returning health the king's willingness to carry out his agreement diminished. To remove the cardinal was to subject himself to the active and irritating guidance of a mother for whom he had but a moderate affection, and of a clique of courtiers, who would take liberally from his treasury, and return to him neither victories nor glory. Mary de Medici persisted in her assaults on a king who had the royal aversion to saying no, until on November 10, 1630, the matter reached a dramatic ending. As the queen was striving with Louis in his closet, Richelieu, fearful of her efforts, and finding the ordinary entrance closed, suddenly appeared through a secret door.² "I am persuaded your majesties are talking of me," said the cardinal, who had been listening to some of the queen's assaults, "and I desire to justify myself against the crimes with which I am charged." The queen was at first speechless from anger at this interruption, but she soon found words to attack him with all the venom of Italian hatred. "It must needs be," said she, "that the king rids himself of one or the other of us." "In that case," said the cardinal meekly, "it would be more reasonable it should be of me." Louis, in the meantime, unwilling to announce any decision, and only desirous to escape from an uncomfortable position, said that it was growing late, and he must go to Versailles. Versailles was then but a poor hunting lodge in a barren country, and there the king drove early on the 11th, leaving the cardinal behind. But the queen obtained orders giving to the

¹ This statement, very often repeated, may be correct, but I do not think it is well authenticated.

² He says in a memoir for Chavigni, written in 1642 (*Lettres de Richelieu*, t. vi. 921-925): "Dieu s'est servi de l'occasion d'une porte non barrière, qui me donna lieu de me défendre lorsqu'on taschoit de faire conclure l'exécution de ma ruine."

Marshal of Marillac the command in chief of the Italian army, and the hope that his brother, the Guard of the Seals and her chief adviser, would succeed Richelieu as minister.

The overthrow of the latter was now deemed certain. Even the cardinal himself, who was more timid in these Court revolutions, than with Austria, Spain, and Savoy in arms, and whose nervousness about the king's uncertain favor made him despondent at any mark of coldness, now believed that his overthrow had been accomplished. He had his carriage made ready to take him to Pontoise, and from there he purposed to retire to Havre. But his friend, the Cardinal of La Valette, said Louis had only run away from the queen's pertinacity, and his safety was to follow him to Versailles. The king had for a first equerry St. Simon, who became the father of the author of the most vivid memoirs in any language. The young St. Simon was peculiarly fitted to please a suspicious master, as he was always at hand, always ready to suggest what the king desired, and never suggested what the king did not wish to hear. He claimed that his friendly interposition led his master to send for Richelieu to follow him to the lodge. At all events, the cardinal on the 11th saw the king at Versailles, and in a personal interview, unmolested by his over-confident enemies, he undid all that they believed they had accomplished.

In the meantime the Luxembourg was crowded with exultant courtiers, drawn thither by the news of Richelieu's downfall, and to felicitate the triumphant queen. The Duke of Épernon said they would now push the cardinal to the wall. A great crowd of smiling ladies and of triumphant nobles surrounded the queen on the day, which was to become historical as the Day of the Dupes, when a message from Louis came, announcing to her that he had decided to dismiss M. de Marillac from his position as guard of the seals. "He has dealt ill with me," said the queen, "not only because I am his mother, but because he has failed in what he has promised; but I know

the devices of the cardinal." Marillac had already felt that the battle was lost, when he heard that the queen was at Paris, and Richelieu was alone with Louis at Versailles. On the next day the order was sent to Italy to arrest the Marshal of Marillac and bring him to France, where he was to meet an ignominious death.¹

However discouraged by this disappointment, hope was not abandoned by the queen-mother or her counsellors. Printed libels as well as whispered slanders pursued the minister. The king, it was said, was but his prisoner. To obtain control of the kingdom, the cardinal wished to get the whole royal family in his hands, and he had already the king and queen in his power. He controlled all the forces, all the strongholds, and all the money; he had sought to prevent the rescue of the island of Ré, that he might ruin Toiras; he had kept alive for two years the war in Italy, when an honorable peace might have been made. While a part of the people were dying of hunger, and the rest were living on herbs, like the beasts, he was spending ten times more money in his palace than the king did in his. He boasted his descent from Louis the Fat, and aimed at supreme power in the kingdom.²

¹ The account of this memorable day is found in various memoirs, and with much difference of statement, even among those who were the actors. Richelieu, in his *Memoirs*, writing after the peril was past, gives a slighting notice, which certainly understates the danger in which he felt himself. If nothing more striking happened than he describes, the day would never have reached the dignity of a name. His letter to Chavigni, to which I have referred, shows that he knew how closely he came to overthrow. The affair was, indeed, spread over two or three days. Some allowance must be made in the account St. Simon gives, for his tendency to overstate his father's importance. According to him, Richelieu's safety was due to the timely word of the first equerry, and the cardinal subsequently showed his feeling of the service rendered by frequent nocturnal visits to St. Simon, where, with one valet and a solitary candle, he would sit on the bed and ask counsel on the dangers of his position. See *Mém. de Richelieu*, t. xxii., 308-309; St. Simon, i., 51-53; Mme. de Motteville, 27-29; Montglat, 21; *Mémoires de Gaston*, 579, 580; Fontenay Marcuil, 228-237; Pontis, 567-571; *Récit de la Maladie du Roy, par Souffrant son Confesseur*, Arch. curieuses, 21ème series, t. 3, pp. 365-375; Bassompierre, 317-325; Brienne, 51-59; Molé, t. 2, 26-30; *Journal de Richelieu*, Archives curieuses, 21ème series, t. 5, 1-182. See also Richelieu's interesting letter to Louis, Nov. 12, 1630, the day after the reconciliation.

² Richelieu, 22, 325.

To such accusations Richelieu felt himself strong enough to reply by vigorous measures. The Princess of Conti, the duchesses of Ornano and Elbœuf, were sent to their country-places. Vautier, the queen's physician, and the Marshal of Bassompierre were thrown into the Bastille, where the latter was to languish for nearly twelve long years.¹ He had done little to bring upon himself such a fate, but his constant favor with the king made him dangerous in the cardinal's eyes. His crime was the power to please.

The queen-mother refused all offers of her son which involved her breathing the same air with Richelieu, and she retired to Compiègne. There she received orders from the king to go to Moulins. She delayed obeying them, and either to avoid the appearance of keeping her a prisoner, or because the cardinal was willing to offer her every facility to fly the country, the royal guards were withdrawn from Compiègne. Thereupon she fled, hoping to be received at La Capelle. The cardinal's vigilance prevented this, and in her desperation she went to Flanders, where she was hospitably received by the Spanish Infanta.² She never again crossed the boundaries of France. For eleven years she was to be that most wretched of wanderers, a royal exile, going from court to court, nursing a rage that never abated, and willing to meet any fate rather than be subject to the authority of the man her hatred for whom had swallowed up all other passions. Nor was her return desired. Richelieu was glad to be well rid of her, and the king gave no encouragement to any overtures that were made in her behalf.³

The Duke of Orleans espoused his mother's cause, and after countless tergiversations, in which on one day he promised to love the cardinal as much as he had hated him, and on the next sent word that he was again his eternal foe, he was now in open rebellion. He fled to

¹ Bassompierre, 320-325.

² *Mercure François*, 1631, 342, 343, 350. *Lettres de Richelieu*, iv., 140-142, 151-183.

³ See *Lettres de Richelieu*, *passim*.

Lorraine, whose gallant and unwise duke was always ready to receive refugees, and always prompt to involve himself in every imbroglio. Gaston there settled the question of the numerous matrimonial alliances proposed for him since the death of his first wife, by secretly marrying Margaret of Lorraine, the duke's sister.¹ This marriage was long denied to Louis, and when it was finally acknowledged he refused to recognize it. Steps were accordingly taken before the parliament to annul the civil contract, on the plea of abduction, in that Monsieur had been illegally snatched away by the partisans of Lorraine into forbidden nuptials. On this ground an obedient court declared the contract void.² But the sacrament remained unaffected, and the validity of the marriage was at last acknowledged by the king. Margaret did not attain the expected reward of her adventurous career. "It is worth while to risk being made an abbess, in order to marry an only brother of a French king who has no children," her father had said when the marriage was decided. Margaret narrowly escaped having a convent for her home, only to find the childless king rearing up sons to reign after him.

Gaston remained some time in Lorraine and at the Spanish Court at Brussels, occupied by the intrigues of the worthless favorites who governed him, but in the summer of 1632 he led a force of a few thousand soldiers, mostly Spanish, to the invasion of France. He was induced to this step by the promise of aid from a very powerful ally.

The Duke of Montmorenci was the governor of the great province of Languedoc, and he possessed an influence greater than that of most royal governors. He had long been there; his father had governed the province before him, and he was beloved for his personal qualities. The province had its local States, collected its own taxes, and held but distant relations with the Parisian govern-

¹ *Mémoires de Gaston*, 586-597.

² Molé, ii., 214-289. Richelieu, xxii., 416-421, 530-536. *Lettres de Richelieu*, t. iv., *passim*.

ment. The inhabitants would follow a Montmorenci in a conflict with the French king, almost as readily as the Campbells would flock to the standard of MacCallum More should the king at London give him cause to complain.¹ But this great power was believed to be lodged in safe hands. Montmorenci had been looked upon with favor by the king, and was not regarded as among the cardinal's enemies. He had rendered him friendly acts. During the king's illness at Lyons, he espoused the cardinal's cause, and had every reason to expect wealth and dignity by a continuance of faithful service. But he had not received the full reward of which he thought himself worthy. He had suffered imaginary affronts in his government. The office of constable had been so long held in his family that it seemed their hereditary possession, and when the cardinal abolished it, the young duke felt this great dignity was snatched away from him. The prospect of revolt had moreover few uninviting features. There was the possibility of danger in battle, but battles in such risings were few, and such peril was an attraction to the warlike French nobleman. The possibility of any serious danger as a result of such a step, of any severe punishment either in property or person, was hardly considered. A treaty by which all expenses would be paid and probably some new honor granted, had been the ordinary result of such an insurrection—or at the worst an unconditional pardon. Richelieu's severity towards his enemies had grown more manifest, as his power had become firmer, but so great a nobleman as Montmorenci seemed to be above the peril of vulgar punishment.

Gaston marched uninterrupted through eastern France, meeting no opposition, but attracting no followers. Not a city, town, nor even any gentleman, declared for him.² Like all the revolts of that period, this represented no

¹ Bullion writes (cited *Lettres de Richelieu*, iv., 365): "The character of the house of Montmorenci is so impressed in Languedoc, that the people regard the name of king as imaginary."

² *Mémoires de Gaston*, 594.

popular interest, and excited no popular support. Save the Huguenot wars, and some of the early phases of the Fronde, no insurrection during fifty years excited either zeal or apprehension, except in those who hoped advancement from its results, or feared ruin from its ravages.

Montmorenci, however, led his province to the cause to which he had devoted himself. He called together the States of Languedoc, where a local grievance was furnished by an edict of the king, by which he had endeavored to take the collection of taxes from the local assemblies and officers and put it in the hands of his own officials. This, with Montmorenci's influence, induced the States to vote that they would join their governor, in order to obtain the liberties of the province, as they had been under the late king.¹ But the duke's preparations had been made with such haste and improvidence that he was but ill fitted to meet the king's forces, which marched against him under the command of Marshal Schomberg.

Gaston's troops had now reached Languedoc, but he was unfortunate in having no general of ability to command them. A hasty encounter, begun and conducted with the reckless courage, differing little from folly, which was so often found in French warfare, decided the fate of the revolt. The forces of Monsieur were drawn up to attack Schomberg, who with inferior numbers occupied a strong position at Castelnaudary. It was not desired that the attack should be begun until the entire army was in readiness, but the Count of Moret, a bastard son of Henry IV., eager for honor in his first engagement, attacked a company of cavalry and was himself shot. Montmorenci heard that Moret had begun the attack, and resolved that no one should precede him. Though accompanied by a scanty number of men, he at once led a fierce assault on the enemy. The result of this foolhardiness was that his troops were scattered, and he himself was badly wounded and made a prisoner. No sooner

¹ Richelieu, 400.

was this known than the recruits from Languedoc refused to serve further, and Monsieur's army retreated in confusion.¹ The battle was little more than a skirmish, but it ended the insurrection. Monsieur had no more courage than he had fidelity, veracity, constancy, or judgment. He at once submitted to the king, upon terms which were easy enough so far as he personally was concerned. It should be said to his credit, that he at least asked for the safety of Montmorenci. But the king refused to promise it, and Gaston, after pledging himself, on the word and faith of a prince, to live in the future in obedience to the king and affection to the cardinal, contented himself with Louis' agreement to consider the petitions Monsieur should present for the duke's life. It was expressly stated that he should have no right to complain if the king made his followers suffer what they deserved.²

Though Gaston was ready to desert any follower, and did so uniformly all his life, neither he nor any one else believed that Richelieu would dare take the life of the chief of the Montmorenci family. Several of the insurgents of less importance were promptly tried and executed. The Marshal of Marillac had been tried in May, 1632, before a court specially organized for that purpose, and holding its sessions at the cardinal's country house. He was convicted of corruption and peculation and publicly executed. "Peculation!" said the marshal, when he heard his fate; "a man of my quality condemned to death for peculation. I have been tried for hay and straw. There was not enough to flog a lackey."³ His fate was due to his part in the intrigues which culminated in the Day of the Dupes. His brother, the guard of the seals, had suffered an overthrow from the same cause, that broke his heart without the need of any trial.

¹ Three accounts of this battle given by those taking part in it are printed in *Mercure François*, vol. xviii., 555-580.

² *Lettres de Richelieu*, iv., 372-379.

³ Isambert: "*Recueil des Anciennes Lois Françaises*," xvi, 370. *Mercure François*, 1632, 80-91.

But the name of Montmorenci was a far greater one than these. For seven hundred years its possessors had ranked among the great nobility. They bore the proud title of the first barons of France; they had furnished six constables and twelve marshals to that kingdom. No other family could show a more ancient or famous pedigree. Five hundred years before they had been among the great feudatories, powerful enough to be dangerous to the king himself. A Montmorenci almost four centuries past had been one of the first of those who had borne the sword of the constable. The Montmorencis had been illustrious when the names of Condé and Bourbon were unknown; they were still illustrious when the names of Montfort and Conci had been forgotten. They had served the Capets, the Valois, and the Angoulêmes. The sceptre had passed away from the direct line of each, but the Montmorencis, in full possession of their power and honors, were still among the great followers of the French kings.

Henry of Montmorenci was only in his 38th year, and his life had been such as befitted his great ancestry. His baptism had been celebrated at Paris with popular festivities as great as those for a royal prince. Henry IV. had stood as his godfather. When under twenty he succeeded his father in the governorship of Languedoc, where his family possessed a vast influence. He had been Admiral of France and had won a naval victory at La Rochelle. Though possessing no special talent as a general, he had often shown a dashing and reckless bravery, which made him admired by his troops. He was loved in Languedoc for his liberality, his courtesy, and his engaging manners. Says De Pontis: "He was the first Christian and first baron of France, the most valiant, the richest, the handsomest, and the noblest seigneur in the kingdom."¹

But the duke's eminence was his destruction. It was not that his power made him dangerous, for no vassal was now strong enough to be a rival to the king; he could

¹ Pontis, 579.

only be a rebel. But Richelieu was resolved to check future rebellions by showing that there was no prince or noble in France so great, so illustrious, so nobly connected, that he could take up arms against his sovereign without exposing himself to the punishment of a common malefactor. Louis was naturally cruel, and it took little urging to make him implacable.

Montmorenci was a peer and was entitled to a trial before the Parliament of Paris, of which the peers were members. The king declared his peerage forfeited, and sent him to be tried by the Parliament of Toulouse, in the province he had so lately ruled.¹ Of his crime there could be no doubt, for he had been taken in open warfare against the king's troops. Yet he was so beloved and his appearance and answers were so manly and engaging, that the judges wept as they pronounced the sentence. In the meantime every effort was made to save him. Gaston asked for his life; the duke's sister, the Princess of Condé, who had been the beautiful Charlotte of Montmorenci, plead for her brother; the noble and princely families who were proud to be kinsmen of a Montmorenci begged for his pardon; the common people in the streets outside of the king's window cried "Mercy! Pardon!" But nothing could move the king or the cardinal. "If I followed the varying inclinations of the people, I should not act as a king," Louis justly said.² "I am afraid the duke cannot escape imprisonment for life," Richelieu had hypocritically remarked before the trial, and afterwards he affected to lament the result.³ But the prisoner's friends were not deceived by such semblance. Forty gentlemen, it was said, had daggers ready for the cardinal, if Montmorenci was condemned to death. But threats were of even less avail than prayers on that resolute and relentless nature. The duke was brought to trial October 27, 1632. On the 30th he was sentenced to death, and he was executed the same day in the city of Toulouse. He asked to

¹ *Mercure François*, xviii., 545-553.

² Pontis, 577.

³ Brienne, 60.

have the execution two hours earlier than it had been fixed, that he might die on the same hour of the day as his Saviour.' He died like a gentleman and a Christian. He left neither brother nor son, and the direct line of the Montmorencis perished on the scaffold.

By his will he left a painting to Richelieu, to show he was still his faithful servant. His peerage and dukedom expired, and his great possessions were divided. The Prince of Condé's acquiescence in his brother-in-law's execution was paid by a liberal share of the wealth and dignities which he left.³ Languedoc was mildly treated. The king abandoned his endeavor to have the taxes collected directly under his authority, and agreed on 1,050,000 livres, as the amount which the province should raise, for the general expenses of the kingdom.⁴ Monsieur claimed to be so outraged by this execution that he left the kingdom for the fourth time, and fled to Brussels.⁴ The fear of the exposure of his marriage is a more probable reason for his forgetting his oath of fidelity as soon as he had uttered it. Save the brief revolt of Soissons, Richelieu was to encounter no more armed insurrections; more dangerous court intrigues, and plans of assassination were the perils which now awaited him.

¹ Histoire véritable de tout ce qui s'est fait, etc., en la mort de Monsieur de Montmorenci, 1633. The edict for his execution is in Isambert, xvi., 376.

² Bassompierre, 325-327. Gaston, 590-597. Brienne, 60, 61. Lettres de Richelieu, t. i., 400; t. iv., 231, 345, 355, 360, 364-367, 370, 371, 379-383, 395, 403-410. Histoire de la Mort de M. Montmorenci. Mémoires du Duc de Montmorenci, 46-92. Mém. de Richelieu, xxii., 310-314, 319-327, 375-378, 398-423. Mercure François, 1632, 404-558, 774, 825-847, 978-992. Molé ii., 159. The articles disposing of Montmorenci's property are found, Mercure, xviii., 978-992. His last letter to his wife has been printed, and shows him a brave and tender gentleman: "Mon cher coeur.—Je vous dis le dernier adieu, avec l'affection toute pareille à celle qui a esté toujours parmi nous. Je vous conjure par le repos de mon âme que j'espère estre dans peu au ciel de moderer vos ressentimens et recevoir de la main de notre doux Sauveur cette affliction. Adieu, encore une fois mon cher coeur. Henri de Montmorenci."

³ Mercure François, 1632, 885-912.

⁴ Lettres de Richelieu, iv., 406. Mém. de Gaston, 597, *et seq.* Mém. de Campion, 13, *et seq.*

CHAPTER V.

THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR.

THE Thirty Years' War had been waging for many years when France first became an actor in it, and the war itself was the result of religious and political controversies, which had disturbed Germany for a century. The rapid growth of the Reformation bade fair to render all Germany Protestant. In all the states where the rulers were Protestant, the great mass of the people professed the same faith; and in many where the princes adhered to the ancient creed, the majority of the subjects had abandoned it. In Hungary, Bohemia, and Austria, the Catholics, in 1618, were in the minority.

Personal as well as religious motives kept the Protestant princes steadfast in their faith. They had seized vast amounts of church property. The possessor of the lands of some rich abbey, the successor to the emoluments of some wealthy bishopric, was sure to see keenly the iniquities of the Scarlet Woman, and to repel vigilantly any return to the corrupt rule of the Papacy. Thus far the struggle between the two faiths had, on the whole, been favorable to the reformed party. They had resisted the great power of Charles V., and secured at the last a reasonable toleration. The contest of the Netherlands with Philip II. had ended in the complete victory of the new faith in seven of the provinces, and in their political independence. The numbers of the Protestants had largely increased since the peace of Augsburg in 1555. Though it seemed impossible that the head of the Holy Roman Empire should not be a member of the Holy

Roman Church, yet the Protestant party hoped to gain that great dignity. The possession of the throne of Bohemia by Austria gave the Catholics four out of the seven electoral votes, but it was not impossible that even those electors who were church dignitaries might abandon their party. An elector of Cologne had been led by love for Agnes of Mansfield to espouse a young bride and a new faith. The change failed to be important, because the supineness of the Protestants allowed the successor appointed by the Pope to dispossess the legal elector.

During the sixty years preceding the great war, the emperors had done little to interfere with the Protestants. Ferdinand and Maximilian II. had exercised a wise tolerance. Rudolph II. had the inclination but not the vigor to persecute. His time was given to abstruse studies. He pored over chemistry and the science of the stars ; seeking to solve the mysteries of another world, he let slip the affairs of this, and contemplating the cadent houses of the zodiac, he let rebellion rage unchecked and the fortunes of the Church decline.

At last his brothers, the Austrian archdukes, rose against him and chose Matthias, the third son of Maximilian, as Rudolph's successor. The unfortunate Emperor found the planets all adverse. He was driven from his possessions one by one, and in 1612 death took him from a life of humiliation.

The rebellious Matthias found little comfort in the throne from which he had so ruthlessly pushed his brother. The five sons of the Emperor Maximilian II. had all been childless, and the younger brothers of Matthias agreed to postpone their claims to those of their cousin Ferdinand of Styria, who though a young man was recognized as the future hope of the Catholic party and of the House of Austria. Ferdinand was elected King of Hungary and Bohemia during the lifetime of Matthias, and the Emperor had the melancholy feeling that all were impatient for him to surrender the Empire to a younger and an abler successor.

But before Matthias' death the great war had begun. The action of the Protestants of Bohemia over the denial of their rights commenced the struggle. Rudolph, in 1609, when seeking refuge in Bohemia from his brothers, had granted to that state what was called the Majesty Letter, by which was given to the Utraquists, the Protestants of Bohemia, rights nearly equal to those of the Catholics. They could continue to occupy the churches which they then had, and the nobles and inhabitants of royal lands could build such new ones as they might desire. Matthias wished to annul and endeavored to limit these concessions. He made the distinction that the edict did not allow Protestant places of worship to be erected by those living on church lands. These claimed, however, and exercised the same rights as the inhabitants of the royal lands. One of their churches was torn down, another closed, and some of the unruly Protestants were imprisoned.

An assembly of the Protestants of Bohemia complained of this as a violation of the Majesty Letter. They were answered by a letter which pronounced their own conduct illegal and rebellious. Thereupon a second assembly was held in the castle of Prague, and on May 23, 1618, the deputies insisted on knowing from some of the chief advisers of the Emperor whether they had written or suggested the offensive answer. This was denied, but they were thereupon accused of other conduct contrary to the interests of the state, and the Stadtholders Martinitz and Slawata, and the Secretary Fabricius, were forthwith thrown out of the window into the moat, eighty feet below. All three escaped with little harm, but the "window tumble" was considered as the commencement of the Thirty Years' War. To such struggles there is, however, no fixed beginning but they assume more definite shape as the exciting causes become more intense. Matthias died in 1619, and Ferdinand was elected to the imperial throne, receiving all the seven votes cast. Many other names had been proposed for this dignity. It was suggested to Maximilian of Bavaria and to the Duke of

Savoy. But when the day of election came, the influence of the House of Austria, aided by dissensions between the Protestant electors, on this as on many similar occasions, secured an easy victory.

Even had the efforts to prevent this dignity becoming practically hereditary been successful, the result would have been of little political importance. The crown of the Holy Roman Empire was a great dignity; it conferred a title of indefinite grandeur and glory, but it did little more. The power of the Emperor was found in his hereditary dominions and not in his shadowy authority over what was an empire only in name. Possessed by a weak German prince, or by a foreign king, it would have been almost as empty a title as that of King of Jerusalem.

Ferdinand hastened back from Frankfort to meet the dangers that awaited him at home. He was the first emperor since the days of Luther who was filled with an intense Catholic zeal. Even Charles V. had viewed the Protestants only as rebels against his own authority. To Ferdinand they bore the more hateful aspect of rebels against God. Educated by the Jesuits and entirely under their influence, he had, as a young man, made a pilgrimage to Loretto and Rome, and had there vowed to crush out the heresies that were rampant in the countries over which he was to rule. It was a vow he never forgot, and in performing which he plunged Germany into the worst misery it suffered during its long history. He had begun in his own province of Styria, and by a policy of unwavering repression had crushed the Protestant sects, which there, as almost everywhere in Germany, had become predominant. His energies were now to be displayed in a larger field.

Almost insurmountable difficulties seemed to meet him. His capital of Vienna was in danger of capture, and in Bohemia he was declared to have forfeited the crown, and the States proceeded to choose for his successor Frederick V., the Calvinist elector palatine. Frederick accepted the throne against the advice of prudent

counsellors, and was crowned at Prague with much pomp, and with the good-will of the mass of his subjects. But his own weakness and the indifference of the Protestant princes soon lost him the advantage of his position.

In 1608, the Protestants had formed a union for the protection of their religion and for mutual aid. It was intended to disregard the party lines of Calvinists and Lutherans, but that was not the result. The Elector of Saxony and the majority of the German Protestants were Lutherans. The Palatinate had wavered from Lutheranism to Calvinism, and from Calvinism back to Lutheranism, four times in sixty years, but the present elector had been reared and had remained a Calvinist. The jealousy between these two great sects often exceeded their hatred for the common enemy, and united with Jesuit zeal in producing the final triumph of Catholicism in a great portion of Germany. The Union left Frederick to his fate, and the lack of money destroyed the efficiency of the Bohemian armies.

Ferdinand, in the meantime, obtained the assistance of the Duke of Bavaria, of Spain, and of the Catholic League, and thus reinforced, his armies defeated the Bohemians at Weissenberg on November 8, 1620. During the engagement Frederick was eating his dinner at Prague, and as he started to ride to the field of battle he was met by the fugitives from his routed army. He at once despaired of the cause. To a resolute man Bohemia was by no means utterly lost; but Frederick had neither the skill of a general, the courage of a soldier, nor the qualities of a king. He fled back to the Palatinate in such haste that he left his crown behind him. He was to have no further use for it. Bohemia fell under the complete control of Ferdinand, and he carried out a policy of confiscation and of religious repression, which crushed the Protestant party, and in so doing drove away more than half the population and blighted the progress, the prosperity, and the development of that unhappy country. Thirty thousand families are said to have been expelled for refusing to abjure

their faith ; the use of the national language was forbidden in public acts.

But Ferdinand was not content with this. Encouraged in his hopes of bringing back not only his hereditary possessions, but all Germany, into the one fold, he declared that Frederick, as a rebel against the Empire, had forfeited his dominions. The troops of the Emperor and of the League invaded the Palatinate and conquered it with ease. This Ferdinand bestowed on his friend and follower, Maximilian of Bavaria, and with it the seat in the electoral college which Frederick had held. The Protestants had now only two electors, Saxony and Brandenburg. The unhappy Frederick fled into Holland, and began a life of wandering and disappointment.

The success of the Emperor in his conflict with the Elector Palatine was followed by a steady growth in power. The Protestants were disunited. The Catholics were led by great captains, and were animated by pious devotion and by the unlimited plunder that was granted them.

Ferdinand devoted his first energies to the extirpation of heresy in his own dominions, and he labored so effectually that Austria, Bohemia, and a large part of Hungary were permanently secured to the Catholic Church.

Such victories and the military supremacy of the Catholics rendered possible still greater triumphs, and many countries that had been deemed lost to the faith might now be recovered. The Jesuits were Ferdinand's advisers, and they were especially eager to reclaim the lands and property which had been wrested from the Church. Great ecclesiastical possessions had been seized, and were now held by temporal princes. Their occupation was long established ; it had been recognized by repeated treaties, until they seemed to hold the church lands as firmly as their hereditary rank. But no time, the Jesuits said, could strengthen a title which was based on the robbery of God ; no statute of limitations ran against the Almighty ; no treaty of man could be pleaded against the rights of Heaven. Their early influence over

the Emperor had been increased by the active part taken by the Society in the conversion of the masses, who had been forced by the results of the war to return to the faith they had renounced.

This is among the great eras in the history of the Society of Jesus. Gregory XV. belonged to the proselyting popes. He had incited Ferdinand to the utmost zeal, and he had recognized the services of the Jesuits by receiving Loyola and Xavier among the saints of the Church. With their zeal thus encouraged, the Jesuits spread over Germany, and their missions were numerous in the hereditary dominions of the House of Austria, where the work of conversion had been most successful. In one year they claimed to have converted 16,000 heretics in Bohemia alone. Their persuasions were aided by earthly weapons. Vigorous confiscations, the expulsion of the obstinate, and the quartering of soldiers upon the refractory, to the end, said the nuncio, that their vexations might enlighten their understanding, aided the result. In 1627 the Emperor declared that after six months he would not tolerate in Bohemia any person who did not believe in the only true Catholic and saving faith, and similar edicts were proclaimed in Austria and Styria. A thorough, systematic and continued persecution was rewarded by complete success.

Intoxicated by his victories, and incited to further acts that might yet more ensure the favor of Heaven, in March, 1629, Ferdinand published the Edict of Restitution. By this commissioners were directed to demand from their present unauthorized possessors the restitution of all arch-bishoprics, bishoprics, prelacies, and other ecclesiastical property confiscated since the treaty of Passau in 1552. It was an edict, the enforcement of which would have revolutionized a great portion of Germany. The Emperor now hoped to gratify both his piety and his ambition. Ferdinand had armies in the field, not only in Germany, but in Italy, where he was endeavoring to settle the question of the succession to the possessions of the Duke of

Mantua, and show the Italians that the Emperor had not lost all power among them; he was assisting the Poles against Gustavus, and Spain against the Netherlands; Prussia was to be subjected to Austria, and plans were even cherished for extending the power of the House of Austria over the dominions of the Turks, and planting the banners of the Emperor on the shores of the Bosphorus.

The military power which encouraged such vast plans was chiefly due to Wallenstein, the Duke of Friedland.¹ This leader, who seems almost to belong to the realms of romance, and whose conduct and ambitions were surrounded by a dim halo of mystery which centuries have not entirely cleared away, was now in the height of his glory.

Ferdinand's early successes had been due to the Catholic League, under the leadership of Tilly and the Duke of Bavaria. He was thus dependent on the princes of the League, and, abandoned by them, his power would have been greatly diminished. A remedy for this condition was unexpectedly offered. The Count of Wallenstein was the richest nobleman in Bohemia, having greatly increased his wealth by acquiring, for little or nothing, large amounts of the lands confiscated in that country. He had attained distinction as an officer, but he had as yet no such reputation as a general as had been gained by Tilly or Mansfeld. In 1625, he offered the Emperor to furnish an army of 20,000 men for his service, and to support it, feeding, clothing, and paying the troops, and asking nothing save the royal authority for his acts. The offer seemed one which he might find it difficult to execute, but it was approved by the Emperor, and Wallenstein was authorized to raise an army on these terms. The result was to show he had correctly judged the conditions of the time, and that he had conceived a system of

¹ This name is more properly Waldstein, but it is as Wallenstein that he is best known to history. The name is so written, not only in Schiller's great drama and pleasing history, but in recent and scholarly German histories such as Ranke's "*Life of Wallenstein*." Gindely, however, uses the name of Waldstein.

warfare as bold as it was atrocious. Already the ravages of the war, which had for eight years laid waste parts of Germany, together with the great numbers despoiled or driven into exile by religious persecution, had begun to break up the peaceful forms of German life. The farmer planting his fields only to see them laid waste, the tradesman subjected to ruinous levies upon his wares to protect his shop from pillage or help in saving his city from sack, the artisan finding work uncertain and his pay precarious, were abandoning peaceful avocations for a mode of life which offered the plenty of license and plunder. Each year of war left more persons without homes or property. He whose house is burned must become a soldier, says the Highland proverb, and the places of those soldiers who fell were more than filled by those whom war had left without means of subsistence.

The revenues collected by the Emperor or by the princes were insufficient to pay the armies in the field, and the maxim that war must support war, had received full development. Count Mansfeld and Duke Christian of Brunswick, who had carried on a gallant struggle against the tyranny of the Emperor, had themselves been compelled to support their armies by contributions levied on the countries in which they were.

But Wallenstein saw that with greater numbers the system could be carried further. Society is safe from devastation because the forces on the side of order are stronger than those opposed, but if a body of men were of such size and discipline that it could overcome resistance, there was no city so great, no province so powerful, that it was not at its mercy.

Wallenstein viewed also with entire impartiality those who opposed and those who favored the cause for which he had taken up arms. The friend must pay contributions for the good cause. The foe must pay ransom to save from destruction the property which was justly forfeited. The failure of either to meet demands was followed by impartial pillage, and this was often chosen at once as the

shorter and easier way to satisfy the soldier's needs. The forces that gathered to Wallenstein's standard soon exceeded the number he at first agreed to raise. The army he commanded at times consisted of over 100,000 men. Though covered by the Emperor's name, its general wished his soldiers to feel that they were bound to him alone. He practised a system of lavish bounties. His own great wealth was enormously increased by his military successes. Of this he gave profusely, not only to the commanding officers, but to every promising subaltern. Large bribes were bestowed also on the officials at court to preserve the favor of the Emperor, for at that time every one was open to bribes, from an elector to a turnspit.

But Wallenstein based his vague and aspiring ambitions, less on court favor than on an army dependent on him, and ready to follow him if needs were against the Emperor himself. Confidence in his own good fortune and a boundless ambition nursed hopes of becoming not only the most powerful noble, but a sovereign, in Germany. Naturally proud and reticent, he fostered these qualities. He appealed to the influence of the mysterious on the imagination, partly from calculation and partly because his nature had a certain vague grandeur. His words were few; he met the vicissitudes of the battle-field with the same unruffled calm that was one of the causes of Marlborough's success. By the severity of his silence he seemed to exhort his men, said Richelieu.¹ Nor was this love for the mysterious wholly an affected quality. He had plunged into astrology. In the phases of the sky and the combinations of the planets, he sought to read the mystery of his future career. An Italian astrologer, called Seni, whom he kept with him, exerted a strong and often a baneful influence over one whose fortunes had been so strange that he could easily believe the forces of nature took part in them.

The combined forces of Tilly and Wallenstein crushed resistance. Mansfeld and Christian died in the cause they

¹ Richelieu, xxii., 431.

had defended with much valor and little success. Christian IV. of Denmark interfered in behalf of the Protestant interests, but he was a man possessing neither ability nor resolution. Wallenstein gained continued successes and the King of Denmark was driven back to the Baltic. The Emperor now hoped to establish a northern maritime power, and to have his dominions extend from the Baltic to the Adriatic.

Wallenstein besieged the important port of Stralsund. Its harbor stood open to the sea, but the general, whom as yet no obstacle had thwarted, said he would take the city though it were bound with chains to heaven. But here at last his fortune reached its limit. The Swedes furnished troops to the city, and after a siege of months and the loss of 12,000 men, the stubborn commander abandoned the endeavor. Denmark was, however, ready for peace. Her dominions on land were all held by the Emperor's forces, and upon the surrender of these possessions Christian cheerfully promised to interfere no further in the affairs of Germany, and to leave his allies to their fate.

This treaty was in 1629, and the Emperor could now have ended the war, with the power of his House and that of the Catholic Church greater than it had been for almost a century. But he resolved to undertake the execution of the restitution edict, and peace was more remote than ever. Yet in the year 1629 it seemed not improbable that Protestantism would be crushed in the rest of Germany, almost as thoroughly as it had been in the hereditary states of the Emperor. The Protestant princes were weak and disunited. Some had already been driven from their possessions, and the enforcement of the edict would cripple the strength of those who were yet undisturbed. The Elector of Saxony desired to secure his own safety at the expense of his party, and might think absolute security would only be found in a return to the Catholic faith. There were, however, two foreign powers from whom help might be expected. Richelieu had long

shown a willingness to check the dangerous growth of Austria, and if his life were spared it could not be long before France would take some part in the war. But Richelieu's life and favor were alike uncertain, and he had no sympathy with the Protestants of Germany, except as they were a check upon the Emperor's power.

But in Gustavus Adolphus, the King of Sweden, the Protestants found an ally, less powerful than the French king, but strong in genius and an unwavering faith. Gustavus was now thirty-six. Inheriting a throne at seventeen, he had been bred to battles from his youth, and had won the name of a bold and skilful commander. He was in sincere sympathy with the Protestants. An earnest resolve to protect his brethren of the faith was mingled with the desire to extend his power and possessions by playing his part in the battle-field of Germany.

The disgraceful failure of the King of Denmark only excited the ardor of Gustavus. His rising talents had long been apparent, though the extent of them was yet to be disclosed. Richelieu selected him as the most valuable ally for his plans. In 1628 France had agreed to give Gustavus 500,000 livres for two years on condition that he invaded Germany. Gustavus was embarrassed by a war with Poland. The Polish king claimed to be entitled to the Swedish throne, but the adroitness of Charnacé, one of the most skilful of those diplomatists whom Richelieu found to assist his foreign policy, arranged a truce between Sweden and Poland. The cardinal did not wish to assume a position of armed hostility towards Austria, but in 1631 a treaty for five years was signed with Gustavus, by which, for the defence of their oppressed friends and to restore to their former condition the princes and States of the Empire, he was to invade Germany with 36,000 men, and the French were to furnish him 1,200,000 livres per year.¹ Richelieu endeavored to have the treaty provide that the only change to be made in the religious condition of Germany should be the toleration of the Catholic

¹ See *Mercure François*, 1631, 469-472. Dumont, *Corp. Dip.*, vi., 1-2.

religion where it was not then permitted. Gustavus said such an article would repel his Protestant allies, but he agreed to leave the Catholic worship, or that of any other faith, undisturbed in any places that might be conquered.¹

Even before the final execution of this treaty the Swedish king had thrown his dice for this great prize, and at the head of a small army of about fifteen thousand men had invaded Germany. After regulating the affairs of the kingdom, he made his farewell address to the States. "It is from no light caprice," said he, "that I involved you and myself in this new and fearful contest. God is my witness that I do not fight from any lust of war, but the Emperor has insulted my ambassadors, oppressed my friends, persecuted my religion, and stretched out his hand after my crown. The down-trodden States of Germany cry to us for help, and God willing we will give it to them."

In June, 1630, he landed on the coast of Pomerania. He issued proclamations to the electors and to the Protestant princes, but he met at first a cold reception. Even those most inclined to assist him were afraid of exposing themselves to the Emperor's wrath by joining his enemy. In Vienna, Gustavus' undertaking was lightly regarded. "This snow king will soon melt away," was the popular jest. But already the Emperor's position had been seriously weakened from other causes.

An imperial army, as powerful as that led by Wallenstein, excited jealousy among the princes who formed the Catholic League. An Emperor with a great standing army could do away with the privileges of the loosely-bound members of the Empire, and turn a nominal allegiance into an actual subservience. However willing to assist in the suppression of Lutheran or Calvinistic heresies, the danger to their own independence dampened the ardor of the Catholic States. Their discontent was increased by the ruinous and wanton devastations of Wallenstein's soldiers, and the hauteur and calculating

¹ Richelieu, xxii., 298-305. See *Lettres de Richelieu*, t. 3 and 4.

cruelty of the leader. To complaints as to appeals Wallenstein turned a deaf ear. In 1630 a diet of the electors and German princes, attended by the representatives of France and Spain, met at Ratisbon. A united outcry against Wallenstein was there raised by the German leaders, and especially by the Duke of Bavaria. The misery, devastation, and ruin with which Wallenstein visited Catholic as well as Protestant lands was told the Emperor, with bitter complaints that all the crimes of the army, against God and man, were done under his name. Unlike his general, Ferdinand was not a ruthless man, except against heretics; yet he was friendly to Wallenstein, and realized how much of his success was due to the commander of his forces. But he was also anxious to conciliate the electors, for he desired his son to be chosen king of the Romans, and thus designated as his own successor as Emperor. In his perplexity his mind was influenced by the counsels of Father Joseph, the Capucin, who was Richelieu's friend and most skilful diplomat. The Emperor always regarded the voice of a priest as the voice of God, and the subtle suggestions of the Capucin helped to decide Wallenstein's overthrow.

Wallenstein was relieved of his command. He was at the head of a hundred thousand men, bound to him as soldiers rarely are to their commander. The influence of a successful general over his followers had been increased by innumerable personal ties, by gifts, by bribes, by promotions, by plentiful rations, and abundant plunder. But Wallenstein resolved to obey. He was not in a position to defy the Emperor and hold the army in opposition to its allegiance. "The Emperor has been betrayed," he said. "I pity him, but I forgive him. It is clear that Bavaria has forced this from him. I am sorry he should have abandoned me with so little resistance, but I will obey."

He was the more reconciled because his astrologer told him that the stars still reserved a brilliant future for him. But a seer's eye was hardly needed to descry that. A portion of the troops were disbanded, and many of them

took service under the King of Sweden. The armies were now almost wholly composed of mercenaries, who served either cause with equal zeal.

Wallenstein retired to Bohemia, where he lived in more than royal state. Magnificent palaces were built on his various estates; he was attended by great retinues of pages and servants; his table was always laid for a hundred places; sixty carriages with his court followed him when he drove over the country, and a hundred wagons, carrying servants and supplies; six barons and as many noble knights constantly attended him. He needed quiet, and the streets approaching his palace were often closed, lest any passing wagon should disturb his contemplations. Surrounded by such pomp, he lived silent and reserved, despising pleasures, watching the course of the stars, and the ebb and flow of events, and waiting for his hour to come.

The treaty of Ratisbon, which was signed by the French ambassadors in October, 1630, provided that France should give no aid to the enemies of the Emperor.¹ The ambassadors had received full powers to negotiate a treaty, and technically, perhaps, had not exceeded their authority. But their private instructions had related to a peace which should regulate the condition of Italy. The relations of France with Gustavus were known to them, and Richelieu's letters had stated explicitly that this alliance would not be abandoned. It is uncertain whether this provision had been acceded to by Father Joseph in order to deceive the Emperor, or whether, alarmed by the news of Louis' illness at Lyons, he thought best to yield; but Richelieu immediately disavowed the treaty, and Father Joseph was sent into a brief and nominal disgrace.² The

¹ A translation of this treaty is published in *Mercure François*, xvi., p. 704. See also *Corps Dip.*, v., pp. 615-618.

² Richelieu's letters of August, 1630, to Father Joseph and M. de Leon say explicitly: "On vous envoie un pouvoir de faire la paix, non limité."—*Lettres de Richelieu*, iii., p. 877. But the letters of instruction are explicit as to the king's purposes with Gustavus. A despatch of September 5th says: "Nous avons une vraie et sincère intention de nous employer

negotiations with Sweden continued, and the treaty was signed in 1631, which Gustavus at once published to the world.

In the meantime he had been strengthening his position in Germany. The army with which he landed was small, but it was composed of thoroughly disciplined men. Gustavus' forces furnished a strong contrast to the great predatory hordes that had pillaged Germany for years. Whatever was needed for the army was paid for at fair prices. Pillage and excesses were punished. Not only discipline, but religious order and service, prayer and praise were found among the Swedish troops. Morning and evening service was said among the soldiers with as much regularity and more fervor than among the canons of a cathedral. They were those best of soldiers who combine experience and discipline with moral character and a conviction of the justice of the cause for which they fight. They prayed long and fought hard.

The great numbers who gathered under Gustavus' command as the war advanced lowered the discipline of the army. Though called Swedish, it came to be composed of every nationality, and after Gustavus' death it mattered little to a district whether the Swedish or the imperial army was quartered upon it.

Gustavus slowly marched southward, meeting with little aid and little opposition. Those whom he came to protect were so timorous about joining him that he compelled their adhesion by vigorous measures. "If your master

avec Suède pour établir un vray repos en Allemagne ; vous en pouvez assurer, et certainement nous n'y manquerons pas." See also *Lettres de Richelieu*, t. iii., pp. 882, 893, 900, 937, etc. The suggestion that Father Joseph agreed to the article about allies, simply to deceive the Emperor, I think is fanciful. His own explanation is found in *Affaires Étrangères*, Allemagne, t. vii., p. 451. Their letter of September 20th contained proposed articles such as were agreed to. In the anxiety of the king's illness, no answer was sent them until October 9th, and the treaty was signed on the 13th, before the arrival of the letter, which decidedly disapproved of any such article. A study of all this correspondence shows the superiority of Richelieu's judgment and firmness as a diplomat, even over the skilful diplomats whom he employed.

holds with God," said he to the envoy of the Duke of Brandenburg, "let him stand on my side; if with the Devil, he must fight against me." Both Pomerania and Brandenburg at last joined the ally, who offered them the alternative of having their cities protected or bombarded.

Gustavus continued his advance. It was suggested by the imperial general that both sides should go into winter-quarters, as was the custom in those days of slow and ineffective warfare; but the king sent word that the Swedes were soldiers in winter as well as in summer. The publication of the French treaty made Gustavus seem less like a friendless adventurer in a desperate cruise, but he received a severe blow in the spring of 1631.

Tilly had assumed command of the forces of the Emperor and besieged Magdeburg. Gustavus felt bound to rescue this flourishing Protestant city, which asked him for protection, but the remissness of Brandenburg and Saxony delayed him until Magdeburg fell. The ruin visited on this place exceeded the worst barbarities of the war. The city was populous—one of the richest and most flourishing in Germany. It was laid waste as, Tilly boasted, no city had been laid waste since Troy and Jerusalem. Thirty thousand persons were murdered during the sack. Every refinement of cruelty was added which the experience of a long war had taught the soldiers. Women were violated before their husbands and parents, and death was aggravated by dishonor. The Croats sought recreation in throwing infants into the burning buildings, while the Walloons preferred spearing them in their mother's arms. To the destruction of the inhabitants was added that of the city itself, and only two churches and a few houses escaped the flames.¹

The blotting out of this great and prosperous city sent a thrill of terror through Protestant Germany. If Gustavus could not protect his allies from the destruction

¹ It seems, however, probable that the burning of the city was in large part started by the citizens to prevent Tilly's gaining any advantage from its possession. It was, at all events, one of the results of the capture.

with which the Emperor would punish them, it would be madness to join him. In order to force the Elector of Saxony to a decided course, Tilly now invaded his dominions. The Elector of Saxony was the most despicable of all German princes. His only claim to fame was that he had killed more birds and beasts than any other man in Germany, and his achievements in other lines were celebrated by the titles of the "Beer King" and the "Beer Jug." He had hoped to escape the ravages of the Emperor's troops and to leave to their fate his brethren in the faith. This cautious policy had secured immunity thus far from the evils of the war, and the imperial forces now exulted in the plunder of a virgin land, where the fields were tilled, the villages unburned, and the burghers' purses full of gold with which to purchase their ransom. But Tilly had reached the summit of his renown, and the sack of Magdeburg was to be followed by a disastrous ending of a long and successful career. The elector was at last moved to a resolution, and he now wearied Gustavus with prayers for assistance. "He has come to me," said the king to the ambassadors, "in his sore need, when there is no other escape. He must place Wittenberg in my hands, give me his eldest son as a hostage, and pay my troops for three months before I will help him." "Not only Wittenberg, but all Saxony," answered the elector, "and my whole family for hostages, and if that is not enough, myself besides."

The united armies of Sweden and Saxony now marched against Tilly, and encountered him at Breitenfeld, close by the walls of Leipsic. On September 17, 1631, the battle began. The allies had about 45,000 men, and Tilly a few thousand less. The Saxons were defeated and put to flight, but the discipline and valor of the Swedes, under their king's fiery leadership, carried all before them. Tilly met his first defeat, but it was one that was to embitter the rest of his days and change the whole course of a thirty years' war. He lost 19,000 men, and his army was scattered. This victory, the

first great battle won by the Protestant 'cause, made Gustavus Adolphus the hero of Europe. A single victory exposed the weakness of the Emperor and of the loosely bound German states. Gustavus could have advanced at once into the hereditary possessions of the House of Austria, and probably have reached Vienna without a battle. He chose, however, instead of this assault on the centre of the enemy's power, to attack the scattered members of the League and obtain control of northern and western Germany.

His march was a series of rapid successes, such as few generals have met with. Leaving in September with an army of 25,000 men he reached the Rhine in a little over two months with a force of 60,000. Every thing yielded before him. The Protestants joined his alliance; the Catholic princes and electors made the best terms they could; some yielded at once; some made a fruitless resistance. Those who would promise neutrality were left undisturbed. Gustavus took possession of the provinces which resisted, and announced that he should hold them until the end of the war. The electors of Cologne and Treves put themselves under the protection of France. In December the king crossed the Rhine, and Lorraine, Alsace, and the whole left bank of the river lay open before him. But his close approach was viewed with uneasiness by Richelieu, who was finding the success of his champion greater than he desired.

Gustavus therefore left the French to chastise the Duke of Lorraine, and turned his army eastward. Allowing his forces a brief rest, while he regulated the affairs of the numerous electors, dukes, counts, and other potentates, of whom he had so rapidly become the autocrat, in March, 1632, he began again his triumphal progress, but now he marched eastward toward the Duke of Bavaria.

The duke had declined the early overtures of France for his neutrality, and had not been able to bring himself to the humiliating terms which Gustavus had offered

since his victories. The whole force of the war was now to be turned upon the territory which had been spared so long.

Tilly had gathered another army, but he had orders not to risk it in a pitched battle against his victorious rival. The Swedes passed the river Lech in the teeth of Tilly's forces. The defeated general was mortally wounded, and his army yielded a position that seemed impregnable, and left Bavaria open to the enemy. Gustavus marched through the country, meeting little further opposition, and entered Munich. The Elector Palatine, the unlucky Frederick, was among the large body of vagrant and expectant princes that accompanied the conqueror. He had at least the satisfaction of entering the capital of Bavaria, from which the despoiler of his own provinces and electorate had been forced to fly.

Austria lay next to Bavaria, and there seemed nothing to prevent Gustavus having all Germany at his feet, but the Emperor had already turned to what he knew to be his only refuge. Messenger had followed messenger asking Wallenstein again to assume command of the imperial forces. But the deposed leader turned a reluctant ear to the calls. He is said, after Gustavus landed in Germany, to have intimated a readiness to ally himself with the enemies of Austria. He did not raise a hand to protect Bohemia when the Saxons invaded and overran it after the battle of Breitenfeld. Though he desired again to hold the great place from which he had been driven, he was resolved to increase the bids by a persistent coyness. He praised the happy rest of private life. He had enjoyed peace too long, he said, to seek again the delusions of fame and the uncertain favor of princes; his desires for power and might had perished, and tranquillity was now the only object of his wishes. The envoys labored long with the pretended recluse. At first they suggested that the Emperor's son should act with him and learn the art of war. "I will have no associate," said the duke, "not if God himself wished to divide the command with me."

Finally he consented to devote three months to raising an army for the Emperor, but he must not be asked to lead it. So much he would do for his king, but after that he should be allowed to return to his sweet retirement. At the name of Wallenstein soldiers sprang up from every part and hastened to enlist under his banner, and at the end of three months he had 40,000 men in arms. But the great forces which his name had gathered, he alone could hold together. When the genie that had summoned them disappeared, they would fade away as rapidly as they had come. The Emperor besought, entreated, commanded the general's services. At last Wallenstein consented to lead the army, but the terms he imposed were such as subject had never asked from master. Wallenstein was to have absolute control over the Emperor's forces; he alone could punish or reward; neither the Emperor nor his son could exercise any authority in the army or direct any movements in the campaign. Wallenstein alone should dispose of all that was confiscated or conquered; he should not be removed from his position without formal and timely notice, and his services were to be rewarded by the Duchy of Mecklenburg and other great possessions.¹

To grant such power was almost an abdication, but Ferdinand had no choice, and his subject would abate nothing from his demands. The name of Wallenstein again in command encouraged the adversaries of Sweden, but the great leader showed no disposition to take any hasty steps. The troops of Gustavus were laying waste Bavaria, the territory of the Emperor's most powerful and most trusty ally. Wallenstein owed the Duke of Bavaria an old grudge, and he did not hasten to his relief. Not only the duke, but the Emperor besought him to go to the rescue, but Ferdinand was to find what it meant to have no right to command his own army.

¹The terms of the conditions made with Wallenstein are involved in a great deal of doubt. From the contemporary authorities and the subsequent conduct of the parties, what I have given seem to have been substantially the terms that Wallenstein exacted.

At last when there was little left of Bavaria to protect, the general joined the forces of its duke, insisting, however, that he should exercise sole command over the united armies. The presence of so skilful an opponent, with a fresh and powerful army, checked Gustavus in his hitherto uninterrupted course. The united armies marched against Nürnberg, and Gustavus led his forces, now much reduced in number, to the protection of that city. It seemed that the great commanders would now meet, and the fate of Germany be decided. But Wallenstein would not risk all on the fortune of an assault. Gustavus was too weak to do more than maintain the defensive, and he encamped by the city waiting reinforcements. These he received, and the imperial army was also strengthened, until 120,000 men lay encamped over against each other in front of Nürnberg. The support of so large a force laid bare the country around. Disease wasted both armies, and pestilence each day worked more harm than the bloody skirmishes which took place. Still Wallenstein rested strongly entrenched on the hills and watched his adversary. Gustavus' patience was first exhausted, and he led a desperate attack on the imperial forces. But their position was too strong to be forced, and the king was obliged to abandon the effort after severe loss, and he retired to his own camp. After these great armies had been watching each other for nine weeks, hunger and distress compelled them to move. Gustavus broke camp and marched away, and Wallenstein slowly followed. Forty thousand men from the two armies had perished, victims of this long and terrible encampment, and the war was not a hair's breadth nearer an end.

The fatal battle, so long expected, soon occurred. Wallenstein resolved to quarter his troops in Saxony, and Gustavus marched there for the protection of the country. The armies engaged at Lutzen on November 16, 1632, very nearly in sight of Breitenfeld. Gustavus was to end his career as a great conqueror, almost where he had begun it fourteen months before. In the morning the king

prayed before the troops, and the whole army kneeling down sang a hymn to the God of battles, and then, as the mists broke away, they marched against the forces of Wallenstein. The king had one fault as a great general, and that was the one most easily forgiven : with his reckless courage he exposed himself in battle as freely as a common soldier. Early in the combat he was severely wounded. Overcome with pain he asked the Duke of Lüneburg to take him to the rear. As they went, a bullet from an unknown hand struck Gustavus in the back. "I have enough, brother," said the king, "save yourself," and he fell, and was covered by the dead that were slain in the struggle round his body. But the desire for revenge gave increased vigor to the Swedes, and after a desperate battle, they remained in possession of the field. Wallenstein fell back and retreated from Saxony.

He claimed, with little cause, a victory in the field, but he had won what was of greater profit. The death of Gustavus saved the House of Austria from the humiliation that his genius would have made almost certain. His career in Germany had saved the Protestant cause from utter overthrow. His death left the long war to end less disastrously than had seemed probable when he landed in Pomerania—but far less triumphantly than had been hoped when the mist broke away in the morning at Lutzen.

Gustavus Adolphus was reckoned by Napoleon as among the eight great generals of the world. Of the qualities that make the hero, as distinguished from the conqueror,—daring, high resolve, lofty piety, the kindly heart, the open speech,—he had more than any of his rivals in fame. Had his life been spared, he would have made Sweden a great Continental power,—perhaps the head of a northern Protestant empire. But his untimely death put an end to the plans for changing the destiny of northern Europe, and left the fate of Germany to be worked out by sixteen years more of war and constant misery.

The great alliance of which he was the leader was discouraged by his loss, and it left the Protestant cause in a condition of great peril. It seemed for a time as if the struggle might suddenly end in an entire surrender to the Emperor. Ferdinand himself believed so, for he refused to offer any moderate terms of peace.

But France was now to take the chief part in the contest against Spain and the Emperor. Richelieu had watched with jealousy and apprehension the marvellous success of the Swedish king. Desirous to check the House of Austria, he did not wish a far more powerful empire to succeed it, and his Catholic zeal apprehended much from the eager Protestantism of Gustavus.¹ But at his death Richelieu resolved that what had been won should not be wholly lost. Oxenstiern, the chancellor and friend of Gustavus, succeeded to his position as the Swedish leader. A treaty was made at Hailbron, in 1633, by which the chancellor was given command of the ill-united members of the Protestant party.² No longer content with giving money, in 1634 France agreed to furnish an army for the cause, and she became not only an actual but an avowed combatant.³

This great struggle against Austria and Spain absorbed

¹ The minute prepared by Bouthillier after Gustavus' death, but expressing Richelieu's views, says: "On pouvait dire que S. M. n'y avait peut-être pas beaucoup perdu à la mort du roi de Suède."—*Lettres de Richelieu*, vii., 686. Mazarin alludes to the jealousy which the ambition and success of Gustavus caused France.—*Let.*, ii., 871.

² The articles, translated, are printed in "*Mercurie François*," vol. xix., p. 463. See also Dumont, *Corps Dip.*, vi., 50-54. The treaty was signed April 9, 1633. A full account of these negotiations is found in *Lettres de Feuquières*, 1633, 1634, and 1635 (Amsterdam, 1753), t. i., ii, and iii. Feuquières was the French ambassador in those years, and his correspondence details these negotiations very fully, and also those with Wallenstein. From Feuquières' instructions and letters, it appears that France preferred that Oxenstiern and the Electors of Saxony and Brandenburg should be associated in command, but the Swedes utterly refused such an arrangement. All whom Feuquières met seemed to unite in a contemptuous opinion of the Elector of Saxony. The letters are full of the plans, attributed to Wallenstein, to make himself king of Bohemia.

³ Dumont, *Corps Dip.*, vi., 78, 79.

most of the energies of the remaining years of the cardinal's rule. Continued with varying fortunes, but with unwearied pertinacity, it was a terrible strain upon the resources of France. It was to result in a great increase in the power of that kingdom. "The cardinal," says Martin, "sacrificed, not without regret but without remorse, the generation that passed away, to the fatherland that does not pass away." But the war was carried on with more zeal than brilliancy. Failing in any rapid success, it became a long and sullen attempt to conquer the enemy by exhaustion, and the forces of the Emperor were worn away with the same grim tenacity the cardinal had shown at La Rochelle. Richelieu had not the qualities of a great general, nor had he a keen eye to discern military genius in others. The forces of France were scattered over half of Europe. There were French armies in Italy, in Lorraine, in the Low Countries, in Germany, and on the Spanish frontiers. But not one of them struck those rapid and decisive blows at the heart of the enemy that end a war in a campaign. No great general arose among the French. In war, as in diplomacy, Richelieu showed a taste for ecclesiastics. The Cardinal of La Valette for some years commanded, on the German frontiers, forces as great as those which had conquered at Breitenfeld. But La Valette, though a fair general for a priest, was a poor general for a soldier. The Archbishop of Bordeaux was made admiral of the fleet; but his ill-success lost him Richelieu's favor. The episcopal warriors accomplished little by land or sea. The predatory leaders who had been trained under Gustavus were the only ones who showed any talent for their art.

The varying fortunes of the few years following Gustavus' death did not bring the war any nearer to a close. The Swedes gained some successes, but these effected no substantial progress. They were occasional victories rewarded by rich plunder, but followed by no steady extension of power, such as had brought two thirds of all Germany under the control of Gustavus. One part of his

foreign policy Richelieu brought to a successful end. A treaty in 1631 left the Duke of Mantua established in his Italian possessions, and secured to France the possession of Pignerol. In the long and tortuous negotiations, a prominent part was taken by a young Italian called Giulio Mazarini, and though his versatile talents at first excited Richelieu's mistrust, he at last so pleased the cardinal that the French ambassador was told to intimate to the Pope that Mazarini would be an acceptable nuncio to France.¹

The Swedes still cherished hopes of great accessions of territory in Germany, and they suggested plans that perhaps would have been possible if Gustavus had lived, but were chimerical after his death. In 1636, in the negotiations for a further alliance, Oxenstiern proposed a partition of Germany, by which Sweden should receive Bohemia, Westphalia, and Upper and Lower Saxony.² Richelieu had himself cherished a scheme which would have made the French minister a German prince. The coadjutor of Treves, on the death of the elector, would succeed to the electorate. Treves had been driven to accept the protection of France, and the French diplomatic agents endeavored to obtain the election of Richelieu as coadjutor. The elector himself was in no position to oppose such a desire, but the chapter were unwilling, and the papal sanction could not be obtained for a choice that would have so strengthened the power of the French cardinal, and made possible the election of a French king as Emperor. Such a dignity as the electorate, it was said, could only be given to a German subject, and the plan was abandoned.³

Wallenstein's fortunes declined from the death of his great rival. The army under his command accomplished little that was worthy of its leader's fame, and the devastation it wrought was borne with less patience when the

¹ *Lettres de Richelieu*, t. iv., 35, 174, 175.

² *Lettres de Richelieu*, viii., 302.

³ The secret history of this curious intrigue can be gathered from the documents and correspondence collected in *Lettres de Richelieu*, t. vii., p. 720, *et seq.*

greatest danger had passed. The general himself seemed more than ever veiled in mystery. He undertook no vigorous campaign, but kept his great army for the most part inactive, conducting obscure negotiations, and brooding over mysterious plans. Mistrusting the Emperor, he was resolved to use his army solely for his personal ambitions.

The crown of Bohemia had long been the *ignis fatuus* of his hopes, and he now began ill-disguised negotiations with his master's enemies, which should ensure the success of their arms and satisfy his own ambition. Suggestions of such an alliance were made to the Saxons, the Swedes, and the French. But the tortuous nature of the man created as much distrust among those he sought to befriend as those he sought to betray. The negotiations at last became so open that the imperial Court could have no doubt of the treason that Wallenstein was meditating. He had pondered on his ambitions so long, he had communed so deeply with the constellations, that, in the hour of his great enterprise, he was feeble and vacillating.

On January 12, 1634, at Pilsen, the generals and commanders were assembled, and a paper was presented them which recited the dangers to which their leader was exposed by the devices of his enemies, and by which they bound themselves to remain faithful to him to the last drop of their blood. Over forty of the chief officers signed this paper, though one or two added aloud, saving the rights of the Emperor and of religion. Wallenstein now felt sure of his army, but in fact most of those who signed the pledge did it with mental, if not with oral, reservations. The Emperor hesitated no longer, and a secret decree was issued by which Wallenstein was declared a traitor and deposed from his command. Piccolomini, Gallas, and the most of his officers were unwilling to follow him in a revolt against the Emperor, and the command of the army was entrusted to them. It was not, however, until February that the decree was published, and that Wallenstein was himself notified of his deposition.

He found that many of his most trusted officers refused to obey him. Disease had long crippled him physically, and he seemed to be struggling under plans greater than he could accomplish. He now led a small body of troops to Eger.

His position seemed so full of danger, that the Swedes and Saxons felt at last safe in trusting his overtures. They marched to meet him, and once in command of their forces and of his own devoted followers, the great general might have ended the war, and gained the crown which the stars had so long promised him. But he was under the ban of the Empire. His capture or death would be welcome news at Vienna, and his life was at the mercy of every mercenary outcast, who could expect a great reward for a murder done under the guise of patriotism. His extraordinary fortunes, and his strange character, exposed him the more to the vagaries of murderers, who seek the lustre that come from the slaughter of those preëminent among their fellows. Wallenstein's confidence in his officers and men exposed him to constant danger. The strong desire of genius to reach its object blinded him to the difficulties in its attainment, and constant desertions left him still trustful of those who remained. He had so long endeavored to win the army entirely to himself, that he could not believe it would now be false to him. Among the officers of the small force that followed him to Eger, were Butler, Gordon, and Leslie, all of whom belonged to the foreign adventurers, who were so numerous in his service. Gordon and Leslie were Scotch, and Butler was Irish. They now resolved to murder the traitor, as they called their commander, and to kill also some of his officers, who still continued faithful to him. A dinner was given, at which Tréka, Illo, and Kinsky, Wallenstein's most trusted lieutenants, attended. In the midst of the festivities, some soldiers entered the room, and the three, with one Neumann, were butchered by their entertainers. Butler and a Captain Devereux at once led a few soldiers to the house where Wallenstein had taken his quarters. They

burst into his sleeping room, where they found him undressed, and Devereux cried: "Are you the wretch that would lead the Emperor's forces to the enemy, and tear the crown from the Emperor's head. Now you must die." Wallenstein made no answer, and the soldiers murdered him where he stood. He died as silent and mysterious as he had lived. His murderers were all liberally rewarded by the Emperor. Wallenstein was but fifty years old, and his fall took out of European history a figure as important and portentous as that of Richelieu.¹

Wallenstein was murdered on February 25, 1634. His death was soon followed by the utter overthrow of the Swedish and allied forces at Nordlingen. The Emperor gained in one battle a great portion of what he had lost during Gustavus' long triumphal march. A victory equally important was gained when the Elector of Saxony executed his long-cherished purpose of deserting his Protestant brethren. In 1635, by the treaty of Prague, the Beer-Jug made his peace with Ferdinand, and agreed in the future to assist him in the war. It was provided that the Edict of Restitution should be suspended for forty years, and ecclesiastical possessions should be left as they were in November, 1627. The Confession of Augsburg was to be allowed to the nobility, to the imperial cities, and to Silesia, but not in Bohemia or the hereditary dominions of Austria; the Elector Palatine was not to recover what he had lost, but the Duke of Lorraine was to be restored to the possessions of which France had despoiled him.²

¹ The uncertainty that hangs about the end of Wallenstein's career has never been wholly cleared up, notwithstanding the numerous volumes of his correspondence and negotiations that have been published, and the still more numerous volumes that have been written on the subject. Some still claim that Wallenstein was guilty of no act that could be called treasonable, and that his deposition and overthrow were unjustifiable. However brutal his murder may have been, it seems impossible to reconcile his conduct with faithful service to the Emperor. This is the view taken by such authorities as Ranke and Gindely and by many others, and from such examination as I have given the printed correspondence of Wallenstein, considered in the light of his conduct, it seems evident that the Emperor was justified in removing him from his position, and declaring him guilty of treason.

² Dumont, *Corps Diplomatique*, vi., 89-105.

The Elector of Brandenburg was offered Pomerania as a bribe if he would assent to the treaty, and this he presently did. The abandonment of the Protestant Germans by these two great princes left them still more exposed to the vengeance of the Emperor, and many of them joined in the treaty. Had it not been for France and Sweden, it is probable that a general peace on these terms would have been made, but except for their interference, even such terms as were granted by the treaty of Prague would not have been extended to the Protestants. The treaty was followed the next year by the election of Ferdinand's son as King of the Romans. A few months after this last success, for which he had so long labored, in February, 1637, Ferdinand II. died, leaving his son to succeed him as the third of that name.

The misery and devastation which was caused among great masses of humankind by the narrow and unrelenting bigotry of Philip II. was equalled if not exceeded by that caused by his kinsman Ferdinand II. Either of them might have consoled himself with the reflection that his labor had not been in vain. Dissent from the Roman Catholic Church was crushed in most of the hereditary dominions of Austria, as it had been in Spain. Either of these sovereigns would have been undisturbed by the thought that in accomplishing the desired result hundreds of thousands of lives had been lost, a whole generation had been given over to pillage, vice, and misery, and a great portion of Europe had been retarded a century in its progress. A hundred years did not restore portions of Germany to the condition of prosperity or advancement which they enjoyed in 1618.

While these changes were taking place in Germany, France was experiencing the vicissitudes of warfare. The open alliance with Sweden was followed in 1635 by a formal declaration of war against Spain.¹ The detention of the Elector of Treves was taken as the ground for declaring a war that was in fact begun some years before.

¹ Dumont, *Corps Dip.*, vi., 106-108.

Richelieu gave to the declaration a formality that would have seemed more in place in the wars of Louis XI. and Charles the Bold. A herald arrayed in the traditional dress and blazonry of his order, was sent to the Cardinal Infant, the Spanish viceroy in the Low Countries to proclaim the war. But the Spanish treated this survival of feudalism with scant courtesy, and being denied admission to the cardinal, the herald was obliged to content himself with throwing copies of the declaration at the feet of those who refused to receive it, and fastening it as he returned to a post on the frontier.¹

The war proceeded even with this defect in the formalities. France had for many years assisted the United Provinces in their contest with Spain. A treaty in 1630 had increased to 1,000,000 livres the amount which Louis agreed to pay annually to Holland for seven years, should the war last so long.² Holland and France united in a treaty against Spain, and each agreed to furnish 30,000 men for a joint invasion of the Spanish Low Countries. For some years Richelieu had watched for internal discontents there, hoping to avail himself of some uprising to assist in expelling the Spanish from the Netherlands. As the result of such a success, these provinces were to be divided between France and Holland. Luxembourg, Namur, Hainault, Artois, Cambrai and part of Flanders might well be united with France, while the other provinces would join their sisters, who had shaken off the Spanish dominion.³ But in fact the Low Coun-

¹ *Lettres de Richelieu*, iv., 761-763. *Gazette*, June 18, 1635. This was the last time that war was declared by France in this Gothic fashion.

² *Richelieu*, xxii., 237.

³ *Epistolæ Grotii*, 155. *Lettres de Richelieu*, iv., 424. Dumont, *Corps Dip.*, vi., 81-85. The following is the memorandum made by Richelieu in 1633, which I think interesting as showing his plans for the extension of the French boundaries in this direction: (*Projet de Partage*) "Pour la France, le Hainault, l'Artois, le Tournesis, l'Isle, Doué et Orchy. La Flandre Gallicane, qui consiste en Graveline, Dunquerque, Ostende, Nieuport, et le Namurois, Luxembourg.

"Pour les Etats: le Brabant, Malines, Limbourg, la Frise, la Gueldre. Une partie de la Flandre impériale qui contient depuis la rivière de l'Escaut

tries which remained under the Spanish rule had little desire to change their condition. The Spaniards had learned moderation from the revolt of the United Provinces, and a change from the easy rule of the Cardinal Infant to the tax-ridden and oppressed condition of French provinces under Richelieu was desired by none but a few discontented schemers.¹ Even the States-General, though possessing greater political rights, did not excite the envy of the Spanish provinces, which were chiefly Catholic and were reasonably prosperous.

The war now openly waged against Spain did not produce any revolt in her Dutch provinces.² The French armies largely outnumbered their enemies, entered Luxembourg and won a brilliant victory at Avein, but no advantage resulted from this. The army was paralyzed by the manner in which it was commanded. Two marshals of equal rank settled disputes of precedence by each having sole authority over the army on alternate days. Each naturally employed his day of command so that his rival could do nothing notable on the morrow.³ Their forces were presently joined by those of the Prince of Orange, and he commanded the allied troops. But the prince had been trained to long sieges, and regarded the tedious besieging of one town as ample employment for a year's campaign.

Any friendship that might have been aroused among those whose enfranchisement the allies claimed to desire, was checked by the conduct of the troops. Tirlémont was captured and the soldiers sacked it in the most brutal manner, even fighting with each other in their greed for rape and plunder. The great army of 50,000 men accomplished nothing more, and was finally practically reduced

jusques en Hollande. Ils prétendront aussy part dans le Namurois et dans le Luxembourg."

In *Lettres de Richelieu*, vii., 677-682, are contained further memoranda made by him on the subject, and curious details as to the mode of accomplishing this change. Like all great men the cardinal designed more than he could accomplish.

¹ *Epistolæ Grotii*, 105, 158.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Richelieu*, xxii., 606, 641.

to the defensive by opponents that were inferior in number but superior in skill.¹

Two armies under the command of La Force and the Cardinal La Valette were sent against Lorraine and the Germans, but they accomplished little.² Richelieu prepared, however, for future success, by employing the Duke Bernard of Saxe Weimar, a young general who had proved himself a worthy pupil of Gustavus. For 4,000,000 livres a year the duke agreed to maintain an army of 18,000 men, and to use them in the service of the French king.³ Of all the great armies sent out in many different directions, the only one that achieved any marked measure of success, was that which the Duke of Rohan commanded in the Valteline.

In the year 1636, the feeble conduct of the war not only accomplished nothing against the enemy, but it exposed France to very serious peril. The army in Italy carried on a dilatory warfare, and the Prince of Condé was sent to invade Franche Comté. This great and fertile province was still a part of the dominion of Spain. But as its position rendered it easy for it to shake off its allegiance, it was favored with a mild and almost nominal rule, and the desire of the French to gain Franche Comté for themselves met with no sympathy among its inhabitants. On the claim that they were not preserving neutrality, the Prince of Condé, in May, led there the chief army sent out during the year, with the hope of seizing the entire province. After capturing a few towns, he began the siege of Dôle, but the large force under his command seemed utterly unequal, even to the task of capturing that city.⁴ For eleven weeks they lay before

¹ *Epistolæ Grotii*, 167. Richelieu, xxii., 606-616.

² Richelieu, xxii., 641-642.

³ Dumont, *Corps Dip.*, vi., 118, 119. Richelieu, xxii., 642. *Mémoires de Montglat*, ed. Michaud, 29., 38. Much of the detail of this negotiation is found in *Lettres et Negotiations de Feuquières*, t. iii., and *Lettres de Richelieu* for 1635, and *Gazette* for that year *passim*.

⁴ *Ad Dolam res sperato tardius procedunt, imperitia ut videtur artium obsidendi.* Grot. *Epis.*, 250, July, 1636. Grotius' letters are both interesting

the town and accomplished nothing, and in August Condé found with relief that he was recalled by the king, to assist in warding off the enemy from Paris itself.¹

In the early part of July, taking advantage of the scanty forces of the French in the north, the Spanish and Germans under the command of the Cardinal Infant, Piccolomini, and of the daring partisan leader John de Wert, suddenly burst into Picardy. The frontier towns surrendered one after another with constant pusillanimity. Richelieu had the recreant governors sentenced to death and their property confiscated, but they fled to avoid their punishment.² The invaders pushed rapidly on with a small army, crossed the Somme, laid waste the country between that river and the Oise, and came within less than a hundred miles of Paris. The terror in that city was extreme. Not since the battle of St. Quentin had Paris seemed in danger of capture by a foreign invader. But after the first panic, the spirits of the people rose with the peril, and both Louis and Richelieu showed a courage that inspired the citizens. In the first hours of danger the complaints against the cardinal had been loud and deep. His ambition, it was said, had launched France into these great wars, which he had not the ability to manage. While he was rashly projecting foreign invasions, the enemy was marching almost unopposed to the capital of the kingdom. Richelieu had sat in his gorgeous palace planning impossible conquests, or listening to foolish comedies, and had left unguarded the approach to Paris itself.³

Such angry murmurs might have deterred a timid man from exposing himself to the public hatred, but the cardinal was unwavering in his courage. He drove in his carriage through the streets of the city, almost without guard or followers, and by the intrepidity of his conduct,

and valuable, but his unfriendly feeling towards France colors somewhat his narration. He was ambassador from Sweden from 1635-1645.

¹ Lettres de Richelieu, v., 534. Accounts of the siege are found in *Gazette* for 1636, 357-360, 375, *et passim*. ² Lettres de Richelieu, v., 526.

³ See Grotii Epis., 254 *et passim* and *Mémoires* of the time. Lettres d'Alexandre Campion, 298-316.

silenced the mutinous and gave courage to the desponding.¹ Louis also excited the zeal of the people to the utmost. Deputations from the public bodies and trades waited on him to volunteer their aid. The king embraced the syndics of the trades and chiefs of the orders, even to the cobblers, and the exultant cobblers gave 5,000 francs in their patriotic fervor. The other bodies voted large sums. The lackeys and shop boys were formed in companies; those who kept a carriage sent one of the horses to carry a cavalryman; the churches raised money; the workshops were closed, and building was stopped, that the laborers might be enrolled in the army. The Parliament agreed to support 2,000 men. By the first of September an army of 42,000 men marched against the invaders, but the latter fell back without resistance. Indeed, their forces had been but about 32,000 men, and they were quite unequal to the attack of a city like Paris. Very many of them, moreover, had gorged themselves with plunder, and deserted the ranks, to convey it safely home. An active general might have obtained from the Spanish in their retreat some reparation for the harm they had done. But the generals of the French armies were largely those whose right to command rested on their birth rather than on their fitness. The Count of Soissons, the king's cousin, a young man not without ability, but entirely without fidelity, had been in command of the army in Picardy. Not daring to remove him, Richelieu associated in the command Monsieur, the king's brother, who possessed neither ability nor fidelity. The enemy retreated, therefore, undisturbed. The important town of Corbie, which they had captured, was retaken, but only by Richelieu's forcing an attack in direct conflict with the desires of the commanders of the army.²

Richelieu, with the king, had joined the forces, and

¹ "Il soutient bien," says the unfriendly Campion, "cette fois la dignité du ministère et il ne parut en lui rien que de fier et de grand."—Lettres, 309.

² See Lettres de Richelieu, v., 534-630. Mém. de Richelieu, xxiii., 70-82. *Gazette* for 1636, 475, 483-492, 507, 509-512, 557-560, *et passim*. Lettres de Campion, *supra*.

while at Amiens, he had his narrowest escape from any of the many plots laid for his assassination. Soissons and Orleans formed a plan to murder the cardinal, and it was not discovered by any of the force of spies he always had in his employ. The design is told us by the Count of Montresor, one of the confederates, with apparently as little hesitation as if it had been a plan for hunting a stag or spearing a wild boar. It was calculated that as the king departed after a conference which he was to hold, Richelieu would be without attendants. Some conversation was to be held with the minister, and on the pretext that he showed some disrespect to Monsieur, the latter was to give the signal, and Richelieu was to be killed on the spot. All went as had been expected, but when the moment for execution came, the courage of Orleans failed him, and instead of talking with Richelieu, and giving the signal, he walked abruptly away. One of his associates remonstrated, but he only stammered out doubts and fears, and the cardinal entered his carriage and drove away from the unknown peril.¹ Fearful that their plot might be discovered, at the close of the campaign Monsieur and Soissons both fled, and sought an alliance with the Spanish. Monsieur was presently lured back by promises of allowing him both his wife and his pensions, but Soissons agreed to desist from hostilities only on condition that for four years he should be allowed to remain at Sedan in the enjoyment of his pensions, and without being required to appear at the Court.²

Paris was not again exposed to such dangers as in 1636, yet the war made but little progress. The forces levied were sufficiently large; 150,000 men were in arms in 1635, and the numbers were increased rather than diminished, but their division into eight armies, besides garrisons, kept any of these from being imposing in strength.³ Even

¹ *Mém. de Montresor*, 204, 205. *Mém. de Retz*, 35-40. *Montglat*, 49, 50. *Lett. de Campion*, 312. The exact date of this seems very uncertain. See *Lettres de Richelieu*, vii., 760. It was probably during October, 1636.

² *Lettres de Campion*, 317-336.

³ *Lettres de Richelieu*, v., 1, *et passim*.

greater evil resulted from the want of discipline in the army, and the impatience of the nobility of all restraint; from the number of desertions, the irregularity of pay, the lack of supplies, the disputes of the commanders, the corruption of the financiers. Richelieu endeavored to superintend himself each department of the government, but without success. The administration was so imperfectly organized, that the minister found it impossible to have his plans executed as he directed. He was unable to complete an organization by which the detail work of the government could be thoroughly done. He did, indeed, make some changes, and the condition of French political life was such that it was perhaps impossible that an honest and effective system should be created. From all these defects it resulted that the soldiers were often poorly clothed and fed and irregularly paid, and such conditions aggravated the troubles resulting from inefficient leaders and divided commands.¹ In 1635, St. Simon writes from the army commanded by Cardinal La Valette; "I hope for good success if bread is not wanting. We have too many generals, too many by half. We have marshals of the camp who do not serve with efficiency. The army needs repose and supplies. There are complaints from every side."² La Valette wrote: "We could have ruined Galas' army, if we had only had sufficient bread. All our cavalry is practically disbanded."³ The king himself when he was present with the army in 1635, wrote the cardinal from St. Dizier: "There is neither money nor provisions; all the troops are on the point of disbanding if they are not promptly provided for. I do not dare go there on account of the complaints I hear on all sides, which I cannot remedy." Again he writes from Chalons: "I am annoyed at staying here so long doing nothing, but having found neither money, troops, nor provisions, I do not wish to advance."⁴ In December, 1635, the Gov-

¹ See Mém. de Bussy, 116 *et passim*, for some account of the disorders among the soldiers.

² Cited in Lettres de Richelieu, v., 337.

³ Lettres de Richelieu, v., 161.

⁴ Lettres de Richelieu, v., 367-391.

ernor of Grave wrote that soldiers were asking alms and dying of hunger.

Nor were such complaints heard only at the beginning of the war. In 1640 the Marshal of Châtillon wrote: "For six days we have been able to do nothing, because they have not sent us bread enough for a third of the army."¹ The results of such irregularities were that the soldiers frequently supplied their needs by plundering the country where they were encamped, and that desertions were numerous. The number of soldiers was much greater on the rolls than in fact, and a fruitful source of corruption was in receiving allowance for rations for a larger number than were actually in service. Says Richelieu: "There are not more than 20,000 effective men in the army, and yet orders are given for the distribution of 28,000 rations of bread, which is much more than enough to satisfy the officers."²

The officers themselves, taken from the nobility, were restive under discipline, impatient under any hardship, eager to leave at the close of a campaign, and they frequently left without orders. "They have," writes Châtillon of his officers, "an incredible impatience to gain winter quarters." La Valette writes to Chavigni, early in November: "The nobles are leaving without its being possible to retain them. The most infamous thing for our nation is the little heart or affection of the nobles."³ The campaign usually lasted only a few months in the year. The forces of Gustavus, which conquered the most of Germany in twelve months boasted of being soldiers in winter as well as summer, but the French did not carry on war after their fashion. By the end of October the armies generally had retired into their winter quarters, and they would not be-

¹ Lettres de Richelieu, vi., 723, 724.

² Lettres de Richelieu, v., 998. On October 22, 1636, he minutes: "On délivre encore 42,000 rations de pain, qui est un abus insupportable, et il est certain que c'est tout s'il y a des gens pour la moitié" (Lettres v., 635; vii., 268). *Gazette*, Aug. 16, 1635.

³ Lettres de Richelieu, v., 140, 284, 356, 880. Mémoires de Richelieu, xxiii., 98. Lettres de Chavigni cited in Let. de Richelieu, v., 284.

gin the next campaign until late in the following spring.¹ There was not often snow enough to interfere with the prosecution of any campaign, but the commissary was ill supplied, and the difficulties of transportation were serious to a poorly equipped army. The noblemen also who flocked so liberally to the camp, and were the officers in command, desired to return to the pleasures of the Court. Long months spent in seeing artillery and baggage wagons dragged over wretched roads would have been odious to gentlemen who were not afraid of bullets but were much afraid of mud.

While the war was slowly waging, some attempts were made towards peace. As early as 1636 propositions had been made for a conference where a full and final peace might be arranged, and Cologne was chosen as the place where it should be held. But it was not until twelve years later that the negotiations now begun resulted in the peace of Westphalia.²

Except some victories won by the Duke of Weimar, the condition of either party was little changed by the progress of the war from 1636 to 1640. In Italy the French position was weakened by the deaths of the Dukes of Savoy and Mantua. Mantua came under the influence of the mother of the young duke, and she was Spanish in blood and sympathies.³ The widow of the Duke of Savoy, who also left a child the heir to his duchy, was the sister of Louis XIII., but she was a woman whose immorality offended even the lenient judgment of the time, and she was ruled in turn by her lover and her confessor. Neither of these befriended the French, and Richelieu, in his offers of assistance to the duchess, haggled for terms which would have left Savoy little more than a dependent on France. The duchess hesitated long about accepting such aid, and her subjects, who felt the dislike and distrust of Richelieu, that was almost universal in Europe, were im-

¹ *Lettres de Rich.*, vi., 345. *Mém. de Rich.*, xxiii., 260, and see constant illustration of this in *Mémoires* of the time.

² *Lettres de Richelieu*, v., 521; *Gazette* of Aug. 23, 1636.

³ *Richelieu*, xxiii., 173, *et. seq.*

patient of any plan for French protection. Profiting by her unpopularity, her brothers-in-law captured Turin and were the actual rulers of Piedmont until the brilliant successes of Harcourt in 1640.¹

But though the war was little pressed in Italy, it was carried on against Spain itself and its northern provinces with some degree of vigor. A Spanish invasion was checked by the victory of Leucate, won by the soldiers of Languedoc against the veterans of Spain.² Abandoning the defensive in 1638, the French laid siege to the important town of Fontarabia. The siege was begun in the middle of July, and success was confidently promised. Richelieu had this conquest greatly at heart, and awaited it with a desire that was strengthened by confident expectation.³ Entire failure was in store for him, and in September the siege was raised. It was due probably to the insubordination and jealousy of the great French nobles, to whom were given the chief commands. In this siege the conduct of some of the generals reached the point of actual disloyalty. The command of the army had been given to Condé, who was a poor general, but was rich and influential and firmly attached to the cardinal by the chains of absorbing avarice; but abundant pay, though it ensured fidelity, did not create capacity. The Prince of Condé at Fontarabia, as in all his campaigns, showed a lack of all those military talents the possession of which was to make his son so famous. A still more fatal obstacle to success was found in the conduct of the Duke of La Valette, a younger son of the Duke of Épernon. It was thought necessary to conciliate this powerful and unruly

¹ These negotiations are discussed at great length in Richelieu's letters for 1637-1640. See *Lettres de Richelieu*, vi., 580, 585-589, etc.; vii., 806-812, *et passim*.

² See *Gazette* of 1637; *Correspondance de Sourdis*, t. i., 476-510; *Documents inédits sur l'histoire de France*.

³ See his letters for 1638, vol. vi., *passim*. He wrote the king, Sept. 2d: "Je supplie vostre majesté lorsqu'elle aura nouvelles de la prise de Fontarabie de me les faire scavoir aussy tost" (vi., 135). "La douleur de Fontarabie me tue," he wrote after the siege was raised (vi., 182, letter of Sept. 17, 1638).

nobleman by making his son lieutenant-general in the army under Condé. But La Valette chafed at any authority, and was still more irritated when the Archbishop of Bordeaux, as admiral of the fleet, claimed an equal position with him.¹ He used the power he had, if not with deliberate purpose to thwart the efforts of the French army, yet in a manner which produced that result. The assaults attempted were conducted by him with such wavering zeal and frequent disobedience, that little progress was made in the siege. A sudden attack of the Spanish threw the whole army into confusion. The plate and furniture of the Prince of Condé were plundered, and the siege was ignominiously raised.²

Condé had confidently promised this victory to his employer, and he sought to cover his defeat by accusing La Valette of disloyal conduct. The cardinal had already shown that, although he employed great nobles in places for which they had little fitness, he did not hesitate to punish them when they aroused his anger. His wrath at this great disappointment demanded a victim, and La Valette felt no consciousness of rectitude to encourage him in meeting an enraged minister. Not daring to return to Paris, he fled to England. Richelieu tried in vain to bring him within his power. He wrote to the duke's brother, the Cardinal of La Valette: "M. de La Valette is a lost man if he does not purge himself of what is laid to his charge. I write him that he may seek the king for that purpose. * * * I desire and doubt not that he will free himself from blame." To the duke himself he wrote: "The king desires that you should come to render an account of your conduct, which is the same thing that you wish, and that your friends desire for your justification."³

¹ Correspondance de Sourdis, t. ii., 31, 32.

² *Ibid.* ii., 59-78. Lettres de Richelieu, vi., 195-209. The Spanish celebrated this great repulse by comedies played before Philip III. during the winter, representing the rout of the French at Fontarabia. Montglat, xxix., 72. Mém. d' Omer Talon, ed. Michaud, xxx., 64-67.

³ Lettres de Richelieu, vi., 185, 186.

But the duke would not come to Paris, and he was in his absence judged by a council of state, the king presiding in person. By this extraordinary court he was condemned to death for disloyalty, Louis casting his vote with the others for this opinion.¹

The affairs of Lorraine occupied much of Richelieu's attention during the early years of the war, and the first steps were taken toward the union of that province with France.

The position of the great duchy of Lorraine in the midst of other states was one of peril, but in an especial degree it lay open to the attack of France. Its situation, as well as its wealth and fertility, made it an acquisition specially valuable to that kingdom. To a minister who desired to gain a foothold in that province, abundant opportunity was afforded by its rash and indiscreet ruler.

Lorraine had long been ruled by the present family of dukes, and in its government more had remained of feudal usages than in the monarchy that had grown up beside it. The character and career of the members of the house of Guise had brought Lorraine into very intimate connection with France, and the closeness of its relations added danger to its position as an independent state.

Charles IV. became Duke of Lorraine in 1624 by virtue of the rights of his cousin and wife, the daughter of the last duke. Charles claimed, however, that by the Salic law he was himself the legal heir, and by the cession of his father's rights he presently assumed to hold the dukedom for himself and not for his wife.

He soon began to take part in the intrigues of the French Court, and he enrolled himself among the lovers of Mme. de Chevreuse and the enemies of Richelieu. It was in his domains that Gaston sought refuge, and there in 1632 he was secretly married to the duke's sister.

Richelieu had long sought occasion for offence against the Duke Charles. The Duke of Lorraine was bound to do honor to the French king for the Duchy of Bar, a

¹ Omer Talon, t. xxx., 64-67, ed. Michaud.

duty which was often omitted, and the agents of Richelieu discovered that France had ancient and valid claims to other parts of his territory.¹ His relations with France were rendered still more uncertain by his own untrustworthy character. To tell the truth or to keep his agreement were equally impossible for Duke Charles, and he was dealing with a man with whom it was dangerous to trifle. Gustavus Adolphus had invaded Germany, and the Duke of Lorraine was eager in defending the cause of the Emperor.

In January, 1632, he was forced to make a peace with France, by which he agreed to make no treaty with any other prince or state without the knowledge and permission of the French king.²

Charles paid no attention to this treaty, and for all these causes in June, 1632, Louis invaded his dominions.³ They lay open to the French army, and no efficient opposition could be made. On June 26th Charles was forced to sign a second treaty, by which he surrendered the city and county of Clermont, and also yielded the possession for four years of the citadels of Stenai and Jametz.⁴ "This invasion and its results," said Richelieu, "teach little princes not to offend great ones if they do not wish to ruin themselves."⁵

This treaty made little change in the condition of affairs. Charles continued to act in hostility to the Swedes, to assist Gaston, and in every way to violate the conditions of the treaty he had made. He seemed resolved to complete his own ruin, and he did not have to wait long for its accomplishment.

In 1633 Louis a second time invaded Lorraine, and the

¹ The procès verbal stating these rights is found in *Aff. Etr. Lorraine*, vii., 423. See also Richelieu's private memoranda, *Documents Inédits Mélanges*, iii., 738-742.

² *Manuscripts de Conrart*, printed by Haussonville. M. Haussonville, in his interesting and learned work on this subject "*La Reunion de la Lorraine à la France*," has printed in his appendices all the most important documents on this subject.

³ Richelieu, xxii. *Gazette*, for 1632.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ Richelieu, xxii., 389.

Swedes, in return for the duke's hostility to them, also entered the province. Charles' forces were scattered and he was helpless, but he was as false as he was weak. He promised to surrender his sister Margaret, and he allowed her to escape. He sent his brother to make a treaty and then refused to ratify it. At last, he made the most disadvantageous treaty that was possible, and surrendered his capital, Nancy, the most strongly fortified city of Lorraine, into Louis' possession until all difficulties should be settled between the king and the duke, which, as Richelieu said, might take till eternity.¹

In January, 1634, Charles pursued his eccentric career by granting all his rights in the duchy to his brother, the Cardinal of Lorraine. The new duke also married a cousin in order to unite the rights of the two branches. He was in sacred orders, and a dispensation from the Pope was needed on account of the consanguinity of the parties. He advised with the canons of Saint Remy if, as bishop, he could not himself grant the necessary dispensation. They consulted Sanchez and informed him that he could, in a case of absolute necessity. He replied that he was certainly in that case, and he forthwith granted a dispensation in behalf of the Pope, dispensed with the publication of banns by virtue of his own authority as a bishop, and had the marriage celebrated on the spot.²

Charles adopted the life of a wandering soldier of fortune which was most to his taste, and commanded the imperial forces at the battle of Nordlingen. He soon assumed again the rights which he had ceded, but his conduct rendered them constantly less valuable. The following years were filled with struggles with France, which resulted in her taking possession of still more of Lorraine, until its duke was entirely a fugitive. Such

¹ Rich., xxii., 488. Mss. de Conrart, printed by Haussonville. *Gazette* for 1634-35. *Mém. de La Force*, t. iii. In Richelieu's letters and memoranda there are very frequent statements of the value of Lorraine to France. If it was not incorporated with that kingdom Richelieu intended that its duke should be entirely subject to France.

² Haussonville. t. i, p. 406. *Interrogatoire des chanoines de Saint Remy*.

struggles brought upon its inhabitants a condition of constantly increasing want and misery. The common people were glad to find even herbs to eat. Sickness and need so prevailed that it was said three quarters of the population perished or left their country. It was ravaged by the hordes of the Duke of Weimar and the Swedes, and on every side were pillage and burning and murders. Famine followed, and the horrors perpetrated from it were said to be more than could be described. Richelieu himself wrote that the inhabitants of Lorraine were mostly dead, villages burned, cities deserted, and a century would not entirely restore the country. Vincent de Paul did much of his charitable work in that unhappy province, and it is said that he spent 2,000,000 livres in trying to bring some relief to the misery of the inhabitants.¹

The duke at last, in 1641, came as a suppliant to Richelieu to ask for his duchy, and it was granted him, but on the condition that Stenai, Dun, Jametz, and Clermont should be united to France, that Nancy should remain in the king's possession until the peace, and that the duke should assist France with his troops against all enemies whenever required.²

He accepted these terms the more readily because he had no thought of abiding by them, and he returned to his dominions. Always popular among his subjects he was greeted by them with eager enthusiasm. He had endeavored to obtain a divorce from his first wife, the Duchess Nicolle. The duchess, he claimed, had been baptized by a priest, that was afterwards condemned for sorcery, and his marriage with her had been by constraint. After a married life of ten years, his conscience could no longer bear this, and he formed an alliance with the Princess of Cantecroix and, in 1637, he married her. The Pope refused to sanction such conduct, and pronounced his anathema on the alliance with the Princess of Cante-

¹ Mém. de Beauveau, 75, *et seq.*, and original documents collected by M. de Haussonville.

² Dumont, Corps Dip., vi., 211-214. Montglat, 103.

croix. Little disturbed by this, the duke took her with him in his triumphal entry through his duchy, and his subjects, wishing to make no decision on this question, are said to have cried: "Long life to our duke and to his two wives."¹

Charles was hardly back in his dominions before he chose to regard the treaty he had made as of no validity, and in July he violated it openly, and shortly took refuge with the Spanish army. The life of a wanderer was familiar to him. He kept with him his army and his mistress and he asked no more. Thereupon the French again invaded Lorraine, and by October, 1641, practically the whole province was in their hands. It so continued until 1663, and after a century more of varied rule it was definitely united to France in 1766.

¹ *Mém. de Beauveau.*

CHAPTER VI.

THE CLOSE OF RICHELIEU'S ADMINISTRATION.

WHILE the war was slowly progressing in various parts of Europe, important internal affairs interested France and at times threatened the overthrow of Richelieu's power. He had excited the animosity of the king's mother and wife. He was equally unfortunate in failing to obtain the friendship of the king's lady-loves. The relations of Louis with the two beautiful women who in turn absorbed his affections, disclose the complex and unusual character of this king. The varied loves of his father and of his son present no remarkable features. Henry IV. and Louis XIV. fell in love with many pretty women after the manner of other men. They gave their mistresses money and titles, raised up children by them, and in due time quitted one lady-love for another, as the kings of France had done for centuries.

But the amours of Louis XIII. differed from those of all other men. His nature was cold. His relations with the queen were those of indifference, occasionally warming into dislike. Louis constantly desired some companion on whom he could bestow a puerile affection, but those on whom he lavished his devotion were usually men. The succession of male favorites was at last broken by a passion for two beautiful women, but a passion alike pure and grotesque. Mlle. de Hautefort was the first whose beauty and grace excited the ardor of the chaste king.¹

¹ Louis' relations with Mlle. de Hautefort and with Mlle. de LaFayette, have been treated by Cousin in his "Mme. de Hautefort" with that combination of careful investigation and literary grace which pleases alike the scholar and the general reader.

She was a young girl of good family with scanty means, who was early left under the charge of her grandmother, to be reared in the monotony of provincial life. The splendor and excitements of the Court seemed like the joys of paradise to those whose birth entitled them to entrance, but who found themselves removed by chance or misfortune. A French noble regarded life in the provinces as little better than life in the Bastille. An order to leave Paris was banishment from all the joys of life to an existence devoid of charm or color.

Mlle. de Hautefort, though fitted to shine, was enveloped in tedium and obscurity, and she offered fervent prayers to God that He would have her sent to the Court.¹ Her prayers were answered, and at fourteen she was made one of the maids of honor of the queen-mother. Her beauty charmed the new world in which she found herself, and she was called the Aurora, to express her fresh loveliness. She soon excited Louis' admiration, but any jealousy the queen might have had of this favorite, was prevented by the independent and loyal character of the girl, as well as by the virtue of the king. Louis' devotion was marked by a modesty which excited the amusement rather than the respect of the Court.² The king was fond of music, and he composed little airs and songs, of which the charms of Mlle. de Hautefort were always the burden. At table he could look but on her. Though content to do without her favors himself, he was jealous of any suitor who endeavored to invade his virtuous harem.

Although flattered by royal attention Mlle. de Hautefort in no way returned the king's affection. She was too proud to be the mistress even of a king, and Louis was

¹ *Vie Imprimée de Mme de Hautefort.*

² Once as the king entered his wife's chamber, Mlle. de Hautefort held in her hand a letter. Louis asked to read it, but the girl refused and thrust it in her bosom. The queen seized her hands and told the king to take the letter from its place of refuge, but the modest sovereign picked up some silver pincers and thus endeavored to fish out the letter. *Vie Manuscrite de Mme. de Hautefort. Vie imprimée. Montglat (xxix., page 80) describes this triumph of royal modesty in slightly different language.*

not a dangerous suitor. He never talked, she complained, but of his dogs and his hunting. He was, moreover, suspicious and melancholy, and with Mlle. de Hautefort's taste for raillery, they had constant quarrels. These cast a cloud over the Court. Louis spoke to no one and no one dared to speak to him. He sat gloomily in a corner and yawned, gazing at the charmer in silence. At such times his chief occupation was to write out long statements of conversation between himself and his mistress, and voluminous *procès verbaux* of these lovers' quarrels were found among his papers after his death.¹

This bizarre affection excited, however, the jealousy of the minister. Richelieu would have been pleased to have had the good offices of the favorite, but he was rarely successful in exciting any friendship in women. His foreign policy and his resolute character caused no admiration in a young girl who cared nothing about the power of Austria, but who saw in the cardinal a stern and bloody man, who had exiled and beheaded many great nobles, had driven the queen-mother out of France, and caused the king's wife to be treated with harshness and neglect. Mlle. de Hautefort scorned the cardinal's favors and the wealth which he bestowed so liberally on those that helped him, and her relations with the king gave her opportunities to express her views of the minister. Louis always liked to hear Richelieu attacked, and enjoyed a safe opportunity of himself joining in the abuse.² The greatness of Richelieu's plans did not keep his mind from being largely occupied with these petty Court intrigues which might affect his influence with the king. A cabal was therefore formed to replace Mlle. de Hautefort. Mlle. de LaFayette, though less beautiful than her rival, was attractive in appearance and had a melancholy charm of manner, which was more pleasing to Louis than the railleries of de Hautefort. The Bishop of Limoges, St. Simon, and various ladies joined

¹ Montglat, 60. Mlle. de Montpensier, 28., 11. Motteville, 24., 37. Vie Manuscrite de Mme. de Hautefort, printed by Cousin, 143-175. Mémoires de Rochefoucauld, col. Michaud, xxix., 384-385.

² Vie Manuscrite, 154.

in the attempt to establish her as a new favorite. It may be said to their credit that in this endeavor they knew they were not exposing the young girl's virtue to any serious peril. Richelieu also favored this endeavor to remove the king from the influence of de Hautefort.

Two means were used to free Louis from her charms. He was exceedingly sensitive to censure or ridicule. Mlle. de Hautefort's tongue was sharp, and jests on the king which she had uttered or might have uttered were repeated to him. Appeal was made also to his religious fears. "Never man loved God less than the king," said Tallemant des Réaux, "nor feared the Devil more."¹ He was alarmed by delineations of his love as a dangerous and ungodly passion. Mlle. de LaFayette was thrown in his way, and he soon transferred his affection to her. She was well fitted to excite and to keep the love of so peculiar a temperament. Louis' melancholy, his capricious and variable moods, and his mental depression in the great place he held, which had either amused or bored Mlle. de Hautefort, excited a sincere interest and sympathy in the mild and religious character of her successor. A strong attachment grew up for Louis, not as a king but as a man. Mlle. de LaFayette's affection for Louis XIII. was as personal and as touching as that of Mlle. de La Vallière for his son. Louis found this personal attachment a new experience, and into her ear, therefore, he poured all the fulness of his heart.

But the cardinal soon discovered that the change of favorites, which he had effected, had only increased his own peril. Mlle. de LaFayette was even more indifferent than her predecessor to the wealth or position by which Richelieu tried to tempt her. To her pure and gentle character his harsh rule seemed odious. Her tenderness bled for a persecuted and oppressed queen. Her piety revolted against a worldly priest, wasting untold lives in a struggle against the Church and Catholic princes.

The cardinal soon resolved to rid himself of her, and en-

¹ Tallemant des Réaux, ii., 151.

deavored to work upon her devotional feelings and induce her to enter a religious life. Such suggestions found easy entrance into the girl's heart. Even the king's virtue sometimes failed him when overcome by his fondness for her. She became alarmed, and turned her thoughts the more to the safety of a retreat from the world. The king himself feared that their affection would involve them in deadly sin, and did not forbid this step. All means were used by the cardinal to hasten the retreat. Even the priest, who sometimes received the confessions of the young girl's heart, was in Richelieu's service and reported to him the daily progress that was making. "He made God speak," says Cousin, "according to the interests of Richelieu." Extracts from his letters to the cardinal show the tortuous manœuvring which always occupied a large part of the minister's energies, and show also the manner in which, through his innumerable agents, he penetrated the inmost thoughts of his enemies.

"She came yesterday morning," writes the priest of Mlle. de LaFayette, "to confess to me. She told me that her uncle wished her to promise that she would speak to the king before her retreat. We agreed that she should see the king to-morrow evening, but that on Monday morning she should go to Sainte Marie. She seemed entirely contented, and after this she received the communion." A few weeks later, as she still delayed, we find a letter from the same priest to her, ingeniously expressed so as to affect a proud and sensitive nature. "I wish," he writes, "to express my affliction at hearing from the mouths of persons of quality the false reports that calumny spreads of you: that the thought of retreat has been only a feint to possess the affections of his majesty more strongly, and to induce him to give you a great sum of money. * * * But I hope your virtue and courage will soon prevail, and that Christianity will see what it has never seen. * * * Take a step worthy of your piety, birth, and constancy. God, angels, and men will esteem you more than when possible changes in the favor you possess will take away

the merit and honor of your calling, which you can now adopt with so great glory."¹

Her relatives and friends, who desired the advantage of her favor with the king, endeavored in vain to check her pious resolve thus insidiously encouraged. The king was submissive to her desire. "It is true she is dear to me," he said, "but if God calls her to religion, I will offer no obstacle."² At times his feelings overcame him. He said to Father Caussin, weeping, "Why does she hasten? Could not she delay some months until I leave for the army? This separation might then be less severe, but now I am dying from it." But his piety again triumphed. "Nothing has cost me as much as this that I am doing now, but God must be obeyed. Tell her that I allow her to go." She bade farewell to the king quietly, but as his carriage drove away, she cried out: "Alas! I shall see him no more." Her favor had begun in 1635. On the 19th of May 1637 she entered the convent of the Visitation.³

But her influence over Louis had not yet ceased. He was allowed to visit her at the convent, and they held long conversations and mingled their tears, through the wicket which divided her from the world.⁴ Still more free from worldly considerations than she had been at the Court, Mlle. LaFayette exerted her influence to turn the king from his impious wars and his cruel minister. The dangers which threatened Richelieu from the favorite's pleadings were increased by the voice of the keeper of the king's conscience. Father Caussin was a Jesuit, who had been chosen for the king's confessor as a man of piety and moderation, who would take care of the king's morals

¹ See *Lettres de Père Carré*, published by Cousin. Carré continued in the secret service under Mazarin. In Carnet's iii., 23, Mazarin states some reports brought to him by Carré of conversations among the bishops opposed to him. In Carnet v., 28, is a memorandum: "500 livres for Carré."

² Motteville, 33, 34.

³ Motteville, 32, 33. Montglat, 59, 60. *Let. de Richelieu*, t. v., *passim*.

⁴ Mazarin's correspondent writes him: "Il re venne. . . . visitare Mademoisella LaFaietta nel convento della visitazione ed stette con le' piu di quattro hore, parlandogli con tanto affetto che non poteva contener le lagrime." *Aff. Etr. Fr.* lxxxv., 178.

and let alone his politics. But the priest, a sincere though narrow man, came to use the tremendous power of the confessional over the timorous conscience of his penitent, with a view of turning him from the damnable sins into which his course as a sovereign was plunging him. Surrounded by those devoted or sold to the minister, the king found special pleasure in a man who made no treaty with the source of wealth and power. "It is strange," said Louis to Caussin, "that the cardinal is not content to tyrannize over my people; he wishes also to tyrannize over me. Misery and poverty are everywhere, but in his house are gold and silver by shovelfull. He has many benefices, and does not say his breviary."¹

The confessor tried to alarm the king's conscience by pointing out the evils his policy was working. His alliance with the Protestants of Germany, he told Louis, had caused the ruin of religion. More than 6,000 churches had been destroyed or abandoned. For 300 leagues the mass was not performed; the relics of the saints were trodden under foot; the sacred vessels were used for profane purposes; the virgins consecrated to the Lord were scattered abroad. Such abuses the king could not with a good conscience permit. His rigor towards his mother was a violation of the fifth commandment. All power in the kingdom was turned over to a minister who made him violate all laws, human and divine.

The cardinal suspected Caussin's frequent interviews with the king, as he suspected any one whose relations with his master seemed intimate. Feigning some important matter that required the attention of the sovereign, he often entered the king's cabinet when the confessor was there. To allay his suspicions the king had a little book prepared with special offices for his use on great feasts and on saints' days, and about these he consulted with his confessor. When Richelieu entered the room they appeared to be searching the Bible for passages to be used for some new form or office; but after he retired they returned to the discussion of

¹ *Histoire de Louis XIII.* Griffet, t. iii., 1637.

matters of state. But though the king listened willingly, he did not agree in the opinions advanced. The confessor denounced the alliance with German Protestants. They were carefully examined, said the king, and the ablest doctors declared them righteous. The father then turned to the misery of the people. They were weighed down, said he, by tailles and imposts; soldiers were quartered upon them, and there was no end to their afflictions. "Ah! my poor people," said Louis, "but I cannot relieve them because I am engaged in war." The father sought also the return of Mary de Medici to the kingdom. "I would gladly give her contentment," said Louis, "but I dare not speak of it to the cardinal. If you could obtain this from him I should be well pleased." The king ordered the confessor to meet him at Ruel, where the cardinal was staying, and there Caussin accordingly went. He was coldly received by the minister, who talked to him of the vanity of this world and the happiness of those who are entirely given to the service of God. Richelieu cautioned him against his relations with Mlle. de LaFayette and the queen-mother, and said that a virtuous man should beware of the artifices of women. At this time the king was announced. "The king," said the cardinal, "must not find us together." "Retire by this staircase." The Jesuit dared not decline, but left expecting soon to be recalled by his master.¹ But Richelieu could always control the king's scrupulous and wavering mind. He proved to him

¹ My authority for this is from "*Histoire du règne de Louis XIII.*," by Père Griffet. The Père Griffet had in his possession the letters of Caussin and other contemporary documents which came into the hands of the Jesuits, and I think his account is therefore trustworthy. Louis may not have used the exact expressions given, but whatever he said would only express his changing moods and his tendency to agree with those about him. His long correspondence with Richelieu is filled with expressions of affection and devotion for his minister, and he was probably sincere in all these different statements when he made them. The account of these intrigues, given by Richelieu in his *Mémoires*, varies considerably from that of Père Griffet, but the cardinal did not propose disclosing all of these matters for the information of posterity. In vols. v., vi. and vii. of his letters are numerous references to these intrigues. He calls Caussin's conduct (*Lettres*, t. v., 814) "*la plus noire et damnable malice qui ait jamais esté en esprit de moine.*"

by the opinions of theologians that the alliances with the Protestants were in conformity with God's law, and that the return of the queen-mother would bring only strife and confusion. He asked the king if he could govern his kingdom by the advice of a novice of the Visitation, and of a simple and credulous priest. The king on this, as on many other occasions, was overcome by the vigor and force of his minister's arguments. Two days after the interview at Ruel, the Jesuit received his dismissal and retired in disgrace to Rennes.¹ There he wrote letters bemoaning his lot, until Richelieu asked the superior of the order to send him to Canada, so that he might be no more heard from. The superior replied that they sent to their Canada missions only those of great virtue and a singular piety, and what they accorded as a grace must not be used as a punishment. Father Caussin was sent to Brittany, and his place was filled by Sirmond, a member of the same order, but an old man who sought to guide the king's morals and not his policy. The Jesuits advised him to visit the Court but little, and not to busy himself in soliciting abbeys and bishoprics for his friends.²

Anne of Austria was too indifferent towards her husband to sympathize with his projects, and she found some diversion in maintaining a secret correspondence with her brother the Cardinal Infant and with other Spanish adherents. In her letters she had told of her discontent, and disclosed some of the small bits of political information she occasionally gleaned. Many of these letters were written at the monastery of Val de Grace, which the queen often visited under the guise of devotion, and they were sent by a faithful follower, named LaPorte. These intrigues were suspected, and in August, 1637, LaPorte was suddenly arrested, but there was found on him nothing more dangerous than an unimportant letter to Mme. de Chevreuse. His room was searched, but the hole in the

¹ "Father Caussin has been dismissed for bad conduct," says the *Gazette* of Dec. 26, 1637.

² Montglat, 59-61, and especially the letters of instruction of the order on this subject, published by Cousin.

wall, where were the documents of importance, escaped the officers. Richelieu proceeded in the matter with great vigor and with perhaps a pretence of greater peril to the state than could have resulted from any correspondence of the queen's. LaPorte was strictly examined before the cardinal but he denied with more fidelity than truthfulness, that the queen had carried on any correspondence with foreigners.¹ The queen herself was submitted to humiliating examinations, and her situation seemed full of peril. She was disliked by her husband and his minister, and she had borne no heirs to the French crown. Treasonable correspondence with the king's enemies might be a full justification for repudiating a barren and disloyal wife. She might be sent to wander with the queen-mother, an unwelcome guest, receiving from strangers a grudging charity. The queen was never extreme in her devotion to truth, and she thought her present peril might mitigate the sin of lying. She received the sacrament, and swore upon the body of the Saviour that she had not written to any foreign power. But it was difficult for her to maintain this falsehood, and after receiving the king's promise of forgiveness she confessed to the cardinal that her oath had been false, and that she had written to the Cardinal Infant and disclosed certain secrets of state. The cardinal promised the king would forget all. "What goodness you must have," the poor queen said, as she confessed her guilt and perjury to the cardinal, whom of all men she most hated.²

It was important that LaPorte, who was braving confinement in the Bastille rather than expose the queen, should now confess as much as she had, and the cardinal would probably search no further for evidence of still more guilty letters. Means were found to reach him by the aid of some other prisoners. A small opening was made in the floor of one of the other prisoners' rooms several stories above his, and the messages were dropped through

¹ His denials for a time deceived even Richelieu. See Let. vii., 773. But see further v., 836, 7, 8, *et passim*.

² Richelieu, xxiii., 221-224.

into a room below where were some *croquants* of Bordeaux. Those of every rank were confined in this great prison and all were ready to do what they could for a companion in misfortune. The messages were passed down in this manner until they reached LaPorte, without discovery and without exposure, though any prisoner might have found, in betraying such a secret, liberty and large reward. LaPorte at last agreed to confess, and told what the queen had already said. Richelieu was now convinced there was no more to discover. LaPorte was released the next year, and the queen had already received her pardon.¹

She was soon to have her position changed from one of danger and vexation to the certainty of future power. On Sept. 5, 1638, after twenty-three years of unfruitful marriage, Anne gave birth to a son who was to be Louis XIV. The joy natural to the birth of a future monarch was increased because the weak and despicable Gaston ceased to be the heir-presumptive.² The child coming when the expectation of offspring had been abandoned was styled the God-given. The very incidents of the cradle might instil the feeling of superhuman importance into the mind of the future sovereign, who was to regard himself, and be regarded by others, as the greatest of kings and of men.

Shortly before this auspicious birth Louis had in a special manner placed his kingdom under the divine protection. A proclamation was prepared in 1637, and published early in 1638, in which the king declared that, mindful of the great mercies vouchsafed him and his victories at home and abroad, and desirous of having some one specially to intercede with the holy Trinity for continued preservation, he took the holy and glorious Virgin for the special protector of his realm, and consecrated to her his person, his

¹ Mémoires de LaPorte, col. Michaud, vol. xxxii., 10-35. Vie Manuscrite de Mme. de Hautefort.

² The festivities over this birth were the greatest ever seen in France. For several days Paris was given over to celebrations. The great ballet called *Félicité* was danced before their majesties during the winter. Richelieu, xxiii., 326. Montglat 73, 75. A curious feature of the superstitious views of the times is found in a letter of Richelieu. Let. de Rich. vii., 767.

crown, and his state. That posterity should remember this act, and as a monument of this consecration, the great altar of Notre Dame was to be constructed anew, with a figure of the Virgin and Child and Louis at their feet offering his crown and sceptre.¹ This curious manifestation of piety, more to be expected in the twelfth than in the seventeenth century, attracted but little attention. The religious feeling of the mass of the French was not sufficiently strong to be affected by it, and had not become sufficiently sceptical to jest about it. They had drifted away from St. Louis and had not reached Voltaire.

The news of the repulse at Fontarabia reached Paris just after the rejoicings for the birth of the Dauphin, but successes in other quarters soon brought consolation for this disappointment. The Duke of Weimar was the only leader on the French side, who thus far in the war had shown any marked talent. He prosecuted his campaign with vigor, and in 1638 he laid siege to the important city of Brisach. A desperate contest of some months ensued for its possession, but Weimar's genius triumphed over all opposition, and on December 17th the city surrendered. "Brisach is ours," is said to have been the last thing whispered into the ears of Father Joseph, as he lay on his death-bed. Father Joseph died still possessing the affection of Richelieu, whom he had served faithfully and sagaciously, but without receiving his long-promised reward of a cardinal's hat. The opposition of Spain to its bestowal kept Urban VIII. from pronouncing the promotion which he had promised.² Though a skilful diplomatist and with that strength which a man gains from giving his life and energy to one pursuit, Father Joseph has been exalted to a melodramatic prominence which exaggerates the importance of the position he filled. He stands prominent among Avaux, Charnacé, and the skilful di-

¹ *Lettres de Richelieu*, v., 908-912. *Anc. Lois Françaises*, xvi., 483. *Gazette*, 1638, 501, 525, *et seq.*

² The idea that Richelieu was not sincere in asking this dignity for Father Joseph has no foundation. After his death the nomination was given to Mazarin.—*Let. de Rich.*, vi.

plomatists who rendered France valuable service during the early part of the century. But Richelieu's career was no more dependent on the assistance of Father Joseph than upon that of Avaux or Chavigni, La Valette or Bouthillier.¹

The capture of Brisach gave such power to the Duke of Weimar that Richelieu began to apprehend in him an ally, who, like Gustavus Adolphus, had the fault of being too successful. The duke desired Brisach for himself and Richelieu claimed it for France. Weimar was entitled by his treaty with France to a large portion of Alsace, but Richelieu seems to have thought this a convenient territory to surrender when the time for peace should arrive.² Weimar cherished great dreams of ambition. He hoped to unite his forces with the Swedes under Banner, repeat the successes of Gustavus, and carve out for himself a great principality in Germany. He was yet only thirty-six, in the full vigor of manhood, with the best army in Germany devoted to him. He had reached a position where he might hope to dictate the fortunes of the Empire, and hold a power that should not be dependent on the favor and alliance of France.

But death steadily removed those who became dangerous to Richelieu. In the very summit of his power and the fulness of his hopes, Weimar suddenly sickened, and on July 18, 1639, he died. He left to his brothers his army and the possessions which his sword had won, but they were not equal to the succession. His army, which was his empire, was put up at auction for ambitious princes. Applicants were plentiful, but the liberal promises of Richelieu obtained the prize. The soldiers enlisted in the French service, and the Duke of Longueville was accepted as their general in chief. He was succeeded by the Marshal of Guébriant, who was an able and experienced officer.³

¹ This view of the relation of Richelieu and Father Joseph, I think, is sustained by an examination of the correspondence and negotiations of the time.

² See *Let. de Rich.*, vi., 409. Instruction to Avaux, 423-430, and Letters of 1635-1638, *passim*.

³ *Lettres de Richelieu*, vi., 451-481, *et passim*. Dumont, *Corps, Dip.*, vi., 185.

The Duke of Rohan was mortally wounded at a skirmish in the early part of 1638. His success in the Valtelline had been followed by disaster and disgrace. He abandoned the country for reasons for which he blamed the government, but which showed in him a lack of the vigor and courage which he formerly possessed. The influence of France there was utterly overthrown. Rohan retired in disgrace to Venice, but presently enlisted as a volunteer under Weimar, and there ended his warlike life with a soldier's death.¹

While France and Sweden pressed the war in Germany with good success, Spain was suffering from the process of disintegration which had begun in the Netherlands. Portugal had been declared by Philip II. to be forever united to the crown of Castille. But its inhabitants had been treated as a conquered people. Their commerce had greatly diminished, and the exactions of the viceroys plundered a country that had become poor. Their merchant ships were left exposed to the ravages of pirates: their official positions were sold to foreigners; taxes were imposed without the consent of the States, and the country suffered under every form of Spanish misrule.²

The Portuguese, no less proud and bold a people than their Spanish oppressors, found at last the opportunity to regain their national existence. Many plans for insurrection had been formed, but the timidity of leaders, or the apparently overwhelming power of Spain had checked them. The great coalition which was now at war with Spain so engaged her forces, that the opportunity was favorable for a successful revolt. In December, 1640, an insurrection suddenly broke out. The regent, Margaret of Savoy, was arrested, the Spanish chief minister put to death, and the Duke of Braganza, the heir of the ancient rulers of the kingdom, was proclaimed King of Portugal. The uprising met with nothing that could be called resist-

¹ Mém. de Rohan, 613-674. Lettres de Richelieu, 1635-1637, *passim*.

² These statements are contained in "Declaration of the States of Portugal in 1641," found in Dumont, Corps Dip., vi., 202-205.

ance. The hatred of the Spanish was universal, and they were found to be destitute of the power to oppose a popular movement. In a very few weeks the whole of Portugal was free from Spanish garrisons, and even the colonies followed the example. The Portuguese Cortes solemnly proclaimed the new ruler as John IV. His government was promptly recognized by the powers warring with Spain. France and Holland promised aid against any attempt at Spanish reconquest.¹

This great blow at the Spanish power had been preceded by a revolt, hardly less important, in another part of her wide dominions. Catalonia lies at the eastern extremity of the Pyrenees, adjacent to the Gulf of Lyons and near to Languedoc. Situated on the off-shoots of the mountains, it was populated by a hardy and vigorous people. Though small in extent it contains such variety of soil that the olive and the orange grow in the lowlands, while on the heights thorn-apples and heaths abound. Many of its inhabitants, when weary of the peaceful labor of the fields, would go into the mountains and lead the more exciting life of bandits and brigands. The province had been early occupied by the Romans, and after being overrun by the Goths had formed part of the Empire of Charlemagne. Long ruled by the counts of Barcelona, it became through marriage annexed to Aragon. But it had preserved privileges and rights which made it an independent state rather than a portion of Spain. It claimed that its envoys to Madrid should be treated as foreign ambassadors. Its inhabitants were excluded from the Spanish commerce with the Indies, and they claimed in return the right to serve as soldiers only in their own province, and to be free from the exactions imposed by the troops of Spain on the districts on which they were quartered. Local Bras or Cortes fixed the imposts and determined what contingent of troops should be furnished. Philip IV. and his minister Olivarez resolved to destroy these privileges, as dear to the people as they

¹ See *Let. de Richelieu*, vi., 769-773, *et passim* for 1641.

were embarrassing to the central government. Soldiers were quartered in Catalonia and exercised brutalities even beyond those visited on hostile provinces. The viceroy was ordered to drive the inhabitants into the service, though he should have to garrote the men and make the women bring supplies on their backs. Olivarez wrote the viceroy, with the misdirected energy of despotism: "If you do not oblige the people to bring on their backs all the wheat, barley and straw that is found, you will fail in what you owe to God, your king, and the blood in your veins. If the privileges of the country do not interfere with what you have to do, it were well to conform to them, but if they cause delay, were it but for an hour, he is an enemy to his country who will yield to them." Such measures brought on a violent explosion, and in 1640 the inhabitants broke into revolt. The viceroy was murdered, and the Spanish troops were driven to find refuge in the city of Perpignan. All Catalonia, with the counties of Roussillon and Cerdagne declared themselves independent of the Spanish crown.¹

In December, 1640, they signed a treaty with France by which Louis agreed to furnish 8,000 men for their defence. This was soon followed in January, 1641, by a treaty in which Catalonia and its tributaries were united to the crown of France, preserving, however, their privileges and independent rights. Their officers were to be of their own people, their cities were to impose their own taxes. Their soldiers were to serve in their own province, their counsellors were to be covered in the presence of the king. They even stipulated for the gloomy right of preserving the inquisition to be directly subject to the holy inquisition at Rome.²

In Savoy the Marquis of Harcourt, by some brilliant successes, restored the French influence. The Regent Christine had alienated the affection of her subjects with-

¹ Mélo, lib. i. chap. 71-99, "Guerra de Cateluna." Correspondance de Sourdis, ii., 485-579, *et passim*. *Gazette*, 1641, 69-76, 101-108.

² Dumont, vi., 196; vii., 197-202. Correspondance de Sourdis, ii., 490-503.

out gaining the protection of France, and her brothers-in-law with the aid of Spain had driven her from Turin and left her little more than a fugitive in her own dominions. In 1639 the Marquis of Harcourt assumed the command, and he began his career by a series of daring victories. The Spanish had again laid siege to Casal, a place so important that its siege and relief were the chief features in successive campaigns. La Tour, the governor of the city, sent word to Harcourt that he must have speedy succor. Harcourt had a small army of 7,000 men and the besiegers were estimated at 18,000. But with a daring that prevented his troops from doubting as to the victory, he marched to the city, and on April 29, 1640, he attacked the Spanish army. The suddenness and boldness of the attack demoralized the enemy, and they fled in confusion, leaving their baggage and cannons.¹

Casal was furnished with supplies, and Harcourt led his army to Turin, now occupied by Prince Thomas, the brother of the late duke and grandfather of the famous Prince Eugene of Savoy. To lay siege to the city seemed almost an absurdity, for the forces under Prince Thomas were nearly equal in number to the besieging army. But the French dug their trenches and began a regular siege of the place. Their difficulties were soon increased. Lleganez, the Spanish general, eager to retrieve his disaster of Casal, marched to the relief of Turin, with an army far outnumbering that of the French. Vigorous attacks on the outside of their entrenchments soon rendered them besieged rather than besiegers, having the enemy on either side. But with what reinforcements he could gather, Harcourt sustained the assaults of the Spaniards and the sallies of Prince Thomas. Lleganez failed in repeated attempts to break the lines, and no supplies could be conveyed into the city, which now began to suffer from hunger.

On September 25th, Prince Thomas capitulated, and was allowed to retire with his army of 8,000 men. Harcourt

¹ *Gazette*, 1640, 305-308, 317-324. Du Plessis, 364, 365.

made his triumphant entry into Turin and was soon followed by the Duchess of Savoy. A leading part in this brilliant campaign was taken by the young Viscount of Turenne, who was beginning to attract attention, and was training himself to become the greatest general of the age.¹

Even in the Lowlands where the apathy of the Dutch allies and the inefficiency of the French generals met with constant disaster, or at best gained no advantage, the year 1640 yielded an important victory. After a long siege, the great and strong city of Arras surrendered. It had been deemed so impregnable that the local proverb ran: "When the French take Arras, the rats will eat the cats." But it yielded after a hard-pressed siege of two months.² The winter that followed such success was filled with festivities of unusual brilliancy. At a great ballet given by the Cardinal of Richelieu, the sieges of Arras and Turin were represented. The cardinal, amid the cares of state, never forgot the ballets and masques, the works of art, the decorations, the well-ordered grounds, the stately palaces, which were only second in his thoughts to assisting the revolt of Portugal, or pushing the boundaries of France towards the Rhine. In all of these things he was training Mazarin to be his successor.

"His excellency," writes Chavigni in December, 1640, to Mazarin who was then in Savoy, "expects you to be here at the end of the year, that you may prepare with him the comedy and ballet, which are to be given in the grand hall." And Richelieu himself writes on December 21st, after congratulating Mazarin on his diplomatic triumphs: "I desire to see Seignior Colmardo that he may take part in our shrovetide rejoicings."³ Frequent commissions for the purchase of works of art are mingled with diplomatic correspondence, and show how much

¹ Montglat, 96-100. *Gazette*, 1640, *passim*. Mém. de Campion, 171, *et seq.* Mém. du Maréchal du Plessis, 364-367.

² Montglat, 91-95. Let. de Richelieu, t. vi., for 1640. *Gazette*, 560-590.

³ Mazarin is called Colmardo in much of the correspondence. *Lettres de Richelieu*, vii., 838, 839. *Ibid.*, vi., 889, etc.

Richelieu trusted to Mazarin's taste in such matters. They also show how carefully he weighed the sums he had to pay for the artistic treasures he desired, and how he cheapened the wares as prudently as any fish-woman.

The severe repression that had been laid on the French nobles had produced a comparatively long freedom from internal dissension. For nine years there had been no insurrection of importance, save risings of starved peasants. Even Monsieur seemed to have ceased from fruitless plotting. The birth of a dauphin had deprived Gaston of his importance as heir-presumptive and he employed his energies in dissipation.¹

But a new insurrection now began to cast its shadow before it. The Count of Soissons was the only one of the princes of the blood who had qualities that gave him any popularity. He had feared to expose himself to the cardinal's resentment after the unsuccessful plot of Amiens, and it had finally been stipulated that he should retire to Sedan, a city subject to the Duke of Bouillon. The four years he was to remain there had expired, and Louis refused to let him stay longer. Soissons was unwilling to expose himself in France, and he and the Duke of Bouillon, in the spring of 1641, made a treaty with Spain and the Emperor, and prepared for an invasion of France.²

The long miseries of the war and the grinding taxation had spread discontent in that country. The cardinal excited no love except in those who enjoyed or desired his favors and his patronage. The success of the war had been too slow and varied to excite the enthusiasm that would forget the distress it brought. The Count of Soissons appealed to these feelings in the proclamation he

¹ One of Richelieu's letters to Gaston beseeches him to abandon low female society and also profanity. Gaston, in reply, agrees to give up the profanity.

² See for much of these negotiations, *Lettres de Campion* 350-368. Lorraine agreed to join Soissons, and in case of a successful battle, it was expected to push at once to Paris. Aid was expected from some of the armies of the king.

issued to justify his course, and denounced the cardinal as the most dangerous enemy of the king and his subjects. He had rashly imperilled the reputation of the king, squandered the money of the state, and the blood of the nobility and soldiers, and reduced the people to utter misery, in wars brought without object, except to sustain his own authority. He had banished, imprisoned, despoiled, executed. He had bought from the Swiss places he could not hold, and sent great sums of money to Italy to assist friends whom his help had ruined. He had risked a schism to make himself head of the church. The laws of the realm were violated, the privileges of the nobility disregarded, the clergy illegally taxed, to support on the sea Algerian corsairs commanded by an archbishop, and on land troops who pillaged the churches under the command of a cardinal. To remedy such evils, to change the counsels which troubled all Christianity, the Count of Soissons asked the nobles and the people of France to rise to his assistance.¹ Richelieu viewed this rising with much apprehension. Yet the army sent to oppose it was commanded by the Marshal of Chatillon, whose career in the Low Countries had shown the pride of a Spanish grandee, with the incompetence of a colonel of militia. The armies met at Marfée, on July 6, 1641, and the forces of Chatillon were promptly defeated, but the rebellion perished in the very moment of its victory. Soissons was mysteriously shot after the rout of the French and with the death of its leader the insurrection soon came to an end.² Bouillon made his peace. Louis was with difficulty dissuaded from having the corpse of Soissons dragged on a hurdle. His cousin, the Prince of Condé,

¹ "Ipsi principes se federatos dicunt pro Orbis Christiani pace ; favoribili titulo," Grotius remarks, *Epistolæ*, April 27, 1641. *Il Mercurio*, 1641, 392-401.

² Montglat, 107. Grotii *Epis.*, July 13, 1641. *Il Mercurio*, 346-403. *Lettres de Richelieu*, vi., 812, 829-831. Richelieu announces the news to Bouthillier with great conciseness. "M. de Chatillon has let himself be beaten. M. le Comte has been killed. We must have both the bitter and the sweet." *Lettres de Rich.*, vi., 829, 830. *Relazione dei Ambasciatori Venete, Francia*, l. ii., 369-373.

as soon as he heard of the death, made his wife write to Richelieu, asking him to remember her children in the offices and pensions, which the death of the count would leave vacant.¹

The revolt of Catalonia and its union with France was imitated by a petty prince, the singularity of whose position seemed to give him a certain importance. The Prince of Monaco governed a territory smaller than the possessions of many private gentlemen, for his rule extended only over the neighboring cities of Monaco and Mentone. But his title was older than that of much greater sovereigns. His dominion was in that part of the world which has been most favored by heaven, where the Alps sink into the Mediterranean clothed with the olive and the palm, amid beauties of sky and scenery such as can nowhere else be found. It was not without strategic importance. He had long held his minute power under the control of Spain, but he now assembled his followers, surprised the Spanish garrison, and placed himself under the protection of France. He sent back his collar of the Golden Fleece, assumed the white scarf, and, as Duke of Valentinois, presently became a member of the French nobility.²

The successes of two years brought more hopes of peace. After four years of diplomatic delays, a preliminary treaty was signed on December 25, 1641. The cardinal resolved to abandon the ineffectual and expensive endeavor to carry on seven or eight campaigns in as many parts of Europe. The armies in Italy and along the Rhine were reduced to the defensive, and it was decided to concentrate the forces in Catalonia and Roussillon.

¹ She wrote the same day to Chavigni expressing her chagrin at begging for the places of a relative not yet in his grave. "The man (the Prince) that you know is here, and whom I dare not contradict, made me do it." The Prince himself wrote July 14th: "I say nothing of the death of M. le Comte, and hope that your goodness will bear in mind my children and me." —Aff. Etr. France, 1641, folio 30–51.

² Montglat, 113. His declaration is printed in full in *Gazette*, 1641, 955–962. See Molé, iii., 24. Dumont, Corp. Dip., vi., 218, 219.

The army alone now cost over 50,000,000 livres a year, and the expenses of the government were much larger than the receipts, though the taxes had been greatly increased since 1625.¹

The beginning of the year 1642 found Richelieu apparently at the very summit of his power. Notwithstanding frequent illness he seemed capable of an enormous amount of work. In August, 1642, one of his assistants described the way in which the cardinal divided the day. In the morning from seven to eight he dictated, from eight to nine he thought, from nine to eleven he worked and held conference with those who had business with him. At eleven he heard mass and dined. After that until two he consulted with Mazarin and other of his associates, and the next two hours were given to writing and audience.²

A proof of his power was shown by the marriage solemnized between his niece and the Duke of Enghien. Years before it had been charged, though upon no satisfactory evidence, that Richelieu became hostile to Monsieur, and afterwards to the Count of Soissons, because each of them had declined a proffered alliance with one of his relatives. If this were true, such an alliance was now sought by one equal to either in power and but little inferior to Monsieur in rank. The Duke of Enghien was the son and heir of the Prince of Condé, and only the young children of Louis and the life of Monsieur stood between the prince and the crown. Yet for him his father eagerly sought an alliance with Richelieu's niece. A prince of the blood might be content to marry in the family of the controller of the fortunes of France.³

Though Richelieu was much older than Louis and

¹ Testament politique, t. i. *Lettres de Richelieu*, vi., 707, 708, 742, 754. The figures of 50,000,000 livres, given by Richelieu as the cost of the army, do not include the sums collected for subsistence and rations, which were 25,000,000 more.

² Lettre de H. Arnault. Bibliothèque Nationale, fonds Bethune.

³ Richelieu agreed to give his niece his lands of Anssac, Mouy, Cambronne, and Plessis Billebault, and the sum of 300,000, or according to another contract, 600,000 livres.—*Lettres de Richelieu*, vi., 751.

equally infirm, he was busy with plans for perpetuating his power after the king's death. Monsieur was now removed from the succession and a long regency seemed probable. From Anne of Austria little favor could be hoped by the man who had so long opposed and humiliated her. But her position as the mother of the future king by no means secured her control of him even while an infant. The plan was considered of taking her two children from her charge, and in case of a regency the cardinal desired that his influence might be secured by the control of the young king.¹

But while Richelieu's power was at its height and he was planning to continue it even beyond the life of his master, he was himself attacked by new and complicated disorders, which it seemed his constitution could not long withstand. He was exposed also to dangers so serious that his enemies believed even his adroitness could not avert his overthrow. His peril was probably less than it had often been before, but the last plot against him was so dramatically developed that it stands in history as the chief conspiracy of his long rule. He had himself introduced into favor the youth who it was thought would drive from power a minister with an experience of a quarter of a century. A younger son of the Marshal of Effiat, named Cinq Mars, had early entered the service of the king. He was befriended by Richelieu, who imagined that he might distract the king's attention from the dangerous and engaging Hautefort. The son of a faithful adherent of Richelieu's, introduced into favor by the cardinal, he might reasonably be counted among his followers.² The youth was handsome and of pleasing manners and his favor grew apace.

"We have a new favorite at court," Chavigni writes Mazarin in 1639, "M. de Cinq Mars, dependent entirely on the cardinal. * * * Never has the king had a passion for any one more violent than for him. He is the grand

¹ Motteville, 37. See letters of Chavigni cited later.

² Montglat, 125. Motteville, 36.

equerry of France, which is not a bad debut for a youth of nineteen." "His favor is unprecedented," writes another correspondent. "I hear the king said frankly to Mme. de Hautefort he could not pretend longer to an affection for her, he had given it all to M. de Cinq Mars."¹ The king's loves for women were so bizarre, that he could be turned from them by some strong attachment for a man. His feelings towards a favorite of either sex seems to have been much the same; he paid to either the same jealous, fitful, and wearisome devotion.

The new favorite soon found serious trials in the temperament of his master. The quarrels, the poutings, the little alienations, and speedy reconciliations seem indeed strange, when on one side was a king about forty years old. Cinq Mars' own conduct was not unnatural. He was a conceited boy, puffed up by his great favor, and dreaming of supplanting Richelieu, but at the same time eager in his own pleasures, and bored by the dulness of constantly attending on a stupid, middle-aged, and melancholy king. He might have learned the courtier's arts from the cardinal he sought to displace. Though Richelieu's chief hold was in the conviction entertained of his capacity, yet the minister flattered his capricious master with unceasing care. However certain that his views would be adopted, they were submitted to the king with entire deference. But the young favorite seemed to think that as his favor rested on nothing it could never grow less. After a weary day spent with the king, Cinq Mars would gallop over to Paris, for the delights of the Marais and the society of Marion de Lorme. Such adventures often made him irritable during the day, and his moral and thrifty master thought his vices reprehensible and his amusements extravagant.² The bickerings of the king and the favorite were submitted to the minister with as much solicitude as the latest bulletins from Roussillon or Arras, and were studied by him with fully as much care. "I was a little ill last night," writes the king to the cardinal, "so this morning I took a little

¹ Mss., Bibliothèque Nationale.

² Montglat, 125.

remedy, and to-night perhaps I shall take some medicine. The certificate enclosed will show the condition of the reconciliation you made yesterday." The certificate is in these words: "We, the undersigned, certify to whom it may concern, that we are, well contented and satisfied with each other and have never been in so perfect intelligence as now. In witness whereof we have signed this certificate. Dated at St. Germain, November 26, 1639.

(Signed)

"Louis. Cinq Mars."¹

This is not the only one of such documents that form part of the state papers. Louis' actual quarrels with his favorite were reduced to writing, as well as his imaginary reasonings with his lady-loves. We find this certificate duly signed by both parties. "To-day, the 9th of May, 1640, the king being at Soissons, his majesty has seen fit to promise Monsieur le Grand, that during all this campaign he will not be angry with him. If M. le Grand should give him some slight cause, the complaint shall be made by his majesty to the cardinal without bitterness, that by his advice M. le Grand may correct himself of all that may displease the king."²

But the bickerings were never ceasing. In January, 1641, the king writes Richelieu, "I am vexed to weary you with the bad humors of M. le Grand. I said to him on his return from Ruel, 'the cardinal writes me, you desire to please me in all things, but you do not in one respect and that is your indolence.' He answered me that he could not change, and could do no better than he had. I was offended by this. * * * I resumed the conversation on idleness, saying that it rendered a man incapable of all good things, that he was only fit for the Marais, and if he wished to continue this life he could return there. He told me arrogantly he was quite ready to give up his wealth and as willing to be Cinq Mars as M. le Grand, and as for changing his fashion of life, he could not live other-

¹ Lettres de Richelieu, vi., 644.

² Archives des aff. étr., 1640. Lettres de Richelieu, vi., 646, 647.

wise. I finally told him that in this humor I would be pleased not to see him. He told me he would willingly attend to that. All this took place in the presence of Gordes. I have shown Gordes this memoir before sending it to you, and he tells me there is nothing in it which is not correct."¹

Such fits of petulance on the part of the favorite did not permanently loosen his hold on his master. Louis complained, reproved, sulked, wrote budgets of his grievances for the consideration of the officers of state, but he remained dependent on the companionship of his youthful comrade. Though Cinq Mars would not sacrifice the caprice or the anger of the moment, he still cherished his foolish dreams of ambition. He wished his nights of pleasure in Paris, splendor and profusion around him, the jests of his friends and the smiles of his lady-loves and he did not wish to be bored by Louis' society more than was necessary ; but he desired also to control the king's policy as well as his affection, and to become a Luines instead of a Saint Simon. The practical sense, which Louis did not lose in all his remarkable philanderings, discouraged these hopes. The king was willing to listen to Cinq Mars' complaints of the cardinal, but he answered that Richelieu was indispensable to the state. Finding that Cinq Mars had forgotten his original benefactor, Richelieu now treated him with open contempt. Cinq Mars stayed with Louis and his ministers during their councils. Wearied of this, the cardinal forbade him to attend any more, and said that such an incompetent among the ministers would ruin their reputation in Europe.²

In the latter part of the year 1641, the king's health was very feeble, but this excited hope rather than apprehension in his favorite. His relations were intimate with Monsieur and the queen, and their only fear was that Richelieu should be appointed regent, or should obtain

¹ Letters printed by Aubery cited, *Lettres de Richelieu*, vi., 647, 648.

² Cinq Mars obeyed the order, but with such rage that he wept and sobbed for a long time among his friends, finding his only consolation in the hope of destroying his enemy.—*Relation de Fontrailles*, 249.

possession of the dauphin, and continue himself in power. The king's improving health made this danger seem less, but in the uncertainties that surrounded his life and Cinq Mars' favor, the latter began to indulge in dangerous plots. He seems to have begun negotiations with Spain as lightly as he would have begun any court intrigue.

Cinq Mars, Monsieur, and the Duke of Bouillon consulted as to the measures they had best take. The queen extended her sympathy to this cabal. She was apprehensive alike of the claims of Richelieu and of Monsieur to the regency, and she desired the overthrow of either, and still more the overthrow of both. A mild part in the plot was taken by young DeThou, a son of the historian, who was drawn along by friendship for Cinq Mars and by that hatred for Richelieu which he shared with all the young nobility. The plan of murdering the cardinal was discussed. A gentleman named Fontrailles said that if Monsieur would give his consent, he could easily find those who would dispose of the enemy. But Monsieur was afraid to consent to any thing, and DeThou openly said he would take no part in murder.¹ It seemed desirable to have some city where the conspirators might retire if necessary, and the place chosen was the strong city of Sedan, which was independent of the French king, and of which the Duke of Bouillon was sovereign. Bouillon declared they must have a treaty with Spain, so that she would furnish an army for their assistance in time of need. Save empty promises, they had little to offer Spain for her aid, but the Spanish minister was always willing to take any steps which might embroil the internal affairs of France.

Fontrailles was accordingly sent to Spain, in the winter of 1642, with power to negotiate a treaty. He reached Madrid about the 1st of March, and met the Count of Olivarez, who governed Spain with the authority but not the ability of Richelieu. The proposed treaty was tendered by Monsieur, who said that he had associ-

¹ Relation de Fontrailles, 249.

ated with him two great personages, whose names, however, were to be kept secret. The Spanish minister objected that Monsieur was no longer heir to the throne, and his plots had always been unsuccessful. Unless, therefore, the names of the two personages could be disclosed, no treaty would be signed. Fontrailles then announced that they were the Duke of Bouillon and Cinq Mars, the king's favorite.

These were satisfactory, and on March 13, 1642, a treaty was signed by which the Spanish agreed to furnish Monsieur 17,000 men, 400,000 crowns down, 12,000 per month as pension, and 80,000 ducats a month to his two associates. No peace was to be made except by the consent of all, and the places that they should capture in France should only be surrendered when she yielded all that she had taken from Spain during the war. Those who professed to take up arms against the misrule of the cardinal agreed that France should surrender all the conquests she had made.¹ Fontrailles returned from Madrid with his dangerous secret, and the treaty was delivered to Monsieur.

The king, in January, had set out for the south, accompanied both by the minister and the favorite, to take part personally in the campaign in Catalonia. The cardinal's health so entirely failed him that he was obliged at last to abandon the expedition. Attacked by fever in March, suffering from abscesses so that he was unable even to sign his name, he was left at Narbonne, while the king, on April 22d, departed for the siege of Perpignan. For over two months from his first attack the cardinal lay there in great pain and in great danger alike of loss of life and of loss of power. Though still exerting some degree of control from his sick-bed, he felt his position precarious. The Court was filled with reports that his power was so shaken, that even should he rally from the disorders that were killing him, his influence over Louis was irretrieva-

¹ Dumont, *Corps Dip.*, vi., 244, 245. *Relation de Fontrailles*, 250-253. *Mém. de Brienne*, 72-74.

bly lost.¹ It seemed impossible that even Richelieu's energy could keep life much longer in so shattered a body, and the part of prudence for his enemies would have been to have waited for a death that could not long be postponed. But his great vitality had withstood many diseases. He had long filled so great a part that a half superstitious feeling existed that only by violence could he be removed.

Cinq Mars had now exclusive possession of the king's ear; and he made every endeavor to poison his mind against his minister. He proceeded even so far as to suggest his murder if disease should not rid them of him; but the king replied, they would suffer excommunication for assassinating a priest and a cardinal. Troisville offered to go to Rome and obtain absolution, but the king would not wholly desert the man whom he still believed to be the support of his fortunes.² Negotiations, looking towards a peace, were carried on with Rome and Spain by Cinq Mars and DeThou writing under the authority of the king, but the fatal treaty of March, signed but utterly neglected even by those who had made it, was never brought to Louis' knowledge.³

¹ See Dispacci Veneziani, Filza 98., 103, 104, *et passim*. The ambassador says it was well known that Cinq Mars and his party wished to keep Louis away from Narbonne. The entire correspondence of the Venetian ambassadors in Mss., copied from the Mss. at Venice, is now at the Bibliothèque Nationale. It has only recently been accessible, and is one of the most valuable sources of information for this period. These letters are detailed statements of the occurrences of the time, made as they happened, and are the observations of men of special intelligence, having from their position every opportunity for being well informed, and entirely free from any motive to misinterpret the facts.

² Montglat, 126. The statement that the king was informed of the plan to kill Richelieu rests on Montglat's authority. Montglat was not a party to these intrigues, and though the matter as he states it is not very improbable, it cannot be regarded as certainly correct. This is one of the many illustrations that the only satisfactory evidence of such matters are the letters or memoranda written by the parties to them at the very time of the occurrences. Montglat falls into several errors in his account of this affair, which can be corrected by a study of such authorities. Martin, however, seems to receive this statement without questioning, and, as I have said, it is not improbable.

³ DeThou, in his examination, states distinctly that though he was not

The Marshal of Meilleraie, after capturing Callioure, had laid siege to Perpignan, and the king remained for some time before that important city. In the meantime, Richelieu had somewhat rallied from his illness, and on May 27th he left Narbonne, but proceeded towards Provence, apparently uncertain as to his destination, and as to the treatment he might expect from the king. But his star was again in the ascendancy, and shrewd courtiers now foretold the overthrow of the presumptuous and indiscreet favorite. Louis was weary of the campaign in Catalonia, and annoyed by Cinq Mars' incapacity. The king's favorites found him most critical when they sought to take part in military affairs. Louis was displeased with Cinq Mars' ignorance as a soldier, as he had been with that of Luines. Cinq Mars had ventured to suggest that the charge of the king's children should be left to him, and such a request was little relished by a monarch who did not like speculations on his death.¹

Late in May, the French met a severe defeat at Honne-court. It seemed for a moment that the disaster might renew the terror that had followed the capture of Corbie, six years before. But the king assured Chavigni, that his confidence in the cardinal was unshaken. "Whatever false reports they spread," he wrote Richelieu, "I love you more than ever. We have been too long together to be ever separated."²

At this critical moment the great discovery was made, which was to overthrow the last cabal against the minister. A copy of the treaty made with Spain in March had come into the possession of the cardinal. How this treaty was disclosed still remains a secret. It has been suggested that the queen or some of Monsieur's attendants may have

Secretary of State, he wrote to Rome and Spain, acting under the express orders of the king. This was not denied by Louis.—*Lettres de Richelieu*, viii., 180.

¹ MSS. Aff. Etr., France, 101. Lettre de Chavigni, July 28, 1642, to Richelieu, printed by Cousin. The king said of his children to Chavigni: "Je ne les puis laisser qu' à Monseigneur le Cardinal."

² *Lettres de Richelieu*, vi., 926.

betrayed the plot. Orleans was surrounded by men like unto himself and ready for any baseness. His chief adviser was then the Abbé de la Rivière, who was fully capable of such a step, but it is questionable if he knew of the treaty. But Richelieu had everywhere an admirable force of spies, and it is not improbable that he obtained a copy of the treaty through a secret emissary in Spain.¹

The wonder is not so much how the treaty was discovered, but that it remained a secret so long. The conspirators were numerous, reckless, and indiscreet. Fontrailles had been annoyed, on his return, to find the treaty known to the queen, DeThou, and others.² Cinq Mars' secrets had been poorly kept. He now aspired to the affection of the Princess Marie of Gonzagua, a lady of such rank that an alliance had been projected between her and Monsieur when he was heir-presumptive to the throne.³ She is said to have promised to marry the favorite, when he should have attained a greater position, and she excited hopes in him that he might become constable and prime minister of France. She now wrote him about his Spanish treaty: "Your affairs are as commonly known at Paris as that the Seine flows under the Pont Neuf."

The prudent Fontrailles had insisted on flying when he saw that the Grand Équerry's favor and safety were in peril. "You," he said to Cinq Mars, "are so large and well made that you do not care about losing your head, but I am small and short and I should look deformed without one."⁴ He therefore fled to England and returned in safety after Richelieu's death, but Cinq Mars stayed with the king regardless of warnings.

The treaty, under which nothing had been done, was not a thing fraught with much danger to the state, but it delivered the enemies of Richelieu into his hands. The copy was received by him probably after the 8th or 9th of June, and he at once sent Chavigni with it to the king. Louis had just left the siege of Perpignan and met

¹ Lettres de Richelieu, vi., 929-934. ² Relation de Fontrailles, 254.

³ Lettres de Richelieu, iii., 305. ⁴ Fontrailles, 255. Montglat, 125, 129.

Chavigni at Narbonne on June 12th. There the treaty was laid before him, with such proof as could be furnished of its genuineness, and of Cinq Mars' complicity. The order for his arrest was given, and he and DeThou were at once taken into custody.¹ A messenger was sent to Italy, where the Duke of Bouillon was in command of the French army, with an order to take him dead or alive. He was arrested and brought to France.

Monsieur was more cautiously cajoled. There was no thought of any extreme punishment to be visited upon him, but he was relied on to turn state's evidence and furnish legal proof of the treaty that there might be a conviction of the others. The arrest of Cinq Mars was followed by Monsieur's appointment as general in chief of the army of Champagne. Encouraged by this, Gaston wrote the cardinal, attacking the conduct of that ungrateful M. le Grand. "He is," said the Duke, "the most culpable man in the world, to have displeased you after so many obligations. I am sure you know, that if I have considered his plans, I have done no more." But on June 25th, he found that a copy of the treaty had been discovered, and the Abbé de la Rivière was at once sent to negotiate his peace. The terms imposed were simple. Orleans must make his deposition to the treaty and the complicity of the others, and if this was full and sufficient he could retire to Venice. He would be allowed 12,000 crowns a month, being, as it was maliciously stated, the amount the king of Spain had promised him.

Monsieur sent the most piteous letters. "I must be relieved from the pain I am in," he writes Chavigni. "Twice you have helped me with his eminence. I swear this shall be the last time I will give you such employment." La Rivière offered, that in case his majesty would promise in writing that Orleans could retire to Blois and there enjoy his appanage, he would acknowledge the treaty made with Spain with all its circumstances. This bargain was

¹ *Dispacci degl' ambasciatori veneziani*, t. xcvi., 155, *et seq.* Giustiniani, the ambassador, says it was not thought at first Cinq Mars would be executed.

made and Gaston thereupon signed his confession, in which he declared that he had been seduced by M. le Grand into plots against the cardinal; that they with the Duke of Bouillon had agreed to make a treaty with Spain, and that they would enter France with an army while the king was at Perpignan; that he had twice spoken with DeThou about this matter. He protested that he had never lent ear or heart to any design against the cardinal's person. "All my life I have held in horror such damnable thoughts against any one, and much more against a life so precious and sacred, which I pray God may long be preserved to France."¹

Though the king had been prompt in ordering the arrest of Cinq Mars, it was feared that he might yet relent. "How terrible a leap M. le Grand has taken," he said after his arrest. But his resentment was carefully kept alive.² On June 28th, the king visited the cardinal at Tarascon, and they met again after the events of their two months' separation.³ Both were such invalids that their beds were placed side by side, and thus their conference was held. Louis feared Richelieu's reproaches as a truant school-boy fears his teacher's; but the cardinal was profuse only in gratitude and affection.⁴ Greatly cheered by this, the king, after assuring the minister of his confidence and affection, returned to St. Germain.

Richelieu's enjoyment of his triumph was not affected by the death of the founder of his fortune, who had so long been his bitterest enemy. The queen-mother had left the Spanish Netherlands and gone to Holland. Driven from there, and finding the English unwilling to protect her, she took refuge in Cologne. There she was attacked by a long and dangerous illness. Louis had sent to her Riolan, one of her former physicians, but he went really as a

¹ See *Carnets of Mazarin*, i., 35, 37, 38, 39, 41. *Lettres de Richelieu*, vi., 929, 935, 949, 951-959.

² *Lettres de Richelieu*, vii., 14. Letters from de Noyers and Chavigni to Richelieu. *Lettre de Noyers à Chavigni*, June 15th. *Aff. Etr., Fr.*, i., 102.

³ *Dispacci Veneziani*, 98. Despatch of June 24, 1642.

⁴ *Père Griffet*, 473. *Lettres de Richelieu* for last of June.

spy of Richelieu's. He reported regularly through Father Carré, to the cardinal, her physical ailments, her railings against him, her hopes of his death, the petty plans of her few followers. "They publish," he writes, "that Monseigneur will die of his malady, and that Cinq Mars rules the king and governs his affairs. They say that Monseigneur has the disease of Antiochus." In June, 1642, he sends more welcome news. "The queen has been very ill. I repeat the secret that she will not survive this year."¹

She died July 2d, but two weeks later the news was not known at Tarascon, and Richelieu on the 15th dictated for the king a letter of seven lines, in which Louis sent the most formal wishes for the restoration to health of his mother.² The most private acts of the king were regulated by his minister. We find not only letters to his mother dictated by Richelieu, but minutes of conversations which he was to have with his wife.³ The news of the queen's death came at last and was received with indifference.⁴ Orders were given when her remains reached Paris, to see to her sepulture after first attending to that of the last king. Henry IV. had been dead for thirty-two years, and neither his widow, his son, nor the minister had found time to have him buried.⁵

¹ See *Lettres de Richelieu*, vii., 910-914; and letters of Riolan there cited.

² *Lettres de Richelieu*, vii., 36.

³ *Lettres de Richelieu*, vi., 235. (Au Roy): "Si le roy le trouve bon, la reyne arrivant à St. Germain, Sa Majesté luy peut dire: Je vous ay mandé que, quand Madame de Sènegé m' auroit obéy, je vous escouterois volontiers sur son sujet, si vous avés quelque chose à me dire. Si elle est partie de Paris pour s' en aller vous pouvés dire ce qu' il vous plaira, mais, quoique c'en soit, je veux que l' obéissance précède. Si la reyne veut entrer davantage en discours, S. M. lui respondra, s'il luy plaist, selon sa prudence, concluant qu' il luy suffit de sçavoir qu' il faict les choses avec raison sans estre obligé d' en rendre compte. Après, si elle veut, elle peut ajouster: Vous sçavés autant des impertinences de l' esprit de Madame de Sènegé que moy; je vous en ay vue cent fois rire la première."

⁴ The *Gazette*, the official organ, thus announces it on July 19th: "She was the widow of Henry the Great and mother of the kings and queens who occupy the principal thrones of Europe. The regret for her death at the Court is increased by her absence, which was caused by her giving too great credit to the counsel of some factious spirits."

⁵ *Lettres de Richelieu*, vii., 44.

On the fourth of August, Louis published and sent to the parliaments, chief cities, foreign ambassadors, and others, a statement as to his relations with the late favorite, prepared by Richelieu, and containing strange confessions for a king. In it he says: "The notable change in M. de Cinq Mars for a year made us resolve to watch his words and actions that we might discover the cause. For this end we resolved to let him talk and act with us more freely than before. * * * We discovered that one of his chief ends was to blame the acts of our dear cousin, the Cardinal Duke of Richelieu. * * * He was favorable to those in our disfavor, and hostile to those who served us the best. * * * He complained of all that we did for the advantage of our state. * * * The interest of our state, which has always been dearer than life, obliged us to seize his person, and that of his associates." He then announced the pardon granted Monsieur, on condition of his confession, and the steps taken against the others.¹

Late in August, the all-powerful minister, now better in health, started on his return to Paris. He went up the Rhone in a barge, proceeding so slowly against the rapid current that he was seventeen days going from Tarascon to Lyons, a distance of one hundred and thirty miles. DeThou was carried along in a boat fastened to the cardinal's barge.

At Lyons the court sat for the trial of the conspirators. As with most of the trials for political offences, the court had been specially organized for the duty. Cinq Mars reached Lyons September 4th, and DeThou was also brought there.² A serious trouble had arisen about the evidence for the trial. The law required that the witnesses in criminal cases should be confronted with the accused. But not all of Richelieu's jesuitical reasonings, the answers

¹ Lettres de Richelieu, vii., 71-75.

² It has been stated by Mme. de Motteville, and more modern writers, that Cinq Mars and DeThou were drawn along in a boat attached to the cardinal's barge, like captive generals gracing a Roman triumph. It is, however, a mistake, and DeThou was so carried part of the way to Lyons, simply as a matter of convenience.

which he suggested for Gaston to make, the moral lights which he threw upon his testimony, could induce Monsieur to subject himself to this indignity, and to meet face to face his comrades whom he was bringing to the block.¹ The difficulty was solved by the opinion of two counselors and of Omer Talon, the advocate-general, that a son of France in a trial for high treason need not be confronted with the accused, but his deposition duly signed could be used with like effect.²

The deposition of Monsieur was thus given, and was amply sufficient for a conviction. DeThou sought to escape death by showing that he had taken no part in the treaty, and his only offence was that he had not disclosed the fact that such a treaty had been made. On September 12th the court met at eight in the morning to pass sentence. Cinq Mars and DeThou made their final statements. No statement could have been of any avail had the offences been more doubtful, and they were too clearly proved to allow of refutation. DeThou might justly have hoped for less punishment than death; but the court was not organized to grant mercy. Cinq Mars was unanimously condemned to death. One or two votes were cast against this punishment for DeThou. Execution usually followed close on judgment. On the afternoon of the twelfth, the condemned were carried to the scaffold, surrounded by so great a crowd that the carriage could scarcely move. Both met death as most men do, calmly and piously. Cinq Mars was only twenty-two when he ended his adventurous life. Bouillon had escaped a like punishment by the surrender of Sedan to France. His family hesitated about the loss of this independent sovereignty, on which both the family pride and power chiefly rested, but Richelieu said they must change their views or Monsieur de Bouillon would be without a head. The city was delivered to Mazarin, as the representative of the government, and the duke received his pardon.³

¹ Lettres de Richelieu, vii., 77-81.

² Omer Talon, 83-85.

³ The authorities for the conspiracies of Cinq Mars are Richelieu's *Lettres* for 1642, in t. vi., vii., viii.; *Relation de Fontrailles*, *Mémoires de Mon-*

On the same day that Cinq Mars was executed, Richelieu left Lyons for his last journey to Paris. He was still too weak to travel in a carriage, and he was therefore carried partly by water and partly on a large litter borne by sixteen men. At the houses where they stopped, an opening was knocked out beside the upper windows. The litter was placed on a great scaffolding, and then taken into the room where the cardinal was to sleep. He was thus carried to Roanne, and then gently sailed down the Loire to Briare, dictating to his secretaries and sending orders to generals and ambassadors from his litter during his progress. From there going to Fontainebleau he was met by the king. Two days' sailing down the Seine brought him to Paris, and on October 17th he was carried into the great Palais Cardinal. Chains were placed in the streets of Paris to keep back the vast crowds that gathered to see the great minister as he returned slowly home in his stately litter, triumphant over all his enemies. From every part came news of victory. On September 9th, Perpignan surrendered. Salces was captured on September 29th. By these victories, Roussillon became entirely joined to the kingdom of France, from which it was not again to be separated. Torstenstan, at the head of the Swedes, was winning victories in Germany, and almost all Saxony had yielded to him and to the Marshal of Guébriant.¹

The cardinal was, however, nervous from past dangers, and he forced Louis to dismiss some of his officers that he feared might prove troublesome. But an enemy more dangerous than Cinq Mars was now working his over-

tesor, 215-238; *Dispacci Veneziani* t. 98, 1642, from March to Sept.; Montglat, 118-132; Brienne, 71-75; *Mém. de Goulas*, 376-402; *Mém. de Chouppes*, 11-39; Omer Talon, 83-85; *Procès de MM. Cinq Mars et De Thou*; *Archives Curieuses*, tome vi., second series.

¹ *Gazette* for 1642, 816, 923, 976, 1042; *Molé* iii., 30. Curious confirmation of the dangerous position in which Richelieu was thought to be even in the summer of 1642, is found in the letter of the Prince of Orange to the king, in which he alludes to reports that the cardinal was no longer in Louis' good graces, and says that as he would have no confidence in new ministers, if Richelieu were removed, he should at once make peace with Spain. These letters are printed with *Mém. de Turenne*, ed. Michaud, t. xxvii., p. 323, 324.

throw. The improvement in his health had been only apparent. On the 28th of November he was attacked by a violent fever, and it was soon evident he could never rally. His friends and family waited in distraction about the dying man, but he met his end with perfect calmness. Growing rapidly worse, he asked his physicians how long he could live. They answered that God would preserve a life so necessary to France, but by their art they could not say. "Tell me frankly," he said to Chicot; "not as a physician, but as a friend." "You will be dead or cured in twenty-four hours," said the doctor. "That is talking as one should," said Richelieu; "I understand you." A little after midnight he received the sacrament. At three he received extreme unction. "Talk to me as a great sinner," he said to the priest, "and treat me as the humblest of your parish." "Do you pardon your enemies?" asked the priest. "I have had none but those of the state," replied the dying man. He struggled a day longer. Feeling death near, he turned to his niece, the Duchess of Aiguillon, whom he had loved most of any one in the world, and said: "I beg you to retire. Do not suffer the pain of seeing me die." She left the room, and in a few moments he was no more.

He died December 4, 1642, in the fifty-eighth year of his life, in the great palace which he had built for himself, in full possession of all the power, the splendor, and the glory for which he had labored so long and faithfully. Save to his family and his immediate followers, his death brought no sorrow. The king felt relief that the overshadowing presence had passed. "He is dead, a great politician," said Louis, when he heard of his death. "If there be a God," said Urban VIII., "he will have to suffer, but if not, he has done well."¹

¹ Montresor, 238-241; De Pontis, 627-632; Archives Curieuses, 2ième partie, t. vi.; Motteville, 42; *Gazette*, 1642, 1155. His statement, that his enemies were only those of the state, is not contained in the narrative of the eye-witness of his last minutes, found in Archives Curieuses, *supra*. It is found in almost all of the contemporary memoirs. Grotius tells the story of the Pope, that he was asked to perform a mass for Richelieu's soul, but

Over almost all of France a sigh of relief followed the news of his death. Save the few he protected, the nobility united in a common hatred of him. He had trodden hard on the aristocracy of the robe, and they did not love him. The mass of the people saw only heavy taxation, long and wearisome wars, and his own enormous wealth, as the results of his rule. The whole country desired a change after eighteen years of the government of one man, and it looked with that hope which never fails for what a new administration might bring forth.¹

The cardinal had disposed with care both of the wealth and of the power which had been his. The Palais Cardinal was left to the king. It was to become the Palais Royal, and to be occupied by kings, cardinals, and princes, and at last to be devoted to restaurants. Where Richelieu and Mazarin had laid their plans, cooks were to discuss the stuffing of pheasants or the mysteries of *patés de foie gras*. Richelieu left to the king also 1,500,000 livres, which he held as a fund for special emergencies of the state. Large estates and 60,000 livres a year were left to the Duchess of Aiguillon. The duchy and property of Fransac and Caumont, with other lands, and 50,000 livres a year, were left to his nephew, Armand de Maille. The duchy of Richelieu and many other possessions were left to his grandnephew, Armand de Vignerot, and to his eldest heirs male, on condition that they should bear only the name of Plessis de Richelieu. All of his property was entailed in the strictest fashion. Should the heir at any time be an ecclesiastic he was not to inherit. He forbade his heirs marrying in any family not truly noble, saying that he left them such wealth that they might choose

he declined, saying he did not care to waste his time "*operam perdere*," *Epistolæ*, 959. Giustiniani, however, writes that the cardinal "*ha incontrata la morte con sentimenti di vera pietà*," 98., 429, and that the king honored his death with his tears.

¹ A letter of Alexander Campion, written December 6th, is one of the many illustrations of the feeling of relief at Richelieu's death. "At last," he says, "one need no longer write in cipher, and the use of speech is restored."—*Lettres de A. Campion*, 382.

solely with regard to birth and virtue. The income from two thirds of his estate for three years was to be spent in erecting the Hotel Richelieu, and in buildings for the church and college of the Sorbonne, and for some other charitable purposes, and in the church of the Sorbonne his own remains were to be laid. He left his library so it could be used by scholars, but with only the small allowance of 1,000 livres a year for its increase. Many friends and servants received moderate legacies, but the entire will displayed the spirit of a nobleman whose chief desire was the perpetuation of a wealthy and powerful family. But one political reference is found in his will, and that shows how closely the reproaches of his original benefactress had touched him. "I cannot but say," he writes, "that I never have failed in what I owed to the queen-mother, whatever calumnies they may have heaped upon me."¹ No accurate estimate can be formed of the value of his estate. It must have represented many millions of dollars. It had all been accumulated in the service of the state, but pecuniary disinterestedness in those in power was then neither found nor expected.

The minister had not neglected the government of the state which he was at last to lay down. He commended in his last illness the Cardinal Mazarin to the king as his successor.² The advice of the dead man was promptly followed. On December 5th, in a letter to the parliaments and governors of France, Louis announced that, "God having called to himself the Cardinal of Richelieu, the king, continuing in his counsels the same persons who had served him so worthily, had called to the ministry the Cardinal Mazarin, whose capacity and affection had been proved in various employments, and of whom he was not less assured than if he had been born among his subjects."³

¹ The will may be found, Documents inédits, 2ième series, t. vi.

² See Mazarin's letters, i., 18, 30, 32, 42. The authenticity has been questioned of a formal letter from Richelieu to Mazarin, choosing him as his successor, but there can be no doubt that in some manner the dying cardinal indicated Mazarin to the king as the man fittest to hold his place.

³ Molé, iii., 36, 37.

CHAPTER VII.

MAZARIN.

NOTHING in Mazarin's life escaped the virulence of the numerous satires of which he was the subject.¹ The birth and pedigree of the Italian minister were sufficiently obscure to furnish opportunity for a malicious ingenuity. The family of Mazarin was from Sicily, and the poets of the Fronde were fond of styling him the Sicilian. They told the adventures and crimes of the "Sicilian Icarus," "The Sicilian Butterfly," of the "Sicilian Giant, overthrown by the good French."²

¹ There are many thousand of Mazarinades, which can be chiefly found at the Bibliothèque Nationale. A collection entitled "Choix des Mazarinades" has been published in two volumes, and a digest of them in three vols., "Bibliographie des Mazarinades." It is from these great masses of abusive literature that I have gathered the complaints that were heaped on the minister.

² The satires and burlesque poetry of the Fronde are frequently full of vigor. Sometimes coarse, they are often amusing. Hardly any political period has been more fertile in satires. I will quote a few lines from a well-known Mazarinade, called a "Virelay sur les Vertus de sa Faquinance":

" Il est de Sicile natif,
Il est toujours prompt à malfaire,
Il est fourbe au superlatif,
Il est de Sicile natif.
Il est lâche, il est mercenaire ;
Il n'est qu'à son bien attentif ;
Le peuple ne cesse de braire—
Il est de Sicile natif ;
Il est toujours prompt à malfaire.

" On ne sait quel est ce chetif,
Quel est son père présomptif,
D'où nous est venu ce faussaire,
S'il est noble, s'il est métif ;

Mazarin was not, however, born in Sicily. His father was a Sicilian, and the family name was thought to have been derived from a town called Mazarino, "in the same way," writes Scarron, "that names are taken in France by rogues of low birth." "Indeed," says another pamphleteer of the cardinal: "his extraction is so low, that one could almost say he had no father."¹ His father, we are told, was a tradesman, and was forced by bankruptcy to fly from Sicily to seek refuge in Rome. On the other hand, flatterers were not wanting, during the cardinal's prosperity, to trace his pedigree to ancient Roman patricians, and even to derive from the Cæsars his coat-of-arms, which consisted of the axes and a bundle of rods.* He seems himself to have had a just indifference for these endeavors to create for him a fabulous ancestry.

His pedigree was undoubtedly obscure, but his father moved to Rome and there became chamberlain to the Constable Colonna. He was married to Ortensia Bufalini, a young lady of good family, and had for his second wife a member of the family of the Orsini. His daughters were well married long before the great fortune of their brother; one of them to a member of the family of Mancini, whose name can be traced back to the fourteenth century. It is not probable that a bankrupt and fraudulent hatter or hosier could thus have established himself and his family.

More trustworthy authorities describe the father as a man of fair education and shrewdness, who found favor with his patron and advanced his own fortunes and those

Et la cour, comme le vulgaire
Chante pour tout point décisif—
Il est de Sicile natif;
Il est toujours prompt à malfaire."

Even Grotius, in his Latin diplomatic despatches to the Court of Sweden, speaks of Mazarin as "the Sicilian."—*Epis. Ined.*, 87.

¹ *Lettre du Père Michel*, 19th Feb., 1649.

* The wits found employment with the cardinal's coat-of-arms:

"Pour parler avec équité,
Il n'est personne qui ne sache
Qu'il a justement mérité
Les verges, la corde, et la hache."

of his children. To him was born on July 14, 1602, Giulio Mazarini, the older of two sons, at Piscina, a little village of Abruzzi, near Rome. His mother, Ortensia Bufalini, had retired there among the mountains, during the heat of the summer.¹

The young Mazarini received his education at Rome, under the charge of the Jesuits, and showed himself an apt scholar. The fathers desired so promising a youth for their order, but he resisted their solicitations to join their society, and at sixteen entered the world as an *attaché* of the Colonna family. There he made himself known by agreeable manners, elastic morals, and good judgment in obtaining the friendship of those who might be of service to him. He was equally well known by his passion for gambling, and his great skill in its exercise. His enemies in later life did not hesitate to charge his success in cards to his skill in cheating. "Pipeur," the card cheater, was one of the commonest of the terms applied to him.

The surroundings of the young Mazarin were not fitted to develop high moral character. Nothing but a virtue and power of resistance uncommon in youth and unknown to him, could have made his early life a profitable one. He was alike the friend and the dependent of young nobles, who were eager for pleasure and impatient of restraint. The young *attaché* entertained them by good stories about the adventures of some cardinal or the increasing impotence of the holy father, and he was the companion of their amusements and of their vices.

Gambling was universal, and superior skill and judgment enabled Mazarin alike to join in this amusement of his betters, and to gain from it the means of equalling their extravagance and display. But fortune does not

¹ A register of his baptism has been found at the parish church of Piscina, but its authenticity has been questioned. The family name was spelled Mazzarini. Its spelling was changed by dropping one z, and some years after he had lived in France he adopted the French form of Mazarin. In later years the parish church of the quarter where his parents lived in Rome was rebuilt and decorated by Mazarin with great magnificence.

always favor her most judicious followers. After a few weeks of free living from easy gains, the money won was gone, and an ill turn of the cards would sweep away the few scudi still left. The future cardinal was then plunged in sorrow. An early friend says: "He could not rest night or day, but groaned over his misfortunes." "Oh, the stupid animal that man is without money!" he cried, as he rose from the table with his last scudo gone.¹

His adventures at Rome were varied by a journey to Spain, with the future Cardinal Colonna. There he acquired a familiarity with the Spanish language that was to stand him in good stead in winning the favor of the Spanish Queen of France. The wits of the Fronde insist that there his youthful passion nearly checked his promising career. A damsel, who, one says, sold fruits, and whom another more poetically makes a dealer in flowers, so won his heart, that he insisted on allying his fortunes with hers. A companion of his early days, more prosaically, makes her the pretty daughter of a notary who lent money to the young *attaché*, whom he found plunged in grief, at some reverses at cards. Mazarin put the money to good use, won back his losses, paid the notary, fell in love with the daughter, and insisted on marriage.

His patron discreetly sent him to Rome, and there the alliance was absolutely forbidden. The young Mazarin sighed but obeyed.² The son-in-law of a Spanish notary would not have excited the passions of the Fronde, but the feeble rule of Spain offered a better field than France, for the clever adventurer, and Mazarin might have followed the favor of Olivarez and anticipated that of Alberoni. At Rome, Mazarin, who had now reached twenty, presently became a soldier. He was made a captain in the Pope's forces, and continued a life more gay than edifying.

¹ *Il Cardinale Mazarino*, published in *Rivista Contemporanea*, Turin, 1855.

² This incident is fully related at much length in "*Il Cardinale Mazarini*," which professes to be, and I think is, written by an associate of Mazarin's youth. It was not published until 1855, but the manuscript has been examined by Cousin.

When the disputed territory of the Valteline was put in pledge in the hands of Gregory XV., in 1623, the papal forces marched there, and in a regiment commanded by a Colonna the young Mazarin served as a captain of infantry. No dangerous service was required of an army employed in occupying a country which nobody threatened. With a mind alert to all he saw, the young captain gained, however, a knowledge of military affairs, that was to be of service when in future years he had to direct the campaigns of France. He showed also in some minor negotiations the eagerness and skill for diplomatic work, that was soon to make him prominent.¹

The treaty of Moncon made the papal possession unnecessary, and Urban VIII. was glad to withdraw the army, which brought the papacy but small lustre and large expense. The troubles of the succession of Mantua gave the young soldier, who had now returned to his canonical studies, a better opportunity for prominence. The Pope wished to prevent the bitter war on Italian soil which the question of this duchy bade fair to excite, and Sacchetti was sent as Nuncio Extraordinary to Milan, in the endeavor to restore peace among the powers. He took with him, as his secretary, Mazarin, now a young man of twenty-six, and favorably known among the cardinals and nuncios of the Papal Court for his adroitness, activity, and winning manners.

The position of the new Duke of Mantua was full of peril and uncertainty. The duchy had fallen to the French Duke of Nevers, a descendant of a younger branch of the house of Gonzagua. To become an independent sovereign was especially pleasing to Nevers. He had long cherished ambitions which seemed out of place in

¹ Among the authorities for Mazarin's early career are "Raccolta, etc., per la Vita del Cardinale Mazarini," by Beneditti, who was closely allied with the cardinal in after life, and another account "Il Cardinale Mazarini," by one familiar with his early career. The latter is probably more accurate. Cousin, in his "Jeunesse de Mazarin," has traced with great care his early diplomatic career, and the gossip about his early life is collected by Renée in his agreeable book, "Les Nièces de Mazarin."

the seventeenth century. He had dreamed of a shadowy kingdom in Jerusalem, and he now found a real principality fallen under his rule. More than most rulers, he was to find it ashes and disappointment in the possession. His duchy was disputed by superior powers and his capital was captured. He was driven from his possessions, and when he returned to Mantua, he had become so poor that while the Duke of Nevers had been known to possess the most magnificent furniture and decorations in Christendom, the Duke of Mantua for a long time could not even have tapestry in his bed-chamber. He had become, said Richelieu, from one of the richest among subjects, a beggar among sovereigns.¹

Charles Emmanuel of Savoy claimed that Montferrat as a female fief passed to his granddaughter. Spain, jealous of one who had been a French subject, favored the claims of Savoy, and also of a rival for the entire duchy in the Duke of Guastalla. The Emperor, while expressing no preferences, claimed the right to decide to whom the duchy belonged, and demanded that the new duke should surrender his domains into the imperial possession to receive them again from his suzerain should his title prove good.

The various claims were sought to be enforced by arms. The Spanish laid siege to Casal, and the French advanced to the assistance of the new duke. The young papal secretary displayed an activity and intelligence which made him prominent in the negotiations, but he accomplished little.

After the relief of Casal by the French, the Duke of Savoy soon formed a new alliance with Spain and the Empire. The Spanish put at the head of their army the famous Spinola, whose successes in the Low Countries had gained him the reputation of the first captain of the age. The Emperor, who was in the full tide of success in Germany, sent an army under Collalto to enforce his seigniorial rights over the duchy. In view of these new com-

¹ Richelieu, xxiii., 172.

plications the Pope now decided to send a still more dignified embassy. His nephew the Cardinal Antonio Barberini was appointed cardinal legate, while Mazarin had shown such ability that he was retained as an *attaché* of the embassy. Spinola arrived in Italy and presently the siege of Casal was again begun, but the hero of Flanders had little taste for a war among his own countrymen. Mazarin gained his confidence and worked on a willing subject in the suggestions he made for a peace or a suspension of arms.

The young *attaché* was vested with little authority, and he exposed himself to disavowals at home and rebuffs abroad. But Mazarin was full of ambition and of a restless activity. He became a volunteer ambassador, traveling over all of northern Italy and Savoy in his endeavors for a peace. He visited the chivalrous Duke of Mantua, and tried to reconcile his honor with his interests; he conferred with the representatives of the republic of Venice; he reasoned with Collalto; he endeavored to master the tortuous policy of the Duke of Savoy; he soothed the wounded pride of Spinola; he negotiated with the generals of France. In January, 1630, he went to Lyons and met for the first time the cardinal, whose successor he was to be. Though impressed with Mazarin's adroitness and ability, Richelieu suspected the young negotiator of friendship with Spain and of a suppleness that might sometimes prove duplicity. It was not until later that Richelieu felt that he could have in Mazarin an assistant who was both skilful and trustworthy. Mazarin, however, seemed to have been early dazzled with the power and ability of the French minister, and he endeavored to ingratiate himself into his favor by showing himself a useful friend of France.¹

Mazarin's activity in his endeavors for a peace was marvellous. He rode over northern Italy and across the

¹ Numerous references to Mazarin are found in Richelieu's letters beginning at about 1629, and from their tone the gradual change in Richelieu's sentiments can be seen.

Alps, travelling day and night, exposing himself to peril from roaming marauders and bands of soldiers, explaining misunderstandings, changing his plans for a peace to suit the will or the caprice of the parties; soothing the wounded honor of one, suggesting advantages to the ambition of another; in all things showing himself ready, subtle, and insinuating. He found time, as during all his life, for an enormous correspondence. The letters of Richelieu were numerous, but concise and vigorous. Those of Mazarin are full of detail, describing almost verbatim his countless interviews. In one day he sent off nine long despatches to the minister at Rome. Collalto attacked and captured Mantua, and the French entered Savoy and captured Pignerol, but Mazarin continued his negotiations.

In September, 1630, a suspension of arms was at last agreed on, which was to expire on October 15th, if a general peace had not been made by that time. The time expired and no peace had been made except that of Ratisbon which the French refused to ratify. They marched to the rescue of Casal, in front of which lay the Spanish army, with its German and Italian reinforcements. On October 26th, the two armies were brought face to face. The French had about 23,000 men, under the command of the Marshal of Schomberg, the Spanish about 26,000 commanded by Saint Croix.¹ Spinola had lately died from grief and mortification at his lack of success in Italy and the slights he had received from the Spanish government. The Spanish cannon began firing, while the French infantry and cavalry advanced slowly towards their entrenchments. At this moment Mazarin suddenly dashed between the armies, riding at full gallop, his hat in one hand and a crucifix in the other. He rode down through the ranks, crying out Peace! peace! A few bullets whistled about the intruder, but an appearance so sudden and strange checked both armies, and the battle just beginning came to a pause.² A hasty meeting

¹ *Lettres de Richelieu*, vi., 335. ² *Mémoires du Maréchal du Plessis*, 357.

of the officers was held, and Mazarin announced that he had at last received the consent of all parties to terms of peace. Casal was to be surrendered to the Duke of Mantua, and an Austrian representative was to hold it in form until the duke received the imperial investiture.

A battle thus stopped was followed by a treaty which contained the just recital: "Treaty made before Casal by the intervention of M. Mazarini, Minister of his Holiness." It made the young negotiator a marked man at Rome. It had been long since the influence of the papacy had been exerted so actively and effectively. The Pope had a picture placed in the capitol representing Mazarin at Casal galloping between two armies, hat in hand. The hat that has been thus used, the lookers-on said, ought to be made red.¹ The brilliant success of these negotiations decided Mazarin's profession as that of a diplomat, and not of a soldier. For such a vocation the character of an ecclesiastic was well fitted, for the clergy still took a great part in the diplomacy of Europe. Two livings were bestowed on Mazarin, but he did not take holy orders and was never a priest.²

His relations with France became more intimate. In 1631 he visited Paris and there made further progress in the favorable esteem of Richelieu. The cardinal's letters are warm in their praise of his efforts. A treaty between France and Savoy gave further opportunity for his skill in

¹ The authorities for these negotiations of Mazarin are found in the original despatches now belonging to the Barberini family, which have been collected and printed by Cousin in his "*Jeunesse de Mazarin*," and in the letters of Richelieu.

² This question, much debated, must now be regarded as settled. It was not necessary to be a priest in order to become a cardinal. Many received that office without even taking deacons' orders, the first step in the priesthood. These orders were nominally required and were necessary before a cardinal could enter the conclave and vote for a pope. A letter from Mazarin to Beneditti, written in 1651, when an exile at Brühl, and when he contemplated a return to Rome, is conclusive that he had not taken orders. He says: "Quanto alla pena della bolla per defitto degli ordini, non è di poca considerazione quella della privatione della voce attiva nel conclave, e perciò desiderarci sapere se quando prenderò gl'ordini sacri, refterò habilitato alla detta voce senza dovere ottenere altra dispensa."

diplomacy. The treaty of Turin, in 1632,¹ gave France the possession of Pignerol, while the diplomat retained for himself the favor of Savoy.

Mazarin was appointed vice-legate at Avignon, but in 1634, he received a more coveted promotion, and was sent as Minister Extraordinary to France. He made his solemn entry into Paris with great pomp. The nuncio and most of the prelates at Paris joined the procession. Over one hundred carriages followed the new ambassador, and he was escorted to the residence of the papal nuncios, who since 1601 had occupied the historical Hotel de Cluny.

To effect a peace between France and Germany and Lorraine had been the duty assigned to the nuncio extraordinary, but such a task was beyond any skill, and in 1636 Mazarin returned to Rome. His services had been such that he might now expect to be made a cardinal, and for this promotion he had the powerful support of the French minister. Richelieu's relations with Mazarin had grown from amity to intimacy. "Monsignor Colmardo will know," the cardinal writes Mazarin in 1638, "by the despatches sent to Rome, how wisely he acts in attaching himself to the service of great princes and good masters like him whom we serve. He will know also that he has done wisely to make good friends, and that I am not the least of them."² But his favor at Paris created distrust at Madrid. The influence of the Spanish element was always strong at Rome, and it was arrayed against his promotion.

The cabals which thwarted Mazarin's ambition inclined

¹ *Lettres de Richelieu*, iv., 174, 175.

² See *Lettres de Richelieu*, vi., 62, 110, 168, 255. Also numerous letters of Chavigni, preserved among the papers of foreign affairs.

Colmardo was the familiar name with which Mazarin was designated in the intimate correspondence between him and Richelieu. It was probably first used in cipher despatches, and from these grew to be a sort of nickname. The letters of Mazarin at this time are full of a still stronger devotion. In August, 1638, he writes: "Ogni mia consolazione consiste in questo. . . che sono indifferentissimo a tutto, e che solamente ho passione di eseguire quello mi sarà ordinato da Mgre. il Cardinale, qualunque cosa si sia, quando ancora fosse di ritirarmi a vivere romito nella parte più solitaria del mondo." Cited *Let. de Richelieu*, vi., 110.

him towards France, where he would be in favor with those in power. In December, 1638, Father Joseph was dying. He had received the nomination of France, for one of the cardinal's hats which the popes reserved for the French kings. It was now evident that Father Joseph could enjoy the honor but a few days, should it at last be bestowed upon him. Though Mazarin was a foreign subject, it was resolved that he should receive this nomination. Chavigni wrote the French minister at Rome: "His Majesty desires that you should not delay to present to his Holiness and Cardinal Barberini, the letters of revocation for Father Joseph, for fear that Barberini, knowing the condition he is in, should maliciously make him cardinal and cause France to lose this place." At the same time he notified Mazarin, that it was proposed to make him cardinal at the first promotion.¹

The honor was now sure, but it was slow in coming, and Mazarin had become a French subject before it was conferred. In 1639 he at last entered the service of that government, of which he was soon to be the master. He was assigned to the difficult negotiations with Turin, and he conducted them with his usual skill. The good judgment and keen eye of Richelieu measured the capacity of his associate, and he expressed his approval with no uncertain sound. "I cannot tell you," he writes, "the contentment I have received, that your negotiation with Prince Thomas has succeeded. I believe that God has allowed you to show by this sample what you can do in the greater and more important treaties to which you are destined. * * * I can only say to you, that I am indeed impatient to see Signor Colmaro, both from love to his person and because I desire that after his exploits in Italy, he shall share in our Shrovetide festivities. He may be sure that in all times and places I shall be not uselessly his servant."² "His eminence has written me a letter that would rouse me if I were dead," Mazarin wrote to Chavigni.³

¹ *Aff. Etr.*, Rome, t. lxiv., pp. 226, 236.

² *Let. de Richelieu*, vii., 838, 839. ³ *Lettre de Jan'y*, 1641. Turin.

The long expected promotion came at last. On December 16, 1641. Mazarin was made a cardinal. He received the beretta, the square red cap that marks the dignity, at the church in Valence, on February 25, 1642. Mazarin had already been chosen as the representative of France, to the general congress for a peace, but Italian questions also needed attention. The Pope's health was infirm, and a new election might occur at any time. It was therefore resolved to send the new cardinal at once to Rome. He received from Richelieu full instructions as to the course he was to pursue.¹ A judicious use of money assisted in all diplomatic successes. Fifty thousand livres had been promised Christine of Savoy, in order to reconcile her to the treaty of 1640, and to Prince Thomas great sums were given. The price of cardinals was cheaper. Fifteen hundred crowns a year could be granted to each of the cardinals who would receive it secretly, and to whom Mazarin thought it could be profitably given. To the more powerful cardinals the prospect of abbeys or larger pensions was to be suggested. Mazarin's own qualities were justly described in a portion of the memoir which referred to his appointment as ambassador to the coming congress. "It is certain that there is no one in the kingdom able to unravel the intrigues which involve the negotiations for peace but the said cardinal; the employments which he has had giving him a general knowledge of foreign interests, and especially the manner that one must treat with the Spanish, where are needed qualities rare among the French: coolness, patience, and a prudent dissimulation."²

But the journey to Rome was delayed, and at last abandoned. Richelieu's illness, and the conspiracy of Cinq Mars, drew attention from foreign politics. During the trying year of 1642, Mazarin's fidelity to the minister was unwavering, and when Bouillon bought his life by the surrender of Sedan, Mazarin signed the treaty, and went in person to take possession of the city in the king's name.

¹ *Œuvres de Richelieu*, vii., 894-898. ² *Lettres de Richelieu*, vii., 898.

December came, and it was evident that Richelieu must at last surrender his power. There were skilful and faithful servants who had long been in the public employ; Mazarin was an Italian, but recently naturalized as a French citizen.¹ Save as the representative of a foreign power, he had been in France but little over two years. But Richelieu designated him to the king as the fittest successor for his own place.²

His judgment did not fail him at the last. There was no man in France who could have continued the work of Richelieu as did Mazarin. With the tendencies of government that were then too well established to be changed, there was no other man whose rule would have been so judicious and so beneficial. There was certainly none among those who might have aspired to the control of the government, who were not his inferiors in every quality needed in the head of an administration.

Alike the hope and the expectation of change followed Richelieu's death. The banished and imprisoned nobles looked for pardon, liberty, and favor. The great families and their adherents hoped soon to find themselves in full possession and enjoyment of honors, places, and pensions. The people anticipated a speedy peace and reduced taxation. It was known that Louis had wearied of his master. He would therefore gladly renounce his principles and dismiss his adherents, when the iron hand was at last removed.

But these reasonable anticipations were to be disappointed. In the same letter which announced Mazarin's promotion, the king, after speaking of the loss of Richelieu, had said: "We are resolved to preserve and support all the establishments which we have ordained during his ministry, and to pursue the projects we have formed with him for affairs both within and without our king-

¹ Mazarin was naturalized as a French citizen June 7, 1639. The act for his naturalization is found, *Aff. Etr.*, France, 91, 115, and it is printed by Cheruel in "*France pendant la Minorité de Louis XIV.*," vol. i., appendice i.

² This is claimed by Mazarin in his letters cited *supra*. The precise office Mazarin was to hold is not indeed indicated in the proclamation, but it was evidently intended he should be practically chief minister.

dom."¹ The despatches of the new minister were to the same effect. He wrote Oxenstiern, that notwithstanding Richelieu's death, his majesty would continue "in the inviolable resolution he had taken, never to lay down arms until he had compelled his enemies to a peace that would be favorable and safe for himself and his allies."²

Mazarin said he was stupefied with grief at Richelieu's loss, and he mingled his laments with protestations that it was with reluctance he took his place, and that his constant entreaty was to be relieved from its burdens and allowed to retreat to Rome. "When I thought I should have permission to return to Rome," he writes Prince Maurice of Savoy, "I was called to the council, but I know that I am not strong enough to bear so great a burden, so I hope his Majesty will use me elsewhere, as I continually supplicate him."³ Even to his brother, then a provincial father at Rome, Mazarin wrote in similar language. "I persist in my resolution to obtain from his Majesty the permission to serve him out of this kingdom. He thinks me not unfit to serve, it having pleased his Eminence in his illness to give his Majesty advantageous testimonials of my sufficiency."⁴

But in truth the new minister's attention was divided between the vigorous prosecution of his predecessor's policy and the most minute study of every court intrigue by which he could preserve his position in France.

¹ Molé, iii., 36.

² *Ib.*, i., 41, January 8, 1643. On December 15, 1642, a letter to Prince Thomas of Savoy, says: "Essendo il Ré risoluto di governarsi con le stesse massime," etc.—*Let.* i., 4. See also 45, 47, *et passim*, *Dis. Ven.* xcvi., 432, 435, etc. In his *Carnets*, i., 50, 51, he says: "Bisogna replicar in buoni termini che il re è piu risoluto che giamai alla guerra." Mazarin still used Italian in most of his letters. He apologizes to Molé, in a letter written May 6, 1643: "I ask pardon because the little practice I have in French writing compels me to use another hand than my own."—Molé, iii., 49. See also letter to Enghien.—*Let. de Maz.*, i., 719. He acquired a complete mastery of French, and wrote it with facility, though, unfortunately for scholars, in an exceedingly illegible hand-writing. His conversation was also for some years very broken French. In 1630 he had to use an interpreter.—*Mém. de Richelieu*, xxii., 207 ³ *Lettres de Mazarin*, i., 2, 13.

⁴ *Lettres de Mazarin*, i., 17, 18. See also p. 30.

Though Richelieu's foreign policy was followed, those who had suffered from his severity began to find relief. The Marshals of Bassompierre and Vitri, the Count of Cramoill, and Vautier, the physician of the queen-mother, were released from the Bastille.¹ Vitri had been confined there for six years, Cramoill for seven years, and Bassompierre for twelve years. No judicial sentence was needed for such imprisonment. An arbitrary arrest might be followed by an unexplained imprisonment longer than our law metes out for forgery or manslaughter.

When Bassompierre at last regained his liberty he said he could not see that any thing had changed in France, except they had cut off the beards of the men and the tails of the horses.² But the model of fashion in the early part of Louis' reign now found himself antiquated, and the courtiers sneered at the old-fashioned bearing and conversation of the gallant of twenty years ago.³ A greater man than Bassompierre also found relief from the cardinal's death. Saint Cyran emerged from the prison where he had been kept for five years by Richelieu's jealousy of his independence, and by the petty theological spite from which even so great a politician was not always free. The voices of the Port Royal were lifted up in praise at the release of its director. They had already noticed that on the day of Richelieu's death the passage sung in the mass had contained these words, which seemed a terrible coincidence to their pious minds: "The fear of the Lord prolongeth days, but the years of the wicked shall be shortened."⁴

The Duke of Vendôme returned from England and his sons reappeared at Court. But though the severities of the former reign were relaxed, the king proceeded slowly in making changes. The bequests of Richelieu's will were regarded.⁵ Solemn ceremonies were held over his remains

¹ Motteville, 42 ; *Dispacci Veneziani*, xcvi., 512.

² *Mémoires de l'Abbé Arnauld*, ed. Michaud, 509, 510.

³ Motteville, 107.

⁴ Molé, iii., 39-41.

⁵ The bequests of Richelieu's will to Mme. d'Aiguillon were afterwards contested by the Prince of Condé in behalf of his daughter-in-law, but un-

in the church of the Sorbonne and at Notre Dame. Three thousand candles relieved the darkness of the black velvet which enveloped the church and showed the magnificent catafalque that contained the remains. "Though for twenty years," says the *Gazette*, "the most polished styles seem to have exhausted all that could be said in praise of the departed, the funeral oration was enriched by new thoughts and gave general satisfaction."¹

The remains of the queen-mother were at last brought back to the country from which she had been so long an exile, and were quietly laid to rest in St. Denis.²

The leaders of the aristocratic party, though disappointed in their expectation of an immediate change in the government, were encouraged by the hope that it could not be far distant. The king had always been an invalid and his health was becoming more infirm. It was impossible that he should live much longer. Little as he loved the queen he could not avoid leaving her as regent. The dauphin was so young that the regency must be long, and the queen's friends, those who had befriended her during Richelieu's long tyranny, those with whom she had sympathized in the plots of Chalais, and of Monsieur and Cinq Mars, those who had been faithful to her, while the time-servers and the parvenus had been holding office and gaining wealth under the bloody cardinal, would now receive their reward. The present ministers had been the creatures of Richelieu, and as soon as the king's protection was withdrawn, they would be sent to their country-seats, or to the Italy or Sicily from which they had obscurely sprung.

The ministers found their positions difficult, endeavoring to retain the confidence of the king, whose natural

successfully. The lawyers used considerable license in their arguments. Those against the will occupied most of their time in abusing the avarice of Mme. d' Aiguillon and attacking the memory of Richelieu. But the counsel for it told how the Prince of Condé had gone down on his knees before the cardinal to beg his niece for the Prince of Enghien. The will was sustained.—Journal d' Ormesson, 174-178. Grotii Epistolæ, 967. Let. de Mazarin, i., 736. ¹ *Gazette*, 1643, 73-81. ² *Gazette*, 1643, 212.

irritability was increased by his infirm health, and anxious, also, to obtain some hold on the favor of the queen, who might soon become their mistress. Bouthillier and his son Chavigni, and De Noyers, all of them experienced public servants, formed with Mazarin the chief members of Louis' council. Of these, Mazarin, Chavigni, and De Noyers exerted the greatest influence, but jealousies soon sprang up among them. De Noyers was thought to have special means for gaining the king's confidence, and to be willing to divert it from his associates. Mazarin and Chavigni lived at large expense, and by profusion and free entertaining they sought to gain supporters at Court. But De Noyers adopted a different course, and one well adapted to please his master. He led a modest life, working much, spending little, and given to prayer and pious meditation. Louis was always devotional, and the minister and sovereign prayed together and joined in mass and vespers. After their religious tasks were done De Noyers had long conferences with a master favorably inclined towards a servant who was both pious and economical.

His more worldly rivals were, however, more than a match for these spiritual weapons. Louis' taste for his prayers was strong, but his dislike for his wife was stronger. It was suggested to him that De Noyers was too much inclined to favor the interests of the queen. The king was not unapt to indulge in harsh words to those about him, partly from ill-humor and partly from a weak desire to show them they were not entirely sure of his favor. Piqued at some such treatment, De Noyers asked to be allowed to retire, and the king took him at his word.¹ His place was filled by Le Tellier, a man, the Venetian minister wrote, "who depended on Mazarin as day upon the sun."² Le Tellier was destined to a long political career. Always capable, never ambitious, filling well the second place and not desiring the first, he served

¹ Grotii *Epistolæ*, 953 ; Rochefoucauld, 53-55 ; Montglat, 135, 136 ; La Châtre, 273-276.

² *Dispacci Veneziani*, xcix., 49 ; Omer Talon, 87.

in various capacities for over forty years, and died chancellor of France at eighty-two.

Louis' infirmities were becoming more alarming, and his physicians were forced to tell him that the end was near. The question of the regency that must soon begin, became the most important matter for the king to decide, and it could be no longer deferred. Anne of Austria, as the mother of the dauphin, might naturally expect to be regent, possessing an authority as untrammelled as that of Mary de Medici. Gaston of Orleans, the uncle of the future king, seemed also entitled to an important place during the long minority that was to begin. But in all his kingdom there were no two persons whom Louis trusted less than his wife and his brother. Louis had dismissed his confessor because he had advised him to make Monsieur regent, and De Noyers was believed to have incurred disgrace because he had advised the untrammelled regency of the queen.¹ A solemn edict, issued four days before Richelieu's death and registered by the Parliament immediately after, had declared that Gaston should never hold any office in the kingdom, nor be regent during the minority. Six times, Louis told the members of the Parliament who waited on him, had he pardoned his brother for political offences. Gaston had made treaties with the enemies of the country, and this edict was required for the king's safety and that of his children.² Its severity, however, had been relaxed, and Monsieur had been allowed to return to Court.³ Anne sent word to the dying king to ask his pardon for any thing that had displeased him, and to beseech him not to believe that she had taken part in the conspiracy of Chalais. But the implacable king replied, that in the condition he was in he was bound to pardon her, but he was not obliged to believe her.⁴ So far as possible Louis desired to restrain the power that she would have as regent. He feared that the sister of the

¹ Dis. Ven., xcvi.ii., 48, 49.

² Molé, iii., 32-35 ; iv., 286-293.

³ Dispacci Veneziani, xcvi.ii., 438, 500.

⁴ Mémoires de Rochefoucauld, ed. Grands Écrivains de la France, ii., p. 56.

Spanish king, when she became the head of the French government, would make a hasty and unworthy peace and fritter away the results of eight years of war. His ministers were not averse to any plan which should secure their own power. In later years Mazarin accused Chavigni of having insulted the queen by telling the king she must have a council to control her.¹ But Mazarin undoubtedly had a voice in a matter of such importance, though he seems to have gained favor with the queen by convincing her that his conduct was really in her interest.²

On April 20th, the representatives of the Parliament were summoned into the king's chamber. They found Louis lying on his bed, surrounded by the queen and the dauphin, Monsieur, Mazarin, and the principal personages of the kingdom. Louis' declaration as to a regency was then read. After reciting the great deeds of his reign, and declaring that he proposed to assure the future happiness of the kingdom, he directed that the queen should be regent, and the Duke of Orleans lieutenant-general.

"But," the declaration proceeded, "as the office of regent is of great weight, and on it depends the welfare of the state, and as our well-loved spouse cannot have all the knowledge necessary for such great and difficult affairs, and that perfect acquaintance with matters of government which comes only from long experience, we have thought best to establish a council, where the important affairs of the state shall be decided by a plurality of voices."

The Prince of Condé, Mazarin, the Chancellor Seguier, Bouthillier, and his son, Chavigni, were to compose this council, with the Duke of Orleans, and in his absence Condé and Mazarin, for its chief. No change could be made in the council, save by death, and then the vacancy should be filled by the regent, upon the advice of the majority of its members. It was even to have control of the nominations for all important offices. The chief ecclesi-

¹ Letter of Mazarin to Ondedei, July 18, 1650.

² Rochefoucauld, 54, 55. The Venetian ambassador says explicitly that the king decided on this act, "persuaso dalle efficaci rimostranze del Signore Cardinale Mazarini," xcix., 54,

astical places could be filled by the queen, upon the advice of Mazarin, "to whom we have made known our desire that God should be honored in their choice." Two persons were deemed so dangerous as to be specially named in this paper. Chateauneuf was to remain in prison, and Mme. de Chevreuse in exile, until peace was made. Even after that, Mme. de Chevreuse, by reason of her bad conduct and her artifices to sow division in the kingdom, was not to be allowed to reside near the Court or the queen. The declaration was then signed by Gaston and Anne, and they swore to observe it inviolably. On the next day it was duly registered by the Parliament.¹ The queen's oath sat lightly on her, and at the same time she had her protest against the restriction of her powers secretly prepared and filed. Nor was the declaration more favorably received by others. All saw in it only an attempt of the creatures of Richelieu to continue themselves in power against the queen's will.²

The imminence of the crisis drew to Paris almost every one of weight in the kingdom. Most of those imprisoned under Richelieu had by this time been relieved and allowed to return to Court. Richelieu had cast a pall over society by his ponderous gayeties, as well as by his severities. All now was life and expectation. Never, said Mlle. de Montpensier, had there been so many balls as that year.³ The king's chamber was filled daily by an increasing throng, the most of whom watched his illness with a strong desire for its speedy and fatal end. In death as in life the king

¹ Isambert, *Anciennes Lois Françaises*, t. xvi., 550-556. Motteville, 43. Brienne, 76. La Porte, 39. Rochefoucauld, 59. Omer Talon, 85, 86. Molé, iii., 41-45. Grotii Epis., 952. A curious account and defence of the measure was published in the *Gazette* (313-321), and shows how even then the press was used to influence public opinion. Journal d'Olivier d'Ormesson, i., 29-32. The Journal of Ormesson is among the most valuable and trustworthy sources of information for events from 1643 to 1650.

² Omer Talon, 86. Dispacci Veneziani, xcix., 64. The ambassador says it was thought to be the work of the ministers for their own ends, and generally disapproved, and, by giving the government to a plurality of voices in the council, was regarded as contrary to the fundamental laws of the kingdom.

³ Mémoires de Mlle. Montpensier, t. viii., 17.



LOUIS XIII.



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LOUIS XIII.

of France could have no privacy. Louis lay for weeks dying, but the daily levée attended and watched his last agonies. When he was worse, an air of contentment could be seen in the faces of most; when he seemed to rally, impatience and discontent were manifest. The host of attendants did not ensure good care to the patient. In the midst of a great number of officers, says one of the few who really loved him, he could not get as much as a dish of soup that was warm. He was worse served than the smallest bourgeois in Paris.¹ Louis was himself aware of the offence he gave by his delay in dying. Weary of life and of suffering, he desired the end, but the impatience of others stirred him into saying: "Oh! if I could recover, I would serve them well for desiring my death!"² When he was more comfortable, he joined in songs of devotion which he had himself set to music.³ His taste for music had always been one of the chief diversions for his melancholy, and he composed plaintive or religious airs, the complaints of the unhappy lover or the doubting soul, possessing a certain merit. His conscience disturbed him at the last. He regretted his long wars, and especially his conduct to his mother, in which he had shown the coldest side of his cold character. The confessor said that maladies like his were sent to free us from the pains of purgatory, and the king might hope for that grace. "I have no such thought," said Louis, "If God only leaves me one hundred years in purgatory I shall think he is very gracious." Towards the end his mind wandered to deeds of war, which had always been his chief delight. He asked for his pistols, and cried out that he saw the Duke of Enghien engaged in a desperate combat, and at last victorious.⁴ On May 14th, the end came at last. The chamber where he lay was full to overflowing. The queen was there, the princes and princesses, and all those whose rank entitled them to see a king die, and thus surrounded,

¹ De Pontis, 632.² Motteville, 44.³ Mlle. de Montpensier, 20.⁴ This curious incident, which, after the duke's victory at Rocroi five days later, was converted into a death-bed prophecy, seems too well authenticated to be questioned.—Mort de Louis XIII., 527. *Mém. de Lenet*, 482.

Louis breathed his last.¹ He died, says a contemporary, little regretted by his family, his court, or his subjects.² His death excited again the hatred felt by the populace for Richelieu. It was rumored during his illness that he had been poisoned by the late cardinal, and threats were made to take Richelieu's body from the Sorbonne and drag it through the streets.³

The reign of Louis XIII. marks a turning-point in French history. Weak as he was in many ways, he still possessed the quality of most value in a sovereign, who is not himself a great man; he was unshaken in his support of those who were able to guide the state. In an age of immorality his own life was pure, and he was not undeserving of his title of Louis the Just.⁴ The weariness which he found in his great place, shows at least that his mind was not of a vulgar cast. His qualities have been overshadowed by those of his great minister, but excepting Henry IV., his career compares favorably with that of any of the Bourbon kings.

The breath was hardly out of the king's body before the crowd of courtiers poured from the new chateau of St. Germain, where the king had died, to the old chateau where were the regent and her sons. The French atoned for excessive veneration for a living king by entire contempt for a dead one, and the body of Louis XIII. was left unattended except by one or two officials, and by the common people who came from the ordinary curiosity to gaze upon the dead.⁵ Though Anne's grief at her husband's death was not excessive, she was overcome by the

¹ Mort de Louis XIII., par Dubois, one of his valets, ed. Michaud, xi., 523-531. Derniers Moments de Louis XIII., par Dinet, his confessor. Cabinet Historique, 12. The account of the valet is more interesting than that of the priest. Mém de Motteville, 44. Montglat, 136, 137. Dis. Venezia, xcix., 39, 64.

² Lenet, 471. The *Gazette* does not so put it. "Ne m'appellez plus agréable, appelez-moi la desolée et pleine d'amertume, dit aujourd'hui la France," p. 401. Ormesson, i., 26.

³ Ormesson, 34, *et seq.* Grotii Epis., 953.

⁴ "Jamais," says Montglat, "Prince n' a vecu avec tant de chastité que lui."—Mém. 137.

⁵ Motteville, 45.

excitement of the day, by watching in the close and fetid chamber of the dying king, and by the responsibilities that now came upon her. She retired to her chamber and stationed the Duke of Beaufort to protect her from the crowd of courtiers who pursued and almost mobbed her. "Retire, the queen wishes to repose," cried the duke. The Prince of Condé, who was already jealous of the house of Vendôme and of the favor of Beaufort, said: "Who is this that speaks and gives orders in the name of the queen where I am?" "It is one," said Beaufort, "who will always execute what her Majesty commands." Condé was forced to retire with rage in his heart, and a formal reconciliation had the usual effect of leaving both parties more hostile than before.¹

It was not until June 22d that the solemn obsequies of the late king were performed. As the formalities symbolized the conception of the nature of the kingly office, they are not without interest. Eight heralds dressed in mourning visited the Parliament and bade it attend the last ceremonies in honor of the late king. These were followed by twenty-four criers of the city, also dressed in mourning. Standing along the great hall, their leader cried out: "Noble and devout persons, pray God for the soul of the very elevated, very mighty, very excellent, and very magnanimous prince, Louis the Just, by the Grace of God King of France and Navarre, very Christian, very august, very victorious, incomparable in piety and clemency!" The members answered they would not fail to render the honors due their late king and sovereign lord and master. At nine in the morning of June 22d, the Parliament attended at St. Denis, its members arrayed in their red gowns. The princes of the blood, the cardinals, the foreign ambassadors, and the great nobles were also in attendance. The officers of state bore the insignia of their places covered with crape. In the nave were four hundred poor persons, clothed in mourning, each bearing a lighted torch. The mass was sung, and the Bishop of

¹ Lenet, 471, 472. La Châtre, 282. Ormesson, 44, 45.

Sarlat preached on the text, "In his life he did wonders and in death marvellous things." But the observers of etiquette complained that some of his remarks were intended for the Duke of Orleans and the Prince of Condé, while in the presence of a king, even a dead king, no one but him should be addressed. After the *De Profundis* the body was borne where the remains of the French kings were laid, it was believed to wait for the resurrection, but in truth to wait for the revolution. Then the heralds drew off their coats-of-arms and cast them into the vault. Other officers in turn placed there the royal spurs and gauntlets and the king's helmet. The royal colors were furled and laid away. The king-at-arms then cried out to bring the hand of justice, the royal sceptre, and the royal crown. As he was summoned each of the great officers brought the insignia of royalty of which his office made him the guardian, and cast it into the vault. Then the king-at-arms cried three times: "The king is dead, Pray God for his soul!" At this all knelt and prayed. A few moments of silence followed, when the king-at-arms rose and cried with a loud voice: "Long live the king, Louis XIV. by name, King of France and Navarre, our sovereign lord and master, to whom God give good life." The cry of "Long live the king" was taken up and resounded through the church, amid the noise of trumpets, tabourines, and hautboys. Then each officer took from the vault the insignia he had laid there, unbound the crape, and marched away, the representative of a new king.

The regency so long anticipated had at last begun, and it was believed that the hour of triumph had arrived for the enemies of Richelieu and of his policy. But dissensions at once sprung up among those who hoped for favor and places under the new regency. It was impossible that it should be otherwise. The Importants, as they were called from the importance they ascribed to themselves, the queen's friends, who now expected to control the government, were bound together by no political prin-

ciple. With the maxims of Cato and Brutus in their mouths, they had only offices and pensions in their hearts. Not only in the memoirs of that time, but in more recent histories, the party which had been restrained under Richelieu, but hoped for control under Anne and furnished leaders for the Fronde, has been credited with an intelligent movement against the extreme centralization of French government, and with an endeavor to create a wholesome restraint on the omnipotence of the king. There were indeed a few who talked of the ancient liberties of France, of the old government which had been overthrown by the tyranny of Richelieu, and which would be entirely destroyed by the corruption and duplicity of Mazarin. But such complaints were only idle words. The motive which actuated the Importants was a desire for personal favor and promotion. If the Duke of Beaufort could be the queen's favorite, and the Bishop of Beauvais the prime-minister, if the Duke of Vendôme could have the government of Brittany, and Chateauneuf receive the seals, Mme. de Chevreuse be the dispenser of the queen's favor, and the treasury stand open to all, the power of the king might grow more absolute, the Parliament become more subservient, the state become more entirely absorbed in the person of the king, and no one of the Importants or the great nobles would have lamented the condition of France.¹ The politics of the time were personal politics. This is perhaps a reason that women for twenty years played so active a part in them. Their interest and their influence would have been less, had the questions been as to modes of government or concerning religious or personal liberty.

Beaufort and Beauvais were the two men who it was believed would enjoy the most favor from the new regent, and they were fair representatives of the element to which they belonged. The Duke of Beaufort was filled with

¹ These views are based upon careful examination of the mass of memoirs, letters, and pamphlets of the time, Mazarin's carnets, and the conduct and demands of the parties.

great hopes of his coming favor, and they were deemed by others not ill founded. He was a young man of twenty-seven, the son of the Duke of Vendôme, of pleasant address and handsome person. His figure was fine and long golden hair invested him with a halo of beauty. This grandson of Henry IV. became the idol of the Parisian populace, and he hoped to become also the idol of the queen's affections. He was younger than Anne, but that accident has not always proved fatal to inspiring an interest in the breast of matrons. The queen certainly regarded him with favor and it might perhaps have been fanned into affection, but though Anne was gallant she was prudent as well. Beaufort was young, hot-headed, and as unfit as any boy in the kingdom for the political assistance which the regent required. Nor were his only faults those of ignorance and levity. The voice of the Court designated him as probably already the possessor of the queen's affections. Beaufort could not resist claiming a hold on them which he certainly did not as yet possess, while he was himself entirely controlled by Mme. de Montbazon,¹ a woman who exerted a considerable influence in the events of the next few years. The Bishop of Beauvais shared with Beaufort the leadership of the party, and his qualities, though far different, were equally unfit for political activity. Beauvais had long been the grand almoner of the queen. A worthy and pious man, devoted to her interests, he was selected, by the common voice, to be made a cardinal and to hold the place that had been filled by Richelieu and Mazarin. The Important party had in him a fitting leader. "Of all the idiots I have known," said Retz, "he was the most idiotic."² His political sagacity he showed, by insisting that if Holland was to continue the ally of France, its people must forthwith

¹ *Campion*, 225. *Rochefoucauld*, 59-61. Mazarin says, *Carnets*, iv., 13: "Che Bofort ha fatto gran discorsi per far credere che era bene con S. M. et che non attendeva che l'occasione." etc. *Carnet*, iv., 49, contains similar statements obtained from an obscure source.

² *Mém. de Retz*, i., 82. *Motteville*, 46, 62. *Brienne*, 76. *La Châtre*, 283. *Lettres d'A. Campion*, 385.

become Catholics. Anne had already perceived that such a minister would make her administration a laughing-stock.¹

The first act of the new regency was to do away with the restraints upon it that had been established by the edict of the dying king, solemnly ratified by the Parliament and by the oath of the queen. To accomplish this, resort was had to the Parliament of Paris, in which the edict had been registered. A power so great as to declare a regency, and still more to annul the will of the king, certainly did not belong to this judicial body, and yet this step was not without precedent. In the terror and confusion that had followed the murder of Henry IV. it was necessary to have a regent appointed at once, who could be invested with the powers of the government, and the Parliament was summoned "to provide, as it had been wont, for the regency and the control of the infant king." It assumed the power, though it was not one which it had been wont to exercise. It declared Mary regent, and its act met the acquiescence and the approval of the people. There was therefore an authority for claiming that the right to provide for a regency, was vested in the Parliament of Paris. That body was glad to adopt such a view. It was constantly endeavoring to enlarge its political authority. Under Richelieu it had been vigorously repressed, and even its jurisdiction as a court of law had been infringed upon. An opportunity therefore to regulate the great question of the regency was eagerly embraced. There was little difficulty also in obtaining the consent of the Parliament to disregard the provisions that had been made by the late king as to the regency. His memory inspired neither reverence nor affection sufficient to make his last desires respected. The declaration had from the first been unpopular as an endeavor to curtail the queen's just authority, and perpetuate the power of ministers, whose connection with Richelieu made them

¹ See *Carnets*, iii., 11. Che S. M. haveva detto che Bove era un buon prelado, ma incapace d'affari.

odious.' Anne herself was popular. She was an amiable woman who had suffered neglect from her husband, and oppression from his minister. All had looked forward to her rule as one that would bring peace and prosperity, and all were desirous that there should be no check on its beneficent activity. To annul the edict was to take away the powers granted by it to Monsieur and the Prince of Condé, but they were brought to give their consent by liberal promises. Steps were therefore at once taken to have the queen declared regent, free from all checks upon her authority, and the ministers who were to compose the council had not the power to make any resistance to the queen's desires.

On May 15th the Parliament was officially informed by the new king of the death of his father, but the form of the notification suggested a constitutional question of much gravity. "We order and exhort you," the letter ran, "that after having offered to God the prayers that you owe, for the welfare of our lord and father, you should, notwithstanding this change, continue your charges and administer justice to our subjects, according to the integrity of your consciences, until you have received from us the usual confirmation." The Parliament objected to the last clause as implying that their offices became vacant with the death of the sovereign, and needed confirmation from the new king. Such was in theory the nature of most offices held under the king, but the officers of the courts, by payment of a certain tax, claimed and exercised the right to sell or dispose of their places as their absolute property, and such a right could not be destroyed by the death of the sovereign. If all judicial offices expired with the king's death, it was a matter of grave concern to the courts as public bodies, as well as to the individual members.

A deputation waited upon the chancellor to insist on

¹ See Talon, 86, Ormesson, 32, Motteville, 44, 45, and the views indicated in the various memoirs of the time. Ormesson says, April, 1643; "Tout le monde se moquait des précautions que Messieurs les quatre ministres avaient mises dans cette déclaration pour éviter leur chute."

the withdrawal of this phrase. But the chancellor claimed this was the ancient usage, and he cited the formula used after the death of Francis I., in 1547. To this the judges justly rejoined that since then, in the reign of Henry IV., the institution of the *paulette* had changed the nature of their tenure. The chancellor was only willing to modify the objectionable clause, so that it should run: "Until you have taken the customary oath." But the queen had no desire for any quarrel with a powerful body which was inclined to be zealous in her behalf, and of whose aid she had need. The remonstrances of the Parliament were therefore tacitly acquiesced in, and there was required of it only such terms of obedience, respect, and submission as it was wont to use on such occasions.¹

On the morning of the 18th of May the Parliament was assembled for the bed of justice of the new king. Six lay peers of the kingdom who were members of the body, were in attendance wearing the cloak bordered with ermine which marked their dignity. The only ecclesiastical peer present was the Bishop of Beauvais. He had been active in preparing for the great act of the day, and was eager in his anticipation of the place and power which were so soon to be entrusted to him. The presidents and counsellors of the Grand Chamber and of the Courts of Inquests and Petitions, which together formed the Parliament of Paris, were there dressed in their scarlet gowns, and the presidents wore the mantles and caps of their office. At half past eight the Chancellor Seguier was summoned and formally received. He was arrayed in the gorgeous dress of his dignity, a robe of violet velvet, lined with crimson satin, and with the blue ribbon of the order of the Holy Spirit.² He had a trying part to perform. He was specially odious from his subservience to Richelieu, from presiding at the condemnation of Cinq

¹ Molé, t. iii., 53-56. Omer Talon, 89-91. Ormesson, 47. *Anciennes Lois Françaises*, xvii., 1, 2,

² I have alluded to the dress of the officers, from the great attention that was paid to its regulation, and the minuteness with which it is described in the contemporary memoirs and the official reports of the session.

Mars and DeThou, and from the great wealth he had accumulated in his office. The revocation of the king's edict deprived him of his place in the council, and it was expected that he would be one of the first to suffer disgrace. He had, therefore, to preside at his own deposition. Not until half past nine did the young king appear, accompanied by his mother and by many of the great notables and officers. Neither Mazarin nor Chavigni were present.¹ They had been unwilling to assist at their own humiliation. It was understood that Mazarin, deeply mortified at his removal from the council of regency, and seeing that his overthrow was now imminent, was preparing immediately to start for Italy, and he had declined to display himself to the gaze of his enemies in their hour of triumph.² The king was raised in his seat by his mother and his governess, and opened the session with the usual formula. He had come to announce to the Parliament his good pleasure, and the chancellor would say the rest. The regent spoke briefly, and the chancellor then made his harangue. Having first knelt before Louis and received permission to speak, he then returned to his place at the chair at the king's feet and addressed the Parliament. In the turgid oratory which was then in vogue, he informed the members that the king, who eight days before made Europe tremble at his power, was no more—that pious and invincible monarch whom God had rendered the marvel of sovereigns, the instrument of his grace to France. There was reason to believe they were deprived of him by reason of their faults, that God would no longer leave so pious a prince on earth, but had called him to heaven that his virtue might be rewarded by exchanging a temporal for an immortal crown. He then passed to the regency, and declared that the authority of

¹ It is stated by M. Cheruel that Bouthillier was also absent. This seems to be, however, one of the few and trifling inaccuracies to be found in this learned and most accurate historian. The Superintendent is mentioned as being present by Molé, iii., 58.

² Giustiniani writes, May 12th, that Mazarin announced his speedy return to Rome. *Dis. Venez.*, 99., 79.

the queen, that wise and virtuous princess, could not be too great, because it was placed in the hands of virtue itself. At the close of this harangue, which was marked by constraint and hesitation, it was answered by Omer Talon, the advocate-general. To comparisons of the late king to David, because he had reigned thirty-three years, and to anticipations that the queen in the excess of her grief would be able to wipe away her tears by giving solace to her people, Talon added some vigorous abuse of the present ministers.

The votes of the assemblage were then taken. Monsieur and the Prince of Condé both declared that they wished the power of the queen to be unfettered. The other princes, dukes, marshals, members of the Parliament, together with the members of the council, who were entitled to a deliberative voice, declared themselves to the same effect. Some of the members of the Inquests desired not only to annul the declaration, but to attack the late administration, and to demand reformations in the state. But the friends of the queen had deemed best to attempt no condemnation of the former government, and the Bishop of Beauvais had used his large parliamentary influence to prevent such action. An edict was accordingly pronounced, by which it was declared that the queen should have the free, absolute, and entire administration of affairs during the minority of the king. The Duke of Orleans was to be lieutenant-general of the kingdom, under her authority, and also president of the council, and in his absence the Prince of Condé. The queen should choose for her council such persons as she saw fit, without being controlled by the voice of the majority. The provisions in the declaration of the late king, which restricted the regent's authority, were annulled. This edict having been duly registered, the bed of justice was dissolved.¹

The queen returned to the palace vested with the en-

¹ Molé, iii., 55-65. Talon, 91. Journal d'Olivier d'Ormesson, i., 48-54. Dispacci Veneziani, xcix, 88-89. Anciennes Lois Françaises, xvii., 2-13. Gazette for May 18, 1643.

tire power of the government; but consternation was spread among her followers, when on the evening of the same day it was announced that her majesty had seen fit to offer to the Cardinal Mazarin, the position which the king's declaration had given him, and to make him chief of the council. After some resistance the cardinal had yielded and had promised to remain in France, but only until the peace. The Importants were filled with amazement when they learned that this foreign tool of Richelieu's was to be kept in power. What does this mean, demanded La Châtre, of the Bishop of Beauvais. The would-be statesman shrugged his shoulders and said he was responsible for the first act, but not the sequel, and La Châtre retired, cursing the inefficiency of their chief director.¹

Though the bishop had not taken heed as to what should follow the annulling of the declaration, the matter had received very careful attention from Mazarin himself. Before the death of Louis XIII. the cardinal had endeavored to make overtures to the queen, and had succeeded in obtaining an agreement that he should be retained in office, even if the royal declaration was annulled. The Nuncio Grimoldi, Beringhen, Brienne, and others had paved the way to a better understanding. Mazarin cajoled even the Bishop of Beauvais into viewing him with some favor. The bishop thought that in an administration of which he should be head, the experienced Italian might perhaps be a useful subordinate. Anne, however, measured the men more accurately. She had discovered that Beauvais was but a child in politics. She distrusted the ambition, the greed and the dissensions of the great nobles, and especially of the Vendômes and the Condés, while Mazarin's experience, his adroitness, his industry, would be invaluable. Anne was a true Spaniard in her indolence. She wished for some one able to relieve her from the burden of affairs, and such an one would be still more desirable if he were smooth spoken, of agreeable

¹ *Mém. de Châtre*, ed. Michaud, xxvii., 282.

manners, supple, flattering, and even gallant. Mazarin possessed all these qualities. Few men could be more charming in conversation, more deferential in manner, more adroit in persuading without offending.¹ Few could more happily combine personal devotion with judicious advice. The cardinal possessed physical as well as mental charms. He was now forty-one, in the full vigor of manly beauty. He was tall with a good figure, a bright eye, and an expression of great mildness and amiability.² He was said to bear a striking resemblance to the Duke of Buckingham, who had excited the admiration if not the affection of the queen. Anne was only forty-two, with a Spanish taste for intrigue and gallantry, pious, but with a piety reasonably elastic, fond of flattery, devotion, and ease. If she felt offended at the declaration of regency by the late king, Mazarin proved that to be rather an advantage to her. She had gained the one important thing in being named as the regent; the restraints imposed could easily be brushed away. The quarrels that had already risen between Beaufort and Condé showed the dangers to be apprehended from the jealousies of the great nobles. The Importants wearied Anne by their greed, their constant requests, their domineering ways. It was far pleasanter to deal with the subtle Italian, who seemed to have nothing to ask, who was both able and affable, and who added a delicate flavor of southern devotion.

The very fact that Mazarin was a foreigner, while it made him disliked by the French, might increase his favor with the regent. She too was a foreigner brought to live among a strange people. Mazarin talked with her in Spanish, the tongue of her childhood. They were both strangers in a foreign land. Mazarin had no ravenous family to enrich. His relatives were far off in Italy. In France he could have but one purpose, and that would be to advance the interests of the queen. He could protect

¹ Grotii Epis. ined. 62. Gramont, 255.

² Ormesson, 119. Mém. du Jeune Brienne, ii., 14, 15.

her from the greed and selfishness of her so-called friends; he could devote to her his great ability, his long experience, his unequalled industry.

The negotiations between Mazarin and the queen were conducted so quietly as to excite little distrust among the Importants. The latter were too confident of their position, too puffed-up by their greatness, to have any fears for their ascendancy; their only anxiety was as to a satisfactory distribution of the governments, secretaryships, and cardinals' hats, that would be theirs to possess. The queen sometimes expressed a passing desire to retain the cardinal for a while, but with her usual dissimulation, when reasons were advanced against it, she seemed to acquiesce and dismiss the matter from her mind. It was well understood that De Noyers should be recalled, the seals be given Chateauneuf and the finances to La Vieuville, as soon as the king died.¹

This was not all dissimulation. The queen was wavering and uncertain in her own mind. Had Louis died immediately after the declaration of regency, it is probable that there would have been an entire change of the ministry, such as followed the murder of the Marshal of Ancre. But Mazarin, once removed and returned to Rome, would have had none of the opportunities which enabled Richelieu to recover from his first overthrow. To be charged with the interests of France at the papal Court, to represent the Holy Father at some council for peace, to be active in cabals for the election of successive popes, to be influential in the curia and well provided with abbeys and livings, would have been the career left to him. But the lingering death of the king gave opportunity for intrigue and explanation. Terms were secretly made. Mazarin promised his services to the queen. She requested him to retain his position, and he willingly consented.² Not till

¹ La Châtre, 280.

² For these negotiations see *Mém. de Brienne*, 78-89, 297-305. *Mém. du Jeune Brienne*, vol. i., 296-309. He gives a detailed account of the negotiations which he says he received from his father's lips, and a paper which he says was signed by Mazarin before Louis' death, saying he would

after the meeting of Parliament was this known or suspected, save by a very few. On the evening of May 18th, the news of Mazarin's reappointment absorbed the attention of the Court and cast a gloom over the elation excited by the success of the day. But while it became evident that Anne was not the pliant and confiding friend of the Importants that they had believed, many hoped that the reorganization of the government was only deferred for a brief time. Beauvais whispered to his friends that all would yet be well. The queen would retain Mazarin for a short period to avail herself of his experience in the beginning of her regency. His odious friends would be dismissed at once, and his own continuance in place would be very brief.¹

Two days later the news of a great and unexpected victory reached the Court. The victorious reign of Louis XIV. had begun five days after his father's death, and the position of the new minister was strengthened by a success more brilliant than any gained by the French during the long wars of Louis XIII.

The hero of this battle, the young Duke of Enghien, whose name was to go into history as the Great Condé, the most famous of a famous family, was twenty-two years old. He was the oldest son of the Prince of Condé, and the younger brother of Mme. de Longueville. His father had given him an education far superior to that of most of the nobility. The education of many of the young nobles consisted of little more than very elementary studies, accompanied by a thorough drill in horsemanship, fencing, dancing, and all that would promote martial skill or social grace. Many began their service of arms, the

have no wish but that of the queen, and would abandon all advantages secured by the king's declaration. I do not, however, regard the *mémoires* of the younger Brienne as entirely trustworthy. Rochefoucauld, 52-65. Motteville, 45-49. La Châtre, 278-281. Montglat, 138-143. Mazarin's *Carnets* show plainly that before Louis' death he made an agreement with Anne, that he should be retained in office.

¹ La Châtre, 282. *Carnet*, iii., 29. "Scusano la regina della tardanza in chiamarlo sopra la necessita che da servirsi di me per un poco."

only calling open to them except the church, when mere boys. Bussy was a lad of twelve, when he was given a company in his father's regiment.¹ The future Duke of Rochefoucauld served before Casal at the age of sixteen. The Viscount of Turenne served under Maurice of Nassau as a common soldier when he was fourteen. Unless the taste for letters was strong, the youth who had shared in the excitement and authority of war was not willing again to submit himself to the authority of a pedagogue.² He would not exchange the mess table, the stories of the bivouac, the drilling and ordering of a company of grown men, to be feruled for giving a wrong termination in the dative or kept in of an afternoon for errors in vulgar fractions. But the young Enghien was thoroughly educated. He was well drilled in the languages, he was familiar with history, he had mastered geometry and the art of fortification. At the age of twenty he was an accomplished man of the world with a good knowledge of warfare both as a science and an art.

His appearance, as well as his birth, distinguished him from the mass of men. His face was unusually thin, with a nose large and aquiline, the nose of a great soldier. Brown hair flowing in profusion to his shoulders proclaimed the brother of Mme. de Longueville. His eyes were large and brilliant.³ "That young prince of the blood, who bore victory in his eyes," Bossuet called him, without oratorical exaggeration. His countenance, with its hooked nose and glowing eye, was called that of an eagle by his admirers, while his enemies claimed this eager and sinister face was that of a vulture.

This prince had been married in 1641 to Mlle. de Brézé, the niece of Richelieu. The marriage had been celebrated at the Palais Cardinal by a ballet, having for its subject the successes of the armies of France, and by a comedy which was believed to have been composed by the minister himself. The prince appeared in the play as

¹ *Mém. de Bussy*, i., 5, 6.

² *Bussy*, i., 8.

³ *Mme. de Motteville*, i., 420.

Jupiter, and again as a demon, and in both parts acquitted himself with much grace.¹

But the young duke had been reluctant for the alliance, which he regarded as degrading, and he seems to have hoped for a divorce after the cardinal's death. He was not a pliant subject, and he openly affronted Richelieu's brother.² When the minister heard of this he is said to have fallen into a transport of rage, and to have cursed with such vigor that his attendants, though not unaccustomed to his bursts of pious anger, were filled with horror.³ Ambition brought Enghien to subserviency. He at last yielded precedence to Richelieu's brother, and dined with him, we are told, in a very melancholy manner. This submission was rewarded by favor, which was continued under Mazarin.

In the spring of 1643 Enghien received the command of the army which was to operate against the Spanish in the Low Countries, but the Marshal de l'Hôpital was sent to guide and restrain his youthful ardor.⁴ Early in May the Spanish laid siege to Rocroi, a city important from its position at the head of the forest of Ardennes. The place was poorly fortified and garrisoned. Its capture would leave France open to the ravages of mercenary hordes, and expose it to the discontents and disorders which such an invasion would create. The Spanish were eager for the campaign, and hoped during the regency that was now beginning, to regain the losses they had suffered. The weakness of a minority was proverbial, and it was not believed that the queen and her friends would prosecute, with the vigor of Richelieu, a war against Spain and its king, her brother. The rescue of Rocroi was, therefore,

¹ Lenet, 448, 449. Portrait par Mademoiselle Scudery, "Grand Cyrus," t., iii, liv. 2, p. 598; Cyrus, t., v, liv. 2, p. 478. Cousin, "Société Française," i., 66-96.

² There had been disputes about yielding precedence. Enghien would yield it to Richelieu but not to his brother the Cardinal of Lyons. Condé promised that his son should visit Lyons and give him the right hand. The time was appointed, but Enghien refused to appear (Lenet, 452, 462).

³ Lenet, 462, 463.

⁴ Dispacchi Veneziani, Feb. 24th, xcvi., 574.

of much importance, and the young general was anxious that his assuming command should not be signalled by the loss of this place.

The French marched rapidly towards the city. As they approached, a council of war was held as to the best means for its relief. The Marshal de l'Hôpital deemed it most prudent to throw reinforcements into the town. To attempt a pitched battle at this juncture would be to risk a defeat that might be most disastrous to the kingdom. But the young commander thought an attack upon the hostile army the most practicable way to relieve the city. If successful it would ensure a year of repose to France, and an opportunity to remedy the disorders that might result from the king's death. Even if it failed, the Spanish would be so weakened by the conflict that they would be in no condition to attempt an invasion. This course was advocated by the valiant and experienced Gassion and by Sirot. The duke settled the matter by his authority, and told de l'Hôpital that he would himself be responsible for the result.

The Spanish army lay in the plain before Rocroi, and in order to reach them it was necessary to pass through a long defile between woods and marshes. A few thousand men could there have checked a large army.¹ But Don Francisco de Mello, the Spanish commander, was either too inert to seize this advantage, or else, desiring a pitched battle, he resolved to afford every facility. Enghien wished the battle to take place as soon as possible, for General Beck, with 6,000 men was near at hand, and his arrival would increase an army already larger than that of the French. It was now the 18th of May. Gassion led an advance force rapidly through the defile, and the rest of the army followed. As a portion first entered the plain, a vigorous attack would have exposed them to almost sure defeat; but none was made. The army rapidly defiled on the plain, and was drawn up in order of battle. It was now about six in the afternoon, and Enghien

¹ Sirot says 6,000 men would have been enough.

wished to begin the attack at once, but he found himself exposed to new peril by the rashness of one of his lieutenants. La Ferté Seneterre, who commanded the left wing of the army, jealous of Gassion's activity, had sent his cavalry and five battalions of infantry across the marsh, with the purpose of distinguishing himself by throwing them as a reinforcement into Rocroi. Enghien found his left wing fatally weakened by this, and Mello marched forward as if to attack it. But the eye of genius is needed to catch these passing opportunities in the hour of battle. The Spanish paused and occupied themselves in arranging their line, and the French brought back their detached forces, but it was now so late that the battle was deferred until the morning. The position of the two armies was striking. They were enclosed on every side by woods and marshes. A clear, level field, bordered by swamps and by the dense woods that were the outskirts of the great forest of Ardennes, seemed like a chosen tournament ground for the combatants. As night came on, the camp fires lighted up the whole plain, and the soldiers were so near together that the fires seemed almost to blend. The French army consisted of about 15,000 infantry and 7,000 horse.¹ The enemy were more numerous, having about 18,000 infantry and 8,000 cavalry, consisting of Spanish, Flemish, Germans, and Italians. Enghien feared that Beck would arrive early on the 19th, and he had his forces under arms at three in the morning, and by four the battle was raging. The duke led the right wing, conspicuous with his white plumes, which were to be seen in the thickest of the fight. Gassion also commanded at the right, and a vigorous attack speedily broke the enemy's line, but at the left, the French, under La Ferté Seneterre, were broken and driven back. Seneterre was taken prisoner, L'Hôpital wounded and disabled, and the Spanish captured their cannon. But they were now met by the French reserve, commanded by the Baron of Sirot, a gallant and

¹ Sirot says 25,000, and the *Gazette* and Lenet say 20,000. The numbers of the Spanish are given from 25,000 to 28,000.

experienced officer. The French soldiers were discouraged by the disorder and flight of their comrades and by the faint-hearted advice of some of the higher officers, but Sirot rallied them to their work. "The battle is lost!" cried a flying officer to the baron. "It is not lost," he answered, "because Sirot and his companions have not yet entered the combat."

In fact their valor checked the rout and drove back their enemies. In the meantime, the young duke was manifesting, in the conduct of the battle, not only the courage of a soldier, but the genius of a commander. Leaving Gassion to pursue the enemy at the right, and to meet Beck should he come up, Enghien with the cavalry turned to restore his shattered fortunes on the left. Avoiding the Spanish reserve, he attacked their right wing in the rear. Pressed both by Sirot and by Enghien, the Spanish right gave way. There still remained a body of Spanish veterans, the equals of any soldiers in Europe, commanded by the Count of Fontaine. If they had been used in the attack of the French the battle might have been won, but they had been kept in reserve and had thus far taken little part. Their commander was so infirm that he had to be moved about in a chair. Thus disabled he was wheeled to the front of his battalions, and from place to place as need required. His forces grimly maintained their position and were ready for a desperate defence. "The fierceness of their countenances," says a witness, "showed that they would defend themselves to the last." There was danger that Beck's forces might still arrive and change the fortune of the battle, and the French made a desperate assault upon this compact phalanx. The cavalry of Enghien were received with such murderous fire that they fell back. Three times he led them to the attack, and three times they broke under the fire. But Sirot and his forces now joined in the attack, and the Spanish were surrounded on all sides. The gallant Fontaine was killed in his chair, and his troops at last asked for quarter. Enghien with difficulty checked the Swiss under his command, who had

the bloody thirst of most mercenaries, for the slaughter of those who at last cried for mercy. About 2,000 of the Spanish were killed and as many more taken prisoners. The entire loss of the Spanish army was claimed to be 7,000 killed and over 6,000 prisoners. The French lost about 2,000 killed. Two hundred and fifty flags and standards were taken and sent to be displayed at the hotel of Condé.¹ From there they were borne to Notre Dame to add their brilliancy to the *Te Deum* sung over the victory.²

A brilliant victory, won at the beginning of a new reign, had a moral effect even greater than its military effect. It checked the hopes of the Spanish for a turn in the fortunes of the war, and it at once threw them on the defensive. "It crowned with laurels the cradle of Louis XIV."³ To all Europe the regency and the rule of the boy-king became invested with that halo of success, which is of itself a cause of success. The position of the queen and of Mazarin was greatly strengthened. In the rejoicing over a victory that moved the national heart and excited the national pride, the discontents or the intrigues of Vendômes or Importants might be safely disregarded. Mazarin recognized an element of danger to himself in the increased popularity of the Condés, who were already so powerful as to be dangerous allies. But in the beginning of his career, as through all of it, with much of greed, selfishness, and petty scheming, Mazarin's first thought was for the interests of his adopted country. In the Carnets,⁴ in which he noted his secret thoughts, he wrote:

¹ Lenet, 481. The Venetian ambassador gives the figures at 4,000 killed and 5,000 prisoners.—Dis. Ven., 99., 102.

² See Mém. de Sirot, t. ii., 34-48. *Gazette*, 1643, 429, 448-452. Lenet, 477-482; La Moussaye, "Relations des Campagnes de Rocroi et de Fribourg," 1-50. Sirot and la Moussaye took part in the battle. Lenet received his account from Condé. The *Gazette* gives the official account. Cousin, app., 2, chap. iv., "Jeunesse de Mme. de Longueville," where these authorities are analyzed. Cheruel app., 2, vol. i., has pointed out some changes between the account of Moussaye as printed and the MSS. he examined. ³ Mém. de Retz.

⁴ The Carnets of Mazarin, to which reference will often be made, are very valuable authorities for the secret history of the time. They are little

"Great credit will result to Enghien, but the good of the state must be foremost."¹ He bestowed on Enghien an adulation that was Italian and excessive. "He wished only to be his chaplain, his man of affairs with the queen," he bade Tourville tell the duke.² At all events, he loyally desired that this victory should not be fruitless. Alone in the council he insisted on attempting the siege of Thionville. The capture of this important place on the Moselle would lay open the entrance into Germany by that river, and assure Lorraine to the possession of the French. Mazarin was resolved also that the vigor of the new administration should be seen. The victory of Rocroi could be attributed to the plans of the late king; to the valor or the fortunate rashness of a young commander. Following this success by the capture of Thionville, a thing that had been unsuccessfully attempted in 1639, would show that a man's hand was still at the helm. It would show also that the regent was resolved on a prosecution of the war, and did not desire to make peace with her brother on any terms.³

The queen followed the advice of the minister, whose words became to her every day more persuasive. Enghien continued the campaign with skill. Exciting the apprehension of the enemy that he intended invading the Spanish Low Countries, he suddenly turned and marched rapidly towards Thionville. The siege of this place was begun by the Marquis of Gesvres and Enghien joined him on the 18th of June.

Thionville was strongly situated, but garrisoned only by 800 men, so its immediate capture was hoped for. But 2,000 more men were thrown into the town, and a formal

books in which for some years Mazarin jotted down very roughly private memoranda for his own use or that of the queen. Written in Spanish, French, and Italian, sometimes entirely illegible, they have the merit of being memoranda which it was never supposed would be seen, and which state with absolute truthfulness Mazarin's views.

¹ Second Carnet, p. 1.

² Lenet, 483.

³ *Lettres de Mazarin*, i., 51-56. Letter to Cardinal Bichi, 311, 312. Carnet, iii., 50, 51.

siege became necessary. Guébriant, the French commander in Germany, so engaged the enemy that they could not relieve the city, and the constant progress of the trenches and mines made its capture but a question of time. The mines were pushed under the town, and their explosion would make breaches that would leave the city open to assault and pillage. Unable to make further resistance, the garrison, now reduced to 1,200 men, offered to surrender, and on August 10th they were allowed to march from the city with the honors of war.¹

This second victory was followed by the capture of some minor towns, but the self-will of Enghien began to interfere with the plans of Mazarin. The cardinal had encouraged and flattered the zeal of the young general. "Another than you," he wrote, "would have rested after the two most memorable actions of this century. You may judge that my strongest passion being for your glory, I have no small joy to see this ardor of yours to extend the boundaries of France."²

But after having pushed as far as Luxembourg, Enghien resolved to return to the Court and enjoy the glory he had won. He was grudgingly given a leave for eight days which he extended to suit his own convenience.³ He found himself the hero of the Court and the town, but critics were not lacking even in the first freshness of his glory. The skilful attack on the Spanish centre and right wing which had won the battle at Rocroi, was attributed to Gassion. The duke's first enterprise, it was claimed, had savored more of temerity than of good judgment.⁴

Enghien showed the spirit of a true soldier in his feelings towards his associates. Disregarding the endeavor to make a rival of Gassion, he claimed and obtained for

¹ See Mazarin's letters, i., 191, 201, 311, *et passim*. *Relation de la Moussaye*, 51-93. *Gazette*, 561-568, *et passim*, 681-688. *Dispacci Veneziani*, 99., 199, *et passim*.

² Let. de Mazarin, i., 304.

³ *Carnets*, iii., 40. "Venuta inaspettata e senz'ordini del Duca d'Enghien." *Dis. Ven.*, t. xcix., Sep. 22d.

⁴ Montglat, 143. *Journal d'Ormesson*, i., 59. *Archives de la Maison d'Orange Nassau*, 2d series, t. iv., p. 86.

him the marshal's baton. The Prince of Condé more prudently advised his son to ask a government for himself and one for Gassion, as the reward of victory.¹ The bestowing of the baton on Gassion was delayed until the same honor could be conferred on Turenne. The queen made some objection because a like dignity was due the Marquis de La Force, and her piety resisted conferring this rank on three Huguenots at the beginning of her regency.²

The Huguenots were, however, assured they should have the same liberty they had enjoyed under the last reign, and that the edict of Nantes should be loyally enforced. This assurance was carried out during all of Mazarin's rule. On June 18th an edict was granted confirming to the Protestants the free profession of their faith in accordance with the rights which they had possessed.³ The cardinal was free from bigotry,—free, perhaps from any strong religious feeling. He was a less strenuous Catholic than Richelieu, and his political schemes were little affected by any questions as to the opposing religions. He regarded a Protestant as much less dangerous than an Important. There was, however, in the early part of his administration, some apprehension that the Huguenots would again seek to exert a political activity.⁴

The Duke of Enghien remained at Court attending to the affairs of his family. Meanwhile, Guébriant, opposed by superior forces under the skilful command of General Mercy, had fallen back across the Rhine into Alsace. Mazarin desired to push the campaign in Germany with vigor, but Enghien's tarrying at Paris delayed its progress. In October the duke at last returned to the army, and led about 5,000 men to the assistance of Guébriant.⁵ Enghien reviewed the united forces, and then returned to his own command. It was now late in the season, but the

¹ 2d Carnet, 22.

² Lenet, 481. Epis. Grotii, 718, 959.

³ Anciennes Lois, vii., 32-34.

⁴ See Carnets, ii., 43; iii., 48, *et passim*. Let Mazarin, i., 562, 404-5. Grotii Epis. Ined., 46. Dis. Ven., 99., 122. "Pare che Ugonotti voglin suscitar qualche movimento."

⁵ Grotii Epis. Ined., 100. Montglat, 145, says 7,000.

cardinal wished to relieve Alsace from the pillage it would suffer if the army made its winter quarters in that province. Already complaints were made of the injury it had done the country, for which no excuse could be made except that it was unavoidable.¹ Rigid discipline was difficult in any army, and it was impossible with an army like the Weimerian, accustomed to the license and plunder of the German wars, under the leadership of a soldier of fortune. The peasants for miles around the winter quarters of such soldiers, would find their pigs and chickens all gone; the shopkeepers had to endure free levies on their stores. Those who by spring had escaped with their houses unburned and their wives and daughters free from insult, might regard themselves well rid of their warlike neighbors. That a hostile district might suffer such evils, Guébriant now crossed the Rhine, and early in November marched through the defiles of the Black Forest.² Snow and rain increased the perils of the march. The army struggled painfully through forests from which it seemed impossible to escape, and along the torrents which rushed down, carrying off the unwary. Emerging at last, they laid siege to Rottweil, in November. The place surrendered on the 19th, but its capture was dearly bought. During the siege Guébriant's right arm was shot off, and of this wound he died on November 24th. The Marshal of Guébriant was a skilful soldier, taught by long experience in the German wars. He was not only a gallant leader, but sagacious in sketching the outlines of bold campaigns, which would produce greater results than the capture of a single city, or the gain of an unproductive battle. Above all, he had the faculty of governing the fierce and unruly army left by the Duke of Weimar. He alone, says one of his lieutenants, was of more importance than a half of the army.³

¹ Let. de Mazarin, i., 417.

² Grotii Epis. Ined., 105.

³ Histoire du Maréchal de Guébriant, Recit par Montausier, 715-717. Lettres de Mazarin, i., 335, 357, 443-447, 475-479, and relations there printed. *Gazette*, 1046, 1054.

The unruly remains of the army of Weimar grew still less amenable to discipline, when the commander they loved and respected was taken away.¹ A portion of the army had already marched from Rottweil to Dütlingen on the Danube. There they encamped with a carelessness little justified by the vigilance of their enemies. The officers were playing cards, the men idling about the camp and the city, when John de Wert suddenly fell upon them and captured the park of artillery. The soldiers in the city were wakened to the situation by the fire of their own guns turned on them. Resistance was hardly attempted, and Dütlingen surrendered on November 25th. The troops scattered in the neighborhood were routed. Rantzau and the Baron of Sirot were taken prisoners. The Bavarians claimed to have captured 7,000 men, with only a small loss to themselves.² The scattered remnants of the French army were finally gathered into the city of Brisach, and the campaign in Germany ended in disgrace.³

It was criticised by Grotius as having been undertaken with a rashness that made probable the result. He claimed that not over 13,000 men, opposed by an army of 20,000, had marched, in severe weather and through a dangerous country, far from their base of supplies, and courted the calamity that came.⁴ The rashness of the minister who planned the expedition had been supplemented by the carelessness of the officers to whom he entrusted it. Mazarin, while endeavoring to lessen this misfortune, endeavored also to justify the expedition. "Even if we had foreseen the check," he wrote, "we should not have hesitated to expose ourselves to it, to show our allies with what vigor we enter upon the affairs of Germany, and to destroy the suspicions they have, that we wish to spare any of our enemies."⁵

¹ Grotii Epis. Ined., 109.

² Grotii Epis. Ined., say 4,000. Mazarin, Let., i., 497, says 1,500 or 1,600 infantry and some officers.

³ See authorities before cited, and Let. de Mazarin, i., 479, 481, 493. Montglat, 144, 145. Turenne, 355-364.

⁴ Epis. Ined., 114-119, *et passim*.

⁵ Lettres de Mazarin i., p. 493.

The suspicion that Anne would not prosecute the war against her brother, the king of Spain, with any vigor, was widespread. Mazarin insisted frequently and emphatically in his letters to the allies that the foreign policy of France was in no way changed by the regency, and that she still insisted on a peace that should be safe and honorable for herself and her confederates.¹

Such assurances he confirmed by sending to the command of the scattered German army the ablest soldier in France. The Viscount of Turenne, who had lately been made a marshal of France, was brother of the turbulent Duke of Bouillon. He belonged to a family of hazy antiquity, of immense pride and ambition, and which remained powerful even after the loss of Sedan. The ancient house of de la Tour had risen to great prominence under Henry IV. Henry de la Tour, Viscount of Turenne, served Henry of Navarre with such zeal that he was rewarded by marriage with the heiress of Bouillon, Sedan, and other territories along the eastern frontier of France. She died without children, but her husband held her possessions against her heirs. As dukes of Bouillon and rulers of Sedan, the de la Tours claimed the rank of independent princes, and became one of the great families who controlled the Huguenot party.

The first duke had been so powerful a Protestant that William of Orange was glad to give him one of his daughters for his second wife. The present duke and Turenne were children of this marriage and grandchildren of William the Silent. The oldest brother followed the example of the Condés, the Lesdiguières, and most of the great Protestant families, and became a Catholic; but Turenne still remained true to the religion for which his grandfather died. He began his military career as a lad, serving under Maurice of Nassau. After France became engaged in the Thirty Years' War the young Turenne had constant employment, and soon showed himself a general who com-

¹ Grotius, in his despatches, refers to such statements made to him. *Epis.*, p. 955. They are found frequently in Mazarin's correspondence.

bined daring with prudence, and his reputation as a skilful officer constantly increased. Though now but thirty-two, his services had won the marshal's baton, and except Condé he had no rival in the armies of France. He possessed not only the talents but the ambition of his family, and Mazarin feared his dangerous popularity. He was thought to have "vast designs," and to contemplate rendering himself head of the Huguenot party.¹ But with Turenne as with Condé, no jealousy of the power they might acquire kept Mazarin from putting them where they could be most useful to the state. Turenne was therefore appointed commander of the army in Germany, as the man best fitted to restore its fortune and to control its turbulence. He left Savoy and the war in Italy, where, during the year, little had been done of importance. The recapture by the Spanish of Torona had been offset by the capture of some places by Prince Thomas, and active operations had there ceased before the disasters in Germany.²

Nor in Catalonia, where more had been expected, had more been accomplished. The Marshal de la Mothe Houdancourt was frequently urged by Mazarin to some action that should correspond to the force under his command; but he attempted little and accomplished nothing.³ The Spaniards captured Moncon and drove the French from Aragon. On the sea, however, the effects were seen of Richelieu's nursing of the French

¹ In *Carnets*, iii., pp. 47-50, is a curious discussion of Turenne's character and purposes—"que se deve mas temer es . . . para con los ugonottes el viconte de Turena . . . sine duda tiene grandes pensamientos," etc.

Mazarin's comments, in his *Carnets*, on all the persons of importance, their character and purposes, are characterized by extraordinary penetration; but in his apprehension of danger from the Huguenots and Turenne he fell into error. Turenne was, in 1643, not wholly friendly to Mazarin (*Chouppes*, i., p. 102), but he had not a turbulent nature like his brother.

² *Montglat*, xxix., p. 146. *Mém du Maréchal du Plessis*, ed. Michaud, 368-370. Du Plessis took an active and honorable part in the campaigns under Louis XIV. for many years, and the memoirs he has left of the military events in which he was an actor are always valuable.

³ *Lettres de Mazarin*, i., pp. 297-298, 333, 334, 342, 365, 366, *et passim*. *Montglat*, 147.

navy. The fleet was commanded by the Duke of Brézé, Richelieu's nephew. In August he won a slight advantage over the enemy, and sunk and captured six vessels intended for the relief of Roses. Cruising thence southerly, he met with the Spanish fleet off the port of Carthagená. The French had twenty men-of-war, two frigates, and two fire-boats. The Spanish fleet consisted of twenty-five sail. Five were galleons, one of which was of 1,500 tons burden, at that time regarded as a ship of prodigious size. The smaller ships ranged in size from 500 to 800 tons. The French, on September 3d, valiantly led by their admiral, attacked them, and a close contest resulted in victory, won more by obstinate courage than by nautical manœuvres. The galleon of the Admiral of Naples, of 1,000 tons burden, which had been armed with fifty pieces of cannon and 500 men, was burned. Several other ships were captured or sunk, and the remainder of the fleet narrowly escaped into the harbor of Carthagená. One thousand prisoners were taken, and the Spanish loss was reckoned at 3,000 men.¹ The victory was so complete that the supremacy of the French was unquestioned in the Gulf of Lyons, where the flag of Spain formerly had no rival.

This year saw the overthrow of the Count of Olivarez, who, for over twenty years, had in Spain an authority more absolute than that of Richelieu in France. Olivarez was not simply a vulgar favorite who desired wealth and rank from his power, but his rule was more injurious to Spain than if he had been more frivolous. He possessed ambition without ability, and he had a ruined country with which to accomplish designs that needed the resources of Charles V. He engaged Spain in war with Germany and France, proceeding as if a powerful empire was under his command, and such a policy ended in the exhaustion and humiliation of the kingdom.

¹ See account of this Aff. Etr. France, t. cvi., p. 191. Archives Curieuses, 2d series, vi., 351-359. *Lettres de Mazarin*, i., 347, 359, 401, *et passim*. *Gazette*, 1643, 833-840.

While war was thus raging with more or less of vigor and success from the Danube to the Pyrenees, Mazarin had been occupied at home in acquiring the favor of the queen. The position of the new minister was not yet assured. He applied himself with his usual adroitness to obtaining the friendship of the powerful nobles, and to thwarting the endeavors constantly made to loosen his hold on the queen's good-will. He was helped in this by the mistakes that were made by the Importants. Their indiscretion contrasted with his prudence, and their complaints made all the more agreeable the compliments of the favorite. A passage from his *Carnets* shows the views that Mazarin entertained of the French Government, and the arguments he used with the queen for his own retention in power. "The French of every order are interested in diminishing the authority of the king. They desire that it may be feeble, that they may be important * * * Therefore the Parliament, the princes, the governors of provinces, and the Huguenots, endeavor, under a specious pretext, to destroy what was accomplished under the late king, in making his authority absolute and independent of all. They wish to reduce France to its condition at the time when, though in form governed by a king, it was really a republic. When the king becomes of age, there is nothing which he will regret more than, being the successor of a king who was powerful and absolute, to find himself dependent on his subjects, as has been the case in the past. It is important that her Majesty should consider this point more than any other, and in this she cannot trust in any Frenchman, because he will have a contrary interest. A great minister, who will be trusty and faithful to the king, will surely be hated by the French who will oppose his plans."¹

The regent, however, while declining immediately to

¹ *Carnet*, ii., 43, 44, 45. This passage was written as an argument to be used with the queen. It perhaps, however, expressed Mazarin's own views as to the former nature of the French monarchy, but it was written by one who knew little of French history, to be read to one who knew nothing of it.

dismiss Mazarin, seemed full of kindness to those who were especially styled her friends, and indeed to all who sought her favor or her bounty. Chateauneuf was released from the prison of Vincennes, where he had atoned for his devotion to Mme. de Chevreuse by ten years of imprisonment. He did not at once return to the Court, but it was expected he would soon be again the guard of the seals, and that his talents would make him the most influential member of the ministry.¹ Mme. de Chevreuse was recalled from Brussels, and she returned amid much pomp. Twenty carriages filled with persons of the highest rank accompanied her as she left that city. As she travelled through France, she was received by the governors in solemn state. After a triumphal progress of eight days she reached Paris, and was received by the queen with marks of warm affection. Ten years of absence, the courtly *Gazette* tells us, had affected neither her natural magnanimity, nor, what was more extraordinary, her beauty.²

She was visited and courted as the future dispenser of fortune. She expected to be Anne's confidential friend and adviser, as she had been years before; she looked forward to bestowing honors and rewards on her friends, and anticipated making alliances with the foreign powers, whose hospitality she had received during her exile. She planned a peace with Spain and assistance to Charles I. in his contests with his unruly subjects.³ But it is doubtful whether Anne desired her return at all. Weakness, and a feeling of shame at keeping in exile one who was regarded as a martyr for her sake, had led the regent to disregard Louis' instructions. But while a persecuted queen had been glad to take counsel from

¹ Grotii. Epis., June, 1643.

² *Gazette*, 20th June, 1643. Epis. Ined., 272, 273. "Chevreusia foemina illecebrosa."

³ In Dis. Ven., 99, 221, despatch of Sept. 8, 1643, the ambassador says that Mme. de Chevreuse besought the queen to make peace with Spain, and abandon her allies. Anne, however, told this in confidence to Mazarin, and he dissuaded her from any such steps.

Mme. de Chevreuse, the regent did not desire a friend who was sure to be domineering. Years had also worked other changes. Mme. de Chevreuse was now forty-three, and her beauty had reached the stage when it excited admiration, but not devotion, but she was still fond of gallantry and intrigue. The queen, on the other hand, had grown more serious. The development of one strong and mature passion made her impatient of the levity of her friend.¹

Still, apparently all was harmony, and the most of the courtiers believed Mme. de Chevreuse a more influential friend than Mazarin. Another favorite, Mme. de Hautefort, was also recalled, but she was to grow wearisome to her mistress, not from the frivolity, but from the severity, of her character. The faithful La Porte was made first valet of the king's chamber as a reward for past services. He came up to Paris with Mme. de Hautefort when the king was thought to be dying. So great was the crowd of people then pouring into Paris, in anticipation of the change a new reign would bring, that they had to search until eleven at night before they could find a place to lodge, and then they had to be content with quarters that had the appearance of being none too reputable.²

Some disappointments, some jealousy of Mazarin, did not prevent the beginning of the regency from being a period of hope and reasonable satisfaction. If those who sought favors from Anne did not get all, they got much. The Bishop of Beauvais was made a minister, and he was recommended for a cardinal's hat.³ Mme. de Chevreuse received gifts to the amount of 200,000 livres.⁴ La Châtre was made colonel of the Swiss Guards. Monsieur received the governorship of Languedoc. The Condés were enormously rewarded. Enghien demanded and received Chantilly, a property worth 400,000 scudi, for undertaking the expedition into Germany.⁵

¹ Mme. de Motteville, 54.

² La Porte, 39.

³ *Let. ineditæ*, Grotius, 262.

⁴ *Carnets*, ii., 38 ; iii., 86.

⁵ *Dis. Ven.*, xcix., 257. A familiar doggerel describes the popular view of the situation :

" The queen gives every thing, The prince takes every thing,
Monsieur gambles every thing, The cardinal does every thing."

For a while all were so contented, that Retz declared five little words, "the queen is so good," composed the French language.¹ The *Gazette* reflects the general ecstasy.² "We are come at last," says the number of the 6th of June, "to a golden age; not fabulous, like that of the poets, but truly so, if the rule of the best queen of the world merits that name; who, acting by the principles of piety and gentleness and with the prudence and wisdom which are natural to her, has opened the prison to the captive and recalled those whom private interests had banished." Mazarin himself was viewed with favor by many. In the place of Richelieu was a mild and benign successor, who asked nothing for himself, and was in despair because his dignity as cardinal would not allow him to humiliate himself before all the world as much as he desired.

The overthrow of some of the old ministers of Richelieu accompanied the favors bestowed on their enemies. Chavigni had been specially odious to the queen. He had been one of Mazarin's earliest and truest friends in France. But Mazarin, unlike Richelieu, was strong neither in his hate nor his love. He was equally ready to forgive an enemy and to forget a friend, and he made but a weak defence of his benefactor. Chavigni tendered his resignation as secretary of state, hoping perhaps it would be refused. But Mazarin was weary of hearing that Chavigni was the author of his fortunes. The resignation was gladly accepted by the queen, and the place was given to the Count of Brienne, a man of long experience in its duties.³ Bouthillier, the father, was dismissed, and Bailleur and Avaux filled his place as superintendent. Avaux soon resumed his work as a diplomat, and the finances of the government were controlled by the evil ingenuity of Emeri. Chavigni, however, was soon again in the service, but he harbored a bitter resentment against Mazarin. A vigorous attack was begun on the family of Richelieu,

¹ "Regimen Reginæ persuave est," Grotius wrote.—*Let.* of July 11, 1643.

² *Gazette*, 1643, 471.

³ Brienne, 79.

whose prosperity had made them odious. Mme. de Chevreuse skilfully chose them as objects of attack, thus appealing to the widespread hatred of the late minister. She demanded of the queen to take from La Meilleraie the government of Brittany and bestow it upon the Duke of Vendôme. The admiralty was held by Brézé, Richelieu's nephew and heir, and this was also asked for some member of the Vendôme family. The governorship of the city of Havre belonged to Mme. d'Aiguillon, Richelieu's favorite niece, and this Mme. de Chevreuse sought for the young Prince of Marcillac, whose zeal and keen wit made him a favorite of the veteran intriguer.¹

But Mazarin was firm in his defence of the family of Richelieu. The policy and the character of his predecessor appealed to Mazarin's intellect, and this intellectual attraction was perhaps stronger with him than feelings of gratitude or affection. While Richelieu's enemies demanded that his memory should be solemnly condemned by the Parliament, while the Parisian bourgeoisie only referred to him as a tyrant, or a public plunderer, Mazarin wrote to the Marshal of Brézé: "Nothing is more painful to me than to hear the reputation of the cardinal maligned; but time will do justice to this great man, and those who blame him to-day, will know perhaps in the future how far his course was necessary to achieve the well-being of the state of which he has laid the foundations. Let us allow the malice of ignorant or passionate spirits to evaporate."² Mazarin persuaded the queen it was more prudent to leave the relations of Richelieu in possession of an influence for which they must be dependent on her, than to strip them to add to the already enormous power of the Vendômes and their allies.³ A like disappointment met the efforts for Chateauneuf's restoration. Mazarin dreaded his abilities, and he was assisted

¹ See Carnets, i., 143, 145, *et passim*.

² Lettres de Mazarin, i., 187. Letter of May 28, 1643.

³ Carnets, i., 143, 145.

in his opposition by the Princess of Condé. While, therefore, it was constantly expected that the seals would be taken from Seguier and given to Chateauneuf, expectation grew weary with delay.

The situation of the Court under the new king seemed, to a superficial observer, much like that after the death of Henry IV. Then the foreign policy of the king had been changed by the advisers of his widow, and the party friendly to Spain and hostile to an alliance with Protestant powers had gained the ascendancy. The queen then, during a long minority, had squandered the moncy of the state in the endeavor to buy peace from unruly nobles, and she had lavished favors and perhaps her affection on an Italian favorite. But the favorite under the regency of Anne of Austria, though with little nobility of character, was a skilful and sagacious politician. His controlling influence kept the queen from the errors of foreign policy which she was ready to commit; it checked somewhat the reckless prodigality with which she sought to conciliate or to satisfy her adherents.¹

A curious light is thrown on all these intrigues by Mazarin's *Carnets*, in which were set down his most secret thoughts. They show the uncertainties under which he labored before he had permanently gained Anne's favor, not only through her head, but through her heart. These revelations do not display the workings of an heroic mind. Neither Mazarin's intellect, his good judgment, his perseverance, nor the results he accomplished, can blind us to his taste for small intrigue, his narrow and selfish hopes and fears. He combined the statesmanship of Burleigh with the schemes of a Duke of Newcastle. Still the situation in which Mazarin was placed was such, that only by constant study of the personal politics of the Court, could he retain his position. Had he been indifferent to the Vendômes and the Chevreuses, the priests who heard Anne's confessions

¹ *Carnets*, i., 101. "Se S. M. si mette in testa di contentar tutti, non potrà eseguirlo e passerà una vita infelicissima."

and the ladies-in-waiting who talked with her after she had retired, he probably would never have made the peace of Westphalia or of the Pyrenees. Where the government is vested in one person, the caprices of that person may change the fortune of states. Mazarin knew that his hold on power depended on his possessing the confidence and, if possible, even the affection of the regent. At all events, extracts from the *Carnets*, as he jotted them down, may, to some extent, illustrate the times, and the character of the man who was to rule France for eighteen years. "Let her Majesty trust me for three months and afterwards do what she will." "Vendôme does me the most hostile offices with Monsieur." "The Prince of Condé believes that Mme. de Chevreuse when she arrives will effect a special treaty between France and Spain, to the exclusion of all others." "The cabal is arming against me. Condé tells all to attach themselves to Beauvais, who will last longer than any one. He says Chatcauneuf will certainly be chancellor." "They all instigate Beauvais to speak against me and do the same with Brienne and his wife. Condé tells the chancellor that really I do not stand well, and that he will soon see it." "They say that I wish guards, and hope to do me great harm with the trumped-up invention of gallantry." "Condé has said that they must make her Majesty distrust me, by saying I am all for Monsieur."¹ "Beauvais and Beaufort are in league against me. I endure trouble to preserve myself, because I am constantly pursued, being able to say without vanity, that Condé first, and then many others, think they could have better terms from her Majesty, if she were not counselled by a person disinterested and firm as I am." "I do not desire to speak of certain things, fearing that her Majesty may believe, what is insinuated to her every day, that I hold the maxims of Richelieu." "Brienne has called to see

¹ The name used by Mazarin is "*Il Rosso*," but there can be no doubt that Condé is the person intended. See note in Cheruel's "*Histoire de la Minorité de Louis XIV.*," vol. i.

me. He endeavors to reconcile Condé with the house of Vendôme; I do not know whether by her Majesty's order." "I am entirely betrayed by the Vendômes while I do all I can to save them." "Every one says that her Majesty inclines in favor of Chateauneuf. If so, let her tell me so, and if she wishes him, retire me." "Beauvais works constantly to acquire friends and take away mine. He works against me at every turn. He receives Chateauneuf and throws himself into the arms of Beaufort and Mme. de Montbazou." "I have talked with Mme. de Chevreuse, and she says that without interest there can be no friendship." "The Importants have told Monsieur, that her Majesty is the most dissembling person in the world. Although, apparently, she makes much of me, she really dissembles from the necessity of her affairs and has her confidence in them." "All the house of Vendôme say they cannot rest until the relations of Richelieu are entirely ruined. The Vendômes and the adherents of Beaufort, excite all the cabals of the Court." "Her majesty has told Condé, who has told me, that she will consider the request about the relatives of Richelieu. This shows that she does not trust in me, because she does not give her views when I ask her intention about this. Friendship compels one to communicate every thing. Thus I could believe I had gained her heart, but her Majesty talks with me only on affairs of state." "If her Majesty wishes to keep me so that I can be of service, let her throw aside her mask." "The enemies combine to do me harm; Mme. de Chevreuse inspires them all. It is certain that they continue to meet at the garden of the Tuileries. Those who call themselves the queen's greatest servants are more than ever against me, and if they cannot destroy me by cabals, they will by other means. I receive a thousand warnings to guard my person." "Vendôme seeks for the admiralty, saying that I have orders about it, and nothing is done. Beauvais throws it all on me, and makes it believed that I wish to sustain Brézé as a relative of the cardinal's." "To

make the people hostile to me, they insinuate I wish to increase by a quarter the taxes of Paris, and claim that Beauvais opposed this firmly, saying, it was the blood of the poor, and that I said, that did not matter, and it ought to be done." "Chevreuse has said that the business of Chateauneuf was not desperate. She asked three months to show what she could do, and so she told the Vendômes, preaching to them patience, and they would see a change on the scene." "They tell me that every day her Majesty assures Beauvais of her affection, and excuses her demonstrations for me as necessary. This is a point so delicate that her Majesty should suffer me to speak often of it." "A gentleman has said to her Majesty that I do not desire peace, and that I hold the same maxims as the cardinal. This is all from Mme. de Chevreuse. That woman wants to ruin France." "Some say I should not trust so much in the affection of her Majesty, for she had more for Mme. de Chevreuse, and it now appears that she does not care for her." "If I believed what they say, that her Majesty uses me from necessity, without having any inclination for me, I would not remain here three days."¹

The Importants soon found their position less favorable than they had hoped. Chateauneuf was not restored, and the Vendômes did not receive Brittany or the admiralty. Mazarin's assurances that the foreign policy of France would be unchanged were borne out by the conduct of the government. He, however, continued his efforts to conciliate all, and offices and bribes were bestowed on every one of sufficient importance to be worth buying.² He even attempted friendly relations with Mme. de Chevreuse, and paid his devotions to her and to the

¹ Carnets, iii., 10. "Sy yo creyera lo que dicen que S. M. se sirve de me por necesidad, sin tener alguna inclinacion, no pararia aqui tres dias." The most private memoranda are usually written in Spanish.

Carnets., i.-iii., *passim*. Spring and summer of 1643.

² The earlier Carnets are full of innumerable statements of money to be paid and offices or livings secured for those of any prominence. La Châtre, 283. Grotii Epis., 723; Ined., 62.

Princess of Gueméné. They were so equally divided that each sought to discover whether she was the favorite.¹

But in the meantime the favor of the cardinal with the queen was constantly increasing.² Anne praised his charming conversation and his disinterested conduct. His conversations with her, which had begun by occupying an hour or two, now sometimes occupied all the evening. Beauvais, who had once entertained her during these confidential moments, now had hardly time given him to pronounce the *benedicite*, and spent the rest of the evening in dreary and melancholy waiting in another chamber.³ A social imbroglio in itself of no importance hastened the political downfall of the queen's friends. Mme. de Montbazon was one of the most ardent of the Importants, and many of their leaders were counted among her past or present lovers.⁴ Among this faction the family of the Condés excited jealousy and distrust.

The daughter of the Prince of Condé was now appearing on the scene and charming the world by her loveliness. Anne of Bourbon was the only daughter of the beautiful Charlotte of Montmorenci, and she had grown to be the most charming woman in France. Men and women, poets and courtiers united their praises, and the lines which describe her are fairly redolent of lilies and roses. A certain indescribable languor of manner made talking with her seem like the dream of a lotus-eater. "She resembled far more an angel, as our feeble nature may imagine one, than a woman," says Mme. de Motteville.⁵

¹ Carnets, iii., 39. "Botru m' ha fatto molta istanza per che li dicesse chi stimavo piu della dama e la principessa di Ghimené e mi ha confessato che questa l' haveva pregato di riconoscerlo." He then continues with other still more confidential communications.

² The Venetian ambassador writes in June (99, 122) of Mazarin: "guadagna ogni giorno maggior grado di credito e confidenza appresso la Regina." His letters during the summer contain many similar remarks.

³ La Châtre, 284. Carnets, iii., 23. Grotii Epis. ined., *passim*.

⁴ Grotius describes her as "feminam forma et amantium numero superbam." Epis. ined., 61.

⁵ Mme. de Motteville, 120. Retz i., 221, 259. Rochefoucauld, 81, 94. Mademoiselle says of her ill-assorted marriage: "M. de Longueville was old; she was young and fair as an angel." Montpensier, 15.

She had been educated for the Court, but she had been subjected also to religious influences, which were to bear fruit later in her life. The Princess of Condé was one of the patrons of the Convent of the Carmelites in the Faubourg St. Jacques, and there at times she sought retreat from the world. Her daughter was often there and received care and religious education from the Sisters. Attracted by the fervent piety of the inmates, the young princess would have been glad to have followed the example of many daughters of great houses and have become a member of the order. But her parents insisted that she should enter the world, where her family and her beauty would prepare for her a brilliant career.¹ Nineteen years later, disappointed in her affections and her ambition, she left the world to lead thenceforward a long life of religious penitence.

In 1642, Mlle. de Bourbon was married to the Duke of Longueville. He was of ancient family, a descendant of the heroic Dunois, and one of the great noblemen of France, but he was a widower of forty-seven, and little fitted to charm a romantic princess of twenty-three. He had been an acknowledged lover of Mme. de Montbazon, who was little pleased with his desertion to her younger rival. One evening in the salon of Mme. de Montbazon, and after the young Maurice de Coligny had left, two letters were picked up, written by some lady to her lover, and filled with a very ardent affection. Mme. de Montbazon read them to the company, and adding to a slight suspicion a malicious ingenuity, said that Coligny had dropped them, and that they were in the handwriting of Mme. de Longueville. So choice a scandal was soon whispered to every one who belonged to polite society. The letters had been dropped by an unlucky gentleman named Maulevrier, but he dared not tell his loss, lest the writer of them should be exposed. The Princess of Condé heard the report, and long treasured jealousies and dislikes found an opportunity for outbreak. She

¹ Cousin, "*Jeunesse de Mme. de Longueville*," 106-116.

demanded of the queen that Mme. de Montbazon should be commanded to make a public apology for the insult she had offered her daughter. The queen was irritated at the party of Montbazon and was quite willing to grant a not unreasonable request. The matter was treated as one of national importance. Mazarin flitted from side to side, using his utmost diplomatic skill in wording an apology which should be accepted by both parties. The terms were at last agreed upon. Mme. de Montbazon visited the Hotel Condé, accompanied by a number of gentlemen and ladies, and there she read from a paper fastened in her fan the agreed form of apology. The reconciliation became even more of a farce, from the sneering tone of Mme. de Montbazon and the freezing dignity of the princess.¹ This social complication was followed by another, when Mme. de Montbazon openly refused to obey the queen's order to retire from a company where the Princess of Condé was present. The good-nature of the queen was now exhausted. On August 22d she ordered Mme. de Montbazon to leave Paris and retire to Rochefort, a sentence thought almost as terrible as banishment to Siberia for a Polish nobleman. Her political position was such, that her exile seemed little less than a *coup d'état*.²

In despair of other means of success, Beaufort had already planned disposing of Mazarin, as Concini had been disposed of by Luines. He had been instigated to this by the Duchesses of Chevreuse and Montbazon. These ladies, who took a part in politics, were less scrupulous even than the men as to the means by which they reached their ends, and Beaufort promised them that Mazarin should be murdered. He found some of his officers ready to undertake the task if he would give it his personal direction. The plan was to kill the cardinal in his carriage as he was riding through the street. One or two oppor-

¹ Montpensier, 20-21. Motteville, 56-58. Rochefoucauld, 82-86. Grotii Epis., 61. "Jeunesse de Mme. de Longueville," chap. iii.

² Motteville, 57, 58. Montpensier, 21. Grot. Epis. Ined., 61-69.

tunities were neglected from the unwillingness of one of the conspirators. Twice the arrangements were made for the assassination, but Mazarin was saved once by being in the carriage with the Count of Harcourt, and once by being with the Duke of Orleans. The conspirators feared that in the scuffle one of these great noblemen might be killed, and the animosity of a double murder rest on them. Discouraged by these delays, they endeavored to find the cardinal, as he went each evening from his own palace to the Louvre. On the night of August 31st, they watched for him with their preparations all made, but Mazarin had been warned and did not visit the Louvre that evening. There had been vague rumors of such plans before, and on the next day the report of an attempt on Mazarin's life was circulated at the Court. Anne was convinced that an attempt had been made on the life of the cardinal, and her anger was fierce. Beaufort was warned by his friends that he was in danger and to absent himself a while, but he answered that they would not dare to arrest him. On the 2d of September he waited on the queen at the Louvre. She received him with the dissimulation of which she was so great a mistress, asking him about his hunting, with every appearance of amiability. The cardinal arrived and the queen left to consult with him as usual. As Beaufort turned to leave he was arrested and carried to the prison of Vincennes, and there he remained for five years.¹

The arrest of Beaufort was regarded by the public as an act of the greater vigor, because the report of an attempted assassination was believed to have been devised by Mazarin as a pretext. The cardinal was unable to find the less important conspirators by whom he could prove the charge.

¹ The whole history of this plot is given by Henri de Campion, who was one of those who was to assist in the murder. Though the plot was not generally believed at the time, its existence is now beyond question. *Mémoires d' Henri Campion*, 229-254. Motteville, 59, 60. The accuracy of Mazarin's secret service is found by comparing his letters and Carnets with the revelations found in Campion's *Mémoires*. See Carnets, iii., 25, 28, 70, 82, 84, *et passim*.

Such evidence as he could elicit fell short of proving a crime, which the confessions of the actors themselves have made known to posterity. But Mazarin was far from a bloody man. No one was brought to the block for all the plots and the rebellions of his long rule. A wise clemency contrasted with the rigor of Richelieu, and even had Beaufort's crime been proved, he was in little danger of following Montmorenci or Cinq Mars to the scaffold. But his overthrow was the proof of the unquestioned supremacy of his rival, and it caused both fear and amazement.¹

The dispersion of the Importants which followed was so thorough that even the silliest of them no longer hoped for the removal of Mazarin.² From September, 1643, his power was fixed and acknowledged. He was to be driven from it for a while by popular tumult, but from this time till his death there was never a day when his favor with the queen was either shaken or questioned. Anne regretted mildly the severance from her former friends. "Alas!" she is said to have exclaimed, as she looked at Beaufort the day before his arrest, "that poor boy will in three days be where, perhaps, he will laugh no more." She is said to have wept on the night of his arrest, for the necessity of losing the friends she had loved while Louis was alive.³ But she did not hesitate. The Bishop of Beauvais was sent to his diocese and his nomination as cardinal was withdrawn. Mazarin had already, on August 24th, secretly written his friend, Cardinal Bichi, that notwithstanding his overtures and the queen's commands, Beauvais was unfriendly to him, and he requested Bichi to prevent his elevation to the cardinalate.⁴ The poor bishop insisted that a reason should be given for his dismissal and he was told that if he would know, the reason was his incapacity.⁵ He retired to lead a saintly life in his diocese, serving a heavenly king with as much zeal as

¹ Dis. Ven., Sept. 8, 1648. "Ammirazione in molti, timor ne grandi e stordimento dell' universale."

² *Ib.*, 228. "Professe Mazarini haver dissipata tutta la fazione."

³ Motteville, 62. ⁴ Lettres de Mazarin, i., 312. ⁵ Montglat, 142.

he had an earthly one, and with much more wisdom.¹ Montresor and other leaders of the *Importants* were sent from Paris. Vendôme retired to Anet and presently went into exile in Italy.

Mme. de Chevreuse soon followed her friends. She complained to the queen that she showed little consideration for her ancient followers. The queen replied by advising her not to meddle with the affairs of state, but to enjoy the repose she had never found under the late king; she had reached an age when she should be pleased with retreat, and should govern her life by the thoughts of another world, and if she would thus live she could keep the friendship of the regent. She was ordered to retire to Dampierre, but she soon began again her wanderings from Court to Court.²

Mazarin resolved to rid himself of other enemies whom he believed equally dangerous. He was apprehensive of the use against him of spiritual as well as earthly weapons. The cardinal felt that he could be sure of Anne of Austria only when he had gained her affection as well as her admiration, and he soon excited an interest that could easily ripen into love. "When one has the heart he has all," he wrote many years later.³ The frequent consultations, the long interviews gave opportunities for the discussion of other matters than those of state. They caused also unfavorable reports as to the relations of the queen with her minister. Those jealous of the ascendancy of the favorite told Anne of the injurious suspicions her conduct excited, and they endeavored to alarm her by the peril to which she was exposing her soul. Like a true Spaniard, Anne was pious as well as gallant. Mme. de Hautefort told her of the injury her reputation was receiving, and La Porte threw into her bed long anonymous letters containing the malevolent gossip of the Court.⁴ Priests poured into

¹ Motteville, 62.

² Motteville, 63. La Châtre, 293.

³ *Lettres de Mazarin relatives à la Paix des Pyrenees*, Ed. 1745, t. i., 308.

⁴ La Porte, 41, 42. *Carnets*, iv., 21. Mazarin accuses Mme. de Hautefort of coöperating with La Porte in this. "La Porta che mi tradisce, che di concerto con Otfort messe la scrittura etc. e che fu veduto."

her ears spiritual counsel and warning. The saintly Vincent de Paul spoke to her with a religious courage, which in him was free from any worldly plans. Mazarin's *Carnets* show his jealousy of the influence of the priests. "The convents are against me and particularly Val de Grace. Mme. de Brienne and Liancourt attack her Majesty through her devotions, and under the pretext of affection tell the queen her reputation suffers from gallantry."¹

The step was now taken of requiring all bishops to retire to their own dioceses. Such was the regulation of the church, and was a proper means of securing to the flocks the presence of the chief shepherds. Solicitude for the souls of the faithful was increased in this case by the desire of removing from the queen the bishop of Lisieux.² He was a devout man, bold to denounce what he thought wrong, the saint of the Court, and regarded by the queen with affection mingled with veneration. He was free from political aspirations, but the relations of Mazarin and Anne were becoming such, that the cardinal wished her confessors and religious friends to be those who would not be eager to reprove suspected vices. The queen asked Lisieux to remember her in his prayers and he took his leave in silence. Sixty-two bishops left Paris and retired to their dioceses.³

Another leader of the saints, as Mazarin called them, soon followed. Mme. de Hautefort had for many years served the queen with rare fidelity. Louis XIII., years before, had told her that she loved an ingrate, and she would see, one day, how she would be paid for her services. Mme. de Hautefort's character was so pure as to be severe. The evil suspicions of the queen's reputation seemed to her much greater misfortunes, than would have been defeat at Rocroi, or a humiliating peace with Spain. She could not accommodate the queen by becoming Mazarin's friend, or

¹ *Carnets*, ii., 12, 62, 105; iii., 6, 20, 23, 44; iv., 46, 59; v. 24, 28.

² Mazarin says explicitly in his *Carnets*, iv., 93: "Mandar li vescovi alla residenza sotto pretesto delle istanze da Roma." v., 90: "M. di Limoglio farlo ritornare."

³ *Lettres de Patin*, i., 299. Motteville, 63.

indulge in a courtly reserve as to the conduct of her sovereign. Early in 1644, a chance remark about the queen's desertion of her friends, vexed the regent already tired of her former favorite. Anne informed her she was weary of her remonstrances, and the next day Mme. de Hautefort was ordered to leave the Court. Mazarin had already ordered her dismissal, and it was forbidden to speak in her behalf.¹

Mazarin endeavored also to restrain Anne's religious ardor and her frequent visits to the convents, as he feared the influences to which she would there be subjected. "This sort of piety," he said, "which is practised in Spain, is not the fashion in France. Henry III. was given over to his devotions, but he was chased from Paris." "All those pretended servants of God, are really enemies of the state." "The queen should believe that a moment given to her duties to the state is more acceptable to God than hours of sermons, and vespers, and visits at churches." "God is everywhere, and the queen can pray to Him in her private oratory."²

Mazarin's triumph over his enemies was complete, because Anne had bestowed upon him her unequivocal favor. The extent of that favor has been debated. A curious page, perhaps somewhat inaccurate because depending on the recollection of spoken words, describes the strength of the queen's feelings and the bounds claimed to have been set. Mme. de Brienne, the wife of the secretary, was in the oratory of the queen when Anne entered, her beads in her hands, plunged in revery. "Let us pray together," said the queen, "we shall be better heard." As they rose from their devotions, Mme. de Brienne asked the queen

¹ *Lettres de Mazarin à Beringhen*, i., 667, April 16, 1644. Motteville, 65; La Porte, 43. *Let. de Patin*, i., 329. Patin says that the steps of the *Palais Royal* had become as slippery as were those of the *Louvre*. The Venetian ambassador refers to this and says that Cardinal Mazarin has the entire ascendancy over the queen, and the proofs of it appear every day. *Dis., ci.a.*, 96. In his *Carnets*, v., 48, Mazarin says: "Mme. de Hautefort cabals constantly; orders must be given for her departure."

² *Carnets*, iv., 35, 62; v., 26, 28, "Dio è da per tutto e perciò S. M. può pregarlo in casa d'ordinario."

if she could speak of her relations with the cardinal. The queen permitted her, and she told of all that evil tongues said. The queen blushed, and tears filled her eyes. "Why have you not told me this before?" she said. "I confess I am fond of him, I can even say tenderly, but my affection does not extend to love, or if it does I do not know it. My senses have no part, only my mind is charmed by the beauty of his intellect. If this is wrong I will renounce it now before God, and the saints. I will speak to him no more but of the affairs of state, and check him when he speaks of any thing else." "Swear to me," said the friend, "on these relics of the saints, that you will never abandon what you have promised God." "I swear it," said the queen, placing her hand upon the holy relics. "God's goodness," said the pious attendant, "will soon make your innocence known."¹ Anne had, however, taken oaths before, and the remembrance of Val de Grace makes us doubtful, whether simply admiration for beauty of mind could have withstood the shock of circumstances and survived the lapse of years.

The letters of the queen, written, indeed, some years later, breathe the tone not only of the pleased sovereign, but of the fond woman. "I cannot but tell you," she writes Mazarin in 1652, "that I think the sight of those one loves is not unpleasant, even if it be but for a few hours. I fear that your fondness for the army will be greater than all others. Still I pray you to believe that I shall be always what I should be, come what will." Again she writes in January, 1653. "I do not know when I can expect your return. I can tell you that I bear these delays with impatience, and if Mazarin knew what the queen suffers from this, I am sure he would be touched. * * * Yours' until the last sigh." "If this matter displeases you, it has not been done with that purpose, for the queen has and can have no design except to please

¹ *Mém. du Jeune Brienne*, ii., 41-44

² Parts of these letters are in cipher. The mark here used, which I have translated "yours," as M. Ravenel shows, must represent some expression of affection.

Mazarin, and show him that nothing in the world equals her friendship for him * * * "I would say more if I did not fear to weary you by so long a letter, and though it is pleasant to write to you, I am sorry that I cannot entertain you otherwise. But I say nothing of this, for I fear that on that subject I should talk none too reasonably. Believe me yours with all my heart."

The affection then displayed had been kindled many years before. Civil war, the hatred of her subjects, even the coolness and harshness of Mazarin never weakened its steady glow. Sixteen hundred and sixty was the year before Mazarin's death, and each of them was then almost sixty years old. The cardinal himself was sick, gouty, gorged with wealth, with his manly beauty faded, and his ardor of earlier years often turned to complaint. But the affection of the Spanish woman was unchanged by all this, for the man who had won her heart seventeen years before. "Your letter," she writes him in June, 1660, "has given me great joy. If I had believed one of my letters would have thus pleased you, I would have written it gladly. To see the pleasure with which it was received makes me recall another time, which, indeed, I do recall almost every minute. Though you may doubt, if I could make you see my heart, as well as what I say on this paper, you would be content, or you would be the most ungrateful man in the world, and I do not believe that you are that."¹

It has been claimed that Mazarin and the queen were secretly married. The Princess Palatine wrote that Anne did worse than love Mazarin, she married him.² Such a charge was made in many of the pamphlets of the Fronde. Mazarin was not a priest, and he could have married, but notwithstanding this, the fact that no proofs have ever

¹ Printed by Walckenaer, "*Mém. sur Mme. de Sévigné*," iii., 471. The original was found by him at the Bibliothèque Nationale. The other letters of the queen from which I have quoted are also at the Bib. Nat., and have been published by Cousin. But few of Anne's letters to Mazarin have been discovered.

² *Mém. sur la Cour de Louis XIV.*, 319.

been discovered of such a relation makes its existence improbable. The Carnets for 1643 show the change in the relations of the minister and the queen.¹ During the summer he had complained of her dissimulation, and that her entire confidence was not given to him. By September this distrust is dispelled. "I should no longer doubt, since the queen, in an excess of goodness, has told me that nothing can take from me the part she has graciously given me."² The demands noted in the Carnets show the desires of the confident, and alas, also of the greedy favorite. "Her Majesty should endeavor to gain for me the affection of all who serve her, and to this end have all the favors that are bestowed pass through my hands."³ "Let her Majesty send to me all the ecclesiastical offices, abbeys, and priories."⁴ A council of conscience had been created, which was to have control of all religious appointments, but Mazarin was jealous of its patronage, and its duties became nominal.

Amid the more important matters of foreign policy, and the final establishment of Mazarin's power, some lesser affairs deserve passing attention. A duel arising from the social complications of this year, possesses a certain interest as the last encounter of great and historic houses. The young Coligny, an admirer of Mme. de Longueville, was the descendant of the heroic admiral. Among those who had been active in the support of Mme. de Montbazon in the quarrel about the letters, was the young Duke of Guise, the grandson of the Guise who was murdered at Blois. Coligny sent him a challenge, appointing himself a volunteer vindicator of the assailed character of Mme. de Longueville, and the place of meeting was fixed at the Place Royale. This historic square was then surrounded by the residences of many of the great nobles of France. There Mme. de Sevigné was born, and lived. DeThou is said to have there heard the fatal news of the plot of

¹ Curious evidence on this matter may be found by comparing Carnets iv., 3, about January, 1644, and Mme. de Motteville 64, for the same time.

² Carnets, iii., 45.

³ Carnets, iv., 65 ; vi., 21.

⁴ See Carnets iii., 6, 72 ; ii., 80, 90 ; iv., 42, 72, 74, *et passim*.

Cinq Mars, and Descartes to have told Pascal his experiments on the weight of the air. It was also the favorite place for duels. The present combatants met there in the middle of the afternoon, and the seconds fought with the same fury as the principals, according to the fashion of the time. Said the Duke of Guise to Coligny: "We are going to decide the ancient quarrels of our houses. The difference will be seen between the blood of a Guise and a Coligny." Victory there, as in greater contests, declared for the house of Guise. Coligny was weak from sickness, and was soon wounded and disarmed. If not lacking in courage, his conduct was inglorious, and he died the following year from his wounds and from mortification at his disgrace.¹

¹ Rochefoucauld, 91 ; Motteville, 64 ; Epis. Grot., 719, 961 ; Epis. Ined., 120 ; Dis. Ven., xcix., ; Dec., 15. It was said that Mme. de Longueville watched the contest, and the popular song ran, addressed to her :

" S'il a demandé la vie,
Ne l'en blâmez nullement,
Car c'est pour être votre amant,
Qu'il veut vivre éternellement."

CHAPTER VIII.

CONTINUATION OF THE WAR.

THOUGH Mazarin was successful both in the Court and the camp, the government was involved in financial embarrassments. The annual expenses had been steadily increasing. The entire sum collected for taxes in 1609 was 26,000,000 livres. In 1639 the *taille* alone amounted to 44,000,000 livres, and the expenses of the government, besides the sums paid for interest, were as much as 110,000,000 livres. Including the expenses of collection, as much as 120,000,000 livres were collected from the people, and 50,000,000 livres more were obtained by loans and by the sale of offices.¹ For the year 1643 the expenses of the government exceeded 124,000,000 livres.²

This increase in the expenses had not been attended by a corresponding increase in the wealth of the nation. It is probable that after thirty years, mostly filled with civil or foreign wars and with no marked improvement in commerce or internal development, the nation was poorer in 1643 than in 1610.³ The burden of such taxation was

¹ These figures are made from Mallet's *Comptes Rendus*, Mss. Godefroy ; the table prepared by M. d'Avenel ; the partial statement in *Testament Politique de Richelieu*, and the statement found in *Archives Curieuses*, 2d series, t. vi. It is impossible to give accurate figures of the expenses and receipts of the government. There are no statements from which any industry can glean figures that are trustworthy, and it is impossible to reconcile the conflicting data which we have. The entire receipts in 1609 were over 30,000,000 livres, but 26,000,000 livres seems to be the amount collected by taxation.

² *Arch. Cur.*, 2d ser., t. vi.

³ Such was the statement made by President Le Coigneux in 1648, *Journal d'Ormesson*, i., 594, and statistics tending to show this will be found later.

increased by the methods by which it was collected. Of the sums taken from the people a large portion was consumed in the collection and by the profits of the farmers of taxes. Colossal fortunes were made by those who farmed the taxes or made advances to the government.¹

The expenditure of the sums which reached the treasury was no more satisfactory. In 1643, 48,000,000 livres were paid on *acquits à comptant*, and in 1644, 59,000,000. No account was rendered of these sums, but it was said that 30,000,000 were for interest at an average of 15 per cent. and the rest largely represented bounties, pensions, and illegal gains.² In 1639 the charges on the taxes for alienations made to secure interest and advances were stated at 46,000,000 livres, and the debts thus secured must have been from 150,000,000 to 200,000,000.³ National borrowing existed in France long before the beginning of the national debt in England, but it was conducted with little regard for the interests of the borrower or the lender. With the most stable government in Europe, the two centuries before the revolution are a long record of partial, and at times of total repudiation. A debt on which the interest was irregularly paid was at times redeemed with even more irregularity. The *rentes* of the Hotel de Ville, secured by the gabelle and largely held by the bourgeoisie of Paris, were the most valuable, but on those secured by the *taille* there had been frequent defaults and they sold at a large discount. The government under Richelieu began redeeming these, paying fourteen livres for one livre of *rentes*, and the process was continued under Mazarin. But it was usually the officers and those favored by the government who obtained payments. *Rentes* sold by unlucky holders for a few francs were bought by those in favor, and were redeemed at an enormous profit. The controller, Emeri, a protégé of Mazarin's, equally able and corrupt, reaped the greatest profit from these appliances,

¹ See Journal d'Ormesson, *Choix des Mazarinades*, Mém. de Talon, etc.

² Arch. Cur., t. vi., 64, 65.

³ Testament politique, Forbonnais, "Recherches sur les Finances," i., 241, 242.

and while such gains were made by officers of the treasury, the army was ill paid and the war was delayed by the frequent want of money.¹

New loans were attempted in these years, but they could only be floated at so ruinous a discount, that 12,000,000 livres were borrowed on terms that represented 25 per cent. interest.² Colbert says that the loans and advances upon taxes, which Emeri constantly obtained, cost the government 15 per cent. a year, and at such rates large portions of the revenue were anticipated for one and two years.³

The taxation was aggravated by irregularities in its assessment. Mazarin writes of an inhabitant of Blaison, whose revenue was less than a hundred livres, that he was assessed for the taille on an income of two hundred livres, and was obliged besides, under the gabelle, to take an excessive quantity of salt.⁴ The amount of the taille was often apportioned by greed or caprice, and to an excessive tax was sometimes added the solidarity which compelled a man to pay for his neighbors' default. On account of this weight of taxation in France, enforced chiefly on the poor, the old English prints, which represented John Bull as fat and well filled with beef, and Jacques as a skeleton, starving in rags, were not wholly untrue portraits of the condition of the two peoples.

The misery caused by such taxation at times excited local revolts among the peasants. They were in no condition to make any effective opposition to the government, and the only result of such outbreaks was the dispersion of bodies of ill-armed peasants, the vigorous punishment of the leaders, and the exaction of the bur-

¹ Grotii Epistolæ, 738, 749, 1644, etc., refer frequently to the difficulties in getting money. Turenne writes his sister in July, 1644, to press the Court to send wages due the soldiers, of which there was absolute need.

² Forbonnais, i., 246.

³ See his letters cited *supra*. Archives Cur. t. vi., 2d Series, 370, 374.

⁴ Lettres de Mazarin, i., 286. He says 27 boisseaux at 10 livres the boisseau. He writes again: "We are informed that the apportionment of impositions is made with great irregularity. Some are taxed too much and others too little."—Let. i., 626.

dens which they had sought to escape. As such uprisings were undertaken in folly, so they were often accompanied by pillage and cruelty. These revolts of the Croquants, as they were called, were to some extent successors to the Jacquerie, and they were in like manner caused by misery and marked by brutality.

That such should have been their character is not a thing to surprise us, and the condemnation does not chiefly rest upon those whose ignorance, whose hopeless poverty, whose constant misery maddened them at the sight of the luxury of the house where the tax-collector passed by and the soldier was not quartered.

In 1624 there had been a rising at Quercy of peasants, excited by a new creation of collecting officers, and alleging that their country was burdened down by tailles and other duties; that the rich bought their exemption and left the whole weight to fall upon the poor. The numbers had grown until there were 16,000 men, armed with poles, hoe-handles, plow-shares, and some with muskets and pikes. They burned the houses and destroyed the crops of a few who they charged had bought exemption from taxation, and were then met by a body of troops. No resistance to regular soldiers could be made by the peasants, and the 16,000 were scattered almost without loss. One of their leaders was hung, and another was quartered, and the Croquants were remitted to the tax-gatherer.¹ A more formidable rising occurred in Normandy in 1639. The imposition of some new taxes excited the revolt, and placards about the hills asked the people to rise for the defence of their country, oppressed by tax-gatherers and excise men. Twenty thousand men collected, calling themselves the Bare Feet, and their leader took the title of John Barefoot. They sacked the houses of the farmers or collectors of taxes, and murdered a few of them on whom they could lay hands. The example set by the Barefeet was followed by those of higher position; the city of Rouen assumed an attitude of revolt, and pillaged the houses of

¹ An account of this is found in *Mercure François*, 1624, 473-8.

the tax-gatherers, and even the Parliament of the province showed some sympathy with the disaffected.

There could be, however, but one end to such a movement. In November, Gassion entered Normandy with 4,000 soldiers, and crushed the insurrection with bloody vigor. The Barefeet were scattered in one battle, and Rouen submitted without resistance.

A severe punishment was imposed upon those who had taken any part in the revolt. The leaders of the peasants were so tortured, in order to force a disclosure of their accomplices, that only one of the officers appointed to take their confession was hardy enough to stay until it was obtained. They were then hung or broken on the wheel without any formal trial. Some of the citizens of Rouen were punished for their activity in the troubles, and a penalty of 1,085,000 livres was imposed upon the town, to be paid within three years. It was a fine which would be equivalent to over a million dollars, to be paid by a population which we can safely estimate at less than 35,000.

Nor was the Parliament allowed to go unpunished for the remissness it had shown. Its functions were temporarily suspended and it was then divided into halves, each of which was to perform its duties in alternate six months, and new officers were created at the expense of the old ones, whose authority and whose revenues were thus diminished by half.¹ Richelieu wrote Gassion that he could not have given greater contentment to the king, and the chancellor was dissatisfied because he was not allowed to destroy the Hotel de Ville of Rouen.²

Similar risings were caused by the increasing burdens of taxation under Mazarin. In 1643 the peasants rose in Rovergue, complaining that it was impossible for them to pay the *taille* that was imposed upon them. Carrying on

¹ See Journal de Seguier. Arch. Cur., 2d. ser., t. vi. Floquet, "Histoire du Parlement de Normandie," t. iv. and v. Mercure, t. xxiii. Grotii Epis., 580, 585, 595, *et passim*. M. Floquet has discussed these matters with much learning and length.

² Let. de Richelieu, viii., 360; vii., 253.

the usual pillaging, they even attempted to seize the important place of Villefranche, and many of the inhabitants who did not join in the insurrection refused to act against those who, they said, were exposing their lives for the relief of all and for the public liberty.¹ But the Croquants found none of the nobility to lead them, and they could make no effectual resistance to the troops sent against them.

In the winter, insurrections followed in Bas Poitou, Saintonge, and Angoumois, against an increase in duties. There some of the minor nobles offered themselves as leaders to the people.² In these districts there was also a strong Huguenot element, and it was feared the political activity of the party might be revived, and a rebellion be based on the incongruous cry of "greater freedom for church and wine."³ Mazarin's treatment of the Huguenots was uniformly moderate and judicious. "His Majesty has resolved," he wrote the Bishop of Poitiers, "in the interest of public concord, that those of the reformed religion should enjoy the benefit of the edicts granted by his predecessors, but he desires to see to it carefully that they shall undertake nothing beyond, and shall not pass the bounds prescribed to them by the authority of the king."⁴ The insurgents, however, alleged only pecuniary grievances. They received no satisfaction for these and were speedily repressed. They were not severely punished for these outbreaks, and an amnesty was proclaimed. Motives of expediency, as well as Mazarin's aversion to bloodshed, favored a mild punishment for these offences. "In the penalties to be imposed on the guilty," he wrote La Terrière, "we should consider this first, that the goods be spared that they may pay the king what is imposed on them, and that there may be no arrears. This consideration, which is above all others, should make you careful that the troops live with more

¹ See *Gazette* for 1643, 897, 908, 907. Dis. Ven., xcix., 303, 307, 370, etc. Dis. Ven., xcix., 269, *et pas*.

² *Lettres de Mazarin*, i., 549.

³ See *Carnets*, iv., 29, 83. ⁴ *Lettres de Mazarin*, i., 400. *Carnets*, i., 86.

order, and at the least possible charge upon the people, lest they should be rendered unable to pay the king what is due. Lodging for three days, with the customary license of soldiers, will do more harm than the 'taille' and 'subsistence' for a year."¹

Still more serious resistance was excited by the endeavor to impose new taxes at Paris. The desire to foster the indefinite growth of large cities is quite modern. Former legislators engaged in endeavors to check an increase in population, which they feared was dangerous, or believed drew undue numbers from the tilling of the soil. An edict of Henry II., in 1548, declared that the great number of buildings in the faubourgs of Paris had drawn many from other cities and villages, and furnished also vast numbers of taverns and retreats for persons of evil life, which ruined the young and harbored and encouraged murderers and robbers, and it ordered that any buildings which were there erected should be destroyed.²

The law had been a dead letter, and with the growth of the city numerous buildings had arisen in the prohibited districts. The controller-general, Emeri, now exhumed this forgotten provision, and in 1644, it was ordered that the proprietors should be taxed a certain amount per square foot for the buildings that had been erected in contravention of its terms. The officers charged with the enforcement of the *toisé*, as the tax was called, proceeded to take measurements in the faubourg Saint Antoine and the faubourg Saint Germain, both of which were then largely occupied by the poorer classes. The inhabitants appealed to the Parliament of Paris for protection. Four or five hundred poor people crowded into the great hall demanding justice and protection from the *toisé*.³

The Parliament summoned the officers executing the *toisé* to render an account of their proceedings. They complained of the interference by this body, and its

¹ Lettres de Mazarin, 413, 414.

² Anciennes Lois Françaises, xviii., 63-65.

³ Grotii Epis. Ined. 165. Talon, 115. Ormesson, 192, 194. Lettres de Mazarin, ii., 6.

representatives held a conference with the queen and her ministers. The resistance, either of the Parliament or of the people, gained a practical victory. It had been expected to raise eight or ten millions by the *toisé*.¹ The government at last declared that it would accept 1,000,000 in commutation of the duty. A new scheme for raising money was prepared, which met with equal disfavor, though from a different class. The regent announced an alienation of 2,300,000 of *rentes*. The principal raised would amount to nearly 28,000,000. These *rentes* were to be issued at 8½ per cent., and secured by wine duties in Paris, and by other revenues of the state. One million five hundred thousand of these were to be taken by the rich citizens of Paris, and 800,000 by those of other cities.² To take a part of a government loan at over eight per cent., would not now be thought a rigorous imposition by a prosperous Parisian, but in those days of default and financial irregularities such a measure was regarded as equivalent to a forced loan. The Parliament considered the edict before registering it, and left it in such a shape that it would not be recognized by its originator. It was resolved that the loan should be reduced to an alienation of 1,500,000 livres, that it should be demanded only from those who had been engaged in farming taxes or lending money to the state, and from the small class who, for twenty years, had been occupied in wholesale trade.³ This resolution practically left the whole sum to be raised by the financiers. But Emeri came to their rescue. His financial expedients had shown little but an evil ingenuity in consuming in advance the revenues of future years. It was a policy, says Colbert, which threatened sure ruin in five or six years, constantly required extraordinary measures, alienations of the ordinary revenues, creation of new offices, and the imposition of new taxes, for the verification of which

¹ Talon, 142. Grotii Epis., 969; Ined., 126-148. Grotius puts the amount expected from the taxes on buildings at 4,000,000. Molé, iii., 104-107.

² Talon, 125. Anc. Lois, xvii., 43-45. The edict says: "Que l'acquisition leur tournera plutôt à grâce qu'à charge."

³ Talon, 125. Molé, iii., 117-120. Ormesson, 213-214.

recourse must be had to the sovereign companies. The fortunes made by the financiers soured the companies, alienated the people, and stirred up revolt and sedition on every occasion.¹

To a minister given to such measures, the assistance of the financiers was indispensable, and any step was dreaded which might lessen their ability or their willingness to give aid. "The credit of men of affairs," he said to the Parliament, "consists only in the opinion of others, and the financiers will lose theirs, if it is believed they will be subjected to the rigor of the Parliament. This year they have paid great sums to the Chamber of Justice, and it will be most injurious to them to be separated from the other citizens of Paris and alone subjected to this tax." The Parliament answered that they had devised a way by which 18,000,000 livres could be raised not only without clamor from the people, but amid joy and benediction.² The financiers had all the wealth of the kingdom. They lived in richly furnished houses and gave princely fêtes, while the rest of France was suffering under oppression. The conclusion of the Parliament was modified so that the loan fell less exclusively on the financiers, but it still remained in such shape that the government would not enforce it.³

The *toisé* had been likewise relinquished, but in the spring of 1645 the collection was attempted of the smaller amount to which it had been reduced. Even in this shape it again excited commotion among those subjected to its burdens. The women of the faubourgs crowded the halls of Parliament asking justice and mercy. Their complaints were received by the Courts of Inquests, and it was demanded that the various courts of the Parliament should meet in the chamber of St. Louis, and consult concerning the needs of the State. But the zeal of the Inquests was checked by Molé, the first President, who refused to call together the Parliament for this purpose.

¹ *Lettres de Colbert*, ii., 17. See his remarks on the financial disorders from 1630-1660, 19-29. ² Talon, 126. ³ Talon, 128. *Grotii Epis.*, 729, 969.

Unable to shake his resolution, the members of the Inquests abandoned hearing causes, and disturbed by their presence the Grand Chamber during its deliberations. A deputation waited on the regent to present their views, but they were received with scant courtesy. The chancellor rebuked them for their sedition; the Prince of Condé said that long experience had taught him the danger of any diminution in the royal authority. As the President Gayant endeavored to reply, the queen cried out: "Be still, you old fool, I don't wish to hear you." Such reproofs were followed by more rigorous measures. Gayant and two other members of the Parliament were sent into exile, and the President Barillon was arrested and confined at Pignerol.¹ A fresh grievance was thus furnished, and new deputations waited on the queen to request the recall of the exiled members. Three were allowed to return, but President Barillon continued suspended from his duties until his death closed the struggle over him.²

The resistance of the Parliament aggravated the financial embarrassment, and the government resolved now to enforce its measures, by resorting to the violent means of a bed of justice. On September 7, 1645, the boy-king visited the Parliament with the ceremonial of such occasions. It was two years and a half since the last bed of justice was held, in which the uncontrolled regency of the queen had been declared. Then the Parliament had met, eager for the task, and filled with zeal for the new administration; but the feelings with which its members now assembled were far different. The influence accorded to them at the beginning of the regency had encouraged endeavors to extend an uncertain and debated authority. The numerous devices to which financial distress had driven the government, had offered many opportunities for the exercise of their right of refusing registration. Their activity had been excited by the Important party,

¹ Talon, 143. Ormesson, 270, 273. Molé, iii., 121-135. Grotii Epis., 747.

² *Lettres de Mazarin*, ii., 154, 155. *Let. de Guy Patin*.

which had among them many sympathizers and kinsmen, and had been encouraged by the speech of the Prince of Condé, who had said to them: "It is you who have made the queen, regent."¹ But the government became alarmed by the control which the Parliament was endeavoring to exercise, and was now seeking to reduce it to its condition under Richelieu. The disasters of Charles I., in his struggles with a popular body, which indeed resembled the Parliament of Paris only in name, added to the alarm of the regent. Because a legislative body chosen by the people had driven a king from his throne, it was feared that a court of hereditary legists might at last strip the sovereign of his authority. Mazarin had always felt apprehension of the power of this body. He had warned the queen not to grant an authority to the Parliament which would be used against her, and told her that when it had broken the solemn declaration of the king, it would hold itself superior to the regency.² A curious plan is disclosed in his *Carnets*. He had contemplated being made a counselor of the Parliament, that he might have a voice there.³ In lieu of that he had pursued his usual policy of liberally bribing the judges.⁴

A bed of justice, an extreme measure at any time, seemed the more so when the sovereign, whose presence should compel obedience, was a child of seven. Nineteen edicts for raising money in as many different ways were, however, laid before the assembly. The most of the edicts provided for the creation of a great number of new offices, and there was also a duty of one fortieth imposed upon certain classes of legacies.⁵ The chancellor then proceeded to the form of taking the votes of those present. He first recited the familiar story of the needs of the great and prosperous wars in which France was engaged, which

¹ *Carnets*, vii., 9.

² *Carnets*, i., 87; ii., 10, 15, 44, 54, *et passim*. "Se S. M. non vi prendi rimedio il parlamento e li grandi havranno troppo d' autorita."

³ This curious idea, which has been little noticed by historians, is found in *Carnets*, iii., 8; iv., 86.

⁴ See v., 43, 95, etc.

⁵ *Gazette*, 801-805, only gives sixteen.

now compelled a search for the least injurious means that could be found for replenishing the treasury, and the members of Parliament then announced their votes. The first president, while expressing the joy of his subjects at the sight of their king, regretted that this feeling should be disturbed on an occasion when the power of the sovereign was displayed to diminish the authority of justice and the honor of the Parliament. Most of the members said they could not in conscience approve of the edicts, but they gave their voice for them, under the necessity of state.¹

Popular discontent followed such measures, and it was becoming strong in Paris, where it would be most dangerous. As the queen entered Notre Dame, the wives of three hundred merchants who suffered from these impositions, threw themselves at her feet, saying they would bring to her their infants to nourish, since the bread was taken from their mouths. God would grant them justice and mercy if she refused.² But the Parliament felt too strong and had too firm a hold of the popular favor to abandon the struggle over these edicts, even after this forced approval. In the following year, 1646, as the obnoxious edicts were in process of execution, the Courts of Inquests again demanded an assembly of the Chambers. The first president informed them that he had the promises of the queen for a revocation of some of the edicts, and that they must seek for her favors and not extort them.³ A mutinous and grumbling assent to this policy was forced by Molé's influence and his friends, but a matter of greater importance renewed the conflict.

In October, 1646, a decree of the Council established a new imposition on all articles of consumption entering Paris.⁴ It took the place of some other duties, and of the uncollected portion of the loan which had been imposed upon the inhabitants of the city. It was to furnish also the means for erecting a new bridge of stone over the

¹ Talon, 155-159. Ormesson, i., 309-312.

² Talon, 159.

³ Ormesson, i., 332, 333. Dis. Ven., ciii., 98.

⁴ Anc. Lois, xvii., 50.

Seine, opposite the Tuileries, which was demanded by the growth of business and population. A verification of this edict was obtained from the Court of Aids, a body much more closely connected with the government than was the Parliament, and its execution was at once begun. The Court of Aids was one of the sovereign courts of France, but its duties had been confined to passing upon various questions that arose from the imposition and collection of taxes. From the nature of its functions it had for a long time exercised some control over certain aids and octroi duties, which were regarded as of a different nature from the taille, the gabelle, and the general imposts of the kingdom. But it was now claimed that for it to grant registration to such an edict as this, was to usurp the powers of the Parliament. Had France resembled England, such a question would have been settled by a proceeding, trivial in appearance, but really of great importance. Some farmer would have refused to pay the tax of a few sous on a bushel of turnips which he brought to Paris for sale. The collector would have seized them for the duty, and a suit against him for a small amount would have raised the question whether the verification of the Court of Aids was of any avail, and could justify the collection of the impost. It would have been argued at length by learned counsel, and the decision of the highest court would have set the matter at rest. But in France, great constitutional suits have been rare. Apart from differences in procedure and temperament, the supremacy of the courts of law, even within their own jurisdiction, was not sure to be respected. The king's council might assume to annul the decision of the Parliament on a matter which was of political importance, or at an early stage of the case it might be taken from the process of the ordinary courts to be passed upon by some tribunal believed to be more tractable. While the courts protested against such encroachments, the authority of the king was so vague, its excesses were so little restrained by defined boundaries, that such acts did not receive the universal con-

demnation that would make them dangerous and of no avail.

The duty on provisions that was now established was a better tax than many of those imposed in France ; it fell upon all, and it could be collected with ease and with uniformity. The octroi duties, which have always defrayed so much of the expenses of the towns of France, are certainly less injurious than many others that might be levied. It was said that the zeal of the members of the Parliament was now excited by motives which were not of the highest order. Some of the presidents and counsellors were annoyed by finding that their melons and apricots, their grapes and pears, suddenly became dear by reason of this tax.¹ A deputation accordingly visited the regent to complain of the edict and demand that it should be sent to the Parliament for verification. The chancellor replied that such a duty as this, a temporary charge established for temporary needs, required only the verification of the Court of Aids, and its jurisdiction had been conceded for eighty years.

It could not be denied that such powers had been exercised by that court without objection, but the division between temporary aids and the ordinary revenues was vague. It would be possible, by calling all new duties temporary aids, to escape altogether the necessity of registration by Parliament. The active part taken by that body during the last three years, encouraged it to insist on an enlarged jurisdiction. It had popular opinion for its support in these struggles over taxation. Its members were sunning themselves in a new and pleasing glow of popularity. Instead of being reviled for delays of justice or greed for fees, they were now called the fathers of the people and the preservers of their rights.

The government tacitly yielded the ground and offered to submit some new taxes to take the place of the offending aid. The Parliament was content with having the matter brought before it, and in September, 1647, it re-

¹ Talon, 196.

solved that the duty on provisions should be continued, but for two years only. This order of the court was in turn annulled by the Council of State. The result, however, of these contests was to increase alike the power and the popularity of the Parliament.¹ The constant growth of taxes excited animosity in the people, which was increased by the unpopularity of Mazarin and by much that was squalid and petty in his administration. The way was preparing for the outbreak of popular feeling in the Fronde, which was now close at hand. But during these quarrels with the courts much had been accomplished out of France, both by arms and by diplomacy, and to this we must now turn our attention.

The victory of Rocroi and the capture of Thionville left France, at the end of 1643, triumphant in the Low Countries, but, on the other hand, the disaster of Dütlingen had checked any progress in Germany. The formal consultations for peace began at Münster in 1644, but neither side relaxed its exertions in the field, and the war continued with as much vigor as was allowed by the failing resources of the parties. Mazarin was especially resolved to prosecute the war in Germany. Vigorous endeavors there would not only encourage the allies of France, but might compel the Duke of Bavaria to abandon the cause he had so long sustained, and force the Emperor to grant a favorable peace. Turenne had already been sent to assume command of the army in Germany, and in the early summer of 1644 he was further strengthened by nine thousand men, led by the hero of Rocroi.² The French crossed the Rhine at Brisach, and found the Bavarian army, under Mercy, strongly entrenched near Freiburg. Their forces were nearly equal, and their position at the foot of the mountains of the Black Forest seemed fitted to repel any assault. But to the Duke of Enghien, who commanded the united forces of the French, no difficulty seemed insurmountable, and his boldness was seconded

¹ Talon, 195-214; Molé, iii., 168, 175, 177, 178, 181-188; Journal d'Ormesson, t. i., 1646-1647. ² Turenne, 370; Lettres de Mazarin, ii., 8, 9.

by the skill of the ablest lieutenant in the world. Turenne yielded the command to his younger rival, and assisted him with all the zeal he could have displayed in a battle, the sole glory of which was to be his own. Mercy's army numbered about fifteen thousand men, that of Enghien twenty thousand. It was hoped to turn the position of Mercy's troops, and Turenne led a detachment through a ravine to the rear of the Bavarian army. Late in the afternoon of August 5th, the French, led by Enghien, attacked the Bavarians with such reckless valor that they carried the first entrenchments. In the meantime Turenne had forced his way through a narrow ravine, and as night came on the French seemed ready to attack Mercy on either side, but he prudently fell back, and the next morning disclosed his forces drawn up on the slope of a high mountain just by Freiburg.¹

This position seemed impregnable against an army which must struggle up the heights from the plain below, exposed during its advance to a murderous fire. But the ardor of Enghien was unabated. A day was given for rest, and on the 7th he attacked the enemy on the mountain. Even French valor was checked by such difficulties but Enghien's courage increased in proportion with the peril, and he reformed his troops and led them up again to the assault. Night ended a conflict in which either side had gained little in position, and both armies had lost heavily in men. The mortality among the French officers was especially great. Enghien was at last forced to admit that Mercy's position must again be turned and it was reckless slaughter to continue the struggle up the mountain. This course had been advised before the battle, but Enghien's taste led him to prefer an open and desperate attack, to an endeavor to force the enemy to retreat by cutting off their supplies. He now, however, marched to cut Mercy off in the rear, but the prudent Bavarian fell back through the mountains, and, after a few skirmishes, on the 9th effected his retreat. The honor of the victory was thus

¹ Gramont, 257.

with the French, but it had been dearly bought. Six thousand of their men, almost one third of the army, had fallen during this bloody week. Mercy was said to have been able to rally but six thousand of his soldiers as he retreated towards Bavaria.

The contest had been so bloody and its results apparently so small, that the enemies of Enghien protested against a *Te Deum* being sung for what they said was at best but a drawn battle. It was only at Condé's urgency, the Venetian minister wrote, that it was decided to celebrate the battle as a victory.¹ The people complained that the *Te Deum* was sung, when the enemy, after inflicting great loss, had at last voluntarily left their entrenchments and their useless baggage.²

The results of the battle were in reality important and justified its carnage. Mercy's army was too broken to make further opposition. Enghien, unharassed by it, captured in rapid succession, Philipsburg, Speyer, Worms, Mainz, Mannheim, and Landau.³ The French then commanded the Rhine from Switzerland to Mainz, and controlled the Palatinate. Content with this the Duke of Enghien returned to Court, while Turenne sought winter quarters in Alsace and Lorraine, and along the Rhine. The country was so ruined, that in twenty leagues outside of the large towns enough could not be found to feed a horse, except at some château whose owner had thus far enjoyed sufficient favor to escape entire ruin.⁴

The Duke of Orleans had been stimulated by the growing fame of his cousin Enghien, and had sought this year the command of the army in the Low Countries. Delayed

¹ Dis. Ven., ci., 208, 217.

² Ormesson, i., 210. For battle of Freiburg and the rest of the campaign, see Turenne, 372-376, and Relation de la Moussaye, 97-168. Montglat, 149. Gramont, 256-258. See also *Gazette* for 1644, 661-672, 789-809. The *Gazette* speaks of the battle of Freiburg with no exultation and hardly claims a victory. Turenne, Moussaye, and Gramont all took part in the campaign.

³ Grotius, 731. Epis. Ined., 199, 200: "Ex Philip-friburgo dedito magnum ubique gaudium est." Lettres de Mazarin, ii., 58, *et passim*. Lenet, 499, 500.

⁴ Turenne, 380.

by contentions and jealousies among the French generals, after an obstinate siege of two months, he had captured the important city of Gravelines. In the terms made by the city, it stipulated that liberty of conscience should not be allowed and only a Catholic should be appointed its governor.¹ Satisfied with this achievement Gaston returned to the Court. The Marshal of La Meilleraie, who had commanded under him, sought rest at the baths, and Gassion was left to continue the campaign, but little more was accomplished.²

Exhaustion was restoring peace to some portions of the vast area where the war had raged. Many parts of Germany had been so wasted by the long years of pillage that there was no one left to fight, and the countries were so desolate that armies shunned them like a desert. This year Franche Comté again obtained neutrality by agreeing to pay to Mazarin forty thousand crowns annually while the war lasted. "It had," says a contemporary, "great need of peace. Never had been such ruin as there. All the villages were burned, the inhabitants dead, and the country so desolate that it more resembled a desert than a land that had once been populated."³

The prosperity of the French arms this year was broken only in Catalonia. There the Spanish, inspired by the presence of their king, captured the strong and important city of Lerida. La Mothe Houdancourt was at last removed from a command in which he had so long suffered disaster.⁴ He was thrown into prison, and public feeling at first demanded a victim for a long series of reverses. But the unpopularity of Mazarin presently covered the faults of the marshal. His being disgraced by the minister

¹ Frequent references in Grotius show the interest in the siege. Epis. 727, 728, 730. *Ineditæ*, 148, 150, 157, etc. *Let. de Mazarin*, i., 657, 732, 747, 762. *Gazette*, 389, 605-628, *et passim*.

² Montglat, 152. Grotius, Epis. Ined., 213.

³ Montglat, 153.

⁴ Grotius says he had alienated the inhabitants of Catalonia from the French by his avarice. Epis., 972. Ined., 142, 225, 226, *et passim*. Montglat, 153. *Lettres de Mazarin*, i., 738, 746.

atoned for his inefficiency as a general. He was regarded as the victim of persecution, and was at last released.

The campaign in Germany attracted again the chief attention. In 1644 Sweden, not content with the war already waging, had invaded Denmark and left the chief burden of the contest in Germany for the French. But the diplomatic energies of Mazarin and Avaux had been employed successfully in negotiating a peace between these countries sufficiently favorable for the Swedes, and not too humiliating for the Danes.¹ The Swedes were enabled again to give their undivided energies to the struggle against Bavaria and the Emperor, and in 1645 they began an active and successful campaign, while Turenne crossed the Rhine and came up with the Bavarians under Mercy at Marienthal. The Bavarian general prudently avoided a combat. The country was desolate, and the French cavalry insisted on scattering through the neighboring villages, that they might more easily forage for supplies. "They made M. de Turenne decide to send them into some small towns, ill-advisedly," says the marshal of himself, with the courage of a great man. The infantry and artillery remained at Marienthal. Mercy discovered that Turenne's forces were scattered, and he instantly profited by this carelessness. On the 2d of May he led a fierce attack upon the French. Turenne had but a few thousand men together, and they were ill-prepared to meet the shock. The infantry broke at once in confusion; Turenne retreated as best he could, and succeeded in bringing the most of the cavalry safely into Hesse. But his infantry was entirely dispersed, and all of the baggage, ten cannon, and 1,500 cavalry fell into the hands of the enemy.²

The Landgrave of Hesse protected the shattered forces, and they were presently joined by the Swedish troops. The Swedes had carried on a successful campaign against

¹ Lettres de Mazarin, ii., 8, 108, *et passim*. Epis. Grot., 967, *et passim* Corps Diplomatique, vi., 304-306.

² Turenne. 386, 387. Lettres de Mazarin, ii., 165, *et seq.* Gazette, 1645, 419-430.

the imperial forces, which it had been intended to supplement by an advance of the French into Bavaria, but this was now checked by the defeat at Marienthal.

Turenne assumed the entire responsibility of this disaster, and was ready to meet any disgrace it might bring upon him. "The misfortune," he wrote Mazarin, "will not prevent my endeavoring to restore affairs, so far as they depend upon me. Should the queen and your eminence think that for this misfortune, or for other reasons, it was not necessary to avail yourselves of my services, I shall receive this as I ought."¹ But Mazarin was too sagacious to confound the occasional mistakes of a soldier like Turenne with the chronic incapacity of a dawdler like La Mothe Houdancourt. He wrote Turenne assuring him that regret at the defeat was balanced by the joy that the first rumor of his own death or capture had proven false, and that the check he had suffered would be only a spur to excite him to greater achievements in the future.² One thing, indeed, was announced which could not but be unpalatable to the defeated general; Enghien was sent to Germany with an army of 10,000 men to restore the French position and obtain revenge for Turenne's overthrow.

The young duke marched rapidly to the Rhine, crossed it, joined Turenne in Hesse, and with the united armies, over 25,000 strong, moved towards the Danube. He was soon embarrassed by the defection of the Swedish contingent. Konigsmarck, their general, was jealous of Enghien's authority, and he refused to join further in the advance. The departure of these troops, 6,000 in number, was a serious loss, but Enghien continued his forward march and came up with the Bavarians near Nordlingen. Here eleven years before the victorious army of Gustavus had sustained that first great defeat after his death, which destroyed the prospect of Swedish ascendancy in Germany. Mercy, with the usual caution of that skilful veteran, had drawn up his forces in a position which seemed im-

¹ Turenne, 388.

² *Lettres de Mazarin*, ii., 169-178.

pregnable. The right wing, consisting of six or seven thousand of the troops of the Emperor, was placed on the mountains of Vineberg, which rose slowly from the plain. At the left the cavalry under John de Wert, with two regiments of infantry, commanded the hill of Allerheim. Between them lay the village of Allerheim, where Mercy in person commanded the bulk of the infantry.

The position was so strong that even Turenne did not advise an attack. But here as at Freiburg, Enghien believed that no strength of position could withstand the fury of his assault, and that for him a battle must result in victory. It was the afternoon of August 3d when the attack began. As with most of Enghien's battles the success varied in the different wings. At the right the French cavalry yielded disgracefully before John de Wert. But the great predatory leader had little genius in turning the success of a fierce assault into the gain of a complete victory. He indulged rather his natural impulse and that of his troops in pursuing the routed cavalry and capturing wagons loaded with supplies, or officers who could be held for a rich ransom. Free, therefore, from any movement on the flank which might have been disastrous, Enghien led the attack on Mercy's infantry, stationed in the village. But neither his own valor nor that of his followers could break the enemy. Fortune turned the scale in his favor. He was wounded himself and two horses were shot under him, but as the darkness was beginning to stop the conflict, Mercy, the Bavarian commander, was struck by a bullet and fell dead on the spot. Turenne in the meantime was leading the Hessians up the mountain in the teeth of 7,000 entrenched troops, with numerous cannon pouring shot down upon them. Notwithstanding such resistance he forced the enemy from the position. The Imperialist, General Gleen, was taken prisoner, his cannon captured, and his forces routed. Night had now stopped this murderous conflict. De Wert returned from his pursuit and his plundering to find Mercy dead, and Gleen a prisoner. Even then he proba-

bly could have held his ground. The French loss had been greater than that of their enemies, and three or four thousand of their men lay dead on the field. But De Wert was unwilling to cope with Enghien, and during the night he led back his troops unmolested to Donawert.¹

The glory of success was therefore with the French, and Enghien had alike avenged the old disaster of the Swedes and the rout of Turenne in the spring. But the victory had been dearly bought. They had better sing a *De Profundis* over the dead than a *Te Deum* for the living, was again said at Paris, when the celebration was ordered for the victory.²

It was not only dearly bought, but it was productive of nothing but glory. To retrieve their tarnished reputation and to establish their winter quarters in Suabia was all that Mazarin had expected from Enghien's expedition.³ He was forced to be content with the gain of reputation alone. The Duke of Enghien was taken sick and had to be carried back to France. The Swedes had been checked in the successes they had met with in the beginning of the year and had fallen back into Silesia, while the Prince of Transylvania had made his peace with the Empire. The Emperor's forces were thus left free to join those of the Duke of Bavaria, and Turenne was in turn compelled to retreat, and he fell back beyond the Rhine. He gained a victory of no great military importance, in the capture of Treves. The imprisonment of its archbishop and elector ten years before had been the pretext for a formal declaration of war between France and Spain. After many years of imprisonment and wandering, the elector was now restored to his seat, and once again had the souls of his flock under his charge.⁴

In the next year the French and Swedish armies sought to avoid the evils of separate attacks, which left the

¹ Turenne, 392-396. Gramont, 262. Gramont was present at the battle and was taken prisoner. *Gazette*, 421, 455-486. *Let. de Mazarin*, ii., 210.

² Motteville, 103.

³ Letter, Aug. 18, 1645, Instruction to Enghien, *Let. de Mazarin*, ii., 687.

⁴ Turenne, 399-401. *Mazarin*, ii., 261.

Emperor and the Bavarians operating upon inner lines of communication. Under Turenne and Wrangel an army of 17,000 men advanced, in 1646, into the possessions of the Duke of Bavaria. The duke was now an old man of seventy-three. Richelieu and Mazarin had in turn endeavored to draw him from the support of the Emperor, by offers as liberal as he could hope to receive from Ferdinand II. But religion and ambition had made him eager for the long conflict, which was to bring souls to the mass and an electorate to himself. The fierce and stubborn soldier had been reluctant to abandon the war which he had greatly helped to excite and to sustain. His dominions had been drained of men and of money for its prosecution, but they had suffered less than most of Germany from the worst of scourges, the presence of hostile armies within their boundaries. The entry of the allied armies into his territory, proved an argument for peace much stronger than any of Mazarin's letters.¹ Though opposed by superior forces the allies advanced into Bavaria. The choice of this new field had the further advantage, that it was easy to get recruits for an army engaged in a country so little ravaged that it furnished abundant provisions and plunder.² After an ineffectual siege of Augsburg, the allies pressed on to the very gates of Munich. The Duke of Bavaria, who saw the enemy laying waste the environs of his capital, and who received but tardy assistance from the forces of the Emperor, resolved at last to make his peace. On March 14, 1647, he signed at Ulm a separate treaty with Sweden and France. By this he bound himself to give no further aid to the Emperor, and his own dominions were in turn to be saved from further invasion.³

Abandoned by his powerful ally, the hereditary dominions of the Emperor seemed open to the invasion of the enemy. It might have been expected that in the campaign of 1647 they would reach Vienna itself and

¹ *Mém. de Turenne*, 407.

² *Mém. de Turenne*, 404.

³ *Corps Dip.*, vi., 371-386.

extort a peace at the palace of the Hapsburgs. But the French government feared too much success. They were jealous of the amount of territory Sweden might demand for herself. They were unwilling to allow too great a triumph to the Protestant princes. Now, as ever since the war began, the zeal of the French was modified by their Catholic sympathies. Unlike most allies, they had been earnest in the hour of disaster, but they grew lukewarm in times of success. The Emperor was now willing to make terms which were fairly satisfactory to the French, and they did not care to oblige him to offer any more. Mazarin wrote in 1647, that France did not wish to give too great power to the Swedes, who were not only ambitious, but sought also the ruin of religion, which was not to be feared from the House of Austria.¹

Despite Turenne's protests at abandoning this opportunity for ending the war by the capture of Vienna, he was ordered in 1647 to march to Flanders, and there to assist in the contest against Spain, which showed little sign of approaching its end. But his German cavalry had six months' pay due them. The French government was in such straits that it could not raise the ready money to pay the arrears due the soldiers. At the Rhine, therefore, the old Weimarian army mutinied, and refused to cross the river. The summer was wasted in negotiations, and endeavors to enforce obedience, and though a few regiments were sent into the Low Countries, Turenne's army accomplished nothing during this year.²

Since Enghien's victory at Rocroi the French had prosecuted with success the war in the Low Countries, though receiving little aid from the Dutch. The States-General received from France a subsidy of 1,200,000 livres each year, and it was designed that their forces should coöperate with the French in the attack of the Spanish

¹ See *Lettres de Mazarin*, ii., 243, 392-400, 425, 871, *et passim*. Mazarin to Avaux, *Let. de Maz.*, ii., 870.

² Turenne, 408-416. References to the government's financial straits are frequent in the despatches of the Venetian ambassador, t. ci., a, 44, 99, 80: "*La strettezza del denaro raffredda del marchia delle militie.*"

Netherlands.¹ The Hollanders were, however, often slack in their performance. The independence of the seven provinces had long been established in fact, if not by formal treaty. No burgher of Amsterdam feared that the Inquisition would be reëstablished in his city, or that a Spanish governor would persecute his religion, or confiscate his estate. The war had become for them rather one of conquest, and of conquest which must result in bringing near to them a powerful and aggressive nation, instead of one enfeebled and decrepit. It might be better that Spain should retain all of the ten provinces which still remained subject to her, than that the States-General should gain half of them, at the cost of allowing France to have the others.

The French persevered in the war, receiving from the Dutch such assistance as they could get. In 1645, Orleans led the army into Flanders, and began the campaign with the capture of Mardyck. A few weeks of leisurely siege resulted in the conquest of some towns, and by the first of September Gaston sought rest at the Court.² As it was now well towards the end of the season, the Hollanders were at last ready to coöperate, and they joined the French under Gassion and Rantzau. But the allied armies did little except march and countermarch, and at the end of the year the Spaniards surprised the French garrison at Mardyck and retook the only place of importance they had lost. Mazarin complained of the dissensions which frustrated important plans. "We cannot," he wrote, "complain of the campaign this year in Flanders, but, considering the feebleness of the enemy, the quality and numbers of our troops, and the considerable reinforcements sent, we might justly have hoped for greater advantages."³

Gaston was, however, well content even with the moderate glory of such warfare. In 1646 he commanded an

¹ Dumont, *Corps Dip.*, vi., 293.

² Montglat, 160, 161. *Let. de Maz.*, ii., 200, 271, *et passim*. *Gazette*, 1645, 493, 603, *et passim*. *Grot. Epis.*, 748. *Gazette*, 852.

³ *Let. de Mazarin*, ii., 239.

army of 35,000 men, one portion of which was led by Enghien himself. The Hollanders were under arms unusually early, but they atoned for this by accomplishing nothing. The French laid siege to Courtrai, which in due time surrendered, and they then spent three weeks in a vigorous siege of Mardyck. This place was finally captured for the second time in fourteen months. It was now late in August, and Orleans was ready to rest from a campaign which had lasted three months.¹ He met with twofold encouragement in this desire. Enghien chafed at serving under one who was made commander on account of his birth, but who was destitute of any military talents. They had indeed preserved friendly and even intimate relations, but they were bound together chiefly by a common dislike of Mazarin and by willingness to complain of the present government. But if Orleans returned to the Court, Enghien would himself assume the command, and he hoped to signal the campaign by some exploit worthy of his own fame. He impressed on Orleans that it was too late to accomplish any thing further of importance, and that he should seek the repose his achievements had earned. A still more persuasive counsellor was the Abbé de la Rivière, the favorite who controlled Gaston's vacillating mind. The abbé's fortune rested on this control which he had obtained. Mazarin showered upon him pensions and livings for his influence over his master.² La Rivière hoped to gain from it a cardinal's hat, which he was eagerly seeking. He was not without expectations of succeeding to Mazarin's position.³ But his power brought its penance. He dared not leave the variable mind of the duke exposed to other influences, and to preserve his control he had to be in constant attendance. Though the abbé had been bought to advise the campaigns of Gaston, they

¹ Montglat, 166-170.

² In Mazarin's *Carnets* he states that he intended to keep the friendship of Orleans by means of favors to be given Rivière. *Carnets* 1 and 2.

³ Grot. Epis. Ined., 198. *Carnets*, 8, *passim*. Dis. Ven., civ., cv., *passim*.

were to him an unspeakable terror. Gaston was not cowardly personally, and a stray bullet might, by killing him, leave La Rivière a hated and insignificant priest. What was still more alarming, a stray bullet might kill the abbé himself. He dared not leave the army, but his craven fears became its jest. He insisted on an immense guard, and kept them in commotion by his alarms. At the siege of Mardyck the soldiers complained it was more work to protect the abbé from his fears, than to guard the trenches from the enemy. La Rivière was therefore eager for the close of the campaign, and master and favorite returned to Paris.¹ By the departure of Gaston the Duke of Enghien was left free to attempt some important movement, and his thoughts turned upon the capture of the city of Dunkirk.

Dunkirk was situated on the shore of the North Sea, in a position that made it alike important and formidable to commerce. From it ships could sail, vying with those of Amsterdam and Antwerp in carrying the products of Guinea and the Indies. But its harbor leading to a canal in the city where a fleet might safely enter, and its position near the shores of France and the British Channel, had rendered it a frequent retreat for pirates. The cruisers that captured the ships of the merchants of Havre and Dieppe or made plundering expeditions along the shores of Picardy and Normandy, found safe refuge in the harbor of Dunkirk. Its name was odious through northern France, alike to the shipper and the resident of the towns along the coast. The ravages of the pirates of Dunkirk are said to have cost France as much as a million a year.² They had long had an evil name over all Northern Europe, and strange stories were told of their cruelties; of crews left tied or crucified to the masts of plundered ships to perish by hunger and exposure; of battles where no quarter was given except to those rich enough to pay great ransoms; of barbarities perpetrated on the high seas and whispered by the winds to the

¹ Montglat, 169.

² Dis. Ven., cv., 68.

waves. They themselves in turn, when captured, were generally strung up at the yard-arms with short shrift, as avowed enemies of the race. But the position of Dunkirk was such that it seemed to defy attack, and the strangeness and wildness of its approaches added terror to its name. It was surrounded by vast plains of sand, far over which often spread the waters of the North Sea, and its name was said to signify the church of the dunes. Upon them the fury of the storms often worked strange changes. What had seemed solid land would be swallowed up in some tempest. What had been part of the ocean would be left so that men and wagons could pass over what the day before had been as inaccessible as the Straits of Dover.

An army attempting a siege would find itself on these wild dunes far removed from any places for supplies, and exposed to the utmost severity of storm and weather. Tents could hardly be pitched, and the changing sands would threaten the troops with destruction. The city was, moreover, garrisoned by 3,000 soldiers, and by 3,000 of the citizens and 2,000 sailors, all hardened and experienced in war, as are the inhabitants of such maritime and predatory cities. This force was commanded by the experienced Marquis of Leyde. The ardor of Enghien was increased by these difficulties, and he believed that with skill and vigor the perils of a siege could be overcome. This plan met the warm approval of Mazarin, whose good judgment was always attracted by Enghien's plans, and who had confidence that their boldness was governed by an entire knowledge of what could be accomplished by soldiers commanded by a leader of genius. He had been informed by faithful spies of the abuse which Enghien and Orleans had heaped upon him, and of the offensive doggerel at his expense which had entertained them when sitting over their cups; but this did not deter him from using the duke's talents for a great achievement.¹ The cardinal not only approved of the

¹ *Carnets*, viii., 46.

siege of Dunkirk, but gave Enghien hearty support and valuable advice.¹

The season was already late, and it was impossible to capture the city unless it was accomplished before winter. Enghien advanced with his army of about 15,000 men, and on the 19th of September the siege began.² It was necessary to prevent supplies being received by sea. Tromp, excited to hearty admiration of the genius of the young general, sailed with ten ships into the harbor, and cut off communications. Enghien, in the meantime, was pressing the circumvallation of the city with the utmost vigor. The ordinary trenches would not suffice, because along the coast the changing sands might in a night turn the water into land, over which supplies and reinforcements could enter. To guard against this, Enghien had piles driven, supported by great rocks, in such manner as to render this debatable territory impassable. Such work was done under appalling difficulties. The weather was terrible. Constant rains joined with the fury of the ocean to embarrass the soldiers as they worked upon the treacherous dunes. The commander knew that if the siege was prolonged it must fail. Provisions were brought with difficulty. The sea ran very high and destroyed the barricades; the rain was unceasing, and the wind furious. The soldiers could not keep their fires lighted; the sand, driven by the wind, ruined the little food they had.³ The nights were often spent in the mud, and the storm and cold prevented any sleep. Disease and exhaustion must soon make worse ravages in his army than the most murderous assault. Half fed, wet, sleepless, the men worked on, inspired by the zeal of their leader. Piccolomini attempted to relieve the city, but he could not force Enghien's entrenchments, except by risking a pitched battle, and that he did not dare to venture. Mines were now carried under the city by the besiegers, and a great ex-

¹ Lettres de Mazarin, ii., 311, 317, 327, 328, *et passim*.

² Sarrasin, "Siège de Dunkerque," 1649, 27, 31.

³ Sarrasin, 54. Dis. Ven., cv., 59: "Hanno i grani di sabbia piu imfortunato i soldati che le pelle de moschetti e cannoni de' nemici."

plosion made a breach in the wall. The French and Spanish met, but the smoke and confusion were so terrible that both sides at last fell back in disorder. The French finally discovered that the advantage was really theirs, and held the position. Nothing now remained but a final and bloody assault, but Leyde did not think that honor required him to await this. He agreed that if he did not receive succor by the 10th of October, the city should be surrendered. Piccolomini dared not risk the last army in Flanders in an assault on Enghien's entrenchments, and, on October 11th, the Spanish troops evacuated the town. A siege of three weeks had conquered obstacles of man and nature, and destroyed the scourge of French commerce.

The capture of Dunkirk was not without resulting disadvantages. A stage in the long war had been reached when the allies were more jealous of each other than hostile to the enemy. The marked successes of the French created displeasure among the Hollanders, as the victories of Gustavus had exceeded the desires of Richelieu. By the capture of Dunkirk the French obtained a station on the North Sea, which might be used by them as a formidable rival to the commerce of Amsterdam and Rotterdam. It might turn the allies in arms into rivals in trade.¹ Spain was now ready to grant all that the Dutch really wished. The truce of 1609 could be turned into a permanent peace, with a full and express recognition of the independence of the States, and the long contest of eighty years be formally ended. Mazarin's ambition, and his somewhat devious policy, had been skilfully used by the Spanish to excite still more the apprehension of the States-General. Since 1644 the representatives of the different contestants had been assembled at Münster and Osnabrück, struggling with diplomatic formalities and conflicting interests, with slow success. The treaty between France, Spain, and the Low Countries was one branch of this endeavor to restore peace to Europe. Suc-

¹ *Lettres de Mazarin*, ii, 330, *et passim*. Dis. Ven., cv., 48.

cess had favored the French in their eleven years of war with Spain. They had conquered large portions of Artois and Flanders. Roussillon was entirely in their possession, and the most of Catalonia. Piombino and Porto Longone were captured in 1646, as the results of Mazarin's endeavor to gain a foothold in Central Italy, and, should the war continue, these conquests were more apt to be increased than diminished. The French were therefore in a position where they could demand a large increase of territory.

The boundaries of France had changed but little for over 150 years. With the administrative unity of the seventeenth century, with the decrease of internal turbulence, and the increase of external vigor, came alike the power and the desire for territorial aggrandizement. Such purposes were furthered by a policy uniform in this respect for eighty years. The plans of Richelieu were followed by Mazarin, and were to be still further carried out by Louis XIV. But the tendency of French growth had been toward the Rhine. That seemed a natural boundary; west of it was a territory rich, fertile, and populous, over which there existed vague claims of former political continuity.¹ By the treaty of 1635, negotiated by Richelieu with the States-General, it had been purposed to conquer from Spain the provinces she still held in the Netherlands and divide them among the allies.²

Mazarin had the same desires, and he was willing to sacrifice for them the conquests made in other parts. "The acquisition of the Low Countries," he wrote, "would form an impregnable bulwark for Paris, and it could then truly be called the heart of France. Our frontiers would extend to Holland, and towards Germany to the Rhine, by holding Lorraine and Alsace, and by the possession of Luxembourg and Franche Comté. So much blood and treasure would have been well employed if all the ancient kingdom of Austrasia could be annexed to this crown."

¹ Grotius wrote, in 1645, the French wish: "*ut Galliae veterem restituant limitem.*" *Epis.*, 742.

² See *ante*, p. 175.

"The power of France would be formidable to all its neighbors, and especially to the English, who are naturally jealous of its greatness. The Spanish would regain Catalonia and Roussillon, and perhaps Portugal."¹

These provinces contained the fertile and populous fields of Flanders and Brabant; the flourishing and beautiful city of Brussels; Ghent, with its bodies of trained operatives; the craftsmen of Liege, skilled in iron work; innumerable cultivators of flax and weavers of woollen goods—a population dense, tractable, industrious, and Catholic. They would have been such an addition to the wealth and greatness of France as it had not received since Brittany became a part of the kingdom. To obtain them Mazarin was willing to sacrifice Catalonia and Roussillon, and he was willing to leave Portugal to struggle for herself.² Catalonia and Roussillon had formally renounced their allegiance to Spain, and had been received as subjects of France. To desert them now, to leave them to the mercy of the government against which they had rebelled, was a poor return for their proffered and accepted allegiance. But Mazarin was not the man to be deterred by considerations of sentiment or of political honor. The ambassador suggested a method of duping the inhabitants of Catalonia, and blinding them to the desertion which France proposed.³ The cardinal affected a coy indifference as to the Low Countries and claimed to cherish a special desire for Catalonia. "We must," he writes to the plenipotentiaries at Münster, "in treating with the Spaniards, turn our backs on the place where we wish to go, and disdain that which we really desire."⁴

A still more attractive plan was suggested by the Venetian mediator in behalf of Spain. Spanish pride would revolt at surrendering Flanders as the prize of war, but

¹ *Négociations Secrètes concernant le Traité de Westphalie*, iii., 45, 46, *et passim*. In Mazarin's important despatches to the plenipotentiaries of Jan. 26, 1646 (*Nég. Sec.*, iii., 21-25), these views are advanced in great detail, and the arguments by which he hoped they could induce Spain and Holland to consent.

² *Let. de Maz.*, ii., 299, 710, etc.

³ *Nég. Sec.*, iii., 29.

⁴ *Lettres de Mazarin*, ii., 721.

with no loss of dignity it could be bestowed as a dowry with the hand of the Spanish infanta. The Spanish king had a young daughter, Maria Theresa, who could be affianced to Louis XIV., with the agreement that the Netherlands should be the dower she should bring her husband, and though from the youth of the parties the marriage could not be celebrated at once, the provinces could in the meantime remain in the possession of the French.' "The peace," one of the ambassadors had remarked, "could not be made without violins."¹ It would be far better, the French said, that Spain should give these provinces with joy and good-will, than, unable to protect them as she was, she should see them wrested from her with violence and disgrace. Catalonia and Roussillon were provinces which, held by a foreigner, would give entrance to the heart of the kingdom. They were far more valuable for Spain to retain than these outlying possessions, which were really only sources of weakness. There would be for France the additional advantage in such an arrangement, that if the Spanish Netherlands were yielded as the fruits of the war, Holland must, under the treaty of 1635, receive her share in the division; but if they were freely bestowed as a dowry, she could certainly claim no portion of a marriage settlement.² Mazarin apparently feared the jealousy of the States-General in these plans more than the reluctance of Spain.

Estrades was sent to Holland, to influence public opinion towards such an arrangement, and especially to secure the approval of the Prince of Orange.³ He endeavored to obtain this by the offer of the marquisate of Antwerp. The prince was willing to accede, but his influence was impaired in Holland, and his resolution was easily overcome by his wife.⁴ The princess was greedy and a friend of the Spaniards. Receiving bribes from both sides with impartiality, she was thus free to shape her course accord-

¹ Montglat, 177, 178

² *Lettres de Mazarin*, ii., 299.

³ *Let. de Mazarin*, ii., 295. ⁴ *Lettres de Mazarin*, ii., 288, 293, 719-721.

⁵ Gramont, 271. *Let. de Maz.*, ii., 323, 324. *Nég. Sec.*, iii., 112. Despatch of Mazarin of March 8, 1646.

ing to her own inclination. Mazarin showed an injudicious parsimony in his bribes. He sent a string of pearls, and grumbled to his minister about the uncertain and exorbitant cost, suggesting that the princess might be willing to take instead some plate which could be bought at a fixed price.¹ The Spanish, on the other hand, paid so liberally that the princess was thought to have made, by the conclusion of the peace with them, enough to yield an income of four hundred thousand livres.² The prince himself was becoming imbecile, and when he was visited by the Marshal of Gramont, instead of discussing plans for the war, he insisted that the marshal should perform a round dance with him.³

But the Spaniards made other friends than a dancing dotard. The late campaign had been so unfortunate that they felt their only possibility of obtaining reasonable terms, or of continuing the war with the hope of a change in fortune, was to break the alliance between Holland and France. A long debt of gratitude, assistance rendered in the struggle with Spain when assistance was valuable, the treaty of 1635 renewed in 1644, forbade Holland making a peace, except jointly with France. On the other hand, the States-General were weary of war, and jealous of the power and ambition of the French. The merchants of Amsterdam desired again to devote their whole attention to freighting their ships for the Indies, and unloading the incoming cargoes of sugar from Surinam; the artisans of Haarlem wished their time free to manufacture linen; the sailor of Enkhuizen wanted an opportunity to catch and dry innumerable herrings.

This disposition was skilfully fostered by the Spanish envoys. Pau and Knuyt, plenipotentiaries from Holland to the congress at Münster, were gained to the Spanish interest, as Mazarin claimed, by the promise to each of one hundred thousand crowns.⁴ But, apart from bribes,

¹ Let. de Maz., i., 621; ii., 31.

² Archives de la Maison d'Orange, 2d ser., t. iv., p. 163, 183.

³ Gramont, 269.

⁴ Lettres de Mazarin, ii., 407. *Traité de Westphalie par Bougeant*, ii., 511. Montglat, 177, 178.

the Spanish used Mazarin's own plans to alarm the Hollanders. There is no doubt that the cardinal would gladly have made peace with Spain on obtaining the Low Countries and the hand of the infanta, but the Spanish were not willing to abandon these possessions, which, though diminished in size, still constituted one of the most valuable provinces of the kingdom.¹ It is doubtful if the suggestions made by the Spanish as to this marriage and the cession of the Low Countries were more than a lure, to be turned to the disadvantage of the French. It was intimated to the Hollanders that France was about to make a separate peace, that the Spanish Netherlands were to be given her, and that perhaps with the hand of the infanta might be transferred what claims Spain still made on the allegiance of the United Provinces.²

The French protested in vain they had never thought of making any treaty unless Holland joined, and that the proposed marriage of Louis with the infanta had been idle talk, suggested by the Spanish for the purpose of alarming the States-General. The Hollanders were suspicious, and they became still more eager for peace. A certain element, mindful alike of their obligations to France and of repeated treaties, protested that no separate treaty should be made. But the majority, led by Pau and Knuyt, and supported by the powerful province of Holland, were of the opinion that a lasting peace should be made with Spain without delay, and if France had not yet agreed on terms, it should be made without her.³

It was a constant reproach against the French that they did not really want any peace.⁴ Mazarin, it was thought, believed that war furnished him the opportunity for increasing both his power and his wealth. This belief was generally entertained. Even the Duke of Longueville,

¹ The correspondence about these propositions can be found from the despatches contained in the Neg. Sec., t. ii. and iii., and the letters of Mazarin. Though the French afterwards denied strenuously that they had entertained any such plans, they are as clearly shown from this correspondence as their desire for Alsace and Lorraine. ² See Neg. Sec., ii., 2d part, 101, *et passim*.

³ Bougeant, iii., 136, 137.

⁴ Epis. Grotii, 718, 726, 975, *et passim*.

the French plenipotentiary at Münster, confessed he thought that Mazarin did not really desire peace. The same belief was held at Court. Anne was urged by her friends, by appeals to her religion and her blood, to end the war. She was beset by the Queen of England, now in exile, and by the Princess of Condé. One wept, the other groaned, but neither groans nor tears moved her. The general of the Capucins was sent from Rome; he fell on his knees before her and asked her to make peace and protect religion for the sake of God and her kingdom. But the Court lamented that the queen could hear but one voice, and that she would keep no secret from her minister.¹ An examination of Mazarin's letters and despatches does not confirm any such distrust as to his wish for peace on honorable terms. He proclaimed constantly such a desire, and his conduct does not seem to belie his claim. The diplomacy that he used was often tortuous, but his despatches and confidential correspondence show a genuine effort to procure peace upon the terms to which he thought France was justly entitled. He desired peace with honor. Mazarin had a strong longing for the Spanish Low Countries, and if Holland had still desired a vigorous prosecution of the war for their conquest it would perhaps have pleased him well. But a peace could now be made, which would extend the boundaries of France more than they had been for almost two centuries. An honorable, even a glorious end to a long war was surely better for his interests than a continuation of the ruinous taxation which was exciting general discontent. The Fronde was almost ready to break forth, and though such a movement was not anticipated, Spain in arms was always a dangerous ally for any discontented element. The Spanish, if they could make a separate treaty with Holland, did not care for peace with France, and they were ready to raise constant difficulties, while charging the delays to the French.

¹ Dis. Ven., filza cvi., 121, 182, 190, 241. "Che gli redice tutto cio che a lei viene detto senza guardar nel suo cuore secreto."

Peace with Spain might perhaps, however, have been actually made if the French had not insisted too long on what they really were willing to concede. Spain offered to yield Roussillon and what France then held in Franche Comté and Flanders, and to make a thirty years' truce with Catalonia. Mazarin was at heart willing to abandon Portugal, but the plenipotentiaries long insisted on her interests being provided for in the treaty.¹ Holland, in the meantime, proceeded rapidly with her own negotiations. In the spring of 1646, seventy-one proposed articles had been submitted to the Spanish for their consideration.² The French made repeated protests against these steps, but the States-General insisted that they were only acting with such celerity as should enable them to have the terms of their treaty adjusted as soon as those of the French.³ The successes of 1646 and the capture of Dunkirk quickened the desires of the United Provinces for a treaty with their ancient enemy. It was of enough importance to the Spaniards to make them willing to grant any reasonable terms. At peace with Holland, they might consider whether it was wise, at this time, to treat with France, and whether she, single-handed, would be able to hold the conquests she had made. In December, 1646, articles were signed between Spain and Holland to be inserted in the treaty of Münster, when that should be settled upon, though the States-General still declared that no peace should be made unless the terms were approved by France.⁴

Active hostilities were again commenced in 1647, but little progress was made in Flanders during this campaign. Though the Hollanders had not actually made peace with Spain, they gave the French no aid. Mutiny among his troops prevented Turenne from leading the whole of his experienced army to the Low Countries, and Condé was in Catalonia besieging Lerida with small success. There

¹ Lettres de Mazarin, iii., 69-77. Nég. Sec., iv., 224, 233.

² Bougeant, ii., 505.

³ See Nég. Sec., t. ii., 2d part, 178, 186, etc., and t. ii. and iii., despatches of 1645-6, *passim*.

⁴ Dumont, Corps Dip., vi., 380-385.

was trouble also in getting the French forces into the field. Some of the officers would not leave the Court, and Mazarin took the young king to Amiens to lead these recreants to the front.¹ The regiments were as poorly manned as they were officered. One regiment could show only seventy men. The lack of money, and the misery suffered by the army rendered it difficult to find any who were willing to serve.² To fill the ranks, boys were taken from the shops, vagabonds and loafers were arrested and sold to the recruiting officers at so much a head. A force was thus gathered, but undisciplined and better fitted for flight than for attack.³

In the meantime the Spaniards, no longer compelled to guard against the Hollanders, placed an army of 28,000 men under the command of the Archduke Leopold. No pitched battle marked the campaign, but its results were on the whole favorable to the Spanish.⁴ Marshal Gassion was killed late in the season, and the French lost in him one of their most skilful commanders. Resembling Turenne, and unlike Condé, and still more unlike the crowd of courtiers who commanded a regiment or a division for their summer diversion, Gassion knew no life but that of the camp; he had no ambition but for military glory. Fond neither of wine nor women, he spent whole days in the saddle, and his life was summed up in his favorite nickname, "La Guerre." Some of his associates showed very different qualities. In this campaign of 1647 the army, under the joint command of Gassion and Rantzau, was to march early for the relief of Landrecies; but it was the day for Rantzau to command, and he became so drunk overnight that it cost six hours of delay before he was sober enough to give orders.⁵ The French went into winter quarters in Flanders, discouraged by their slow success, suffering from cold and lack of provisions, and with soldiers and officers sharing a common discontent.

¹ Let. de Maz., ii., 429-434.

² Dis. Ven., cv., 202, Jan. 15, 1647.

³ Dis. Ven., 101., 141.

⁴ Let. de Maz., ii., 419, 452, 465, *et passim*, for 1647.

⁵ Montglat, 179.

The conclusion of peace by the United Netherlands was imminent, and in anticipation of this the Spanish showed no desire to come to terms with the French. The latter were now ready to abandon their position with regard to Portugal, but the Spanish found new difficulties in the status of the Duke of Lorraine. All the provisions of the peace between Spain and Holland had now been agreed upon. The French ambassadors protested in vain, and on January 30, 1648, the treaty was at last signed.¹ "One would think," wrote Mazarin, "that for eighty years France had been warring with the provinces, and Spain had been protecting them. They have stained their reputation with a shameful blemish."²

It was eighty years since William of Orange had issued his proclamation inviting all the Netherlands to take up arms "to oppose the violent tyranny of the Spaniards." Unlike the truce of 1609, a formal and final peace was now made. The United Provinces were acknowledged as free and sovereign states. At the time of the truce the Spaniards had only treated with them "in quality of, and as holding them for independent provinces." By a provision which had increased the eagerness for peace of the burghers and merchants of the United Provinces, it was agreed that the Scheldt should be closed. The wealth and commerce of Antwerp were thus sacrificed for the benefit of Amsterdam. The trade with the Indies was divided between the two countries. Numerous commercial advantages were secured and certain additional territory was ceded to the States-General. Full opportunity was given for the development of the Dutch commerce, and the people who had waged this long struggle, forty years for national life, and thirty years, partly for the welfare of their brethren in Germany, and still more for their own temporal interests, had now an opportunity to restore, by an abundant commerce, the ravages that war had worked, to make their country the richest, as it was the freest, in Europe.

¹ Dumont, *Corps Dip.*, vi., 429-435. Bougeant, iii., 349.

² *Lett. de Maz.*, iii., 62, 63.

The conclusion of the peace between Holland and Spain seemed by common consent to destroy all hope of peace between Spain and France. It was for this diplomatic victory the Spaniards had been struggling, and they had at last obtained it. They were ready to see whether they could not at last obtain more favorable terms than they could now presume to ask. Internal complications in France were greatly to change the aspect of this war. Before it was ended, the hero of Rocroi and Freiburg was to be seen leading Spanish armies against his own countrymen; and when peace was at last made, twelve years later, it was to be reached by the matrimonial alliance Mazarin had already suggested.

Although Mazarin seemed to have become a better Frenchman than most of the French politicians who surrounded him, an Italian cardinal could not lose all interest in Italian politics. The influence of France in Italy had, during the last few years, been seriously diminished. Urban VIII., who, from 1623 to 1644, filled the papal chair, was little in sympathy with the religious fervor of Ferdinand II., or with the Spanish zealots. He belonged to the school of political popes who sought to increase the temporal power, and to deal well by their relatives. Civita Vecchia was improved by him as a maritime port, and it was claimed it was made so free for all, that Barbary corsairs came there to sell the plunder they had taken from Christians.

Urban indulged in secular poetry and even set Simeon's song of praise to Sapphic measures. His kinsmen, the Barberini, were said to have gained from gifts and corruption 200,000,000 livres of money. Besides their plunder of the papal revenues, they destroyed so recklessly, in building their palaces, what the Goths and Vandals had spared of the remains of antiquity, that they furnished Pasquin with one of his most famous jests.¹ Such a pope sympathized with Richelieu, and was secretly, and at times openly hostile to the Emperor Ferdinand, who was devoting himself

¹ "What the barbarians have not done the Barberini have done."

to the great effort to reëstablish the Catholic faith in all Germany.¹ Mazarin was on intimate terms with Urban's nephews, the Cardinal Barberini and the Cardinal Antonio. The latter held the title of Protector of France at Rome; the arms of France were emblazoned over the door of his palace, and almost as much as the French ambassador he represented that kingdom at the Papal Court. During the long pontificate of Urban VIII., forty-eight cardinals had been created, who survived him, and the most of this number were controlled by the papal nephews, to whom they in great part owed their appointments.

On July 29, 1644, Urban VIII. died and the cardinals were shortly gathered together for the choice of a new pope. Fifty-five were present at the conclave. Cardinal Sacchetti was a friend of the Barberini and was also the choice of the French Court. Bentivoglio was first recommended, but he was old and feeble and died during the conclave. In Sacchetti, Mazarin wrote, all the conditions for a good pope were advantageously combined.² Panfilio, on the other hand, as a cardinal known to be devoted to Spain, the French minister was directed to oppose, and he was the first one against whom, if it became necessary, the veto of the French crown was to be interposed. It seemed improbable that the Spanish faction could secure any one specially friendly to that kingdom, as they could not count on over thirteen votes. It was impossible that any one should be chosen who was not acceptable to Cardinal Antonio, and his relations with France were such that he would consent to no one who was thought to be unfriendly to that country.³ The balloting began, and it seemed that Sacchetti could be chosen, but his friendly relations with France were known and the Spanish protector, on behalf of Philip IV., interposed the veto

¹ Ranke : "History of the Popes," ii., 238-298.

² Aff. Etr. Rome, t. lxxxi., cited in *Lettres de Mazarin*, ii., 249.

³ Aff. Etr. Rome, t. lxxxi., p. 437. Mazarin's desires are fully stated by the Venetian ambassador, with whom he consulted. *Dis. Ven.*, t. ci., a., 165, 189, 225, t. ci., b., 11, etc.

of Spain against his election.¹ It was on August 9th that the cardinals were confined for the conclave, and September was reached without a choice. The sultry weather of a Roman summer made the confinement still more trying. One cardinal had died, several were sick, and still twice each day the ascending smoke of burning ballots announced that no pope had yet been chosen.² Without, the disorder reigned, which was common at times when the church and the government were alike left without a head. Armed bands of marauders marched through the city. The houses of the wealthy were defended by garrisons, and assassinations were an every-day occurrence. The Barberini had become especially odious, and they were the objects of numerous popular demonstrations. Every endeavor was made to influence the cardinals in their confinement, and the French minister was ordered to see that the news of the victory at Freiburg should reach them in some manner, that it might increase the prestige of France.³

The Cardinal Panfilio was favored by many, but against him the French ambassador was ordered to use the veto if necessary, and Cardinal Antonio was unwilling to have a man chosen over whom he could expect to have little influence. Antonio's hostility was said to have been averted by a trick which should not have deceived an Italian priest. The cardinals were confined in separate cells or chambers. A friend invited Antonio into his cell, while Panfilio entered the next one, divided only by tapestry. There he was overheard saying that he would not become pope unless Cardinal Antonio desired, for it would be causing strife among the family of his benefactor, Urban VIII.; but should that happiness befall him, Antonio would hold a greater power than he had even under his uncle.⁴ However this may be, Panfilio bestowed on the Barberini affectionate compliments and treated

¹ *Let. de Mazarin*, ii., 249, 250. *Dis. Ven.*, ci., a., 226.

² *Nég. Sec.*, ii., 137.

³ *Dis. Ven.*, ci., a., 208.

⁴ *Fontenay Mareuil*, 273. Fontenay was one of the representatives of France at Rome during the election, and so had every opportunity of being well informed, but this incident seems a little mythical.

them with great marks of tenderness and love.¹ Beguiled by these considerations, Antonio prepared to lead his forces to Panfilio's support, and he advised the French minister to allow the election. St. Chamond, the ambassador, should have interposed his veto, but he was bewildered by these changes and wrote home for instructions.²

The terms submitted were that if France would consent to the choice of Panfilio, Mazarin's brother should be made a cardinal without requiring any nomination from the king, and some other benefits should be given the French crown,³ but before the answer was received which declined this proposition, the matter had been settled. Michel Mazarin, whose eagerness and indiscretion were a constant injury to his brother, was led to believe that his promotion as cardinal would be one of the first acts of the new pope, and his conduct, it was claimed, showed that the hostility of France to Panfilio had ceased. Antonio was besought by his friends not to await the return of the courier, which would either prevent Panfilio's election, or give the credit of it to France, and in an evil hour for himself he yielded. On the night of the 14th of September the cardinals flocked to the cell of Panfilio in their zeal to congratulate him who was soon to become the holy father. A few French cardinals endeavored to check the movement and to prevent Antonio from violating the express order of France, but without success. At the scrutiny on the morning of the 15th fifteen ballots were announced for Panfilio and thirty-three others, led by the Barberini, at once acceded. He thus received forty-eight out of fifty-four votes cast, and assumed the name of Innocent X.⁴ The new Pope was a man of blame-

¹ Mercurio, 681.

² It was charged against him also that he was promised 15,000 pistoles if he would withhold the veto, and that he was unable to refuse such a bribe. *Dis. Ven.*, ci., b., 83.

³ Instructions given Gremonville, published in "*Négociations d' Henri Arnauld*," t. i., 28.

⁴ Much valuable information about this election is found in "*Del Mercurio*" of Siri for 1644, t. iv., 1st part, 560-765, and the correspondence and negotiations of the parties are there fully given.

less life, of learning, and industry, but he was a strong friend of Spain, bitter in his animosities, and easily controlled by certain influences. His choice was received by the Spanish with greater exultation than they would have shown at gaining a battle.¹

The indignation of Mazarin at his election was fierce. St. Chamond was recalled from Rome in disgrace, and was accused of having betrayed the interests of France.² Mazarin charged the ungrateful Barberini with treachery and renounced their friendship.³ Antonio ceased to be the protector of France, and her arms were publicly torn down from his door. The Barberini soon found they had gained nothing by neglecting France, in the hope of possessing the good-will of the new pontiff. Innocent reserved his favors for those who were his friends from the first. It was not difficult to find in the long administration of Urban's nephews, innumerable proofs of their plunder and maladministration of the papal treasury. Proceedings were begun against them to recover the sums they were charged to have thus appropriated. The Pope was applied to for protection, but he only replied he could not stop the course of public justice.⁴

It was no part of Mazarin's character to struggle against the inevitable, and while he sought to wreak his vengeance on his representatives who had neglected their duty, he sent his felicitations to the new Pope on his election. "I must give reverent expression," he writes Innocent, "to my gladness that your Holiness has assumed the Pontificate, knowing better than any one else the solace which afflicted Christianity can hope from the talents of your beatitude, and assuring your Holiness sincerely that my joy at your exaltation has been extraordinary."⁵ Innocent had the power to bestow a favor for which Mazarin was very eager. His younger brother,

¹ *Nég. Sec.*, ii., 156.

² Grotius says that Cardinal Antonio threw the blame of the result on St. Chamond, saying that he did not use money as he was ordered. *Epis.*, 734; *Ined.*, 243.

³ *Grot. Epis.*, 972. *Dis. Ven.*, ci., b., 21, 22, 40, *et passim*.

⁴ Fontenay Mareuil, 275.

⁵ *Let. de Maz.*, ii., 89.

Michel Mazarin, inferior to him in capacity, was his equal in a restless desire for prominence and promotion. He was a Dominican monk, and held the office of master of the sacred palace. His promotion to the cardinalate was now eagerly pressed by his brother, though at times he affected an ostentatious indifference. Mazarin was charged with expending 12,000,000 livres of the money of France in his various endeavors to obtain this additional dignity for his family.¹

His first step was to gain the good-will of the Pope, by bestowing upon his nephew, Cardinal Camille Panfilio, an abbey worth 30,000 livres a year.² Michel Mazarin made the existence of the new French ambassador miserable by his eagerness and his solicitations for the promotion. Ambition had so turned the spirit of the good father, the ambassador wrote, that he thought his interest more important than that of the state; never demon was more importunate or listened less to reason. His zeal defeated itself. He told of the intention to give the abbey, and the Pope asked for it so eagerly that he obtained the promise of it from the ambassador at his second interview. Of this visit the ambassador writes: "The Pope, without giving me time to finish, demanded if his majesty desired to give an abbey to his nephew. After that I could not delay in offering a thing which was asked for with so much avidity. Then the visage of the Pope became serene, he seemed to grow ten years younger, and his eloquence was redoubled to express his thanks, saying, 'you have been the first to gratify us.'"³

But the abbey had been extorted without promises in

¹ Talon, 276.

² *Articles secrets pour M. de Gremonville, Négociations d'Arnauld*, i., 125, 126. Giustiniani speaks of this abbey when it was given to Mazarin in 1642, and says it was worth 40,000 livres a year (*Dis. Ven.*, xcvi., 354), but the war had so affected its rents, that once worth 60,000 a year, in 1644 it was worth but 30,000 (*Dis. Ven.*, cii., 14).

³ See despatch of Gremonville, printed in *Let. de Maz.*, ii., 161. The *Gazette* of 1645, p. 91, says that Mazarin gave the abbey of Corbie, which belonged to him, to Cardinal Panfilio, in his zeal for the interests of the state.

return. Innocent felt himself free to gratify his inclination, and he proceeded to nominate eight cardinals, all friendly to Spain, and of whom Michel Mazarin was not one.¹ The rule of the papacy forbade, it was said, that two brothers should be cardinals. It was a rule that had been broken for royal or princely families. The brother of Cardinal Richelieu had also been made a cardinal, but that was as a reward for the great victory of the faith in the capture of La Rochelle. France received no favors from the new pontiff. He gave some fair words and professed his affection for the interests of the kingdom, but Mazarin said that France received only the flowers and others had the fruit. One of those alleged to have joined in Beaufort's plot to murder the cardinal, had taken refuge at Rome, and his surrender was demanded; but even this was refused. Some Neapolitan bandits, under the orders of the Spanish minister, attacked a Portuguese bishop who was staying there under the protection of France, killed his companion, wounded his coachman, and left him apparently dead. The French minister demanded of the Pope that Spain should be compelled to surrender these ruffians. "It will be seen," he said, "whether he is Pope or only the chaplain of the Spaniards."² Failing to receive any satisfaction, the minister deemed it a good time to make his retreat, and for two years France had no ambassador at the Papal Court.

Mazarin was not discouraged by these failures, and he resolved on more rigorous measures to establish French influence at Rome. He received the Barberini again into favor, and they found a retreat in France.³ A more formidable movement was the attempt to capture from Spain the Tuscan Presides, places so situated that their holders had easy access to Central Italy.⁴ The war in

¹ Grotius, *Epis.*, 749, says the French were greatly offended by this choice of cardinals. The Venetian ambassador says: "L'avviso ha incredibilmente atterrato il signore cardinale" (*cii.*, 9, 91, March 21, 1646).

² See *Let. de Maz.*, ii., 148, and despatch to Brienne there cited.

³ *Dis. Ven.*, ciii., 168, *et passim*. The expedition to Piombino was planned in January, 1664. *Ibid.*, 183.

⁴ *Let. de Maz.*, ii., 267.

Italy had for some years languished, but hostility to the Pope stirred it again into life. New vessels were fitted out for the navy, and large preparations were made for the invasion of Italy. Michel Mazarin was sent to Toulon, where he superintended the preparations with as much vigor as if he were turning the guns on St. Angelo, to bombard a cardinal's hat from the Pope.¹

On April 26, 1646, the expedition set sail, and on the 9th of May, it cast anchor off the important city of Orbitello. The fleet consisted of 150 sail, and was expected to land 10,000 men, and Mazarin wrote that all Italy was in terror.² The ships were commanded by the Duke of Brézé, and no more skilful or gallant leader could have been found. Not turned to sloth by his great inheritance from Richelieu, and undismayed by the hostility of his enemies, he had gained at Carthagen a brilliant naval victory, and he now excited among the sailors entire confidence in similar achievements.

The command of the land forces was, however, entrusted to a leader whose deficiencies more than counterbalanced Brézé's skill. Mazarin desired an Italian prince to lead his expedition, and Prince Thomas of Savoy had been chosen for the command. His zeal might have been excited, because this enterprise presented dim but alluring possibilities. After the capture of Orbitello, which it was believed would not be long deferred, Mazarin hoped to send the expedition on to Naples.³ The disordered condition of that city furnished the opportunity of wresting it, and the territory of which it was the head, from Spanish rule. Prince Thomas might become the king of Naples and of the Sicilies, France receiving Nice and Savoy for her reward, should he or his descendants become heirs to Piedmont.⁴ But the incapacity of Prince Thomas made the crown of the two Sicilies even more remote than an ambitious dream.

¹ See *Gazette*, 1646, 565, 566.

² *Let. de Maz.*, ii., 749.

³ *Let. de Maz.*, ii., 738, 751, 765, 766, 774.

⁴ The terms of the treaty are printed in the Appendix to *Journal d'Ormesson*, t. ii., 710-713.

Orbitello was strongly situated on a narrow strip of land, and was well fortified. The sea wall rested upon enormous polygonal blocks, put together without cement, the relics of Etruscan fortifications. The situation had been chosen by a people who sought the safest places. But four miles from there was the Etruscan city of Cosæ, which Virgil counts among those which sent aid to Æneas, More modern but less ponderous works protected the city on the land side. But its capture was deemed so certain that great plans were built upon it. Mazarin wrote Brézé that perhaps the Neapolitans would prefer the crown of France for a mistress, and if so, they could make Prince Thomas Duke of Calabria.¹ Fearing that disease would come with the hot weather, Mazarin urged Prince Thomas to press forward with the siege.² But the most simple advances seemed beyond his skill. Repeated endeavors were made to pass the ditch which formed the first of the outworks. Hurdles were brought for a bridge, but as fast as they were laid the Spaniards burned them. "It is a strange affair to get over a ditch in Italy," Mazarin wrote a correspondent.³ A severe misfortune to the navy made the situation worse. In a sharp and successful engagement with the Spanish fleet, a cannon ball struck and killed the Duke of Brézé.⁴ His death was more disastrous than would have been the loss of twenty sail. The French fleet retired to Provence and left the sea open to the Spanish. Sickness was fast reducing the army on land, and on July 18th Prince Thomas raised the siege, which was no further advanced than when it was begun, and led back the remains of his command to Piedmont.⁵ Mazarin was greatly depressed by such a failure in a campaign which was to him of special interest. It excited also much hostile criticism in

¹ Let. de Maz., ii., Introduction, 37, 38.

² Let. de Maz., ii., 751, Introduction, 33-40.

³ Let. de Maz., ii., 311.

⁴ Journal du Siège. Lettres, ii., 773.

⁵ A journal of this expedition is printed in Appendix to Journal d'Ormeson, ii., 720-741. Its history can also be traced in Mazarin's letters. See also *Gazette*, 1646, 380-433, *et passim*.

France, and it was believed that his political fortunes would decline on account of the disastrous termination.¹ The news was received with great exultation at Rome, and the Pope said it was an enterprise not of the king, but of an individual, and by a plain miracle the Holy See had been protected from the evil which had been designed.²

But so mortifying an end to this expensive venture only strengthened Mazarin's resolution to make his power felt in Italy. The battered ships and fever-wasted soldiers were scarcely back in Provence, when the minister began to prepare a second expedition for the same end. There were arrears unpaid to the soldiers in Germany, but money was found for Italian conquest. By September a fleet of two hundred sail, with an army of eight thousand men commanded by the Marshals of La Meilleraie and Du Plessis, was under way. The expedition was conducted with skill and success. Orbitello was not again attacked, but Porto Longone, on the island of Elba, and Piombino, on the mainland, both places of much strategic importance, were captured after brief sieges.³ With this result came at once the change in the feelings of Innocent X. for which Mazarin had hoped. The position of France was now an imposing one in many ways. In a time of scanty means and dilatory campaigns it was a great proof of wealth and strength, that, after the defeat of Prince Thomas, a second expedition could have been equipped in two months, and a second campaign successfully prosecuted before winter. The places captured gave the

¹ Journal d' Ormesson, 350-356. Ormesson says, Aug., 1646: "On croit que tost ou tard cette entreprise perdra le cardinal."

² Négociations d'Arnauld, ii., 430, despatch of July 22, 1646. These despatches contain much that is curious. Mazarin had put in some letters the word "aimer," expressing his feeling to the Pope, and Innocent found in this some lack of proper veneration. "Truly," Mazarin writes Arnauld, "I should think his Holiness might be satisfied with the term 'love,' as that is all God requires of us, and with it He is well content" (iii., 152).

³ Mém. du Plessis, 382-386; Despatches of Mazarin, Brienne, and Arnauld, t. ii., iii., Négociations d'Henri Arnauld; Let. de Maz., ii., 330, 337, *et passim*; Gazette, 957, 999, 1053, etc.

French a strong and convenient foothold on the Gulf of Genoa and in Central Italy. Piombino was less than one hundred and fifty miles from Rome. Its revenues belonged to Prince Ludovisio, the Pope's nephew, and its capture was a sharp admonition of what could be expected from a reckless opposition to France.¹ The lesson was not unheeded, and the news of Piombino's fall prepared Innocent for a reconciliation. His manners towards the French became more affable.² He found it possible to interfere with the course of Roman justice; the prosecution of the Barberini was dropped, and their property was left to them. A matter more eagerly pursued was the cardinalate for Michel Mazarin. He had been made by France Archbishop of Aix, and was even appointed to the great office of Viceroy of Catalonia. He abandoned alike his religious and political duties, and returned to Rome, there to labor for his promotion. His brother wrote him sharply to proceed to Catalonia, but nothing could draw him from his absorbing hunt after a cardinal's hat. Nor had his brother been remiss in the use of his great power for the same end. Fontenay Mareuil, the most experienced in Roman politics of French diplomats, was again sent to Rome, and was impressed with the duty of obtaining this promotion.³ As a reward for this, he claims he was promised the lucrative and influential place of governor of the king's younger brother. Not relying on Mazarin's word, Fontenay had desired further assurances, but at last, in May, 1647, he departed, trusting in the promise which was never fulfilled.⁴

A matrimonial alliance had gained the aid of Poland for the ambitions of the Archbishop of Aix. Marie of Gonzagua was the daughter of that Duke of Nevers, who became Duke of Mantua. Many years before, she had been sought in marriage by Gaston, but Mary de Medici had

¹ *Lettres de Mazarin*, ii., 465, 466.

² *Mém. de l'Abbé Arnauld*, ed. Michaud, 518. Arnauld was then connected with the French mission at Rome.

³ See instructions of Brienne to Fontenay, April 19, 1647, published by Loyseleur.

⁴ Fontenay Mareuil, 275, 276.

prevented the match. The King of Poland had also been suggested as a lover, but he had preferred a German princess. With high rank but moderate means, Marie of Gonzagua saw years and princes go by, until she at last became the lady-love of Cinq Mars, and encouraged the advances of the son of a marquis. Cinq Mars' career ended in disaster, and with increased years and diminished beauty, she seemed destined to remain a virgin princess. But the German wife of Wladislas, the Polish king, had now died, and, in 1645, he came again to the French market.

Mazarin was eager to establish some French woman at the Polish Court, where her influence might aid in controlling its politics. But the king, though the ruler of a kingdom still of considerable political importance, was only a king by election. He was old, he was gouty, he lived in a country that seemed barbarous to a Frenchwoman, a country where men wore no linen and slept in their furs. Mademoiselle, the daughter of Gaston, disdained his suit, and an alliance with Mademoiselle de Guise was not favored by Mazarin.¹ It was therefore obtained for the Princess Marie, and to her it justly seemed a great elevation. The ambassadors of the Polish king visited Paris to carry back the bride, and they excited the admiration of a populace to whom they appeared more strange than now would an embassy from Japan.²

They were dressed in Eastern magnificence, and managed their horses with a skill that made the French gentlemen seem indifferent riders. Their garments of brilliant colors, red, yellow, brocades of silver and gold, were adorned with rubies, diamonds, and pearls. Furred bonnets covered shaven heads, and the hair that was uncut hung in a queue down their backs. While those of the French had only iron, their carriages were covered with massive silver, and even their horses were adorned with precious stones and shod with gold and silver. With all this gorgeousness they wore no linen, their clothes were dirty, and they

¹ Dis. Venez., cii., 9, March, 1645.

² Ormesson, 330.

themselves were so greasy, that Mme. de Motteville informs us they made her sick at heart.¹

The Princess Marie was duly married and assumed the crown. She told Mazarin he should see if she wore with wisdom that which he had placed upon her head.² Nothing could be added, wrote Mazarin, to the magnificence of the solemnity, nor the treatment which the ambassadors of the Polish king received. The expenses of the queen of Poland were defrayed to the frontier at an incredible cost.³ But the new queen tarried at Brussels, Amsterdam, and other cities along the route. Her delays wearied the king and distressed the nobles. Some of them were accompanied by a thousand servants and retainers, and the most powerful by three or four thousand, and they wasted in two months the income of two years.⁴

After three months the queen arrived at her kingdom, and found barbarity as well as splendor. Old, fat, broken-down by gout and chagrin, the king did not rise to receive his bride, and he found her, like Anne of Cleves, less fair than her portrait. "Is this the great beauty you have told me such marvels about?" he said to the French ambassador. She sat down to a supper composed of viands which offended alike her palate and her nose, and sighed to her companion, it would be better to return again to France.⁵ She gradually, however, acquired an influence over her husband, and from this Mazarin gained not only her good offices for France, but a family advantage which perhaps he had equally desired to obtain from this costly alliance.⁶ Like other Catholic kingdoms, Poland was entitled to nominate a cardinal, and this nomination Mazarin, after expensive negotiations, procured for his brother. He obtained also advantages for France which were some justification for the money spent on this marriage, and three thousand Polish soldiers served under Enghien at the siege of Dunkirk.

¹ Motteville, 91-96. Full accounts of the Polish embassy are given in the *Gazette* for 1645, 1001, 1016-1049; *Dis. Ven.*, ciii., 98, *et passim*.

² *Lett. de Mazarin*, ii., 772

³ *Ibid.*, 718. *Aff. Etr. Suede*, fo. viii., 372.

⁴ *Mazarin*, ii., 713.

⁵ Motteville, 96. ⁶ *Fontenay Mareuil*, 277.

Fontenay Mareuil, when he reached Rome, told Innocent that this nomination could now be granted to Poland, without justly exciting any jealousy in Spain. It would have been specially agreeable to Mazarin that it should have been so given, partly because he would have felt himself free from any uncomfortable sense of obligation to the Pope, and partly because he did not wish his brother's nomination to seem accorded to France. The great family of Condé wished their second son, the Prince of Conti, to become a cardinal, and their anger might justly be excited, if his promotion should seem to be delayed to advance an obscure Italian priest. But, though Innocent was brought to promise the promotion, he refused to grant it to Poland. It should be made with free will out of his own bosom. He desired, however, to tender an equal honor to the Spanish, and to send a messenger to their king to ascertain whom he desired for this place. This deference was due not only to a desire to please Philip IV., but to obtain from him the nomination of the Count of Ognate, the Spanish ambassador at Rome.¹ Innocent X., though not an especially bad man, was a weak one. His sister-in-law, Donna Olympia, influenced his policy, and controlled his patronage, and upon her the enormous bribes of the ecclesiastics and the foreign governments were bestowed. Count Ognate had promised her 100,000 scudi if she could obtain for him a cardinal's hat, and Innocent was eager for the opportunity of bestowing it. One hundred thousand scudi is said to have been promised to Olympia also, for the nomination of Mazarin's brother.² But the Spanish king did not desire Ognate, and on October 7, 1647, Michel Mazarin received the honor he had so long coveted, and assumed the title of the Cardinal of Saint Cecile. Among the cardinals created at the same time was a nephew of Donna Olympia who was but fifteen.³

¹ Dis. Ven., cvi., 267.

² Dis. Ven., cvi., 230.

³ Despatch of Fontenay to Brienne. Brienne says, despatch of October 18th: "J' ai eu grande joye de la nouvelle." See also despatch of Arnauld Oct. 7, 1647. *Négociations*, t. v., 278. Fontenay, 281. *Let. de Maz.*, ii., 890. *Mém. de Guise*, ed. Michaud, xxxi., 19-24.

Mazarin made but a poor return to those who had labored for the family advancement, and he reproached Fontenay Marcuil for having seemed to make this a national affair. But he showed excessive joy at the promotion, and it was justly charged that he had resolved to accomplish this matter by whatever means, and his affected indifference was an endeavor to avert the public indignation which his efforts excited.¹ To the Pope he sent some tardy and chilly thanks, but Innocent was grieved because there was nothing said of any allowance to his nephew from the revenues of Piombino. For Donna Olympia Mazarin suggested some tapestries, or a silver service, and at last sent some old clothes from the queen's wardrobe, out of fashion and not worth 4,000 scudi.²

Mazarin derived neither advantage nor comfort from the dignity he obtained for a dissolute and incompetent brother. The new cardinal went to Catalonia, and after staying there a few days, left his province without even asking the royal consent and returned to Rome.³ His appointment as viceroy excited the derision of the pamphleteers. They complained that Mazarin had gone to Italy to hunt up a begging friar, and had him leave his frock and wallet to make him a viceroy of Catalonia.⁴ The abrupt departure of the cardinal made the matter seem worse, and Mazarin complained of his conduct as a detestable example of frivolity and ingratitude, and protested he would do no more for one who gave him such returns.⁵ His brother was undisturbed by such reproaches, and continued at Rome, but there he died when only forty-one, the year after he had received his promotion. His death was said to have been caused by excessive debauchery.⁶ Little in Mazarin's conduct was as unjustifiable as

¹ Dis. Ven., cvi., 315, 319, etc. Despatches of Brienne to Fontenay, July 16 and Sept. 6, 1647.

² Fontenay Mareuil, 275-286.

³ Brienne to Font. Mar., October 25 and December 21, 1647.

⁴ Lettre d' un Religieux, Arch. Cur., 2d series, t. vii.

⁵ Lettres de Mazarin, iii., 88, 99.

⁶ Let. de Guy Patin—but Patin's statements as to the Mazarini must be received with some allowances.

his zeal for his brother's advancement, and by the general indignation it caused he largely increased his growing unpopularity.

During the expedition to Orbitello in 1646, Mazarin had closely watched Naples, whose coming revolution he foresaw. The ill-suppressed discontents of the city now showed themselves in disturbances, sudden and erratic as the eruptions of Vesuvius, and they offered to France an opportunity for seizing the richest of the remaining possessions of Spain.¹ After the vicissitudes of centuries, Naples and Sicily were now subject to the Spanish crown. They were governed by a viceroy, and were subjected to the drain of men and money which was the result of Spain's necessities and the characteristic of her rule. Burdened with taxation, they complained that their viceroy, the Duke of Arcos, was sending to Spain money raised solely for their own defence. The imposition of a duty on fruits, in a country where fruit formed a cheap article of diet for the poor, and where almost all were poor, kindled the long smouldering discontent. Under the leadership of a fisherman, nicknamed Masaniello, the people of Naples in 1647 rose in revolt. Springing from utter obscurity, this young man of twenty-seven, poor and illiterate, became powerful almost in a day. While the Duke of Arcos hid himself away from the revolt, Masaniello was made Captain-General of Naples. So sudden a change turned his head. At first he had been bold, popular, and judicious. He sought only, he said, to deliver the people from their taxes, and when that was done, he would return again to selling soles and red mullets. But political delirium seized him when he reached an elevation which, for him, was as dizzy as the throne of the Roman

¹ See despatches of Brienne to Fontenay Mareuil from April, 1647, to April, 1648, published by Loyseleur and especially despatches of August 16th, 23d, 30th, September 28th, etc. *Let. de Mazarin*, ii., 905, 921, *et passim*.

The idea of wresting Naples from Spain is suggested in the diplomatic correspondence of Lionne, then ambassador in Italy, with Mazarin in 1642 and 1643.

emperors, and like some who reached that terrible eminence, his brain was crazed by the bewilderment and ecstasy of power.

He made wild and incoherent speeches. He tore his garments, crying out against popular ingratitude, attacking groups of passers-by, riding his horse wildly through the multitude, and striking with his lance to the right and left. The populace wearied of its darling. Exalted to power on July 7th, he was murdered on the 16th, with the approval of those who had worshipped him a week before.¹ But the revolution did not perish with him. Successive chiefs were chosen and deposed by a fickle people. When the insurrection was active, the representatives of Spain promised untaxed fruits and the privileges allowed by Charles V., and they revoked their promises when it appeared to subside.

In the meantime, Mazarin watched the movement, uncertain as to the course he should pursue. He knew well how great a blow to Spain would be the loss of Naples and Sicily. "The loss of two kingdoms," he wrote, "would be the mortal blow to that monarchy."² From involving France in the troubles of Naples he feared, however, a twofold danger. Peace between France and Spain might now be very near. Already the negotiations for it had been embarrassed by the obligations which had been assumed to Portugal and Catalonia, and to interfere in Naples might only add a further complication. "I pray you above all things," he wrote Fontenay Mareuil, "whatever treaty we are obliged to make with these people, not to put us in condition where we cannot conclude peace without breaking our faith to them whenever the enemy consent to reasonable terms."³

Another consideration deterred the cardinal. His campaigns in Italy had not been marked by uniform success. The alluring beauties of Naples, the olives and orange

¹ "Parthenope Liberata," 7, 8, 1647.

² See also *Lettres de Mazarin*, iii., 75. "Perdre le royaume de Naples qui pourrait bien entraîner la perte de leurs estats d'Italie."

³ *Lettres de Mazarin*, ii., 529.

groves, the bay and islands, the gayety and the wealth of the garden of the world had often proved a fatal attraction for French valor. Charles VIII. had led to Naples an army composed of the flower of French soldiery and chivalry; he had returned broken in fortune and health, with the remnant of his forces bringing back with them only shame and shameful maladies. Louis XII. had marched to Naples in triumph, and had been driven out of Italy with defeat and disgrace. The populace was as fickle as in Roman days. Should the French fleet appear before the city, it might only create a burst of returning loyalty to Spain. Even if admitted as allies, they might soon become suspected and hated, the victims alike of fever and the vendetta. "Let us not gather the fruit till it is ripe," said the prudent cardinal. "Let us wait till the Neapolitans are so estranged from Spain that there can be no irresolution. Then let them choose some king who will not be Spanish, and France will help to establish his power. The Duke of Anjou or the Duke of Orleans would not go to Naples unless all was tranquil, and it would be hard to induce the people to choose either as king. But if they reflected a little they would choose Monsieur the Prince, who is most fit from birth and personal qualities. It seems to me impossible that he should not apply all his force and mind to become master of so beautiful, so great, and so rich a kingdom."¹ But Condé showed no inclination for the venture. Whether he viewed it as desperate, whether he distrusted the sincerity of Mazarin, and the help he would furnish, or whether he preferred being first prince in a great kingdom to being monarch of a small kingdom, he declined the cardinal's suggestions.

While the minister hesitated, the chance was seized by one who was never accused of too great caution.

"See," cried the courtiers at the tourney of 1662, as Condé and Guise led their respective troops, "the hero of

¹ *Ibid.*, ii., 530. This refers to the young Prince of Condé, who had lately succeeded to his father's title.

history and the hero of romance." Henry V., Duke of Guise, was born in 1614, and was now thirty-three years old. He had been intended for the church. Four abbey were conferred on him before he left his cradle, and at fifteen he was Archbishop of Rheims. But the youthful archbishop led a life more scandalous than that of any layman. His loves were innumerable. He even laid siege to the convent of which his sister was abbess, and paid indiscriminate court to the brides of the church. A more serious object of his devotions was Anne of Gonzagua, the sister of the future queen of Poland, and to her he was said to have been secretly married. By the death of his elder brother he had become Duke of Guise. Richelieu thought a man could not justly desire to be at once a priest and a husband, and he sought to lay hold of his ecclesiastical benefices. The archiepiscopal duke threw himself into the revolt led by the Count of Soissons, in 1641, and after that he retired to take service under the Emperor, hotly pursued, not only by his enemies, but by Anne of Gonzagua, who insisted she was his wife. He escaped them all, and married the beautiful Countess Bossut, and the ceremony was duly formalized by the Bishop of Moline. Not until 1644, when he had wasted her fortune of four hundred thousand livres, and had wearied of her charms, did he reappear at Paris. There he formed a still deeper attachment for Mlle. De Pons, one of the queen's ladies in waiting. The critical Tallement says she was too fat and too red in the face for her blonde hair; but Guise thought otherwise, and as "he made love as they do in romances," his devotions furnished pleasant diversion for the Court.¹ Twelve hours of the day he spent with his lady-love. He followed her carriage till the very artisans of the Rue St. Honoré talked of nothing else. When she went to the waters, he must needs have similar treatment; he took the same drugs in similar doses from the hands of the same apothecary, saying he could not be well when she was ill. The Countess of

¹ *Mém. Mme. de Motteville*, 64, 140, *et passim*.

Bossut said that she would encounter him in the midst of the Court and demand of him acknowledgment as his lawful wife, and if he denied her, she would shoot him then and there. "It is certainly true that I married you," he wrote her, "but so many of the doctors assure me you are not my wife, that I must needs believe them."¹

With all his extravagances, the duke had wit, talked well, was good-natured, generous, polite, and brave. "It is a pity," said Chevreuse, "that he is a fool." He took part in the duel with Coligny, and after that he presently went to Rome. There he hoped to have his marriage with the Countess of Bossut declared void, that he might marry Mlle. De Pons. Though Innocent X. was fond of the duke, he was not willing to countenance all his scandalous conduct, and no divorce was granted. While waiting for it, a fortune was offered Guise stranger than a half dozen new marriages. Representatives of the Neapolitan insurgents naturally turned to France for aid, but they had received from Fontenay only uncertain promises. The Duke of Guise was known to be ready for any chance of fortune; he possessed in abundance the qualifications that gain popularity with the multitude; he was young, affable, and daring; he spoke Italian like one born to the soil, and he was descended on the female side from the House of Anjou, which had once been sovereign in Naples.² Whom could the Neapolitans so properly choose for their leader as the romantic descendant of their ancient kings? To the propositions which were made to him the duke lent a willing ear. The wilder and more chimerical the scheme, the more it attracted his active fancy, and the possibility of gaining, by a brilliant display of daring and resolution, supreme power in a strange land, and that land the most beautiful and romantic of the world, might have turned cooler heads than that of Guise. He did, however, first

¹ For all this see chiefly Tallemant des Réaux, vol. vii., 111-121; also Mém. de Motteville. Tallement is given to untrustworthy gossip, but no stories he could tell would be more scandalous than Guise's adventures.

² Modène, ii., 275.

consult France in reference to an undertaking which he claimed was to be solely for her honor and advantage.¹

This new plan was full of embarrassment for Mazarin. He had little confidence in Guise's ability, and no confidence in his fidelity. The duke suggested to the Neapolitans a republic, in which he hoped for himself a place like that of the Prince of Orange in Holland.² Mazarin preferred for them a monarchy, and a monarchy in which so uncertain a friend as the Duke of Guise should not be king. He did not wish to be held responsible for the absurd and compromising failure, which he doubted little would be the result of the duke's expedition. Yet, on the other hand, it did not seem that one could refuse to countenance a French prince in wresting Naples from the control of a Spanish king. Mazarin answered, endeavoring to chill Guise's ardor by the perils of the undertaking³; but the matter was left for final decision with the representatives of France at Rome, and from them Guise seems to have received some authority for his enterprise.⁴ Mazarin's letters show that he had no confidence in Guise's success, and no sympathy with his movement. "It is an altogether *bizarre* incident," he wrote Fontenay Mareuil, "which we

¹ Mém. de Guise, 26.

² Mém. de Guise, 25.

³ See letter of Mazarin to Guise of Oct. 7, 1647. Comte de Modène, i., 112-114.

⁴ Such, I think, was the tenor of these instructions. M. Cheruel, with his usual learned criticism, has shown that a formal letter of authority to the Duke of Guise, dated October 5, 1647, was probably dated back and furnished him after his capture, in order that, as an accredited representative of France, he might be protected from the summary execution which the Spaniards could say was due a freebooter who assisted a revolting province without authority from any power engaged in regular warfare. But Mazarin's letter to Fontenay Mareuil, of October 7th, does not, I think, show that a formal refusal had been given Guise, and in a letter to his brother, written October 17th (Letters, ii., 961). Mazarin seems to have acknowledged that he had written Guise in about the terms that the latter claims (Mém. de Guise, 32). See also Let. de Mazarin, ii., 506; iii., 47. The letter of October 7th is very ambiguous, and could be construed any way, and subsequently Mazarin seems to have acknowledged that Guise had authority for his expedition from the representatives of France at Rome.—Let. de Mazarin, iii., 47, 122.

can no more comprehend than you do."¹ "I will tell you in confidence that the character of the Duke of Guise gives me pain, fearing that his voyage will hurt and embarrass us from his small experience, where the most discreet politician would be none too skilful."² "I fear all the negotiations of the duke will end in smoke."³

Undaunted by any such sinister forebodings, Guise prepared to embark for Naples. Glowing statements of the strength of the revolt were made by the emissaries, and believed, because he wished to believe them, by the duke. One hundred and seventy thousand men were said to be in arms, bold, active, ready for any enterprise. Five or six thousand horse could easily be collected; there were three or four millions of gold, magazines filled with powder and ball, abundance of artillery, and provisions for five months in the granaries. The Spaniards could not only be driven from the country they held about Naples, but the war could be carried into Sicily and Sardinia, and these provinces wrested from Spain.⁴ "Most Serene Highness," said the formal letter of invitation to the duke, "the faithful people of Naples, with tears of blood, entreat your highness to be its defender, as is the Prince of Orange in Holland, and to procure it the assistance your highness has offered in your letter, which the people have received with open arms. We fail not to pray continually to the Blessed Virgin, our Lady of the Carmelites, that we may soon see your highness, and feel the effect of your valor.

"Your highness' servant, the people of Naples."⁵

On November 14, 1647, taking with him four thousand pistoles in money and a half dozen domestics, the duke embarked in a felucca, one of the petty boats that cruise along the Mediterranean, and set sail for the city

¹ Let. de Mazarin, ii., 505; see also 485, 506-7, etc. Brienne to Fontancy Mareuil, Oct. 5, 1645.

² *Ibid.*, 526.

³ Let. de Mazarin, ii., Int., p. 50. In 1644, Mazarin's views about Guise are found in his *Carnets*: "He is frivolous and capable of throwing himself foolishly into every ill-advised or unfortunate affair. I distrust him, and he will not change his character."—*Carnets*, vi., 63.

⁴ Mém. de Guise, 32.

⁵ Mém. de Guise, 37.

of which he hoped to become the liberator. Sailing by rocky and volcanic Ischia, at break of day on the 15th they rounded the bay, and saw Naples lying before them, with the Spanish army encamped about. Passing towards Torre del Greco, and escaping the Spanish cruisers, at eleven in the morning the duke set foot on land, and was received by the tumultuous applause of a great multitude.¹

He found the condition of affairs full of peril and uncertainty. The Spainards had been driven from the city, but their forces lay near to it, threatening alike its supplies and its safety. Among the lower elements of the populace the nobility were disliked, and the nobles had been exposed to violence and plunder from the ruffians and robbers who were always active in such uprisings. They had, therefore, withdrawn from the town, and, almost without exception, preferred trusting themselves to the Spaniards rather than to the perils of popular rule. Among the population still remaining in the city, the controlling element was the "Black Capes," as they were called, the bourgeois, artisans, officials, and most of the middle classes. They, however, were actuated by widely different feelings. A large portion were content with the rule of Spain, if reasonable reforms could be assured; while another element deemed its best interest might be in assisting a Spanish restoration, regardless of terms, and yet a third was in favor of the establishment of a republic. Outside of these was the great body of the *lazzaroni*, the larger part of the population of the city, which then contained about 200,000 inhabitants.² They filled the densely peopled portions of the town, and in these narrow, filthy, and swarming streets a popular leader could at any time gather around him a multitude,

¹ Let. de Mazarin, ii., 556-7, and Despatch of Fontenay Mareuil cited in note. *Mém. de Guise*, 49-52. *Modène*, ii., 180 *et seq.*

² I am not aware of any accurate figures of the population of Naples at this time. From such statistics as I have found I have estimated it at this number. Montglat, 191, states the population at 500,000, but if by this he means the city proper and not the entire district I think his estimate much too large.

having nothing to lose and the hope of something to gain, ready to plunder a palace, to tear in pieces some tribune whose rule had become tiresome within the month, to bear in triumph, amid tears and shouts, a new favorite, who would receive their allegiance and heaven's blessing at some miraculous shrine of the Virgin.¹

The situation in this tumultuous city was far different from what Guise had hoped. After offering his prayers to our Lady of the Carmelites, he was presented to Gennaro Annese. Annese's predecessor, Don Francisco Toralto, had been one of the many examples of how dangerous was power at Naples. After a brief authority, his head had been cut off, and his heart, torn from his body, had been presented to his wife in a silver basin. Annese had lately been declared the generalissimo of the people, under the newly proclaimed republic. "He was," says the duke, "a little man of infamous appearance, very black, with big eyes, a mouth that seemed a slit, and a rough gray beard. He could hardly speak two words without hesitation, and he trembled at every noise he heard. Twenty guards, much like himself, stood near him. He carried half a dozen pistols in a belt of red velvet, which formed part of a dress consisting of a buff cape, adorned by crimson sleeves, with scarlet breeches and a hat of gold cloth, while he bore a great musket in his hand for further protection." Guise handed him a letter from the Marquis of Fontenay, assuring him of French protection, which Gennaro gravely scanned and turned on all four sides. Then, handing it back to the duke, he said he could not read, and begged him to tell its contents. In the meantime came a great knocking at the door and presently entered a man with a sword, but no hat, and with two rosaries about his neck. He flung himself on the floor and began to kiss the duke's feet. Raising up this figure, which Guise believed to have escaped from the madhouse, he was presented as Luigi

¹ See the situation fully described in "*Histoire du Soulèvement de Naples*," du Comte de Modène, ii., 78-86.

del Ferro, the authorized representative of France with the republic. Dinner was now served, but Gennaro, fearing poison, insisted upon his wife's acting as cook and waitress. Unfit, as Guise thought, to be either a lady or a cook, this person served a meal which seemed dirty and ill-prepared to the fastidious Frenchman. She was attired in blue brocade with silver embroidery, and adorned with diamond ear-rings, and a collar of pearls which had belonged to the Duchess of Montalcone, and thus decked out she served the feast, and, when it was over, attended to washing the dishes. As the representative of France, Guise thought Luigi del Ferro should dine with them, but Gennaro assured him that was quite absurd; Luigi was at the most only worthy to wait upon him, and this the ambassador proceeded to do, serving the wine upon his knees.

The meal ended, the duke questioned the municipal authorities, and found the 170,000 men in arms dwindled to 4,000 foot-soldiers and 300 horse, with scanty supplies of ammunition, and provisions in the city for only twelve or fourteen days.

These revelations, that the reports brought him at Rome had been characterized by more than ordinary southern exuberance, were interrupted by a butcher, the captain of one of the quarters of the city, who bursting in the door and crying out that Gennaro was a traitor, proceeded to inflict vigorous blows upon him, with resounding threats that he would break his head. Gennaro threw himself on the floor, and embracing the butcher's knees, begged for life. His wife besought the duke for succor, and he succeeded at last in quieting the unruly patriot. Hardly was this incident over when cries and lamentations burst upon their ears. One Rouse, a famous bandit, had led a force against some nobles, and had been routed, and his men, running through the streets, wounded and frightened, threw the city into such a turmoil, that the whole town was ready to lay down its arms in dismay. Presently came more successful warriors, a gang Gennaro had

sent out to sack some houses. They now returned bringing plate and costly furniture, which was placed with the great accumulation of such booty that Gennaro had stored away in the tower he occupied. Wearied with the day's vicissitudes, the duke was to find no rest by night.

There was danger, Gennaro insisted, that his enemies would come and cut his throat, unless Guise would sleep with him and protect him from peril. The duke protested against inconveniencing Madame Anne, but Gennaro assured him that she would sleep on a mattress before the fire, and he led Guise into a room where was a young slave, plainly suffering from small-pox. There were great amounts of plate, chests of sequins and of pearls, bracelets and chains, rich furniture and beautiful paintings, the results of systematic and successful plunder, piled in vast confusion. Reposing on a state bed, rich in brocade and gold, the unhappy duke was awakened twenty times during the night by Gennaro embracing him, and with tears in his eyes, adjuring him to protect his life from the malice of his enemies.¹

Amidst such difficulties and trials, Guise conducted himself with more judgment than might have been expected. He was installed as generalissimo of the armies of Naples and defender of its liberties. He swore upon the Holy Gospel that he would not lay down his arms until he had procured for the people repose and liberty, and he received from Cardinal Filo Marini the benediction of the sword which marked his dignity. Gennaro was continued in the chief civil authority.²

The new generalissimo possessed the popular qualities of his family. He had a word for all; he held the babies at the font, chatted with the men at the market, and smiled at the ladies in the windows. He found himself preceded by a reputation for gallantry, and the French, as a nation, were ill-viewed by the jealous Italians. With unusual prudence, he strictly confined his devotions to smiles, and amid the many opportunities offered by the

¹ *Mém. de Guise*, 53-56.

² *Guise*, 60.

romantic and beautiful Neapolitans to their chivalrous protector, he preserved strict decorum and chastity. What was more important, he took vigorous steps to check the pillaging and robbing which alienated the better classes and enriched the outcasts of the city. By a reasonable activity, communications were kept open; provisions for some time remained plentiful and were sold at moderate prices. Not only was Guise liked by the people, but in him lay their hopes of French assistance, and he could exercise a vigorous and at times a severe supervision over unruly lieutenants. As he rode through the streets filled with decorations, the women threw flowers and burned perfumes before him, and the men shouted and gesticulated with the ardor of a southern population. He felt sufficiently sure of his position to leave the bed and board of Gennaro, to the regret of the latter, who already viewed with jealousy the power and popularity of the new favorite. The two authorities occasionally came into collision. Guise had issued strict orders against pillage, and one of his officers stopped a body of Gennaro's followers, who, under the pretext of searching for hidden arms, had been sent to gain some plunder. Gennaro retaliated by sending the officer to prison. Thereupon Guise called a conference with the captains of the quarters, and "treating them," he says, "with the contempt one ordinarily feels for that sort of people," he told them that having the command of the army, none but himself should interfere with or punish any of the soldiery. Gennaro replied with some impertinence. The generalissimo at once broke his baton and said that such a rabble did not deserve to be commanded by one of his rank, and he would leave them to suffer the loss of their property, the dishonor of their families, and the desolation of their city from the vengeance of the Spaniards. Terrified at such a threat, those present offered to throw Gennaro out of the window, to cut off his head, or to hang him up by one foot if that would allay the duke's discontent, while the wretched man, throwing himself at Guise's feet, kissing

them a hundred times and bathing them with his tears, besought his pardon.¹

The duke resumed the baton and proceeded with an administration, frequently varied by similar incidents. Attempts were made to regain the nobility, with much persistence and little success. Their property was carefully protected, and they themselves treated, so far as the usages of war allowed, with distinguished courtesy. Guise contrived to meet some of their representatives and endeavored to win them to his support. He was looked upon by many of them with no unfriendly eyes, but his cause and his followers repelled them. "Our view," said one of them, "is that a republic is not fitted for us, and we will not hear it spoken of. We will never allow the people to share in authority with us. Our genius is so active and self-supporting, that we cannot suffer an equality of power. We are born for a monarchical state, and we cannot do without a king."²

Some brief skirmishes during December resulted favorably to the city and increased Guise's reputation and popularity. He was fortunate enough to be hit in the face by a spent bullet, and to be injured sufficiently to show the marks for a few days. There was not a man or woman in the city who did not press to see the traces of the wound, pouring out benedictions on the valor and the skill of the illustrious defender, on whom depended their repose and their liberty.

On December 18th, the French fleet, bearing the assistance so much desired and so long expected, came in sight.³ It was under the nominal command of the Duke of Richelieu, the heir to the title and to much of the wealth of Cardinal Richelieu, but a youth little fitted to add to the lustre of a great name. Mazarin's views of what was to be accomplished by this expedition were not clear to the world, and perhaps not clear to himself. Richelieu seems to have had no more definite instructions

¹ Guise, 73, 74.

² *Ibid.*, 91, 92.

³ Despatch of Fontenay Mareuil, published in *Let. de Maz.*, ii. 558.

than to offer the assistance of France to the Neapolitans, and to protect them from the oppression of Spain.¹ He succeeded in accomplishing nothing at all, even more than was usual with fleets furnished with inefficient officers and despatched with uncertain orders. An excellent opportunity to attack and scatter the Spanish was first neglected, but when the French fleet cast anchor before Naples, peacefully if ingloriously, Guise naturally expected assistance from it in men, money, and supplies. Unless with such a purpose, there seemed no reason why twenty-six men-of-war should spend nearly a month in sailing from Toulon to Naples, and there remain for over two weeks. But the only occupation furnished the soldiers was to burn a few ships, and to gaze leisurely on Vesuvius and the Bay of Naples. The truth was that Mazarin, even if desirous of crippling the Spaniards, was very averse to assisting Guise. He believed that the duke either desired to form a republic, of which he should be chief, or a monarchy, of which he should be king, and neither plan was agreeable to the cardinal. He distrusted his ability and his purposes, and he regarded his presence at Naples as a detriment to the interests of France.² The French representative, the Abbé of Basqui, waited upon the duke to confer as to the aid that was to be given him. The abbé held out much that was attractive, but like the viands placed before Sancho at Barataria, they were withdrawn as soon as shown.

There were 500,000 francs, but they were in bills of exchange, and it was impossible to obtain the money on them at Naples in its present disorder. There were supplies of wheat, but they had not come. Vessels from Provence had been ordered to bring the grain, and would undoubtedly soon arrive. There were soldiers who would be furnished, and Guise asked for six thousand, four thousand, three thousand, two thousand, and at last had to be content with the promise of eighteen hundred. These

¹ See instruction printed by Modène, i., 121, 133.

² Let. de Maz., ii., 554-567, *et passim*; iii., 29, 41-45.

men, and a little powder, were all that he obtained. It was understood at Paris, the French envoy said, that Gennaro was the chief officer of the republic, and with him, therefore, his arrangements must be made. Guise replied that he would promptly relieve him of that embarrassment. On the 20th, he rode through the city, haranguing great crowds at the places where they assembled in times of any excitement. The bell of St. Lawrence sounded and gathered together the leaders of the orders and the officers of the city, and by them Guise was promptly granted absolute power, both civil and military. He informed Gennaro that he might resign his authority at ten o'clock mass the next morning, or, if he did not, his head should be cut off, and his body hung to the gibbet in the centre of the market-place.¹

Gennaro chose the former alternative, which was accompanied by the promise of a dukedom, rich lands, and 50,000 crowns a year so soon as peace should be established. Still the promised succor was not furnished. Basqui suggested having Mazarin's brother, the Cardinal of St. Cecile, established as the protector of Naples. To this Guise replied that he himself had been sent for by the people, and that the Cardinal St. Cccile, as the protector of a republic, would only be a joke for Pasquin.²

He declined an invitation to visit the fleet and there consult with the French generals. It was not impossible that, with Guise once on the fleet, the French might have thought the best way to solve a knotty problem would be to keep him there and give their assistance to some other leader.³ For whatever reason, he declined the invitation, and the French in turn declined by act, if not by word, to furnish the promised assistance. The fleet had now lain for fifteen days before the city, and nothing had been accomplished or attempted. Both water and supplies, it was claimed, were lacking for the men, and without further endeavor, the ships weighed anchor and sailed for Provence,

¹ Guise, 99.

² Dis. Ven., cvii., fo. 146. Guise, 103.

³ Mazarin suggested Guise's arrest later.—Letters iii., 59.

leaving Guise and the Neapolitans to work out their own salvation or their own ruin.¹

If the duke had not gained a firm hold on that fickle people, this lamentable failure of the long-expected assistance from France would have driven him from power, and he would have been fortunate to have escaped being hung in the market-place. But though the great hopes that had accompanied his romantic undertaking were beginning to fade, he apparently remained in full favor. From France he could now expect nothing. Mazarin had plausible grounds for withholding his assistance. Guise sent no report of his affairs to Paris, but proceeded like an independent sovereign, advising no more with the Palais Royal than with the Vatican.

A communication which he did send was not of a nature to remove Mazarin's belief, that he was a shallow and feather-headed man. Mlle. De Pons had watched with interest her lover endeavoring to free Naples from Spain. She carried herself as already Duchess of Guise, and soon, perhaps, to be the Queen of Naples and the Sicilies. Her extravagances were such, that the regent directed her to be confined in the Convent of the Daughters of the Holy Mary. When Guise received this news, he neglected watching the intrigues of Neapolitan fishermen and bandits long enough to send his remonstrances to the French Court. "If the passion I have always had," he wrote Mazarin, "for Mlle. De Pons, and which is now more strong and faithful than ever, were not known to your Eminence, you might be surprised that in the condition I am, I should write you thus. But it is the effect of despair, for I confess to you that neither ambition nor the desire to immortalize myself by extraordinary actions would embark me in this perilous enterprise, but the sole thought that by doing some glorious thing I could better merit the good graces of Mlle. De Pons, and after so many perils and pains, pass softly with her the rest of my days.

¹ Guise, 94-109. *Let. de Maz.*, iii., 24, 38, 39, *et passim*. *Relation du Duc de Richelieu*, published by Modène, i., 133-167. Modène, ii., 254-314.

While I hazard my life here, they maltreat and imprison the being I love. Remedy this, and you shall see that never man was so bound to you. Without this, neither fortune, nor greatness, nor life itself are important to me."¹

"Can a man who writes in this way," said Mazarin, sending this letter to Fontenay Mareuil, "be capable of conducting a great enterprise?"

The situation began to darken about the love-lorn adventurer. "The Duke of Guise," Mazarin wrote, "seeks only his own ends, which are based on confusion and disorder, and will some day end with his own ruin and great prejudice to this crown."² He was exposed to constant threats. Fear of them bred suspicion, and suspicion led to a series of bloody punishments. Gibbets were placed in different quarters of the town, and the market-places often witnessed the brutal scenes, in which the Neapolitan mob would tear to pieces the body of one who had been their leader a few days before. Fair order was, however, still preserved in the city, and the shop-keepers and trades-people had again resumed their avocations.³ Courts were organized which administered fairer justice than had been usual at Naples, and the duke himself every Wednesday and Saturday sat in review of their decisions, modifying, affirming, or reversing them with a zeal that was always honest, and which, he tells us, was so marked by reason and justice that no one ever found aught to say against the judgments he pronounced.⁴ But by the vigor and sometimes the cruelty with which Guise punished disorderly pillaging, he took the risk of offending that great body of the *lazzaroni*, which was the largest and most active element in the revolt. His desire to conciliate the

¹ See this letter published by the Count of Modène, t. i., 169-171. Also pp. 9 and 10, *Mém. de Guise*, ed. Michaud. Also *Let. de Maz.*, iii., 44, *et passim*. "Parano incredibili," Mazarin writes of Guise, "queste leggierezze à chi non conosce la natura di questo signore."

² *Let. de Maz.*, iii., 12, 13. See also 27, 32, 41, *et passim*.

³ Such is Guise's statement; but the Count of Modène, who was also a party in this affair, says food was scarce and dear, and from this cause trouble increased in the city.

⁴ Guise, 168.

nobility, a desire that caused the most scrupulous protection of their property, excited also a certain distrust among the people.¹ A Guise might legitimately have been willing to rely solely upon popular support, but fifty years had affected the sentiments of the Guises, as of all the French nobility. The distance between the nobles and the masses had increased. Caste feeling had grown stronger and more intolerant. Guise could not reconcile himself to having his rule depend upon the sellers of fish or the dealers in macaroni. To hold consultations with the proprietor of a coral-shop, and issue his orders to a tallow-chandler, was too unpleasant a tenure, even of a throne. He could conceive of no suitable government except one in which a nobleman should bear the sword of state, and a marquis of long descent should throw open the door for the morning levée. The nobility could not, however, be induced to return to the city, and the Genaros and Andreas continued plotting for the overthrow of one from whom they received little favor.

Crowds from the lower quarters of the city poured into the burghs of the Virgin, where lived the black capes and bourgeois, and the influence of the generalissimo was needed to quell the occasional quarrels that arose between them. The Spaniards still held Castel Nuovo, the Castle of St. Elmo, and the strong positions about the city. In February, 1648, the duke resolved upon an endeavor to dislodge them. Paul of Naples furnished a large body of bandits, of which he was leader, to be used in connection with the soldiers of the city, but either from inefficiency or treachery, the assaults were unsuccessful. It was evident that Paul was guilty of insubordination or disloyalty, and Guise spread consternation among the outlaws by executing their leader on the following day.²

It still seemed possible that he might succeed in establishing a government independent of Spain, but on any day a revolution was likely to burst forth and overthrow

¹ Mazarin also thought it necessary to obtain the support of the nobility.
—Lettres, iii., 990, 25.

² Guise, 163.

him. The affairs of the Spanish were judiciously managed by the new commander, Don Juan of Austria, and scarcity of food and a growing weariness of Guise assisted him in obtaining adherents within the city of Naples. On April first, a black circle above the moon seemed to overshadow the top of his palace, and the duke's friends told him this was of evil augury and foreshadowed his imprisonment before the month was passed.¹

"I suspected it," he admits, for he took deep counsel with a soothsayer, who was said to have prophesied for him the throne of Naples, "but I answered them that this black circle represented the crown of Naples, not now in its ordinary lustre and beauty."

On the next morning his astronomer, Cucurulle, the most famous astrologer of Italy, asked leave to retire, as the omens indicated a return of fortune to the Spaniards, while Guise's own horoscope showed great danger imminent, and Mars in the 12th house foretold his imprisonment. The astrologer received his passport and bade adieu. But Guise, notwithstanding the malignity of Mars and his own apprehensions of this sinister omen, having made his prayers to St. Gennaro, and kissed the miraculous vial of his blood, marched to Posillipo, and from there crossed to the island of Nisita. He was warned to return to Naples, but thinking all was safe, he proceeded to lay siege to the fort. But Gennaro, Andrea, and many others had made terms with the enemy, and were now prepared to betray the city. One Sebastian Landi, who commanded at the gate of Alba, had been bribed by them, and early on the morning of April 5th, the Spanish entered at that gate, and supported by an eager multitude crying: "Peace! Peace! Live Spain and die France," they captured the town almost without striking a blow.

A few hours later the news reached Guise at Nisita. His mind was always filled with some hero he would imitate, and he trod in the recorded steps of Scipio, Cæsar, or Alexander as the occasion and his recollection suggested.

¹ *Ibid.*, 186.

He was now inclined to imitate the Prince of Orange at Nieuport, and kill the messenger of evil tidings lest his troops should be alarmed by them.¹ But so heroic a step was not taken; he soon found the soldiers in tears at the intelligence, and his forces melted away more rapidly than ice before the southern sun. Guise endeavored, with a handful of followers, to escape towards Capua, but they were captured by a detachment of Spaniards. Mazarin's prophecy was fulfilled, and the whole undertaking vanished in smoke almost within twenty-four hours. By the petition of powerful friends and by the avowal of France, Guise was saved from the public execution which some of his enemies demanded, but he was presently taken to Spain, and there was kept a prisoner during four years.²

In the meantime Mazarin had been as anxious to take some part in the affairs of Naples, as he was apprehensive of the conduct and qualities of Guise. After the failure of the first expedition he at once prepared a second fleet. This was to proceed to Naples and assist the people in their revolt, and if there was no other alternative they would have rendered the aid to Guise which was so grudgingly bestowed. But before the fleet had set sail Mazarin's anticipations had been fulfilled, and the Duke of Guise had been overthrown. The cardinal felt little regret, and he believed that if some one could be found to assist them in Naples, the affairs of France would soon be in better condition than when Guise had the direction.³

¹ Guise, 194.

² The authorities for this expedition are chiefly to be found in Mazarin's letters for 1647 and 1648. Despatches of Brienne, Sec'y of State to Fontenay Mareuil the ambassador at Rome, published by Loysel. *Mémoires du Duc de Guise*, ed. Michaud, t. xxxi. "Histoire du Soulèvement de Naples," par le Comte de Modène, consisting of his own memoirs based upon the active part he took in the expedition, and a valuable collection of letters, and instructions, mostly of Mazarin to the various French representatives.

Much information about the affairs of Italy and some about this expedition is found in "Négociations d'Henri Arnauld." These contain all of Arnauld's despatches and many of Mazarin's and Brienne's letters, during the years Arnauld was at Rome. ³ Let. of May 5th, to Plessis Besancon.

It was hoped that the discontents at Naples would soon cause another revolt, and that the French army would be hailed by the people as their deliverers from an odious tyranny.

But Mazarin was mistaken in his judgment of the revolutions at Naples. The only opportunity for an interference that might have wrenched that kingdom from Spain, was when Guise had become its leader. When Mazarin hesitated to assist the man he mistrusted and despised, he lost the only chance that fortune offered him. The new expedition was put under the leadership of Cardinal Grimaldi and of the Prince Thomas of Savoy, who had already proved his incapacity before Orbitello. It finally appeared before Naples in the summer of 1648, but the anticipations of a rising were bitterly disappointed.

The Neapolitans were discouraged by the result of the last insurrection; they were well inclined to Don Juan, and they bore no love to the French. After asking in vain for aid for almost a year, they did not now care to expose themselves to the dangers of a movement against Spain, because a few French ships were in the bay.

Receiving no popular aid, the expedition, after some ineffective endeavors, was abandoned, and the fair hopes ended in a shameful retreat. "We have entirely lost our fancy of interfering in the affairs of Naples," the secretary of state wrote in the following spring, when the idea was again suggested.¹ The condition of popular feeling at Naples was so uncertain, its distance from France was so great, and the Spanish influence was always so large, that any attempt to use the popular discontents to wrest that city and Sicily from Spain might have ended in failure, but a judicious observer said that if Richelieu had been living the revolt would have had a different result.²

¹ Brienne to Fontenay, September 4, 1648.

² Montglat, 192. The authorities for the last expedition against Naples are chiefly the despatches of Brienne and Fontenay, published by Loys-eleur, 343-376, and despatches of Mazarin, published by Modène, i., 172-237.

Mazarin wrote in March, 1648, that the affairs of Naples were of such importance that a favorable result would give the crown an enormous advantage and force the Spaniards to a peace, while the contrary would show that France, from ill management, had lost the fairest opportunity that would ever be presented.¹ His conduct must be judged by his own admission.

¹ Let. de Maz., iii., 56. Letter to Cardinal Grimaldi: "Per mal governo se fosse lasciata uscir dalle mani la piu bella occasione che le potesse mai nascere." See also *Ibid.*, 38, 39.

CHAPTER IX.

PARLIAMENT AND THE BEGINNING OF THE FRONDE.

FRANCE had gained nothing by the revolution at Naples. Holland had deserted her in the contest with Spain, and had made a separate peace, destroying the hope of any speedy end to that long struggle. Early in 1648 the chief ambassador of Spain left Münster, and the rupture of the negotiations for peace was evident.¹ In another quarter, disaster had met the French armies, and the Prince of Condé, for the first time, had experienced the inconstancy of fortune.² "The God of War," as Condé was styled by poetical flattery, had, in 1647, been sent as Viceroy of Catalonia to retrieve the misfortunes which, during the last few years, had been suffered in that province.

After the disgrace of Houdancourt, the experienced Count of Harcourt had been sent there in 1645. He conducted the campaign with a considerable degree of success, and captured the important city of Roses.³ But in the following year he met with his first military disaster at the siege of Lerida, the strongly-fortified town which had been lost through the incompetence of Houdancourt. Harcourt continued the siege for four months, but in a night of November his lines were penetrated by the Spanish troops. The French suffered considerable loss, and supplies and reinforcements were thrown into the city.

¹ Let. de Maz., iii., 112.

² The Duke of Enghien had become the Prince of Condé by the death of his father in December, 1646.

³ Mém. de Plessis, 372-380.

It was now necessary to raise the siege, and this disaster was the only break in the fortunate campaign of 1646.

Mazarin complained that Harcourt had neglected to fortify his camp, and had been surprised, and that his conduct during this enterprise could not be defended. It was claimed, however, with perhaps equal justice, that the interests of this province had been neglected for the expeditions of Italy, and the Catalonians, for some years, had justly feared that France intended ultimately to abandon them.¹

Condé was accordingly sent there and he also attempted the siege of Lerida. For a month his army endeavored to capture this place, which was defended alike by nature and by the resolution of the Spanish garrison, but with no result except a heavy loss of men from battle, and from desertion.² The siege was raised in June, and this check to a leader who had been deemed invincible was greeted at Paris with copious abuse, with satires and derisive doggerel. A large element was jealous of Condé's success, and ready with gibes and popular songs to celebrate any defeat of the government.³ While the prince was attending the theatre after his return to Paris, a disturbance was made, and the officers endeavored to arrest the offender. "You cannot take me," he cried, as he made his escape; "I am Lerida."

These defeats weakened the government, and the certainty of further war with Spain made it necessary to impose new taxes to replenish the treasury. But the people were weary of war and impatient of taxation. Aversion to Mazarin, fostered by many causes, was becoming universal and outspoken. The Parliament of Paris had already shown a disposition to control any new financial measures, and now, supported by a strong popular feeling, emboldened by the disasters of 1647, and by the hatred felt towards Mazarin, with the members of the body alike animated and irritated, it was ready for that

¹ *Lettres de Mazarin*, ii., 340, 478, 710. *Dis. Ven.*, 1646, cv., 38, 152, etc.

² *Mém. de Gramont*, 272-275. *Lenet*, 503-512. ³ *Motteville*, 125.

open contest with the government which was the beginning of the troubles of the Fronde.

Before entering upon this period, one filled with interest, though productive of small results, it is well to give some review of the growth and organization of a body whose history is not familiar to most English readers.

The English courts have administered a uniform system of law throughout the entire kingdom. Their judges have been taken from members of the profession, of whatever original social rank, who have acquired prominence in the practice of the law. The English judges have done good work for the restraint of tyranny and the development of popular principles, but the courts have held no political power, and only incidentally have they been brought in contact with questions of government. In all this, the history of France was far different. There, separate courts in different parts of the country administered different systems of law. Their judges became a caste, bequeathing or selling the succession to the ermine. At times their political power overshadowed their judicial duties, and the Parliament of Paris, acting as the leader of the provincial courts, endeavored to obtain a check on the power of the king, which might have changed the nature of the monarchy.

The origin of the French Parliament is partly lost in the obscurity of antiquity. With the establishment of the feudal system in France, grew up feudal principles of law. The right to administer justice adhered to the land and belonged to the lord of the land. It furnished also one of the sources of his feudal revenue. The fines and fees that came from his courts were as precious to the seigneur, as his right to a part of the fruit and the crops, to aid when his son was knighted or his daughter wedded. Such rights, sometimes exercised by the nobles themselves, but more often by the baillis, seneschals, and deputies, to whom they were entrusted, composed the system of jurisprudence which prevailed over most of the provinces of France. But the king of France had in like manner his feudal jurisdiction,

extending over the comparatively limited territory of which he was feudal seigneur. The growth of his court was alike a measure and a cause of his increasing power. Important matters of dispute were brought before the king, surrounded by his great vassals, by the lay and ecclesiastical peers, and later by certain officers of state, while smaller controversies were decided by inferior officials. This loose jurisdiction exercised by the courts of the king was extended, often at the expense of some great feudatory.

In France, as in other countries, the tendency was to increase the number and influence of those who sat in such courts as the king's officers. Alike from their own disinclination and from the greater activity of the royal officials, those holding their places simply from their feudal position constantly took less interest and less part in the decisions of the court. A similar change affected the courts of the feudal lords. The transfer of power from untutored nobles to learned clerks became a necessity by the development of the law. However well fitted to pass upon some question of the chase, to adjudge the delinquency of a villein failing to pay his feudal dues, to adjust the quarrels of the chief equerry with the chief huntsman, the nobles found themselves alike perplexed and bored when complicated cases came before them, to be decided by still more complicated rules of law.

Once the judgment of God, the test of hot plow-shares and boiling water, had been appealed to for the decision of embarrassing questions of fact, and the duties of a jury had been imposed upon the Almighty.

But such modes of determining the right and exposing the wrong fell into disuse, and with the increasing study and influence of the civil law came the necessity for having clerks learned in it, to act as advisers to the court. The advisers and assistants in time became themselves the judges. They exchanged the bombazine for the ermine. To hear prolix discussions of Latin texts which they could not understand, containing rules of law which they could

not comprehend, was repugnant to gentlemen who did not wish to exchange their swords for inkstands. It was not pleasant for a gentleman longing for the chase or the tournament to listen to a tedious and confusing trial, only to become in his decision the mouthpiece of some black-gowned student of Bologna, who did not know the first rules of venery, and who was ignorant alike of the art of the troubadour and the weight of a coat-of-mail. A tendency to substitute clerks as judges in the place of nobles was encouraged by kings who, like Philip Augustus, St. Louis, and Philip the Fair, sought the extension of a centralized royal authority. Alike from their studies and their desire for promotion, the legists were eager to lay down rules which increased the authority of the king; and the principles of Roman law, established under the empire, were the grounds for claiming powers for the king like those of the emperors.

The confusion and uncertainty of local customs and the caprices of the feudal tribunals were distasteful to a body of men who were taught that the law should be uniform and exact. The principal courts of the king soon came to be composed entirely of those educated in the law and receiving their appointments from the king. Under them was organized in France earlier than in England a trained class of men, clerks or lawyers, constituting a separate profession. As the king constantly increased his power over the great feudatories and added new territory to the kingdom of France, his courts extended their authority over a larger field and more numerous questions. They encroached upon innumerable feudal jurisdictions, until either they usurped their places or claimed a right to review their decisions.¹

It was a change made easier by the approval of litigants. The people welcomed the change from the uncertain de-

¹ A vast number of petty feudal courts remained, possessing some jurisdiction over small districts. It was stated that 52,000 of these petty seigniorial rights existed in France at the Revolution.—Desmazes, *Parlement de Paris*, 487.

cisions of the feudal courts, from the necessity for bribery, the probability of injustice, and the possibility of wild and bloody vagaries of punishment, to the more orderly and legal judgments of the courts of the king. Before the end of the fourteenth century the administration of justice was chiefly vested in a body of men forming part of the central government. In this system the most important place was held by the Parliament of Paris, which may be regarded as the successor to the king's council.

Some of the judicial powers of the royal council were by Philip Augustus vested in a court of peers, composed of six lay and six ecclesiastical lords. A court so feudal in its organization was soon modified by the introduction of officers of the king, but in the Parliament of Paris, when fully developed, some nobles were still entitled to a seat, and for the decision of certain questions it was required that the court should be "sufficiently garnished with peers." St. Louis proceeded much further with the organization of this court. Under him came the first division into sections, with regular sessions at Paris. The name of Parliament insensibly came into use, having the same origin as the name of the English Parliament, but coming in France to signify a place where were talked matters of law instead of matters of state. Under Philip the Fair, in the early part of the fourteenth century, this court assumed a form, the character of which remained unchanged. It was by the ordinance of 1302 divided into four chambers, and was then composed of two prelates, two barons, thirteen clerks, and thirteen laymen,¹ but additional chambers were afterwards created, its numbers largely increased, and in time, in this as in other courts, the clergy ceased to be members. It possessed both original and appellate jurisdiction.

The right of appeal to the king's Parliament ran from almost all of the inferior local courts, and this body obtained a jurisdiction greater than that of any English court. It had, moreover, a power like that of the Roman

¹ Ord. des Rois de France, t. i., 356. *Anciennes Loix françaises*, ii., 790.

Prætor. In cases not already provided for, the Parliament could declare that, until the king should otherwise order, certain questions should be decided in certain ways, and the French courts thus made a portion of the law they were to administer. Before the Parliament, in its different branches, came questions not only of law, but of finance and of administration, but by the usual development of business, the branches which passed upon the latter questions in time ceased to be attached to the Parliament itself.

The officers of the courts were appointed by the king, and by him also they could be removed. As this right of removal was gradually restricted, their power and independence increased. An ordinance of 1344 declared the judges entitled to hold their offices during the lifetime of the king.¹ Under Louis XI. a fixed tenure of judicial office was recognized by an ordinance strictly prohibiting any removal by the king.² Adopted probably for some tortuous purpose, and often disregarded by the king who pronounced it, this ordinance of 1467 was the enactment on which immunity from removal chiefly rested.

The judiciary thus established with a permanent power, soon became, to a large extent, an hereditary body. Such a result, unusual in judicial history and unwholesome in its effects, was due to the fact, so sharply distinguishing the French from the English courts, that the judicial offices became objects of open barter and sale: sold by the government in its financial needs, and bought by whoever was willing to pay the highest price. Under Louis XII. the sale of judicial offices began to be a recognized source of income. Such sales, made at first with some concealment and much remonstrance, were extended during the reign of Francis I. That monarch, surrounded in his own day and in history, by a false glamour of an expiring chivalry and a dawning renaissance, worked evil in almost every branch of the French government. As the sale was open,

¹ *Anciennes Lois Françaises*, iv., 499.

² *Ibid.*, 1467, x., 541.

so the purchaser was not deemed infamous. The prices paid, which are said not to have exceeded 30,000 livres, show that the places had not yet become of great value. It was easy to establish offices for which there was a ready demand, and the constant creation of new judgeships, which necessarily lessened the profits of those before existing, was a perpetual grievance to the Parliament, and was one of the causes of the troubles of the Fronde.

A further step was needed to make the office of judge not only venal but hereditary, and this was found in the tax which was created under Sully. By this tax, called the *paulette*, an annual duty was imposed upon every magistrate, and by the payment of it he acquired the right, by sale while alive, and by gift or devise at death, to transfer his office to whom he desired; it passed with his estate, as did his horses and plate, his houses and lands. Such an office, though often sold, was more often bequeathed from father to son. The *paulette* thus rendered the magistracy an hereditary aristocracy. The right to exercise judicial functions descended from father to son, like a seat in the English House of Lords. Thus there grew up the *noblesse* of the robe, one regarded as inferior to the aristocracy of birth, but sharing many of the privileges of the nobility, exempt from most forms of taxation, having the rights of the chase and a superior right to places of emolument and to the position of officers in the army. Though rich and powerful, the great judicial families were regarded as outside the pale of the more ancient nobility. The heirs of great lawyers were not held as equals by the descendants of the counts and barons, who had fought at Poitiers and Crecy.

The influence of venality upon the judicial force was less injurious than might have been expected. It was indeed the case, that incompetent men sometimes occupied judicial offices. A dissolute youth, an ignorant rich man might, by purchase or by inheritance, become vested with the power of passing upon the rights of his fellows. A certain right of rejection existed in Parliament, but if

exercised at all it was usually from prejudice or jealousy.¹ A certain examination of the qualifications of the members was prescribed, but it seems to have been little more than a form. Fitness in those holding such offices was secured rather from the spirit of the organization ; from the fostering of Parliamentary traditions and pride among those who possessed, and those who hoped to obtain such positions. Law as well as nobility obliges. A youth just out of school, without beard or brains, could indeed pass from the birch to the ermine. The new judge might decide upon the life or property of his countrymen without having opened the *Corpus Juris*, or having read one of the royal ordinances.²

But a spirit of independence and of traditional pride animated these judicial bodies, and made them fearless, and usually fair administrators of the power entrusted to them. So acute an observer as Montesquieu defended the *paulette*, and declared that in a monarchy, venality rendered the orders of the state more permanent ; that where offices were not publicly sold, the greed of courtiers would sell them privately, and that chance would find better judges than the choice of princes.

Though the first, the Parliament of Paris was not the only one of these great bodies. Parliaments were from time to time established at Toulouse, Grenoble, Bordeaux, Dijon, Rouen, Aix, Pau, Rennes, and Metz.³ Each of these was the supreme court in the territory for which it was created. The Parliament of Paris was the oldest and of the greatest dignity, but it had no appellate jurisdiction over the other Parliaments.

Not only was there no single court of ultimate review,

¹ Talon and Richelieu give instances of such rejections proceeding solely from the jealousy felt of some man of eminence as a student or a teacher of the law.

² Fontenay Mareuil complains of such evils. *Mém.*, 31, 2. There are frequent allusions to them in the pamphlets and libels of the 17th and 18th centuries.

³ Besides these, additional parliaments were created subsequent to this period and before the Revolution, at Touraine, Nancy, and Besançon.

but there was no uniform law which prevailed over all France, as did the common law over England. Different systems of jurisprudence prevailed in different provinces. There were the countries of the "*droit écrit*," in which the civil law was recognized, and the countries "*des coutumes*," where local usages and customs had grown into a local system of law, which was administered by the courts. What was legal in Normandy might be criminal in Provence. The litigant entitled to recover at Rennes might be nonsuited at Aix. Breakfasting at Nismes a guiltless man, when he reached Arles for dinner he might find himself subject to the penalties of the law. Not until the French Revolution was there a uniform law for Frenchmen of every rank and any residence.¹

At the beginning of the reign of Louis XIV., the Parliament of Paris was composed of nearly 200 members.² It was divided into different branches. The Grand Chamber was of the highest dignity and was charged with the most important questions. Five chambers of inquiry heard appeals from inferior tribunals. In the Chambers of Petitions and in the Tournelle were tried most of the civil and criminal cases brought before the Parliament as a court of original jurisdiction. The Court of Accounts, the Court of Aids, and the Grand Council were now separated from the Parliament, and were occupied chiefly with matters of finance and administration.

The office of a member of the Parliament produced a larger income and commanded a larger price than formerly. In 1617 the place of Harlay, first president of the Parliament of Paris, was sold for 200,000 livres.³ The less important office of president à mortier was sold during the reign of Louis XIV. for 500,000 livres, while that of one of the counsellors, the members inferior in rank to the presidents, brought 150,000 livres, a sum whose purchasing power, would be as much as \$150,000

¹ Four hundred and ninety separate customs are said to have been then swept away.—Desmazes, 477. ² In 1789 it had 230.—D'Estang, i., 161.

³ Richelieu, col. Michaud, xxi., 136.

now. Such prices were paid because the places were of great dignity, and the fees and emoluments were very large.

With the judicial power of these bodies had slowly grown a political power, which gave to the judiciary an importance in French history much greater than could have been derived solely from the holding of offices of great emolument, or from sitting in the hall of St. Louis, arrayed in the utmost gorgeousness of red gowns and ermine borders, pronouncing judicial decisions of whatever importance. This power rested chiefly on the right of registration, a right which can be obscurely traced to a very early period. Even under Charlemagne, we find his capitularies proclaimed before public gatherings or *plaid*s.

A continuation of this ancient practice was perhaps found in the registration of the edicts of the French kings with the Parliament. The custom probably owed its origin to the fact, that there were no other means of publishing the royal will to the people. The best method of informing all of the contents of the kings' edicts, was to have them solemnly enrolled in the records of the court of the district. They were there also for the information of the court itself, that it might enforce them in its decrees. When uncertain forms of government had become more fixed, it seems to have been conceded that a royal ordinance was without force in a district, until it had been registered in its local court or Parliament. Registry was required, therefore, from each of the Parliaments of France. But here, as often in French history, the agitations and revolutions of Paris were those of the kingdom, and the struggles of the judiciary for power are to be found almost exclusively in the annals of the Parliament of Paris. As it was necessary for the validity of an edict that it should be registered, it was natural for that body to claim in time the right of deciding whether that registration should be allowed. The popes, who alone could crown the Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire, soon insisted that they had also the right to decide

whether they would confer the crown, and whether the dignity would be worthily bestowed. The possessor of a power that must be invoked soon claims a discretion as to its exercise.

There can be no doubt that registration in Parliament was originally only clerical. The king made his decree; the court enrolled it on its register as a part of the law to be administered. But at an early time we find that Parliament was allowed to present its remonstrance, before an edict was enrolled. There might be error or omission in the decree. The king might have granted it inadvertently or misled by ignorant or wicked advisers; admonished by his court, he might modify or annul his decision. Such remonstrances were at times received with favor and at times with contumely. Under a feeble king, in seasons of anarchy or disaster, the remonstrances of the court would usually be treated with respect, but the principle was admitted by the Parliament itself that its remonstrance was but a remonstrance; it was not a veto. The king could refuse to receive the counsels of his judges. He could, if other means failed, come in person with his edict and hold his bed of justice.¹

No one could oppose the royal will in the royal presence, and his edict was thereupon enrolled. Even after the enrolment fresh remonstrances were sometimes presented, but they rested upon no legal right. A body like the English Parliament could extend its privileges and develop from the husks of forms a living right, but the French courts were only courts, and courts composed of members of a caste. The members of the judiciary in England came from the people, and belonged to the people. Hale on the bench was the same man who had brought in the Comprehension bill. Somers on the wool-sack was still the man who had pleaded for the seven

¹ The origin of this term has been much discussed. The wits complained it was so styled because there justice was put to sleep. The term was probably derived from the arrangement of the throne on which the king sat. The back and sides were made of bolsters and it was called a bed.—D' Estang, i., 191.

bishops, and sat in the convention which declared the throne vacant. But the French judges were governed by the sympathies and desires of the small social class to which they belonged, and from which their ranks were recruited. They were eager for their own rights and their own immunities. Frequently not in accord with popular feeling, when they were in accord with it the popular feeling was generally wrong. A legislative body composed wholly of lawyers, could never prove satisfactory in its workings. However adapted from the conservatism induced by legal study to guard the heritage of the past, lawyers as a body have shown little tendency to develop the promise of the future. The Parliament of Paris exercised its power of registration chiefly by opposition to financial edicts, but it was the unreasoning opposition that would prohibit taxation instead of regulating it. The refusal of the Parliament to register taxes at times made it necessary for the government to exercise its authority, or to cease to have any authority to exercise. Kings, as well as common men, become desperate when their financial straits are extreme.

In the century preceding Mazarin, the Parliament had experienced alternate increase and diminution of power. During the religious wars of the League it had abundant opportunity to play a prominent part. It did not fail to exercise an influence that was felt, but it was not always judiciously exercised. After St. Bartholomew, the Parliament declared Coligny a traitor and ordered an inquiry as to the Protestant plot, which that massacre had so happily averted. In the struggles of the League, the majority of the members were adherents of the Guises. They espoused the cause of the Holy Union, and issued their decrees against Henry of Bourbon and his followers. Even after his abjuration, the Parliament was in slight sympathy with Henry IV., and it hesitated about registering the edict of Nantes. "What I have to say," said Henry to the recalcitrant court, "Is that I ask you to register the edict I have granted the Protestants. God

has chosen to give me this kingdom, which is mine by birth and mine by conquest. But for me, you gentlemen of the Parliament would not be in your seats, and if obedience was due to my predecessor, much more is it due to me."¹

During Henry's reign, the political influence of the Parliament was at a low ebb, but it revived during the regency of Mary de Medici. The court was asked to declare Mary regent, and it endeavored, not in vain, to increase its power during the troubles and civil wars which attended that regency. It was again checked by the rigid control of Richelieu. There was much in the rule of that minister to which Parliament might and did object. It remonstrated against the special and irregular courts that he organized for important trials, which deprived judges of their jurisdiction and the accused of justice; it remonstrated against his illegal acts and against his judicious acts, and even hesitated for eighteen months in registering the edict for the creation of the French Academy.

The cardinal hesitated at no measures to render Parliament as submissive to his will, as were all other branches of the government. Its members were arrested, they were exiled, their offices were abolished and new offices were created.² "You were established only to judge between Maitre Pierre and Maitre Jean," said the king, "and I will return you to your duty; I will cut your nails close."³ The counsellors of the Parliament of Paris, whose offices were created under Richelieu, were received by their brethren with a cold welcome, and it was difficult to have their just share in the work of the court allotted to them. The submission he had compelled, Richelieu resolved to make permanent, by an edict that should mark the end of a troublesome interference with the absolute

¹ *Lettres Missives d' Henri IV.*, t. v., p. 89. The letter is long, and is a curious example of the very familiar style that Henry used in his state papers.

² Molé, ii., 476. The Venetian minister wrote in 1641 that the authority of the Parliament was much reduced. "Ora ridotti in servitu, in altro non s'ingeriscono che nelle materi di giustizia." *Relazioni Francia*, t. ii., 341.

³ Molé, ii., 143.

power of the monarchy. In 1641 letters-patent of the king were registered in a bed of justice, which forbade any members of any Parliament interfering with the matters of state, and directed them to confine their energies to the administration of justice. "The government of one alone," so ran the edict, "is the breath which animates monarchies—which gives them force and vigor. As this authority, when absolute, carries them to the highest glory, so when it is enfeebled they are soon seen to decline." During the minority of Louis, it proceeded to state, the Parliament of Paris had assumed a control to which it was not entitled. But the sovereign could allow no one to share his power. The royal authority had at last been fully established, and had restored the glory and greatness of the state.

In view of these things, and of the numerous declarations of the king and of his predecessors, the Parliament of Paris, and all other courts, were strictly forbidden to consider affairs of the state, which the king reserved for his sole direction, except when he should request their advice by special letter. On the edicts sent them concerning the government and the administration of the state, they should not deliberate, but give them prompt and unquestioning registration. Remonstrances to fiscal edicts, couched in submissive language, might twice be sent, but they must contain no such impertinent language as "we neither can nor ought," and after the second remonstrance there must be instant registration. Such commands were emphasized by the abolishment of the offices of one president and of four counsellors who had too long abused the patience of the king.¹

¹ Molé, ii., 489-510. *Anciennes Lois Françaises*, xvi., 529-535. The authorities for the history of the Parliament of Paris are numerous, apart from the ordinances themselves. Merilhou's "*Parlements de France*" has reviewed its political history. Desmaze's "*Parlement de Paris*," and D'Estang's "*Parlements de France*," both contain much curious information. There are numerous histories of the local Parliaments, of which Floquet's "*Histoire du Parlement de Normandie*" is among the best. The *Mémoires* of Molé, Talon, and Ormesson are also of special value.

The yoke was removed from the judiciary, as well as from the discontented nobility, by the death of Richelieu. A long minority, a regency administered by a woman and controlled by a foreigner, gave an opportunity for obtaining that share in the government which Parliament now regarded as its due. The judges were called upon to annul the king's will, and for the second time to declare a regency. The hopes of increased authority thus excited were not at once dispelled. In the conflict with the government over the edict of the *toisé*, the Parliament had been, on the whole, successful.¹ Mazarin was ignorant of the nature of the French government, and uncertain how far he might safely disregard the remonstrances of the courts.² He was, moreover, a man of compromise, seeking to attain his ends by adroit policy or by devious routes, and he avoided a conflict with a body that seemed resolute, powerful, and popular. By edicts in 1644 and 1645 he endeavored to conciliate the officers of the courts, by granting to them the titles and privileges of nobility.³ But the needs of the government now rendered further taxation necessary.

The revenues of 1648, 1649, and a part of those of 1650 had already been anticipated, and the king had not a sou of ready money at his command.⁴ From the taxes to be collected in those years the government was not entitled to receive over 20,000,000 livres, and Emeri, pursuing his suicidal policy, now endeavored to alienate the revenues for 1651 and 1652. The soldiers and officers were largely unpaid, many nobles were leaving the Court and retiring to their country-places, and there was a general feeling of discontent. Condé came back irritated by his failure at Lerida, saying he wanted to know what became of the 90,000,000 livres collected by a government which left its armies unpaid!⁵ Emeri now suggested a duty like the

¹ *Supra*, p. 307.

² In *Histoire du Temps*, 10, 1647, reference is made to the imperfect knowledge, both of the French language and government, which Mazarin showed in his interview with the representatives of the Parliament.

³ *Anciennes Lois Françaises*, xvii., 43, 49.

⁴ *Dis. Ven.*, cv., 191, 245. "Il Ré non hà mai un soldo efetivo."

⁵ *Dis. Ven.*, t. cvi., 178, 196-7, 309. *Let. de Mazarin*, iii., 159.

paulette to be imposed on all ecclesiastical benefices. By the payment of this tax the holders of all livings or ecclesiastical offices should have the right to select those to be named by the king as their successors. As the result of such a duty, religious like judicial offices would have become venal or hereditary, and each bishop, abbé, or priest would have been invested with the right of naming his successor. A proposition so startling in its results was, however, submitted by Mazarin to the Pope, with tempting allusions to the profits that would at once accrue from it to the Roman Curia,¹ but the Pope was not willing to sanction a universal and legalized simony, and the scheme was dropped. It had been received with favor by some of the clergy who would be affected, but the majority had protested against such a change in the nature of religious offices.² A tax was also suggested which should be levied on certain lands now subject to an annual duty. Apparently this was not oppressive in its character, but it met with an unruly opposition. The bourgeois, who would be subjected to it, with their wives and children, swarmed about the courts, crying for relief, jostling the counsellors, and accusing President Molé of being a hypocrite sold to the government. Soldiers were sent to arrest some of the ring-leaders, but they met with resistance. The Rue St. Denis resounded with discharges of musketry fired from every church-tower and projecting window. Troops were stationed in the streets, and it was noticed that this had not been thought necessary since the barricades in 1588.³ A suggestion was made of the creation of certain judicial offices, some of which the government intended to sell to Huguenots. The Parliament was always bitter in its Catholicism, and it opposed such a scheme as contrary to the interests of God and the state.⁴

But the imposition of new taxes to defray present needs could be no longer postponed. On January 15, 1648, the

¹ Let. de Mazarin, ii., 585, 586.

² Dis. Ven., cvi., 233, 245, 255.

³ Talon, 208. D'Ormesson, 410, 415. Histoire du Temps, 20. Mss. de Lancelot.

⁴ Dis Ven., cvi., 245, 255.

members of the Parliament were notified to attend in the Grand Chamber, where the king was to hold a bed of justice. They were called together on short notice, and with a lack of formality that of itself made them ill-humored. Soldiers filled the court of the palace to check any disturbances that might arise. The young king, who had but lately recovered from an attack of the small-pox, told the court that the chancellor would inform them of his wishes. The chancellor's address was the usual one on such occasions. The needs of the state, and the protracted wars then waging, compelled the king to ask aid from his faithful subjects. Thereupon edicts were read for the creation of twelve new masters of requests, of certain offices in chancery, and of some additional officers of the police, and in the Marshalsea. Payments from "francs fiefs" were required for fourteen years that were passed and for eleven years in the future.¹ The address of the first president in response to this edict contained little but general references to the needs of the public, and expressions of pleasure that the ark of the state, their image of God on earth, was restored to health.² Molé was followed by Omer Talon in a very different strain. An advocate before Parliament from the age of eighteen, and advocate-general for seventeen years, Talon was the embodiment of the Parliamentary spirit. His life was in the rules and decisions of the court, and his hours were spent among the dust and the dulness of its registers. He excelled in that ponderous oratory, weighted by erudition and only relieved by the bizarreness of bad taste, which was indulged in by those whose voices most often resounded in the Grand Chamber and the Hall of St. Louis.

But he possessed the virtues as well as the faults of the Parliament, and he was sturdy in his convictions and bold in their expression. "At other times," said the advocate to the king, with but slight historical accuracy, but with unusual simplicity of style, "the sessions of your ances-

¹ Molé, iii., 195, citing Mss. de Lancelot. Dis. Ven., cvii., 80.

² Molé, iii., 195-199.

tors in a bed of justice were not considered as they now are, the effects of sovereign power, which spread terror everywhere; but rather as assemblies for deliberation and counsel. Your Majesty's power comes from on high, and you are answerable only to God and your conscience, but it is important to its glory that your subjects should be freemen and not slaves. There are now, Sire, ten years that the country is ruined. Peasants sleep on straw, and their furniture is sold to pay their taxes. To support the luxury of Paris, millions of innocent souls must live on oats and bran, and hope for no protection except from their own insignificance. They own nothing with certainty but their souls, for these cannot be struck off at tax-gatherer's sale. The inhabitants of the towns are subjected to every variety of imposition. The sovereign companies are attacked this day by the creation of new offices which will be a perpetual charge to the state. This night, Madame," continued the orator, addressing the regent, "in your oratory, consider the sorrow, the bitterness, the consternation of all the officers of the realm, who may to-day see their estates confiscated without having committed any crime. Think upon the misery of the provinces in which the glory of the battles won cannot nourish those who have no bread, and who cannot count myrtles, palms, and laurels among the fruits of the earth. The land is exhausted by the frequency of these extraordinary levies. Therefore, Sire, let the names of benevolence, tenderness, and humanity be associated with the purple of the empire. Give to those virtues letters of naturalization in the Louvre, and triumph over the luxury of the age rather than over the patience and the tears of your subjects."¹ Still this discourse, however outspoken, ended as in a bed of justice it must end, with a motion for the registration of the edicts. They were accordingly registered, but Talon received cold looks from the courtiers as the reward of his outburst. The cardinal was said to turn pale and the queen to become red during the

¹ Talon, 209-212. *Histoire du Temps*, 22-28.

orator's remarks.¹ "I see," he writes, "that the royal Court is the abode of falsehoods, where it is difficult for a man of heart, probity, and virtue to succeed."²

But the temper of the Parliament was in sympathy with the advocate. The edicts were formally registered at the bed of justice, but the enforced registration was reconsidered on the Friday following. The masters of requests, seventy-two in number, remonstrated against the creation of twelve more of these offices, and their conduct was such that the regent temporarily interdicted the performance of their duties. Their complaints were more favorably received by the Parliament with which they were closely connected, and of which they were to some extent a part. The reading of the edicts was accordingly ordered, and it was resolved to consider each one separately. Such a course was claimed to be allowed even by the ordinance of 1641, for that had permitted the Parliament twice to present remonstrances after an edict had been sent to it.³

On February 15th the ordinance as to the franc fiefs was debated, and the Parliament passed from remonstrance to legislation by declaring that it should be enforced for the fourteen years past, but omitting to make any provision as to the eleven years in the future. This action offended the regent, and on the next day the representatives of the Parliament were summoned to the Louvre, and Anne put to them the plain question, "Does the Parliament pretend to modify an edict verified by the king, sitting in his bed of justice?" "In case the Parliament intends to change an edict verified in this manner," said the queen, "as there is no example of such an encroachment on the king's authority, his Majesty will advise as to the means to repress it; but if the company has only intended to proceed to remonstrances, he will consider them willingly and furnish fitting remedies."⁴

¹ Dis. Ven., cvii., 87.

² Talon, 212.

³ *Idem*, 214. Journal d'Ormesson, 418, 444.

⁴ Talon, 214-216. Histoire du Temps, 33, 34. Ormesson, 447.

"Do they pretend to touch that which the presence of the king has consecrated," was the expression of Seguier, the chancellor. This question was embarrassing to the Parliament. No such power had been recognized. It had never been definitely claimed. The right of remonstrance could not easily be extended into the right of absolute refusal. The Parliament had an undoubted right to present its remonstrances to the king, that he might modify or cancel as unjust or ill advised any law which he had proposed; but it was very different to say that when the king had pronounced the edict, and it had been duly registered, the Parliament could, by its resolution, repeal or modify it.¹

On February 18th, an answer was sent to the regent. "The thought of the Parliament has never been," it said, "to oppose its authority to the king's power; its members know that after a verification before the king sitting in his bed of justice, they cannot combat or destroy what he has done. God forbid," the answer proceeded, "that the axe should turn against the arm that wielded it, or that we should so forget our position as not to know that if the sun withdrew his light, the smaller stars would suffer eclipse and be left in darkness."²

These expressions of figurative loyalty were not thought sufficiently explicit. The Duke of Orleans fretted and fumed, saying that he had not spared his person for the preservation of the state, and he could not conceive how the gentlemen of the Parliament could entertain such erroneous views and delay making known their intentions. Mazarin, more pointedly, desired to know if Parliament had the right to oppose edicts prepared by the council of the king and published in the presence of the judges and of the great nobles of the kingdom.

Two weeks elapsed before any more specific answer could be agreed upon by the court. A satisfactory result was at last reached, though a strong opposition was made to any compromise. There were added to the resolutions

¹ Talon 214. Molé, iii., 205. Retz, i., 135.

² Talon, 215.

concerning the franc fiefs the words "under the good pleasure of the king and queen, who are humbly prayed to send a declaration to that effect."¹

A deputation visited the queen and council and said that the Parliament had no thought of deciding a question, which would make it necessary to penetrate the secrets of the mystery of the empire.² This expression provoked the smiles and favorable words of the regent. Remonstrances to the offending edicts were, however, still presented. Even Molé complained that for the last four years the people had contributed for the needs of the state five hundred million livres, or at the rate of one hundred million dollars annually. The results of grinding taxation, and of the solidarity of a community for taxes imposed upon it, were such, the remonstrance declared, that one man must pass his life in prison for another's debt, and that the disturbances and violences which prevailed made it more dangerous to pass from one city to another in the heart of France than to enter an enemy's country.³

But the king replied to these complaints that the public necessity was such that if money was not raised under these edicts, it would be necessary to impose other taxes. During all these debates a menace had been held over the courts which it was hoped would insure their obedience. The term for which the paulette had been continued expired in 1647. Although this was a considerable tax, yet it secured a right so prized by the judges that their system was deemed to be bound up in its continuance.⁴ Its renewal had not yet been announced, and the threat was thus vaguely made that the courts were again to become open to the world, and the right of the members to choose their successors was to be done away with.

But the government was as eager for the proceeds of

¹ *Idem*, 217. Journal Mss. des Archives Impériales.

² Talon, 217.

³ Molé, iii., 207-214.

⁴ The tax was one sixtieth of the value, or price paid for a judicial office. Ormesson, i., 405.

this tax, as the court was eager for its privileges. The moneys obtained from a renewal of the *paulette* would be between eight and nine million livres.¹ The answer of the king to the last remonstrances of the Parliament was presented on April 22d. It was received without further debate, and every thing seemed to be peaceful. Eight days after this the annual duty upon the sovereign companies was again imposed, but it was accompanied by some new conditions. The officers of each of the companies, except the Parliament, were to forfeit four years' wages in return for the rights given by the *paulette*, and were by this sacrifice to be exempt from forced loans and from the further creation of new offices.²

This additional imposition fell upon the Grand Council and the Courts of Aids and Accounts, and from it the Parliament was exempted. In that body had been found the political opposition that had embarrassed the government, and its members were believed to be so largely biassed by their own interests, that it was thought a tax from which they were free would escape their opposition. Selfish motives had so often influenced them that such a belief was not unnatural, but it was in this case unjust.³ The bribe was so open to all men, that common decency and a sense of shame kept the Parliament from deserting the cause of sister courts. Besides, though they were separate bodies, the members of all of them belonged to the noblesse of the robe and to the great judicial families; they were in one social class; they were connected by blood and by marriage. Although their interests were now separate, they must, for the most part, be identical. Judges of Aids, of Accounts, of Inquests, and of the Grand Chamber were all employed in similar work, influenced by similar associations, and united by similar interests. The other companies resolved to appeal to Parliament urging considerations of fraternity, and sug-

¹ Dis. Ven., cvii., 191, 284.

² Molé, iii., 214. Talon, 222.

³ Journal d' Ormesson, 527. Journal Mss. du Parlement, Arch. Nat., fo. 100-119.

gesting that their misfortune might soon become the misfortune of all. Their deputies labored with such good effect that on May 13, 1648, a resolution was passed almost unanimously for a union of the representatives of all the companies in the Chamber of St. Louis. Broussel, Mesmes, and others were active in demanding a measure required by the interests of the judicial bodies and of the state.¹ This resolution excited both displeasure and uneasiness at the Palais Royal. Twenty-five thousand crowns are said to have been distributed among the judges in the endeavor to prevent this result.² Vague rumors were circulated as to the subjects that would be discussed by the assembled courts. They would consider whether a foreigner could be the chief minister of the kingdom; the superintendent Emeri would be required to render an account of his maladministration; the other parliaments and courts would send their representatives and the complaints of all the discontented in the kingdom would be presented. It was even said that the States-General would be convoked to reform the government. Already some of the other parliaments had made common cause with that of Paris, and ordered the arrest of the officers endeavoring to enforce the new edicts.³

To prevent this union and to spite the unruly judges, on the 18th of May a new edict revoked the entire declaration as to the paulette. Alike the deprivation of four years' wages and the annual duty were swept away. As the judges would not pay what was requested, they might pay nothing, and be rid at the same time of taxation and of their most valued privileges. The judges,

¹ Molé, iii., 217. Talon, 222. Journal d' Ormesson, 482-491.

² Journal d' Ormesson, 492. Ormesson speaks only from hearsay, but Mazarin's Carnets show frequent gifts or pensions to the judges in order to make them friendly to the government. Carnets, v., 43: "2,000 lire alli Presidenti d' Enquestes." 99, "M. de Nemon: 4,000 scudi in segreto," etc. Nani, the Venetian ambassador, says money was believed to have been used among the judges on this occasion,—cvii., 283.

³ Dis. Ven., cvii., 263, 276, 284, etc. At 284, the ambassador says: "Non e dubbio che sara seguitato da tutto il restante con una scoperta unione delle provincie sostenute da lor Parlamenti per resistere all' impositione."

naturally, were put in no better humor by this step. The paulette was the corner-stone of their order, and they were more annoyed to be freed from the duty which secured their privileges, than they had been to be subjected to an imposition which was deemed excessive. The resolution for the union remained unrepealed, although the pretext for it had been removed.

The queen thereupon summoned the representatives of the Parliament, and gave them a letter forbidding the assembly in the Chamber of St. Louis.¹ "She had intended," she said, "to favor the Parliament by special exemptions, and her gifts had been received as if they were poisoned. She had thereupon resolved to cancel the entire edict. The annual duty was a grace which no one was bound to receive, and which she was not bound to grant. But the Parliament had still adhered to its resolution for union with the other courts. There had formerly been such joint meetings to consider some question of delay or embarrassment in the payment of the wages of the judges, but in the absence of such matter, now to establish in Paris an assembly of fifty or sixty persons, to make from four sovereign companies a fifth, was a thing without example and without reason, and was little less than establishing a republic in a monarchy, and introducing institutions dangerous to good order and good government."² Any attempt at such a union was strictly forbidden. The presidents, and especially the first president, Molé, had a large authority in regulating the proceedings of the Parliament and deciding what matters could be brought forward for discussion. The queen spoke to them personally, forbidding them under pain of her indignation to allow this matter to be deliberated upon further. The Duke of Orleans accused the members of opposing every wish of the king, and every need of the state. Every one was scandalized by their conduct, he said, and the queen was fully resolved that she would not suffer it. The duke's

¹ Talon, 222-224. Molé, iii., 217, 218. Ormesson, 494.

² Talon 224, 225.

fervor was roused to a white heat by La Rivière, whose hopes of a cardinal's hat were now very bright. His name had been formally presented for that honor by the French minister at Rome, and Mazarin in his desire for Orleans' support wrote to Donna Olympia asking her to grant the promotion.¹ Friends were already felicitating him upon the approaching purple, and he hoped to retain Mazarin's favor by keeping Orleans active in support of the administration.

The other judicial companies were also summoned to the Palais Royal. On May 26th, they obeyed the summons; the queen reproached them for their conduct, and forbade their proceeding further. On the next day, however, the Grand Council sent to the Court of Aids, to compare the reports of what had been said at the palace. This action the queen saw fit to regard as a deliberate violation of her order, and accordingly, the deputies, Turcan and D'Argouges, were arrested and lodged at Mézières. Representatives of these courts visited the Parliament to consult as to the arrests, and the queen, still more enraged, ordered the arrest of four more of the members. Had she not been restrained, as many as a dozen would have been imprisoned, for Anne was resolved to resort to extreme measures.² Public feeling both within and without the courts became intensified by such violent steps. Assaults upon the personal freedom of their members excited these great bodies, and an air of martyrdom was thrown over them, which increased their popularity in the city.

Criticism grew fiercer as the arrests multiplied. Endeavors were made in the Parliament to debate these acts of the government, but they were repressed by Molé's

¹ *Lettres de Mazarin*, iii., 130. Dis. Venez. Mazarin's letter is a curious illustration of the influence over the Pope attributed to this woman, by all those who had to deal with Innocent X. Mazarin secretly mistrusted La Rivière. He says, 9th Carnet, 6, that Rivière desired to become the favorite, but he had not sufficient ability.

² *Let. de Mazarin*, iii., 127. 9th Carnet, 39, *et seq.* Mazarin writes Longueville that he cannot understand what it is that the judges want.



efforts. The government was still resolute in its policy of repression, and on June 10th an ordinance of the king's council was pronounced, annulling the resolution for a union which the Parliament had adopted on May 13th.¹ In the past quarrels Parliament had at times encroached upon what were by law recognized as the prerogatives of the king; but to annul by the king's council a resolution for consultation with other judicial bodies, on matters of importance to all, was no less an encroachment upon the prerogatives of the courts.

Upon the members who were directed to carry this order to their body, the chancellor inflicted a long review of their continued bad conduct, and of all the grievances which the queen had suffered. The queen interrupted this harangue by saying: "The princes of the blood and the first officers of the crown have been arrested in other times before the sight of all France, and it has been regarded as a legitimate exercise of the royal power. I have arrested a couple of counsellors and one would think I was to be tried for it."²

When the report of this interview was brought before the Parliament, the President Blancménil quoted extracts from the old registers, which showed that in 1594, 1595, and 1597 the deputies of the four sovereign companies had met to deliberate upon public affairs. Precedents taken from the disturbed times of the League were of no great value, but still a solemn vote of thanks was moved by President Mesmes to his associate for his valuable labors. Until recently, Mesmes had been regarded as favorable to the government; but his brother, the Count of Avaux, had been disgraced. The president, who was an adroit and able man, had become a patriot, and he was now ready to fan the public indignation.³

The order adopted in the council, cancelling the decree for a union of the judicial bodies, was laid before the Parliament. The spirit of the court was now so aroused, that

¹ Talon, 236.

² Talon, 229. *Journal du Parlement*, 4.

³ Talon, 227, 230. *Histoire du Temps*, 55.

it hardly endeavored to excuse or conceal an open defiance of the express command of the king. It was decided that this order of cancellation should be held for deliberation, although even to deliberate upon it was a disobedience of its terms. Further remonstrances were sent to the queen, asking for a revocation of the order which forbade the union in the Chamber of St. Louis. "Three times," replied the chancellor, "the queen has informed the gentlemen of the Parliament that this union offended her; that it was prejudicial to the government; that it might be the seed of public disturbance, and encourage the enemies of France to believe that the subjects of the king were discordant, and their affections alienated."¹

This answer was carried to the Parliament, where it was as little heeded as those that had preceded it. On June 15th it was decided by a vote of 97 to 66 to proceed to the union of the courts without more delay. When this open defiance was announced to the queen, she requested to see the wording of so insolent a decree. She examined it with a face showing more than usual indignation, and said that she would listen no longer; she now wished to be obeyed.² Messengers were sent to the other courts, forbidding their choosing delegates to the assembly of the Chamber of St. Louis, and the Parliament was ordered to attend the queen at the Palais Royal on June 16th. A few of the boldest members were in favor of meeting this command by the favorite reply of the unruly, "*Nec possumus, nec debemus*," but the great majority were unwilling to proceed so far. Twenty of the counselors cautiously resolved to stay away, lest their attendance at the Palais Royal might be thought a convenient opportunity for their arrest. But one hundred judges marched thither on foot, arrayed in the gowns and caps of their order. They passed through the immense crowds gathered in the streets, who exhorted them to make their own the cause of the poor people who were so much oppressed. At the palace they were crowded into a hall illy provided with

¹ Talon, 233.

² Talon, 235. Molé, iii., 221. Ormesson, 517-519.

seats. They had been ordered to bring the page of their register which contained the resolution of June 15th, but on some pretext they had omitted to do so. The queen wished that the judges should be kept where they were until the offending page was produced. "This would have been very inconvenient for us," says one of them, "for it was now noon, and for lack of seats we had to stand, and we had not yet dined."¹ Chavigni and Emeri were said to have advised imprisoning the stiff-necked magistrates, but milder counsels prevailed. After delivering further admonition, the chancellor read to them a new edict of the king's council, passed June 15th, which forbade the union and ordered them to replace with this injunction the page containing their disobedient resolution.² Molé started to speak. The queen cried out that she would not hear him; she knew how to distinguish between the good and the seditious servants of the king, and she would inflict on the latter such exemplary chastisement that their persons, their property, and their posterity would suffer from it.

But notwithstanding these threats, no more severe punishment was inflicted than reproaches and edicts, and these were now received by the Parliament with ill-concealed disregard. The members of the Courts of Inquest, who were the youngest and most fiery of the Parliament, preferred seeing disaster in the field and insurrection in Paris, rather than abandon what they had resolved.³

The more judicious hesitated in pressing the authority of the Parliament to an open conflict with the royal power. The result of such a contest might be, that the Parliament would find itself deprived of whatever power it had gained. In time of war it was especially dangerous to paralyze the arm of authority, by the continuation of such a struggle. The collection of taxes might be checked, the army left unpaid, and the country laid open to another invasion like that of 1636.

¹ Talon, 236. *Hist. du Temps*, 62-65.

² *Journal du Parlement*, 5, 6.

³ Motteville, 165.

But the more zealous were ready with their answers. "The country," they said, "was exhausted by excessive taxation; the peasant might see the straw taken from his bed, the barley loaf from his child's mouth, to pay the exactions of the petty tyrant who collected the *taille*, or who had farmed at great profit the duty on wine or salt. The ear of the queen was open to no one but a successful adventurer, a base-born priest, a man to whom the French tongue and the French heart were alike strange.

"This minister neglected the internal interests of the kingdom. He cared for nothing but foreign politics. He had fostered interminable wars in which France had no real interest. He had spent untold millions, and had sent two great expeditions to Italy, only that the Pope might be driven to confer a cardinal's hat upon the favorite's brother, a man whose vices were justly hateful to His Holiness.

"At the head of the finances was Emeri, the most odious of ministers, and under him batted a host of farmers of taxes and speculators in the funds, who robbed the king and oppressed the poor. At such a time, the members of the courts, whose very salaries the government would confiscate if it dared, and whose offices it would willingly make valueless by creating innumerable new ones, must meet and act for their own welfare and for that of the state."

Such resolves were strengthened because the administration showed signs of weakening. No more arrests followed the many threats that had been made. Mazarin was by nature inclined to conciliation; he resorted to any expedient rather than force, and he fed out bland speeches to the members of the courts.¹ Encouraged but not conciliated, the judges deliberated for four days upon the proposed union in the Chamber of St. Louis, resting only for the Feast of St. John. It was suggested to them that the government would now grant the *paulette* without asking for any loan or advance, but the judges, with an unselfishness that excited surprise, refused an offer so ad-

¹ *Dis. Ven.*, cvii., 200.

vantagous to themselves, and resolved to continue in their endeavor to regulate financial abuses.¹

On the 29th of June, at eight in the evening, the representatives of the Parliament were again summoned to the Palais Royal. The chancellor, speaking in the presence of the regent, the cardinal, and the Duke of Orleans, told them that the queen, having been informed of the sincerity of the intentions of the Parliament, and doubting not that its acts would correspond to the assurances given her, thought it good that the edict of May 13th, for a union, should be executed. But she asked the judges to remember that the army of the king was in the presence of his enemies; that the soldiers could not subsist without money; and she prayed that the assembly might convene at once, and finish its session within a week, and that the warmth which they had shown for the service of the king might not prove injurious in its results.²

The masters of requests were also allowed again to perform their duties.³ The cause of these concessions was not solely the timidity or caution of Mazarin. Unfavorable events coming in quick succession made the boldest shrink from a contest with a powerful body, sustained by an excited public opinion. For five years the Duke of Beaufort had been confined in the castle of Vincennes. Since the day he had turned from the smiles of the queen to find himself under arrest, he had been imprisoned without trial, and without further charges than those made when he was disgraced. On the 1st of June, 1648, he succeeded in making his escape, and the government feared, with good reason, that the fair-haired descendant of Henry of Navarre would soon become the favorite of the Parisian mob.⁴

¹ Jour. du Parlement, 8, 9. Ormesson, a most intelligent observer, says: "Every one was surprised to see the vigor with which the members of the Grand Chamber maintained the public interest, as all believed they would embrace these offers without considering any one else." Journal d'Ormesson, 527, June 22d.

² Talon, 240, 241. Retz, 136-140. Molé, iii., 216-230. ³ Ormesson, 534.

⁴ Motteville, 160-162. Mazarin, however, claims that he regarded this as of no importance. Let., iii., 127.

The Spanish had retaken Courtrai, a city whose capture by the French had been celebrated as one of great importance. Disquiet in the provinces had been excited by the fermentations at Paris. Taxes were collected with difficulty, and trade was stagnant. Mazarin was in such a position that his enemies said any thing he could do would be a mistake.¹

Anne of Austria, though she was sluggish in her temperament, and willing that her minister should have both the appearance and reality of power if she could herself enjoy ease and comfort, was courageous to rashness, and her Spanish blood was stirred by these encroachments on the royal authority. She would never allow this canaille of the robe, she told her attendants, to diminish the authority of the king, and she desired that no terms should be made with the rebellious courts. It is probable that a policy of repression, the arrest of a sufficient number of counsellors and presidents, the holding of numerous beds of justice, would have smothered the Fronde at its inception. But Mazarin was not ready for such a course. The queen of England and her sons had lately come to France, exiles from a rebellious people; Charles I. was then fleeing from his own subjects, many of whom threatened his death as well as his deposition.

Such events, produced indeed by conditions far different from any existing in France, encouraged the Parliament and alarmed the government. "The queen is valiant," ungallantly said Mazarin, "like a soldier who has courage when he does not know the danger."² She reluctantly followed his advice to yield now and watch for a better chance to assert the royal prerogative. The cardinal still endeavored to persuade the courts to a wiser course. "The Parliament will succeed," he argued, "in ruining credit and making it impossible to supply the army; to guard against a future malady it will produce one of which the patient will die at once. Without striking a blow, our enemies will regain what so many victorious

¹ Retz, 140. Motteville, 142-167.

² Motteville, 166.

years have gained for us; so much blood spilled and treasure spent will have served only for shame and confusion."¹

But any remonstrance was in vain. There was no more thought of abandoning the joint session of the four companies, than there was of closing it within a week, or of confining its deliberations to the needs of the judicial bodies. On the 30th of June, 1648, eleven delegates from Parliament, two masters of requests, and eighteen from the Court of Aids, the Chamber of Accounts, and the Grand Council, six of whom were chosen by each body, met in the Chamber of St. Louis to deliberate on the needs of the state. The most ardent members of the various courts had been elected as their delegates, and their session may be regarded as the formal beginning of the Fronde.²

The very name of this movement is obscure, and it is only certain that it was adopted in jest, from a child's game. It was fitting that the struggle which became only a mischievous burlesque on a revolution, should be named from the sport of gamins and school-boys. Fronde is the name of a sling, and the boys of the street used this weapon in their mimic contests. How it came to be applied to the opponents of the government is uncertain. Some claimed it was because the members of the Parliament, like the young frondeurs, hurled their weapons at Mazarin, but were ready to fly when the officers of the police appeared.

¹ Ninth Carnet, 41-43.

² The authorities for the controversies which preceded the conference at the Chamber of St. Louis are quite full. Talon took an active part in them, as did also Molé. Ormesson was a master of requests, whose grievances had much to do with them. The "*Journal du Parlement*" contains the official record of its proceedings. "*Histoire du Temps*" is also a contemporary account prepared by a member of the Parliament, but its partisanship injures its accuracy. Mazarin's views are found in the 9th Carnet and the Venetian ambassador describes the events from day to day. They are also described in all the contemporary memoirs and pamphlets with more or less of accuracy, but can be most accurately traced in Talon, 208-240; Ormesson, 404-529; Molé, iii., 193-230; *Histoire du Temps*, 186; *Journal du Parlement*, January-June 30th; *Dis. Ven.*, cvii., *passim*; 9th Carnet of Mazarin.

Others said the term had been used by chance by some counsellor, and had been adopted by the writers of epigrams and mazarinades.¹ However derived, it was not ill applied.

We have first to deal with the Parliamentary period of the Fronde, the only period in which there was even the pretence of consulting popular interests. Even then it was an absurdity that a body whose authority emanated from royalty, and whose members held their seats by purchase, should claim to be an independent legislative part of the government. For such a position it lacked not only any recognized power, but there was nothing in its organization, its character, or its relations to the people that fitted it for such work. Its endeavors were without the authority of law, and without justification from the higher law of the public welfare.

The Parliament did indeed attack the taxation under which the nation suffered, and the taxes were ruinous in amount, oppressively collected, and lavishly wasted. But the judicial bodies brought no wise criticism to the financial system. Mazarin's accusation was just: they prescribed a medicine which might cure the disease, but would surely kill the patient. With war on the frontier, it was no time to paralyze the collection of taxes. Their hostility was excited also by the system of superintendents which Richelieu had introduced, and which simplified the collection and transmission of taxes. They wished the superintendents to be done away with, because a vast horde of petty local officers had formerly been intrusted with the collection of the imposts and had been deprived of the fees and gains which once belonged to them.

To the judges of the Parliament, the safe enjoyment of official places, whose emoluments were always increasing and were to be divided among no new incumbents, seemed the chief good, and to protect and preserve them seemed the chief end of government.

To the Fronde and to its results were largely due the

¹ *Mém. de Montpensier*, ed. Michaud, 46, 7.

twelve years of slow and burdensome warfare which passed before peace was made with Spain. The faltering hopes of the Spaniards were excited by those internal dissensions, and they were roused still more when the leaders of the Fronde held consultations and made treaties with those who were in open hostility to France. Mazarin's faults were many, but in all these years the Sicilian was more faithful to his adopted country than were the Condés or the Bouillons.

But the first period of the Fronde, amid many mistakes, advocated some wise reforms. If it resulted in some evil, it attempted some good. Though we may feel that it was impossible that the Parliament of Paris should have become a legislative body, and that a veto power on the acts of the government could not have been left to a court, whose members obtained their places by purchase, yet the judges in 1648 were justly excited by an atrocious financial system, by the wastefulness of the government, and by the enormous sums extracted by its agents and middle-men from an overburdened people. Their zeal was indeed first excited by assaults upon the interests of their own order, but it was not wholly selfish, and their efforts are entitled to sympathy if not always to admiration. The second period of the Fronde, however, was led by the nobility, by those who had been the enemies of Richelieu, and by the descendants of those who had been in insurrection under Mary de Medici. It was a period whose picturesqueness was not marked by any purpose except greed, vanity, and caprice. The Condés, the Bouillons, and the Beauforts showed how gallantry and genius could be unaccompanied by wisdom or patriotism. Ladies, whose charms of wit and person make us forget that they possessed neither the virtue of Lucretia nor the discretion of Penelope, became leaders in the contest. Their innumerable lovers committed treason for their lady-loves with as chivalric an air as that with which their ancestors had ridden a tournament. In the varied and dramatic chapters of the Fronde there is much

for the student of human nature: gallantry, wit, romance, intrigue, every thing but statesmanship and wisdom. But with all the suffering and disaster that it inflicted on the country, it did much to develop French literature, and among its actors are some of the most attractive characters in French history. It is something that to it we owe the memoirs of Retz, the maxims of Rochefoucauld, and the penitence of Mme. de Longueville.¹

A series of propositions were at once introduced by the representatives gathered in the Chamber of St. Louis. The first resolution that was adopted asked that the offices of the superintendents should be abolished and that the local treasurers and tax-receivers should be re-established in the exercise of the duties formerly entrusted to them. A Chamber of Justice was demanded to investigate and punish the frauds and extortions of the farmers of the revenues, and the impositions practised both on the government and on the tax-payers. That the tribunal might be zealous in its work, it was requested that it should be composed of members of the four companies. Consider-

¹ Contemporary literature was almost entirely in the interest of the Fronde. The memoirs of Retz and Rochefoucauld have delighted and deceived many readers. A great literature of lively and abusive mazarinades has amused posterity by descriptions of the cardinal's faults and vices. Though Mazarin did much for the libraries of France, he did little to foster its literature. The writers of his time were ready to see his faults and unwilling to acknowledge his merits. Even in this century French historians have differed largely in their judgments on the Fronde. St. Aulaire found in it an attempt at constitutional government. Michelet, whose unequalled picturesqueness of style and eloquence of diction are rarely found combined with a just view of any period of the eight hundred years he treats, defends the Fronde with poetic declamation. But the tendency of late among the more judicious and scholarly students of French history, has been to a different and, I think, a much more correct view of this period. Martin, with his almost uniform justness of historical judgment, shows the insufficiency of this movement and its barrenness in results. The same views are more fully stated in Cheruel, who brings to the discussion an unequalled knowledge of the history of the time. Victor Cousin, though dwelling with fondness upon the leading actors of the Fronde, whom he has described with the brilliancy of a rhetorician and the accuracy of a scholar, admits that their contest was without justification, and he has done much to correct the unfair judgment that had long been passed upon Mazarin.

ing the grievous burden of the *taille*, it was asked that it should be reduced by one quarter, and that all arrears back of 1647 should be cancelled.

Many measures were proposed as to the collection of the various taxes, the payment of the interest on the *rentes*, and the regulation of the finances. The public funds were at this time disbursed in such a manner that any supervision of them was impossible. The payments "*à comptant*," those upon which the king wrote, "I know the object of this disbursement," and of which no account was rendered, had been so increased that while they were but two millions two hundred thousand livres under Henry IV., and in 1625 but six or seven millions, they were forty-eight millions in 1643 and fifty-nine millions in 1644. One half the expenditures of the government were thus made in a manner that was intended originally only for monies employed in the secret service, or of which the use was, for some reason, to be concealed.¹

This method, carried to such excess, gave an opportunity for infinite wastefulness. No information was given to the public of the expenditure of the vast sums annually wrung from it. It was well known that these payments "*à comptant*" were employed chiefly to cover pensions and excessive or fraudulent gains, which could not bear exposure.

The need for reform in the financial system was thus very great, but these endeavors for its improvement, though well meant, were ineffective.

Leaving matters of financial detail, the assembly demanded a full recognition of the right on which alone could rest any permanent restraint upon the administration. All taxes that had not been duly registered should be deemed revoked, and all officers seeking to enforce them should be personally liable; and in the future none should be imposed, except by edicts duly registered by the sovereign companies. The creation of new

¹ Forbonnais, i., 221, etc.

offices was still more strictly guarded. Even to offer propositions pernicious to the courts should subject the proposer to exemplary punishment as a disturber of the public repose. The salaries of their members should not be diminished, and no new judicial offices should be created save by their consent. Measures of advantage to the whole community were brought forward, together with those of special importance to the judicial bodies. No subject of the king, of whatever rank, should be detained prisoner more than twenty-four hours without being interrogated and turned over to the judges having jurisdiction of his case.

It was thirty-one years before the Habeas Corpus act became a law in England, that a similar measure was discussed in the Chamber of St. Louis; but the French reform never became effective. The feeling for personal liberty was not so strong in the French mind, and an arrest without cause, followed by an imprisonment without trial, kindled no fervor of public indignation.

Resolutions as to the transportation of letters and packages were also directed to be brought before the courts, and a heavy fine was imposed on any one who should charge more than the legal postage. Commerce, it was said, was suffering. All monopolies and exclusive privileges were therefore to be revoked. Abuses in the sale of wood, coal, wine, and other provisions and merchandise in Paris were to be regulated by the civic and judicial officers.

Holland and English merchants had, it was charged, by sending their wares into the kingdom, discouraged the making of woollen and silk goods, so that many of the people employed in their manufacture had been reduced to poverty, or compelled to move into foreign countries, and immense sums of money had been sent away from the kingdom. The queen was therefore asked to prohibit the introduction of such goods manufactured in England or Holland, under pain of confiscation.¹

¹ The proceedings of the Chamber of St. Louis can be found in Talon, 241 to 245; Journal du Parlement, 12-22; D'Ormesson, 531-543, and are described more or less fully in the contemporary memoirs.

Such were the measures that were discussed in the Chamber of St. Louis. They were of much importance. While some were injudicious, there were some that were wisely devised. A body possessing legislative power, and demanding and enforcing such reforms, would have deserved the gratitude of the country, but the consultations of the Chamber of St. Louis were followed by small and brief results.

These resolutions of the united courts were sent to the Parliament for its consideration. That body, with a full attendance of all the chambers, first deliberated upon the resolution for the abolition of the superintendents. This was of all the measures proposed, the least worthy of favor. It took the collection of the imposts from thirty-five officers appointed by the government, and entrusted it to three thousand petty local officials whose fees from their offices, it was estimated, would amount to nine million livres annually.¹ Such a change would disorder the collection of the revenues for the present and embarrass it for all time. But the superintendents were viewed with ill-will as the creation of the centralizing policy of Richelieu. They had exercised certain judicial duties, and this excited the jealousy of the courts; their appointments had never been verified by the Parliament; they were regarded with dislike by the people as being only servants of the tax farmers, men of low birth who had gained such great wealth that its possession was their condemnation.² A sudden change in the system of collecting taxes would add to the confusion that existed, and the chancellor suggested that it should be deferred until autumn. President Novion replied that the edict must be sent to Parliament before Saturday, and on that day despatched to the provinces.³ The feeling against the superintendents was so strong that Mazarin assented to the demand for the abolition of their offices.

A further attempt was made to propitiate public opin-

¹ Talon, 245. *Journal du Parlement*, 26.

² Talon, 247.

³ *Journal du Parlement*, 29.

ion. On the 9th of July, Emeri, the superintendent of finance, who was regarded by all, and not unjustly, as the deviser of iniquitous taxes and the friend of the public jobbers, was removed from office and ordered to retire from the Court within two hours.¹ The mob had frequently threatened to sack his house, and Mazarin was weary of a man who brought odium on the government and could no longer raise any money.² His place was given to the Marshal of La Meilleraie, who brought to it an honorable military reputation, and entire ignorance of all that was needed for the performance of its duties. His martial pride and imperious manners little fitted him to deal with a body of lawyers, whom he despised as civilians and disliked as busy-bodies.

The government was driven by its necessities to a more violent measure than the removal of Emeri. In its zeal against the financiers, the Parliament had demanded the cancellation of the assignments to them of the proceeds of the taxes, upon the faith of which their advances had been made. It was necessary to take some step, for the collection of taxes was checked by the action of this body, and the small amounts received belonged to those by whose aid the government had anticipated its future revenues. Mazarin was not unwilling therefore to relieve his needs by acceding to the request that was made. A violation of faith could thus be claimed as a concession to the representatives of the people. It was accordingly declared in July that the monies advanced the government could not be paid until the close of the war. In the meantime they would receive interest at six per cent. and temporary loans were thus turned into a permanent debt.

Though such an act of bankruptcy was fatal to what little credit the nation had, and ruined some of its creditors, yet it had been so plundered by them that it seemed to have some justification. Mazarin in announcing this measure to the Swedish minister said that the most of

¹ Motteville, 171. Ormesson, 541. *Let de Maz.*, iii, 150. *Dis. Ven.*, cviii., 21, says: "Emeri s' involto allo sdegno dell' universale."

² *Dis. Ven.*, cvii., 113, 345.

these loans were at fifteen per cent., and by reducing them to six per cent. there would be a gain of fifty million livres. The debt of the government was stated to be 150,000,000 to 170,000,000 livres, some portion of which, however, was in the rentes, which were a permanent and not a temporary indebtedness. The interests that were affected by such a step were numerous. The majority of those having important positions at Court, had some part in these various loans, and even some members of the Parliament had indulged in stock speculation. Like any breach of the public faith, it increased the financial embarrassment which had already been very serious. Every day more than one merchant failed, and even those of the best credit felt that their condition was precarious.¹ It was stated in the Chamber of St. Louis that over 40,000,000 a year were used in repaying advances made for two or three years at fifteen or twenty-five per cent., and by cancelling the security which its creditors held, the government obtained some relief and temporarily diminished the amount of its expenditures.²

The Parliament continued its deliberations on the other propositions, and the government seemed ready to accede to every request. On the 11th of July it was announced that a reduction of one eighth of the taille was granted for the present and ensuing year, and all arrears from 1644 to 1646 were discharged. The offices of the superintendents were also abolished, except in three provinces where the needs of the army required them.³ On the 13th the king declared that he had decided to appoint a Chamber of Justice, composed of members of the sovereign companies, to investigate the frauds and excessive gains of the financiers and farmers of taxes, and to execute justice upon

¹ See *Journal du Parlement. Let. de Mazarin*, iii., 159, *et seq.* *Dis. Ven.*, cviii., 10, 30, 39.

² *Journal du Parlement*, 17. Little or no attention has been given by historians to this act of national bankruptcy, but its nature and effect are pointed out by Colbert. *Lettres*, etc., t. ii., 23, *et seq.*, and by the despatches of the Venetian ambassadors, which for that period have never before been examined.

³ *Journal du Parlement*, 30.

them. Letters-patent were brought to the Parliament on the 14th, declaring that in the future no taxes should be levied upon the people, unless by virtue of edicts which had been duly verified.¹

Even these concessions, which were formally registered a few days later, did not fully satisfy the Parliament. It was urged that the *taille* should be reduced by one quarter instead of by one eighth. The Parliament desired also to nominate the persons from whom the king should choose the new Chamber of Justice. Not content with the promise that the financial edicts in the future should be registered, the judges sought to question the legality of the vast number of aids and duties which were now enforced without having received such registration. They insisted also, that the obnoxious superintendents should not be left in any province. Such demands increased the desire of the government to end these deliberations. Already, bodies of peasants had in some of the villages demanded a reduction of the taxes, and had stopped the carriage of the Prince of Condé to have an audience with him concerning their grievances. The assembly at the Chamber of St. Louis was a centre for the unruly; it excited among the ignorant people hopes of release from all taxation, and made strangers compare the condition of France with the anarchy of England. Broussel said in the Parliament, that if the government continued to dispense with the forms of law, the people would begin to dispense with the forms of obedience.²

The regent and her minister were involved in uncertainty and distress. Mazarin told the governess of his nieces that she should educate them with simple tastes, for he could not say what would become of them or of himself. Surrounded by a people weary of war and of taxation, and by courtiers eager for any change, Mazarin felt himself burdened by the weight of universal hatred. The queen had pledged her jewels and those of the crown for ready money. Her Swiss guards were unpaid, and the very kitchen of the king was ill supplied.³

¹ *Ibid.*, 33, 35.

² *Journal du Parlement*, 38.

³ Motteville, 172.

It was resolved to give a speedy answer to the requests of the companies, and to endeavor to put an end to their sessions. On the 31st of July, the king attended the Parliament and a new edict was read, embodying the reforms which had been demanded, so far as it was deemed expedient to grant them. The taille for the year 1649 and all ensuing years was to be reduced by one quarter to all those who paid the tax with promptness. A duty on wine brought into Paris was taken off, and the obnoxious *toisé* was abolished. The existing ordinances, which forbade the sending of gold or silver out of the kingdom, were directed to be enforced by the confiscation of the property of offenders. The creation of additional masters of requests, the announcement of which had been one of the causes of the troubles which had assumed such gravity, was now revoked. To provide more fully for the needs of the state, it was announced that a Chamber of Notables would soon be convened, consisting of the great nobles and the principal officers of the crown and of the sovereign courts, that by their good advice justice and finance might be well regulated and the king's subjects receive great solace.

After granting these varied favors and reliefs, the declaration further stated, that for various considerations of importance to his subjects, the king desired that the four companies should no longer continue their consultations, and that no further assembly should be held in the Chamber of St. Louis except by the royal permission. The members of the Parliament were directed to resume the administration of justice to the king's subjects, which had already been too long interrupted.¹

The advocate-general replied in a speech full of eloquence. In this he said, that the majesty of the empire was not impaired by the ordinances which had been established, and that the Parliament in its two months' deliberations had proceeded without error or obliquity. After this the chancellor further announced that the *paulette* would be granted to all the sovereign courts of the Par-

¹ *Journal du Parlement*, 50-53.

liament, and then took the votes, which, as always in the presence of the king, were announced in favor of registering the edict that had just been read.

But the concessions granted neither quieted nor satisfied the judicial companies. On the day following the registration of this edict, the members of the Inquests took their seats in the Grand Chamber and demanded the reading of the king's declaration. Molé endeavored to prevent such a discussion and by doing so exposed himself to the charge of subserviency to the government. It is to make the queen afraid of him, his enemies said, that he talks so boldly at times, and in order that he may be paid regularly the 100,000 livres he draws every year, and may receive new favors for his children.¹

But Molé's endeavors were now of little avail, and the Parliament resolved upon remonstrances to various articles in the declaration. By this the officers, whose wages were already scandalously in arrears, were to be paid only one quarter of their salaries in 1648, three eighths in 1649, and one half after that until the condition of affairs should improve. The Parliament asked that full wages should be paid the officers, and should be in no wise diminished except by letters-patent duly verified. These discussions occupied the early weeks of August.² The queen's indignation at them was increased by the fact, that the people were unruly and the advices from the war unfavorable, so she dared not take any vigorous step. But on the 21st of August a messenger from Arras brought the intelligence that there had been a battle near there, and he had heard the distant booming of the cannon. All that day the queen waited in feverish expectation. At midnight, as she was undressing, the Count of Chatillon arrived, bringing the news that a great battle had been fought, and the Prince of Condé had added another to his list of famous victories.³

¹ *Mém. de Joly*, 8.

² A full and accurate account of the proceedings during this summer is found in Omer Talon, 241-261. See also *Journal du Parlement*, 22-67; *Histoire du Temps*, 86-148; *Dis. Ven.*, cviii., 10-62; Ormesson, 531-563.

³ Motteville, 188.

The campaign in the Low Countries had been unsuccessful in the early part of 1648. The Prince of Condé had been given the command of an army and promised 30,000 men, but he had accomplished little. Ypres was captured by the French, but this gain was more than offset by the loss of Courtrai. The governor of Courtrai had left it without defenders while he assisted at the siege of Ypres, and the capture of the city thus negligently abandoned discouraged the allies of the French. The French may know how to capture cities, it was said, but they do not know how to keep them. Bets were offered that within a year both Ypres and Dunkirk would be recaptured by the Spaniards. An expedition against Ostend resulted in the loss of several hundred men, and the Spanish army now threatened to invade Picardy and even press forward to Paris. "Their general," said a French contemporary, "hoped to see opened to him the gates of the most beautiful, the most rich, and the most superb of all the cities of the world,"¹

Meanwhile, the army of Condé had been melting away. The pay of the French army was irregular at any time, and when to habitual remissness was added an empty treasury; when the collection of taxes was paralyzed by internal commotions, it was little wonder that the soldiers preferred taking the chance of being shot if they deserted, to the certainty of being starved if they remained. Hunger, nakedness, sickness, and desertion had so reduced the army, that Condé could collect hardly one third of the troops that he had commanded at the siege of Ypres.

The Spaniards were exultant at the small opposition they met in their campaign. The cloud of Lerida still seemed to envelop the victor of Rocroi. It was sneeringly announced in the *Gazette* of Antwerp, that handbills were soon to be sent out to inquire what had become of the French army; the Spaniards had sought it everywhere and had been unable to find it.²

¹ "Le Bataille de Lens," 1649.

² Motteville, 188.

Notwithstanding his diminished forces, Condé felt the need of an important victory to check the belief that France was paralyzed by her internal dissensions. His own ardor and confidence accorded with his convictions of political and military necessity. It was now late in August, and the Spanish army, under the command of the archduke and of General Beck, undertook the siege of Lens, a small city of Artois. Condé thought this a favorable opportunity for a decisive battle, and he marched thither rapidly with his army of about 14,000 men. On the 18th of August he prepared for the encounter, and at break of day on the 19th his army advanced against the enemy. The Spanish had fallen back and occupied a strong position on rising ground near Lens. That city, accustomed to being the ready conquest of every assailant, had surrendered the night previous, and the Spaniards were now encamped on the hills near by.

The valley in front gradually rose to these heights, and a little stream before them formed a sort of marsh. "The plain, slowly rising into hills," said an enthusiastic soldier, "seemed only made for fighting battles."

Knowing Condé's boldness, the archduke thought that here, as at Nordlingen, he would endeavor to storm the position. But Condé was too prudent to hazard such a risk. Narrow defiles over difficult ground led to the Spanish forces, the main part of which was strongly placed among some groves. The only army of importance which the French had in the field, could not risk a defeat in a desperate assault on an army of 18,000 men possessing great advantage of position. Condé endeavored during the day to lure the archduke down to level ground, but without success. His own position was unfavorable so that it was necessary to fall back. The French camp was in so dry and sterile a spot that no fodder or water could be found. The horses had neither eaten nor drunk during the day, and the prince decided to lead his troops back to Neus, where supplies could be had in abundance.

The night was the natural time for a retreat that should be unmolested, but Condé resolved to invite attack by retreating by day and in sight of the enemy. Such a resolution was full of peril. Should his forces be attacked, a retreat might be easily turned into a flight, and a flight into a rout. But such an opportunity might draw the Spanish army from their stronghold, and Condé trusted to his genius to rally his soldiers and turn the retreat into a battle on equal terms.

At daybreak, on August 20th, the retreat began, the troops marching so that they could most conveniently form in order of battle. The sight of the retiring army attracted Beck, and he led the Lorraine and the Croat cavalry in pursuit. Their attack was met with courage, but its results were such as might have been feared; the last line of the French army was broken and they fled in confusion; the disorder threatened to become general, and the Prince of Condé himself was involved in the rout.

But he had calculated on this peril, and was prepared for it. He rallied his men with all of his accustomed fire. "My friends, be of good courage; it is useless to fly, for I promise you, brave or cowards, all shall fight this day, either because you will, or because you must."

His army rallied and formed for battle.¹ By a skilful movement, the first line, wearied and broken by the attack it had received, was led back and re-formed in the rear, while the second line of retreat advanced in perfect order, and became the first line of battle. The result for which Condé hoped had been produced. Beck sent for the archduke to advance, assuring him that he would come not to battle, but to a certain victory, and the archduke led his troops from the hill, and crossed the plain in pursuit of the retreating army. As they came up they were

¹ "It was his presence of mind and knowledge of men," writes his valiant lieutenant, the Marshal of Gramont, "that put him above all others in the most perilous and important occasions. All there was to be done was present to his mind in a second. Such are the rare geniuses of war."—*Mém. de Gramont*, p. 280.

met by the French, now in good order and full of ardor, and the Spanish, in turn, had the difficult task of forming in order of battle as they marched. At about eight o'clock in the morning the armies met, and the encounter was exceedingly severe. Again and again the prince reformed his broken companies and led them to the charge. At last his valor, and that of the Marshal of Gramont, scattered the forces opposed to them, and the victory was now assured.

A solid body of the Spanish infantry occupied the centre, but it was composed of different soldiers from those who fought under the heroic Fontaine at Rocroi. Assaulted on either side, they at once laid down their arms. The archduke, after vain endeavors to check the confusion, had taken to flight. Beck was a prisoner, severely wounded. He died on the next day from his injuries, aggravated by his chagrin. He is said to have refused any courtesies from his victors, and to have filled the last hours of his life with constant curses at fortune. The French had taken 5,000 prisoners, and 3,000 of their adversaries lay dead upon the field. It was estimated that but 500 of the French had fallen. The battle, from the first charge to the rout of the enemy, had not occupied over an hour.¹

The announcement of this great success had a marked effect on internal politics. The queen thought that strengthened by a brilliant victory, and with discontent allayed by glory, she might now deal boldly with the insolent judges who for seven months had defied her commands and interfered with her plans, had stopped the taxes, en-

¹ For authorities on the battle of Lens consult *Bataille de Lens*, 1649. *Mém. de Gramont*, 278-281. *Gazette*, 1648, 129, 138. *Montglat*, 189, 190. *Motteville*, 187, 189. The two latter speak only from hearsay. Mlle. de Scuderi in the *Grand Cyrus* gives an accurate account of this battle, under the name of the Battle of Thybarra, t. v., liv. iii., p. 241, *et seq.*, undoubtedly founded on the accounts given her at the Hotel of Condé, as is shown by Cousin's "*Société Française*," i., 137 to 156. *Lett. de Maz.*, iii., 107-143. Mazarin says the battle took from eight to one, but that must include the pursuit.

croached on the prerogatives of the king, and endeavored to reduce France to the terrible condition of England. She was resolved to have satisfaction for the injuries that had been done to her.¹ How far the Parliament was thought to be hostile to every interest of France, was shown by the remark attributed to the young Louis XIV. "The Parliament will be well vexed by this news," he cried, when the tidings of the victory of Lens were received. The officers of the courts apprehended that they might be suspected of not sharing the general joy. A solemn *Te Deum* was ordered at Notre Dame on the 26th of August, which the members of Parliament attended in great numbers, lest it should be believed that the victory had not been agreeable to them. Seventy-three banners, taken from the enemy at Lens, hung in the choir of the cathedral, while thanksgivings were sung before the queen and the multitude of dignitaries, soldiers, and citizens that filled the great church.

The joy was not universal even outside of the Parliament. Mademoiselle, who watched Condé with mingled dislike and jealousy, tells us that none of her attendants dared to speak to her of the battle of Lens. When she at last heard the news, it excited in her only tears of rage. In her father and many others, the battles won by Condé aroused similar feelings, though they did not confess them.²

Mazarin said that this victory would show the courts how far removed he was from the sentiments of vengeance that had been attributed to him, and that the advantages won by the armies had softened rather than roused the feelings of the administration.

But Anne of Austria had no thought of letting her enemies escape unscathed, and the minister was ready to obey her. The leaders of the malcontents should find that the government could not be braved with impunity. In the recent deliberations of the Parliament, an active part had been taken by a counsellor named Broussel. He was

¹ Talon, 263.

² *Mém. de Mlle. de Montpensier*, 45.

far from possessing the qualities needed for a dangerous agitator, but he had those which excited both popularity and an exaggerated idea of his wisdom and importance. He was now an old man, seventy-three years of age, who had taken no leading part in the judicial labors of the court, and whose intellectual qualities were neither vigorous nor acute.¹ He had grown gray amidst the dust of the Grand Chamber, with more reputation among his associates for integrity than for ability.² But his flowing white beard, his venerable demeanor, his gravity of speech, and his look of wisdom produced on the populace a conviction of great profundity. He possessed also that quality always sure of popular recognition—absolute pecuniary integrity.³ With something of harmless affectation, he led a life of great simplicity, recalling the austere virtues of the ancient patriots. His house, old and stern in appearance, was situated on the banks of the Seine, near Notre Dame. There he lived rearing a patriarchal family of children on a modest four thousand francs a year. Careful in his personal expenses, he was known to be benevolent to the poor. He had been foremost among those who had attacked blindly every new impost, a course which spoke little for his statesmanship, but added largely to his popularity. He had thus come to be regarded as one of the leaders of the popular party, and had acquired a position of sufficient prominence to bring upon him the malevolence of the government. The queen resolved that the victory over the Spanish in the field should be accompanied by a victory over the malcontents at home. Comminges, a lieutenant of the queen's guards, was ordered to arrest Broussel and the Presidents Blancménil and Charton, immediately after the ceremony at Notre Dame. The queen asked the blessing of the Almighty on her act, as one necessary for the public repose, and as she left the cathedral she whispered to Comminges: "Go, and God be with

¹ Talon, 263. Retz, 154.

² Retz, 181.

³ The Venetian ambassador expresses the general feeling about Broussel. "Questo, sprezzato tutte le offerte, ha sostenuto vigorosamente il partito del popolo," cviii., 62.


you."¹ Blancménil was arrested and letters were served on three other members of the Parliament, directing them to leave Paris forthwith. Charton was given the alarm and escaped. Comminges had reserved for himself the arrest of Broussel, as an act perilous in its execution, in the midst of a people who regarded the old man as their friend and protector. Broussel had not attended mass, and the lieutenant found him at noon eating his dinner with his five children. Comminges told him he had the king's order to seize his person. Broussel replied that he was ill and taking medicine, and must have time before he could obey. In the meantime, an old woman who had charge of the house began to cry out to the neighbors to succor her master, and deliver the friend of the people from his enemies. A crowd quickly assembled in the narrow street before the house, crying for the deliverance of the liberator of the people. The lieutenant saw that no time could be wasted. Broussel was taken by force, without even being allowed to get his cloak or embrace his children, was dragged from his family and thrust into the carriage. An excited crowd followed, as this made its way through the streets. The streets of Paris were at that time so bad that a rapid drive over them was not free from peril. Carriages were constantly broken or upset as they worked their way over the narrow roads, almost as rough and uneven as mountain paths, or more often through mud holes that differed little from a morass. The carriage in which Broussel was taken tipped over on the quay in front of Molé's house and was broken. A new one was seized, and Broussel, by the aid of the soldiers, was transferred to it. As they drove along the Rue St. Honoré, the second carriage broke down. But another one had been sent after them in anticipation of such a mishap, and in it they at last reached the Chateau of Madrid, near the Bois de Boulogne. From there Broussel was carried to St. Germain and safely confined.²

¹ Motteville, 189, 190.

² Motteville, 189, 191. Retz, i., 154. Talon, 263. Molé, iii., 247-251. Journal du Parlement, 67, Dis. Ven., cviii., 62.

But the news of the arrest was by this time noised through the whole city. The attempt to arrest the five members by Charles I. created no more excitement, although the permanent effect of the French *coup d'état* was so slight, that it seems little more than a burlesque upon Charles' rash act. As if by one impulse, the people of Paris rushed to arms. The shops were closed; the streets were filled with excited men crying for Broussel, the friend of the people, to be restored to them; the very shop-girls cried out amid their tears to have M. de Broussel given back to them. Even the calm Molé visited the queen, describing the symptoms of insurrection among the people and advising the release of the prisoners. The queen briefly informed him that when he came at the head of his company she would give him an answer. Another person destined to take a still more prominent part in these troubles, also waited upon the regent to volunteer his counsel and assistance.

Jean François Paul de Gondi, the coadjutor of the archbishop of Paris, and who afterwards became the Cardinal of Retz, belonged to an ancient and distinguished family of Italian origin. The future cardinal was the third son of Philip de Gondi, and belonged to a younger branch of the family. He was originally intended for the profession of arms, but the death of his second brother and the fact that the archbishopric of Paris was now held by a kinsman, decided his father to devote to the church a soul which, as he truthfully admits, was perhaps the least ecclesiastical in the universe. The young Retz was early made a canon and an abbé, but this did not at all interfere with his being best known by his duels and his amours. His love adventures were said to be more of the head than the heart, and to spring as much from a desire to have his exploits in gallantry noised abroad as from any strength of passion. He was small and ill-favored, but there was something in his face that no one would call common, and a charm in his tongue that made the most beautiful forget knights of fair proportions for a little, swarthy, near-sighted, bandy-legged priest.



Such pleasures did not make him entirely forgetful of his studies, for he acquitted himself with credit at the Sorbonne, and preached before the Court at the Feast of Pentecost with much success. Among all these occupations he had a strong and curious taste for stratagems and plots, and dreamed of the career of a Catiline.¹

When only eighteen he had written a history of the conspiracy of Jean Louis de Fiesque, in which all the rules of conspiracy, treason, and deceit are laid down with melodramatic effect. For some time he desired to abandon a profession that he hated, but, despairing of a better field for his activities, he decided at twenty-six to continue permanently in the church. This edifying result was due in part to the failure of the insurrection of the Count of Soissons, but it was also largely caused by his lady-loves. Mme. de Guémené, he tells us, abandoned powder and frizzles, bade him farewell with all the forms of penitence, and was carried by D'Andilly to the Port Royal, while the Maréchale de la Meilleraie looked upon a rival with equal favor. "Here," he says, "was reason enough for becoming a saint." The hopes of ambition, as well as the disappointments of love, suggested the same step. Richelieu had honored the young priest with his hostility, but he was now failing in health, and the archbishopric of Paris might be hoped for. Retz paid, therefore, somewhat more attention to his religious duties, and his discourses as a controversialist were so edifying that a Protestant gentleman of Poitou was said to have been brought back to the Catholic Church by listening to his arguments. On the third of December, 1643, he preached at St. Jean with such ability and eloquence that all hoped for much spiritual fruit when he should become archbishop of Paris.²

He was offered the bishopric of Agde, which was worth 30,000 livres a year, but he excused himself by saying that he feared the burden of a remote bishopric, and that his age and inexperience needed the counsel which could not

¹ *Mém. de Nemours*, ed. Michaud, 620.

² *Journal d'Ormesson*.

be found in the provinces. As he remarked to his friends, his piety did not lead him towards Languedoc; his piety was, as has been justly said, peculiarly Parisian in its character.

After the death of Louis XIII., Retz was made coadjutor of his uncle, the Archbishop of Paris. This not only secured for him the archbishopric when his uncle should die, but it gave him at once a great power in Paris. The archbishop was old, weak, and incapable, and led a life of almost monastic, though not wholly religious, retirement. On the young and active coadjutor came most of the duties of the archbishopric, and its opportunities of acquiring favor and influence among the great flock under his charge.

It was now necessary to take orders, and the future cardinal retired to St. Lazare to meditate on religious truths. There he found himself embarrassed between his desire to increase the power and influence of the see of Paris, and his reflections that it would be difficult to do so with an incumbent whose life was a public scandal. He finally resolved to perform the outward duties of his office with vigor and regularity, without professing or attempting any sanctity in his private life. He declined to join the Importants, whom he viewed as persons of melancholy manners and muddy minds. He devoted his energies to pleasing the clergy by the vigorous position he always took on matters of church privileges, pleasing the people by his affability of manner and profuse charities, and pleasing his lady-loves by his devotions. He was ready for any quarrel in defence of his ecclesiastical rank or personal dignity. Marie of Gonzagua wished to be married to the king of Poland by the bishop of Warmie in Notre Dame, but the coadjutor forbade the ceremony taking place at his cathedral unless he performed it. The future queen decided to content herself with a marriage in the chapel of the Palais Royal, but there also the coadjutor claimed jurisdiction, and he informed the bride that if she was married there without his sanction, he should reluctantly be compelled to declare

the marriage a nullity. His authority was at last asked and obtained, and the Polish bishop performed the ceremony at the chapel of the Palais Royal.¹

In a strife with the Duke of Orleans for precedence in Notre Dame the coadjutor was equally resolute. "Those who affect the actions of St. Ambrose," said Mazarin, discussing this matter with the young prelate, "should lead his life." "I imitate St. Ambrose on this occasion," replied the coadjutor, "that he may obtain for me the grace to imitate him in other things."

To his profuse liberalities he was especially indebted for his great popularity with the people. In less than four months he claims to have given away in alms 36,000 crowns, or as much as \$60,000 of to-day.²

In the commotions now beginning, the coadjutor saw the opportunity he had long desired for weaving innumerable plots, and gaining that political power which of all things he most coveted. Through the crowds crying out for Broussel he marched to the Palais Royal, arrayed in his rochette and camail, and when there he offered to do what he could for the public tranquillity and repose. But the troubles were deemed at Court to be imaginary. "It is revolt to imagine this is revolt," said the queen, in a high, shrill voice. "These are the stories of those who wish to believe them true."

Retz suggested that the surrender of Broussel might allay the tumult. "You wish me to liberate Broussel," replied the queen, "I would rather strangle him with my own two hands, and those also," she continued; but here Mazarin whispered in her ear and presently her manner became milder.³

¹ Retz, i., 104.

² The authorities for Retz's early career and character are to be found in the memoirs and correspondence of the time. His own memoirs discuss his life with great freedom, but not always with equal frankness. They are outspoken in acknowledging and even boasting of his vices as a libertine, but often seek to conceal his mistakes as a politician. A very interesting and accurate account of many phases of Retz's career is found in "Retz et l'Affaire du Collier," by Chantelauze.

³ Retz, 160.

After much consultation of ministers and courtiers, it was decided to send the coadjutor to promise the people the liberty of the prisoners. "Every one," says Retz, "was playing a part. Mazarin pretended to feel quite at his ease and was not ; the queen at times affected softness, and never felt more fierce ; Longueville had an air of sadness, but was really overjoyed, as he always was at the beginning of any movement ; the Duke of Orleans talked with zeal to the queen, but in private whistled with more than his usual indifference ; while his favorite La Rivière, the most notorious poltroon of the age, affected to regard the whole matter as a tale full of sound and fury, signifying nothing." The coadjutor, however, returned to the people, and persuaded them to lay down their arms and wait for the execution of the promises of the queen, a task that was made easy because their hour for supper was approaching. The report of these services was received by the regent with cool indifference, and after his return, Retz was informed by a friend that his actions were made a jest at Court, and were ridiculed by the courtiers, to the great amusement of the queen. Filled with rage at this, the prelate turned his thoughts to the more congenial task of stirring up commotion, and he availed himself of his influence in Paris to excite the popular feeling which needed little instigation to proceed to acts of violence.

On the morning of the 27th, the chancellor Seguier set out in his usual state for the Palace of Justice. There he was to present to the Parliament a decree of the council cancelling all their acts since the bed of justice held on July 31st.¹ At every place he found chains extending across the streets. His followers endeavored to force a passage, but were resisted by the bourgeois. "It is the chancellor," said the guard. But the only reply to this was a shower of stones. The commotion increased, and the chancellor sought refuge in the house of the Duke of Luines. There he confessed himself to his brother, the bishop of Meaux, and obtained absolution, for the mob was now pouring in,

¹ Talon, 264.

crying loudly for his blood. Fortunately, the desire for plunder drew them away from the small chamber where he lay concealed; a company of guards came to his relief, and he was at last conveyed in safety to the Palais Royal.

But the whole city was now in wild excitement. Barri-
cades of chains were stretched across every street; beams,
barrels full of rubble, and paving stones torn from the
roadway helped to form these rude fortifications.

They were guarded by parties of twenty-five or thirty
men, who cried out to passers-by: "Long live the king,
the Parliament, and M. de Broussel." Some varied the cry
by shouting, "No Mazarin." More than 1,200 of these bar-
ricades were erected within two hours all over Paris, and
made it a vast and impassable camp. The whole city was
in arms; 100,000 men were said to be in insurrection;
every apothecary boy, every vendor of charcoal, or of pipes
and tobacco, was equipped as a soldier. Tailors and black-
smiths, apprentices, and clerks of the courts, all were
armed with such weapons as chance furnished or caprice
suggested.¹ Picks, bars, drag-hooks, iron beams,—every
variety of implement was borne by these motley volun-
teers. The weapons and flags which had done service in
the troubles of the League again appeared. One boy was
dragging an ancient lance which had been used in the wars
against the English; another wore a gorget of silver gilt,
on which was the figure of the murderer of Henry III.,
with the inscription "St. Jacques Clement." Even chil-
dren of five or six ran about with poniards in their hands.²

At seven in the morning the Parliament met and re-
solved, in view of the popular commotion, to wait upon the
queen in a body, and ask for the release of Broussel and the
other prisoners. One hundred and sixty members, arrayed
in their judicial robes, marched from the Palace of Justice
over the Pont Neuf, and thence along the Rue St. Honoré

¹ Hist. du Temps, 156. I think the figures of 100,000 are too large for
a city of half a million. But there were at Paris large numbers of soldiers
disbanded from want of pay, forming an unruly element. Dis. Ven.,
cvii., 64. ² Retz, 174. Choix des Mazarinades, i., 10. Talon, 265.

to the Palais Royal, passing through a multitude of twenty thousand people, who cried out: "Long live the Parliament. Bring us back Broussel."

When they had arrived at the palace, Molé addressed the regent on behalf of the body with that boldness which in emergencies he never lacked, and declared that with Paris in insurrection there was no time for her majesty to deliberate, but only to grant the release of Broussel, which alone could quiet the tumult. This petition met with an angry reply. "It is you of the Parliament," said Anne, "who have caused this sedition. You have come here in a body to excite the populace, but you shall answer to the king. Quell the disturbance as you can, but for me, I will do no more. There are two or three thousand miscreants in arms whom I will punish in due time."

But the Parliament a second time returned with their petitions, and Molé told her the evil was greater than she thought. All Paris was in arms, and it was beyond the power of the Parliament to check the disturbance. Advised by those around her, the regent at last promised that Broussel should be released if they would agree to discontinue their joint assemblies and confine themselves to the affairs of litigants. The judges started to return to the Palace of Justice, but they found themselves surrounded by an impatient and enraged people. "Where is Broussel?" they cried out. "Return, traitor," said one to Molé; "and if you do not want to be killed yourself, bring us Broussel, or bring us Mazarin or the chancellor for a hostage."

Frightened by these disturbances, many of the counselors fled to their own houses or to their friends. But Molé gathered those that were left, and led them back to the Palais Royal with a coolness that was unaffected by a constant fire of reproaches, menaces, execrations, and blasphemies. There the Parliament held a special meeting. Many were unwilling to make any concession to the regent, but by a vote of seventy to fifty it was resolved, that until St. Martins no public matter should be discuss-

ed before it, except certain regulations about duties and the payment of the rentes of the Hotel de Ville.

Accepting this modified submission, the regent promised that the prisoners should be released, and the Parliament was allowed to return home in peace, though the populace declared that they would remain in arms until Broussel was actually restored to them.

When the Parliament met the next morning the city was still filled with barricades and armed men. At about ten o'clock, the constant report of guns excited the fear that the soldiers and the people were engaged in actual conflict, but the news soon came that M. de Broussel was riding through the city on his triumphal return, and was meeting with a long succession of salutes. The people flung themselves at his feet, embracing his knees, and addressing him as their saviour and protector. After he had piously offered his thanks at Notre Dame, he was escorted by fifty of the bourgeois, fully armed, to the Grand Chamber, and returned to his brethren. They arose as the popular favorite entered, and even Molé so far departed from the customs of the body as to notice the arrival and to say that "the company were well pleased to see M. de Broussel again in his place after so many storms passed. This was the result of his many praiseworthy actions, which he would continue with the sincere affection of the company."

In less than twenty-four hours every barricade had been removed, the old arms were again stored away, the stones relaid in the pavements, the shops reopened, and Paris was as tranquil as an English village.¹

Though tranquillity was restored, the strife between the government and the judicial bodies was neither ended nor allayed. The Parliament continued its deliberations on

¹ For authorities as to the barricades see Molé, iii., 248-268. Talon, 263-268. Retz, i., 152-179. Choix des Mazarinades, i., 2-27. Montpensier, 45 and 46. Motteville, 189-198. Montglat, 197-200. Ormesson, 556-567. Carnets and Letters of Mazarin, *passim*. Journal du Parlement, 66-78. Histoire du Temps, 148-170. Dis. Ven., cviii., 62, *et seq.* Registres de l'Hotel de Ville, i., 15-35.

matters of state, with little regard for the agreement which had been a condition of Broussel's release. On September 7th its ordinary vacation began, and the regent had looked forward to this day as the end of interference with the royal authority; before its next session in November, it was hoped that the spirit of complaint and insubordination would be quieted. But the Parliament, in its zeal for the public interests, was willing to forego its usual rest, and it asked that the term which had been put upon its labors should be extended. The regent was unable to oppose a continuation which, had she refused, would probably have been taken without her consent, and it was accordingly granted for fifteen days, but the members of the Parliament were asked to do nothing which would encourage the enemies of France, or would animate the malcontents who sought to arouse the people by false reports and lying prophecies.¹

The queen was guided by the advice of her minister in every step she took. True to his favorite reliance on time and himself, Mazarin advised her to pursue a conciliatory policy, and to wait for a favorable opportunity for regaining what was lost. The Parliament, he told her, had assumed the functions of the king; it had given to the king Broussel for an associate; it had made insolent and unheard-of propositions; it had sought to drive away the cardinal, and put the queen in a monastery; the judges had omitted nothing in their endeavors to stir up all the Parliaments of France to revolt, and to excite the people to pay no taxes. But, at present, the government must dissimulate, and pretend that it desired to yield whatever was asked; they must leave Paris, not as if flying, but publicly; the king would be much stronger away from there, and when the Prince of Condé returned, they could take vigorous steps, transfer the Parliament from Paris, and bring from Flanders to St. Cloud and St. Denis, troops who would check disobedience.²

¹ Talon, 269, 270. *Journal du Parlement*, 84.

² *Carnets*, ix., 31, 62, 64.

Thus instructed, the queen yielded to the courts, and at the same time prepared to leave Paris. At six on the morning of September 13th, the young king, accompanied by Mazarin and a few guards, left the city, and retired to Ruel, a town about ten miles distant, and Anne followed on the same day. It was claimed that this change was but an ordinary retreat from the heat and sickness of Paris to the health and refreshing coolness of a country resort. The queen told the provost of the merchants that they should certainly be back in eight days, but notwithstanding such plausible excuses, the change excited mistrust among the citizens. Frequent rumors were circulated that Paris was to be besieged; the soldiers would be recalled from the Low Countries, the supplies of the city cut off, and a severe vengeance taken upon the capital for its revolts, and the affronts it had inflicted upon an offended regent and an outraged minister. Trade became stagnant, and every one laid by what money he had on hand for the necessity that might arise.¹

Condé now returned from his victories in the field to give personal attention to these internal discontents. He had been slightly wounded, and wished to take the baths for his health. He preferred, also, winning a brilliant victory, to that persistent utilizing of victory which alone makes it of large importance. Unlike Turenne, who commanded his army and watched his opportunity both summer and winter, Condé, after a short campaign, was eager to return to the Court. During the alarm at the barricades, Mazarin had written the prince, asking him to come to Paris, but the latter was not yet ready, and had declined. When that peril was passed, the cardinal wrote that Paris was tranquil, and he hoped that Condé would continue his campaign. But the prince now replied that to take ten cities would not ruin Spain, while the continuation of these disorders would ruin France, and that a people which forced the king to surrender his prisoners, indulged in in-

¹ Motteville, 201. Talon, 275, 276. Retz, i., 186-194. Journal d'Ormesson, 573, 574.

solent discourses, and chased away the royal guards with stones and musketry, was far from tranquil.¹ He, therefore, returned, and his movements were watched with eager curiosity. Though hoping for his aid, Mazarin felt how uncertain was the support of one so self-willed, domineering, and capricious. Sure of his own control of the queen, the minister was willing to suffer the appearance of her disapproval, if that would help to allay any jealousy the prince might feel of the cardinal's power. "The queen," Mazarin wrote in October in his *Carnets*, "must remember to complain particularly of me to the prince, saying I have become mild, and such conduct does not increase her affection; but if all men fail her, even the cardinal, God will not permit the injuries she has received to go unpunished, and she may find a minister who may care more than I have done for the outrages she has suffered."² Echoing these secret orders, Anne complained at times of the cardinal, accusing him of too great mildness, so that he would retire from the council room, apparently both humiliated and enraged.³ Even without this elaborate farce which was performed for his benefit, Condé seemed at first sufficiently zealous in the royal interest. He said he was astonished at the propositions the Parliament advanced; that they were offensive to the king, and he could not countenance them.⁴

"The Parliament goes too fast," he said to Retz; "if I went with it, I should perhaps gain advantages for myself, but I will not weaken the throne; my name is Louis of Bourbon."⁵ Retz recognized Condé's political importance, and he endeavored to become his adviser and his guide. He found the prince ready to oppose Mazarin, but inclined to support the queen.

The retirement to Ruel was soon followed by the overthrow of Chateauneuf and Chavigni, two men who Mazarin believed had done much in urging the Parliament to its present position. Chateauneuf had long been regarded

¹ Lenet, 515, 516.

² *Carnets*, x., 77.

³ Motteville, 213.

⁴ Talon, 276, 277.

⁵ Retz, 196.

as a person of such ability, that even Mazarin had once feared him as a rival for Anne's favor. After his disgrace and imprisonment under Richelieu, Chateauneuf had enjoyed some degree of favor, and he was now believed to be active in plans which might obtain him the position of minister, which for five years had seemed but slightly removed. Chavigni was a still more dangerous enemy. Introduced into office by his father, Chavigni, when still very young, had gained the good-will and confidence of Richelieu, and this he had preserved until the cardinal's death. He had hoped for equal favor with Mazarin, whom he regarded as greatly indebted to him for help at the beginning of his career. But Mazarin recognized no benefactor save Richelieu, and the queen had gratified her spite by dismissing Chavigni from office.¹

In the autumn of 1643 he had been recalled "by my folly" wrote Mazarin, and he had continued in the queen's council.² Changing the conduct which, when he was in full favor under Richelieu, had made him odious to many, he now made a hundred visits a day, and was the most civil and humble man in France. Nominally friendly with the cardinal, it was thought he had used his great parliamentary acquaintance in advising and exciting the resistance of that body, and that he was endeavoring secretly to overthrow one whom he regarded as an ungrateful upstart, and whose successor he hoped to become.³ Though still a young man, Chavigni had such experience in the administration, and such knowledge of all the secrets of state, that, if disgraced, he could not with impunity be left in freedom.⁴ Chateauneuf was accordingly ordered to retire fifty leagues from Paris, but

¹ Mazarin seems at first to have been somewhat friendly to Chavigni, but this friendship soon ceased. Chavigni was alike dangerous from his abilities, and disagreeable because he regarded himself as Mazarin's benefactor.

² Carnets, x.

³ These and many other accusations against Chavigni are found in the 10th Carnet, and explain his overthrow, which was undoubtedly due to Mazarin's hostility and distrust.

⁴ Talon, 275.

Chavigni was thrown into close confinement at Vincennes.¹

The arrest of Chavigni added new zeal to the remonstrances of the Parliament, and increased its persistence in demanding the articles, already discussed in the Chamber of St. Louis, as to arbitrary arrests and confinements without examination. On September 22d, the President Viole addressed the Parliament, and declared that the arrest of Chavigni, a man of merit and knowledge of affairs, and his imprisonment without the form or pretence of law, must make every one fear a like calamity; troops were menacing Paris and threatening to starve its citizens; threats were made against those who were laboring for the public welfare, and all this was done by the counsels of the man who governed the state and desired to keep his gripe upon it. In the excitement that followed this attack, Mazarin was assailed as an obscure and low-born foreigner, who sought only to enrich himself by the spoils of office. The queen was prayed to bring the king again to Paris, and the Duke of Orleans, the Prince of Condé, and his brother Conti, were requested to meet on the next day with the Parliament for consultation upon the needs of the state.²

The king's council passed a decree cancelling this invitation, and ordering the Parliament to continue and finish its discussions upon the tariff. By a vote of 71 to 67 the members resolved to continue their deliberations as heretofore, notwithstanding this injunction, and they directed the provost of merchants to see closely to the safety of the city. Business was at once stopped; many persons left Paris during the night; the streets were full of wagons carrying away valuables and household goods, and another collision between the courts and the government seemed imminent.³ But the regent again yielded. Consent was given to the conference, and Orleans and Condé wrote that they would gladly meet and consult on the needs of

¹ Motteville, 202, 203. ² Talon, 276. *Journal du Parlement*, 85, 86.

³ Motteville, 207. *Journal du Parlement*, 86, 87.

the state. The princes were indeed eager for such a meeting. By the wording of the resolution, Mazarin had been excluded from any participation in it. His unpopularity was constantly increasing; and this had given the Parliament courage to inflict so marked an affront, and had compelled him to endure it.

No story of his crimes could be so wild as to be discredited. It was said that he had stolen and sent away to Venice twenty-nine millions of livres, and that he was resolved that Paris should be sacked and burned; this base-born Sicilian, subject to the king of Spain, calling himself by the newly-coined title of First Minister of the State, raised to power by tricks and frauds, had, in six years, injured and ravaged France more than her cruelest enemies; he had banished and imprisoned princes and judges without the forms of justice, because they had served God and the king; he was surrounded by traitors, gamblers, usurers, and atheists; one hundred and twenty millions a year were wrung from the people with such cruelty that twenty-three thousand men were now in prison for failure to pay their taxes, and five thousand had died in one year in confinement and misery; yet the army was unpaid, and more than one hundred and twenty thousand soldiers had perished from need and distress; while brave men were starving on the field and in the garrisons, this Roman debauchee was gambling at the Palais Royal, dividing the king's treasures with publicans and jobbers; sending to Italy money, rich wares, and precious stones, and refusing to allow peace to France, that he might forever continue his tyranny and his thefts.¹

Whether his crimes were more or less, Orleans and Condé were quite willing to proceed without him. On September 25th the representatives of the Parliament met at St. Germain, with Orleans, Condé, Conti, and the Duke of Longueville. Conti was the younger brother of the

¹ Carnets, x. *Choix des Mazarinades*, i., 28-34. Mazarin put down in his *Carnets* many of the varied charges against himself which came to his ears.

Prince of Condé, and he and Orleans were both jealous of the cardinal's rule. Longueville had enjoyed a large share of the royal bounty, but he was far from content. He had been mortified that at Münster he was but a dignified figure-head, while Avaux and Servien did the work of the embassy. Leaving Münster in disgust, he was not satisfied with a position in the council. His mind was bent on obtaining the rank of a royal duke for himself, and the tabouret for his wife. To these aspirations he added a more practical one, for he desired the government of Havre, which was then held by Mme. d'Aiguillon for the young Duke of Richelieu. Though false to many, Mazarin was as true to the memory of the great cardinal as he was to his person when alive. He told the Duke of Longueville that he did him great wrong in believing he was so base as to become an instrument in the ruin of the namesake and heir of his benefactor.¹ The duke was therefore lukewarm towards the government against which he was soon to be in open revolt.

The question of most importance discussed at the conference was the demand of the Parliament that no one should be confined for over twenty-four hours without being brought before a judge for examination, and that *lettres de cachet* should be abolished. This was one of the resolutions adopted by the united courts at their assembly in the Chamber of St. Louis.² It was a demand founded on common justice, and which, if granted and enforced, would have done away with the worst forms of tyranny, but it was a demand which was opposed to the spirit and the practice of the French monarchy. "If I consent to such requests," said Anne, "my son would be no better than a king of cards; it is useless to press me; I will never consent." But both Mazarin and the princes favored yielding on this question, and it was at last declared with the royal consent that, in the future, any officer of the sovereign companies when arrested should be brought before his judges within twenty-four hours. Any

¹ Carnets, x.

² Article vi., *Journal du Parlement*, 14.

other person, imprisoned by order of the king, could be detained without examination for six months, if that time were required to prepare the proofs.¹ He must then be brought before the proper judges. Anne insisted that this concession should not be put into a formal edict, but should rest upon the royal word and faith. It remained little more than a dead letter, and would have been so equally, whether it depended upon seals and parchment or upon the promises and honor of the king.

This concession only increased the zeal of the Parliament in its self-appointed task of reducing taxes and improving financial methods. La Meilleraie presented a statement to the conference, which seemed to show that it was impossible to allow the revenues to be reduced. The general expenses of the war and the government were fifty-nine million livres. The entire revenue was ninety-two millions, but from this must come the wages of officers and the rentes, and a reduction of the *taille* which had already been promised. Ten millions annually must be paid to the financiers, to whom the government owed one hundred and twenty millions for monies advanced. These charges together amounted to fifty-seven millions, and left a net deficit of twenty-four million livres.²

The lack of an efficient financial supervision made it impossible to restore equilibrium by reducing the expenses, but the Parliament still continued to demand reductions in taxation. One fourth of the *taille* for 1649 had been taken off by the edict of July 31st, but only for certain provinces. A demand was now made for a reduction of one fourth for the whole country. An eighth was offered by the government, then a sixth, then a fifth in Orleans, whose condition was specially grievous. At last, one fifth was demanded and granted for the whole of France. Reductions were then asked on the various *octroi* duties imposed in Paris, the duties on cattle, wine, and provisions. The regent offered to abate one million

¹ Talon, 284, 285 ; Motteville, 208-214.

² Talon, 281.

two hundred thousand livres, but the Parliament asked that two millions should be taken from these taxes, which were imposed upon the commodities necessary for the life of the poor people.¹

The queen bade its representatives retire, while she deliberated on this last request. They waited in the antechamber, and heard the clock strike seven, eight, and nine. At last they were recalled, and told that the two millions were granted on condition of their promise to cease forthwith their deliberations.² Having encouraged the regent to believe that she would soon be through with them, they were escorted by torch-bearers to their carriages, and by archers to their homes, which they did not reach until after midnight had sounded, an hour which was thought perilously late. But their deliberations still continued, and within a few days they were embodied in a declaration to be presented to the queen. It was again after six o'clock on an October evening before the representatives could start on their mission. They found a great collation prepared for them, but few partook, for, says one of them, they all desired to retire to sleep, which they were not able to do until ten o'clock at night.³

Mazarin wished two days to consider the declaration, but the most of the council desired to avoid giving the Parliament any pretext for sitting longer. For every day for five months, they said, matters had been getting worse, and every delay did harm. It was decided to yield to the demands that were made, and, on October 24th, the royal declaration was registered with the Parliament, granting, in substance, every thing that had been asked. One fifth was taken from the taille; reductions were granted on the octroi duties; the payment of the rentes and the salaries of the judicial officers were to be strictly provided for; no new offices, either judicial or financial, were to be created for four years, and after that only by edicts duly verified; strict provisions were made for farm-

¹ Talon, 286. *Journal du Parlement*, 90-104.

² Talon, 288.

³ Talon, 292.

ing the revenues to the best advantage, and to the highest bidder; the royal signature to payments, which had been used to cover up gifts, extravagances, and illegal gains, was in the future to be confined, according to ancient custom, to those affairs of state which were really secret and important, and should not exceed 3,000,000 livres a year. The destruction of all monopolies was declared, and with a view still further to foster commerce, the introduction into the kingdom of woollen cloths or silks manufactured in England or Holland, of the laces of Flanders, or of point laces from Spain, Genoa, Rome, or Venice, was forbidden, and those buying or using them were subjected to confiscation of the goods and a fine of 1,500 livres. Finally, the arbitrary and illegal annulling by the council of the decrees of the sovereign courts was to be no more allowed. No subject of whatever quality or condition was to be proceeded against criminally, except according to the forms established by the laws and ordinances of the kingdom.¹

Such were the terms of this decree. Had the government intended to enforce them, it would have been of large importance and would have constituted a permanent step towards a better financial system and a less arbitrary government. It seemed to crown with triumph the long contention of the Parliament, whose demands had at last been granted. Their attorney-general declared that now was experienced that concord so greatly desired by heaven and earth, the union of the upper and lower world, the grace and beneficence of the king extended towards his poor people.

But, at the very time when the people and the Parliament were celebrating the victory they had gained, Mazarin was instructing the queen to tell Orleans and Condé, that what was granted the Parliament was wholly extraordinary, and could not be continued without destroying the better

¹ Talon gives the declaration in full, 293-299. A full account of these transactions, from the standpoint of the regent, is found in *Memoirs of Madame de Motteville*, 200-218, vol. xxiv., col. Michaud. The *Journal du Parlement*, 79-104, gives the official account of the proceedings.

part of royalty; that the king would cease to execute the edict when a propitious time came, and that she must ask of them to be in accord with her. The queen told Madame de Motteville, the night the edict had finally been granted, that it must not be spoken of to her; its memory would be forever hateful, and the very sight of those who had contributed to this surrender of her rights was odious to her eyes.¹

¹ 10th Carnet, 71, *et seq.* Talon, 299. Motteville, 218. The accounts of these negotiations are found in Talon, 270-299. Molé, iii., 268-292. Motteville, 198-218. 10th Carnet, *passim.* Journal du Parlement, 76-104. Documents published in Histoire du Temps. Ormesson, 570-582. Dis. Ven., cviii.

CHAPTER X.

THE TREATY OF WESTPHALIA.

ON October 24, 1648, the day on which the edict was registered with the Parliament, the treaty was signed which ended the Thirty Years' War. The negotiations resulting in this memorable treaty had extended over twelve years. It was natural that many years should be occupied in the closing of struggles which, with various intermissions, had extended over more than a century.

The growth of the new religion had forced an issue of arms not many years after Luther nailed his theses to the church door in Wittenberg. By the Peace of Passau in 1552, an attempt was made to regulate the controversy between the new and the old faiths; but Protestantism was still in its fresh and vigorous growth; it was impossible that a fixed line could then be drawn which would limit its territory; impossible that any agreement should be made at that time which would enable creeds, mutually intolerant and struggling for the control of Germany, to dwell together in amity and good-will.

Though the Netherlands were actually no part of Germany, though they were subject to the king of Spain, and not to the Emperor,¹ and though their struggle was for political as well as for religious freedom, yet the long war of a people closely related to the Germans in blood, faith, and speech, must be regarded as a part of the conflict which began under Charles V., and ended under

¹ The formal separation of the Netherlands from the Empire had not then been acknowledged, but the relation was too faint to be of any practical importance.

Ferdinand III. In 1609 a truce for twelve years had been made between Spain and the Netherlands. It was a truce in form, but only the blindness of Spanish pride could fail to see that the independence of the seven provinces was an accomplished fact. Still that independence was not formally recognized, and the unsettled relations between Spain and the United Provinces increased the dangers which hung over Germany.

When the Duke of Cleves died, leaving his possessions to be contested by various claimants and by different creeds, it seemed as if the spark had been thrown which would start the great conflagration. Had Henry IV. lived, it is possible that his interference would have involved all Germany, but his death and the expedient of the joint occupation of the inheritance of the Duke of Cleves by the Possessory Princes, postponed the day of strife.

In 1618, however, the ill-advised ambition of the Elector Palatine, and the unswerving bigotry of Ferdinand II., had at last blown the embers into a flame. The war was carried on with such success, by the zeal of Ferdinand and the ability of Maximilian of Bavaria, that the whole of the Palatinate was conquered, while in Bohemia and the hereditary dominions of the House of Austria, the reformed creeds were permanently crushed. Dazzled by such success, Ferdinand had issued the edict for the restitution of the territory once belonging to the Catholic Church.¹

At this time Gustavus Adolphus had entered the field, and in two years of brilliant success had more than undone all that the Imperialists had accomplished. France was the somewhat faltering ally of Gustavus while he was alive, but united herself firmly with Sweden after his death. These two nations, receiving assistance from some of the Protestant German states, but deserted by others, carried on the contest with the Emperor and his allies for sixteen years after Gustavus' death.

¹ See p. 151, *supra*.

In the meantime the war had spread far beyond the limits of Germany, and now waged from the Baltic to the Straits of Gibraltar. At the expiration of the truce in 1621, Spain and Holland had at once renewed their hostilities, begun fifty years before. The endeavor to subjugate the provinces was carried on with the failing ardor of a dying cause, and commercial advantages in the Indies, with some slight accessions of territory in the Netherlands, were the only advantages that either party expected to gain.

But the war between Spain and France, formally declared in 1635, and actually waging for some years before, was far more extended, was carried on with greater vigor, and sustained by larger anticipations. Spain, Portugal, Italy, Franche Comté, the Low Countries, sea and land, were the scenes of active hostilities between the rivals. Their armies contended among the Alps, in the defiles of Savoy and the villages of the Valteline, on the high plains of Lombardy and amid the marshy flats of Mantua. The Bay of Biscay, the lemon groves of Sorrento, the slopes of the Pyrenees descending through Roussillon and Catalonia to the Mediterranean Sea, the hills of the free country luxuriant with the vine, the low lands of Artois, Flanders, and Picardy, blooming with fertility, and swarming with a dense population, were all the scenes of that contest between the two great powers of Western Europe which continued for a quarter of a century, and exhausted the resources of the inheritance of Philip II.

Few wars of which history tells us were productive of more ruin and misery to the countries in which they were waged. France and Spain, though consumed by taxation, and drained of men and money, escaped with less injury. Nor were the worst ravages found in the territories in which they carried on their hostilities, but Germany, the scene of the Thirty Years' War, was laid desolate as few countries have been. It is doubtful whether the Goths under Alaric, or the Huns under Attila, inflicted such injury on the countries over which they spread, as was caused in German lands by German armies.

The art of making war support war, the maintenance of armies by systematic plunder, had never before been carried to so great perfection. Early in the conflict, Mansfeld and Christian of Brunswick had organized and commanded hordes which, as there were no regular funds from which they could be paid, were necessarily supported by pillage. On the example thus set, Wallenstein had improved with the sure touch of genius. Instead of small commands of ten or twenty thousand men, he had raised armies of fifty and a hundred thousand to be supported by similar means, and so large and powerful that neither city nor province could resist them.

The ravages of the war increased the number of the ravagers. When the cottage was in ashes, the cattle slaughtered, the field laid waste, what remained but to seek war as a means of sustenance, and under the banner of Wallenstein, or Bernard of Weimar, to gain a livelihood by the plunder of others? The devastation led not only men, but women and children into the field. Many of the armies were accompanied by a body of camp followers, far more numerous than the men-at-arms. Wives and children, harlots and thieves clung to the skirts of these hordes, whose entry into any district meant its entire ruin.

In these long years of misery, men grew callous to such modes of life. Babes were born, and grew to be men, and had children born to them, who had never known the order, the industry, or the security of peaceful and civilized life; who had never seen a year that might not strip them of all they had; who had no idea of a law that protects, and little conception of a God who preserves his people and gives peace to the land.

The condition of the country became such as we should expect. A generation of pillage left the land ruined; towns entirely blotted out; the wealth of many districts wasted; their population but a scanty remnant. The population of Wurtemberg is said to have diminished from five hundred thousand to fifty thousand. Many

provinces had lost three fourths of their inhabitants. Three fourths of the houses that were standing in 1618 were in ruins or had been entirely destroyed. Of one village it was said, in 1636, that it had already been plundered twenty-eight times. In a district of Thuringia, out of over seventeen hundred families but six hundred were left; of seventeen hundred houses but three hundred were standing, and of those one half were deserted. Where fourteen hundred oxen had been pastured, there were now only two hundred and forty.

The desire to restore peace to Europe was held, or at least professed, long before it bore any fruit. Hardly had the French declared open war in 1635, when the Pope, Urban VIII., exhorted them to renounce their impious alliance with the Protestants. Though all parties claimed an eager desire for peace, each hoped to gain further advantages by war, and had little desire to abandon the chance of arms. The Catholic princes, however, agreed on a congress to negotiate a treaty, and, after much debate, Cologne was chosen as the place of meeting. There, in 1636, the Cardinal Ginetti formally repaired as legate of the Pope, and mediator between the Catholic powers. Both Spain and the Empire sent ambassadors to Cologne, and loudly demanded of France to show the sincerity of her professions by doing the same; but unless accompanied by her allies, France would not undertake any negotiations for peace. Neither Holland nor Sweden would accept the Pope's mediation, nor was it offered to them. Only by surrendering the lands of the church, could heretics expect to induce the Holy Father to exert for them his friendly offices.

Very protracted trouble was caused by the question of safe conducts. Spain would grant no safe-conducts to the representatives of the United Provinces, and the Emperor would grant none to representatives from Sweden, and both united in refusing any to the minor Protestant states. The safe-conduct that was offered to the French was little better than none. It assured their representa-

tives of protection so long as they bore themselves modestly, and negotiated in good faith, without questioning the treaty of Prague; but that treaty, made with the Emperor by the unstable and lukewarm Electors of Saxony and Brandenburg, was one which the allied powers would neither acknowledge nor accept. Three years passed, and preliminaries such as these were still languidly discussed.

In 1639, the names of the French plenipotentiaries were at last announced. Mazarin had only that year become a naturalized Frenchman. He was still a young man, and had taken no part in German politics, but the abilities he had shown at Casal and Turin caused Richelieu to regard him as a diplomat of the highest order. The young Italian was therefore announced as the first plenipotentiary of France at the Congress of Cologne. With him was associated the Count of Avaux, who for many years had conducted the diplomatic relations of France with Sweden, and who joined to an unrivalled familiarity with German and Swedish politics, the highest degree of skill in their treatment. In 1640, houses were rented at Cologne for the ambassadors, and it was known that state equipages, befitting the dignity and pomp of the representatives of France, were making in Paris, but neither the houses nor the carriages were soon to be used.

Preliminary councils were held, to see if the place and terms of meeting could not be agreed upon, and satisfactory safe-conducts granted. Ferdinand held a diet at Ratisbon, and deliberated upon measures for obtaining peace. Most of the members were willing to take any steps to this end, but the influence of the House of Austria embarrassed their endeavors. The diet narrowly escaped the perils of war, while it was considering the terms of peace. The Swedish army, under the command of General Banier, was not far away. Banier combined the virtues of the soldier with weaknesses peculiar to himself. He had achieved an enviable reputation by his military skill, by his care for his soldiers, and by what was much

rarer, his care for the unhappy countries through which they marched. He was indifferent to personal gain, and would not allow his troops to become mere plunderers. But to these qualities, which might have befitted a Norse warrior, he added equally primitive vices. His drinking bouts were extraordinary, even at a time and in a country where hard drinking was not uncommon. A French envoy from Richelieu was much delayed in delivering his message, because the Swedish general remained hopelessly drunk for four continuous days. His wife, of the noble house of Erpach, followed him in all his campaigns, and was endeared to the soldiers by her courage and fortitude, and by the skill with which she managed her husband in his fits of drunkenness or rage. Banier had bestowed on her the strongest affection, and, at her death, lamented piteously to his comrades that his joy and his support were gone; yet, while he was taking her remains to the grave, he saw by chance a princess of Baden, for whom so violent a passion was instantly kindled that he could hardly wait three months before marrying her, and he neglected even his military duties in the fervor of his devotion. This general, accompanied by the French under the Marshal Guébriant, a man who possessed Banier's virtues without his vices, suddenly advanced on Ratisbon. The Emperor, who was preparing for the chase, escaped being made a prisoner by hardly an hour. The allies discharged their cannon against the city, but their situation was perilous, and they were obliged to fall back without capturing either the town or its inmates.¹

Questions of etiquette, as well as of religion, made the Swedes unwilling to meet with the French in the congress at Cologne. Precedence must be yielded the latter, as representing a monarchy confessedly of greater dignity, and this was distasteful to the Swedes, at a time when the right to sit first at the council, or at the highest table at

¹ Richelieu, col. Michaud, xxiii., 125. Bougeant, "*Histoire du Traité de Westphalie*," vol. i., 408-414.

the feast, was contended for as tenaciously as the dominion of Pomerania or Lorraine. It was suggested, therefore, to avoid this embarrassment, that the council should be held in two cities. The Catholic states would, for the most part, naturally consult at some place under the direction of the papal envoy, while the Protestants would discuss elsewhere questions of special interest to themselves. These deliberations would proceed together, and frequent consultations would preserve the unity of the entire negotiation. As the Catholic city of Cologne had been selected for one place of meeting, the Swedes suggested that the free city of Lubeck should be chosen for the other.

The idea of two places of meeting was little relished by France. It was known that the Emperor was endeavoring to make a separate peace with Sweden, and that the Spainards were trying to obtain a separate treaty from Holland. The most tempting offers of territory were held out to Sweden if she would make her own arrangements apart from France, and except from the fear that once left alone those promises would be evaded, there was no reason to suppose that she would lose the opportunity of an advantageous peace from any romantic devotion to the interests of her allies. France might thus find herself left to contend alone against the Empire and Spain. Such intrigues could be easily carried on, when one set of representatives were discussing by the Rhine, and another were caballing by the Baltic.

To lessen these dangers, the Count of Avaux proposed two cities near together, as, for instance, Münster and Osnabrück, in Westphalia. The places were but thirty miles from each other, and congresses held in the two, though in form separated, would really constitute one body. The preliminary treaties progressed but slowly. By the skill of Avaux, a further treaty had been made between Sweden and France, and the continued union of these powers seemed sure. Richelieu was encouraged by this success, and thinking, perhaps, that the necessities of

war would assure the continuance of his own power, he instructed his representatives to delay the completion of any treaty.' Spain hoped soon for better success, and Austria hoped for the desertion of some of the allies of France, and they were in no haste.

But, on December 25, 1641, after more than five years of negotiations, a preliminary treaty was signed at Hamburg. It was accomplished by the mediation of Christian of Denmark, who, having been unsuccessful in making war, was now endeavoring to show his skill in making peace. By it, the debated question of safe-conducts was settled. It was agreed that two congresses were to meet, one at Münster, and one at Osnabrück; the French and most of the Catholic princes carrying on their negotiations at Münster, while the Swedes and the Protestant states conferred at Osnabrück. Any power could have a resident in both cities. The two treaties to be made would be regarded as forming but one. Safe-conducts were to be exchanged within two months, and the conferences were to begin on March 25, 1642.¹

But no speedy meeting followed this long-delayed arrangement. Instead of its ratification by Ferdinand, his ambassador at Hamburg was recalled and disgraced, for having been simple enough, Avaux said, to believe that the House of Austria was sincere in pretending to desire peace. Not until late in 1642, after a year of almost unbroken success for the allies, did the Emperor ratify the treaty which had been signed in December, 1641, by his representative.

The king of Denmark was resolved to have no further delay, and he appointed April 28, 1643, for the exchange of safe-conducts, and May 15th for the opening of the conference. On May 14th Louis XIII. died. Richelieu had died some months before, and Mazarin had now the

¹ Despatch of Chavigni to Avaux of March 4, 1642. "On puisse différer le jour des ouvertures des assemblées . . . et rejeter sur les Suedois ce retardement," etc.—Lettres de Richelieu, vii., 904.

² Bougeant, i., 472-481. Corps Dip., vi., 631-633.

entire control of the foreign relations of the government. It was announced that he would adopt the policy of his predecessor. His private views were probably much the same as those of Richelieu. If a peace could be made with such advantages and increase of territory for France, as would bring glory and popularity to the minister under whom it was accomplished, such a peace he desired. If advantageous terms could not be made, he was willing further to try the fortune of arms, and have the nation feel that a strong hand was still needed at the helm.¹

Mazarin's elevation rendered it impossible that he should act as the representative of France at the congress. The diplomatic services of Avaux had been such that he could not be slighted, though he was not regarded by Mazarin as a trusty friend. He was accordingly chosen as one of the ambassadors, but Abel Servien, Marquis of Sablé, was associated with him. With less display than Avaux used in his diplomacy, and with less experience, Servien was quite his equal in ability, and had the advantage of enjoying the confidence of the chief minister.

July, 1643, was now fixed as the time for the congress, but the French ambassadors did not leave Paris until October in that year, and they first went to Holland.² There they remained for some months, and obtained from the States-General, after much urging, a renewal of the treaty of 1635, and a promise that no peace or truce should be made with Spain, except by the allies jointly.³ But their relations continued somewhat strained, and the treaty did not prove such a triumph for France as it was at first thought to be.

An injurious effect was produced also, by the Count of Avaux, whose zeal for the Catholic religion was often embarrassing, and whose piety was greater than was con-

¹ Grotius wrote in 1643 and 1644 that peace was desired by France, but not by those who ruled it. *Epistolæ*, 718, 720, 975, *et passim*. The same views are expressed in the despatches of Nani, the Venetian ambassador.

² *Dis. Ven.*, c., *Des. Oct.* 10th.

³ Bougeant, i., 563-572. Dumont, *Corps Dip.*, vi., 292-296. *Lettres de Mazarin*, i., 208, 382, 426, etc.

venient for a diplomat. In a farewell address to the States, he asked them to grant additional privileges to the Catholics, and to allow them at least to hold religious services in their own houses.¹ This request would not have been unreasonable, if it had not proceeded from one who advocated freedom of worship for Catholics in Amsterdam, and strict repression for Huguenots in Paris, but it was regarded by the Dutch burghers as an impertinent interference with their internal affairs.

An injudicious step was not excused by Mazarin because it sprang from religious zeal. "The States are scandalized," he wrote Avaux, "at the proposition you made them of liberty of conscience for the Catholics. I see that the proposal comes from the great zeal you bear for religion, which is certainly very praiseworthy in itself, but I wish you had been able to foresee these inconveniences. You cannot doubt we have the same passion for religion that you have, as you know the piety of the queen, and that I have a special duty to spend my blood and even my life for the good of the church, where there is opportunity for it, and where prudence counsels it."²

The representatives of the other powers had for some time been gathering at Münster, and that city and Osnabrück were already crowded with those drawn there as members or observers of the great congress. Thither the French ambassadors at last turned their steps, and they arrived at Münster in March, 1644. Two days later, the Nuncio Chigi also arrived, to begin those labors as mediator, for which the papal representative had so long and so vainly waited at Cologne. A solemn mass, performed by the nuncio, celebrated, after eight years of delay, the formal beginning of the Congress of Westphalia. The

¹ Bougeant, i., 577, 578, contains Avaux's address.

² Letter of Mazarin to Avaux. *Lettres*, i., 656, 683, 690, 691. Servien was also reprimanded for this speech, which was regarded as authorized by both ambassadors, but he claimed, and probably with truth, that Avaux had made this appeal from excess of Catholic zeal, without his approval. *Lettres de Mazarin*, i., 683, 684. Servien's reply is found in Le Barde "De Rebus Gallicis," lib. ii., p. 77. *Nég. Sec.*, ii., 194-196.

mediator, though his choice was approved by Mazarin, and though he was nominally an umpire among the contending parties, soon showed himself a friend of the Austrian house. It could hardly be otherwise. How could the sympathy of a true Catholic fail to be with the Holy Roman Emperor and the Catholic king, and against France, who had allied herself with the enemies and despoilers of the church? Venice, on the other hand, offered her mediation not only to the Catholics, but also to Sweden, the States-General, and the other Protestant powers.

Questions of etiquette proved as embarrassing as those relating to the secularized bishoprics. The Count of Avaux was skilled in graduated politeness, and he accompanied Contarini to the foot of the staircase and there he stopped, but Contarini claimed that the dignity of Venice demanded that he should be escorted to his carriage. The home government deemed the friendship of Venice too important to be lost for a question of steps, and after Avaux had reported the matter to Paris, he was instructed to extend to Contarini full diplomatic honors.¹

The various countries were not unequally matched in the abilities of their representatives. The Emperor, indeed, had sent ambassadors of such small personal importance as to indicate that he took little interest in their labors. He was represented by the Count of Nassau, a nobleman with more reputation for good manners than for capacity, together with one Dr. Volmar, a man reputed to be deeply versed in the subtleties of civil and international law, and used to courts as well as to universities. Spain sent the Count of Saavedra, a nobleman who combined the national pride with considerable ability, but his colleague, Brun, was his superior in diplomacy, and in this art had few equals. To him were largely due the defection of Holland, and the fact that the Congress dispersed without Spain's yielding to France the terms which the latter seemed in position to demand. From Sweden came the young Baron Oxenstiern, son of the famous chancel-

¹ Despatch of Avaux. *Nég. Sec.*, ii., 5, 25. *Dis. Venez.*, 1644.



lor, who still exercised a controlling influence in Swedish politics. Oxenstiern made himself noticeable by his arrogance and by his obstinacy, and by the splendor he maintained, which exceeded even that of his associates. Twelve men-at-arms and a great number of gentlemen, pages, and valets, all richly dressed, accompanied his carriage when he drove out on his visits of ceremony. Trumpets and cymbals loudly sounded to the public ear when his excellency rose, or retired, or seated himself at table.¹ Though with much less state, his colleague, Salvius, a diplomat equal in ability and experience to Avaux, took an active and important part in the negotiations. The representatives of Holland did not arrive until 1646 and they were watched with special interest, as much doubt was felt of their firm adherence to the common cause, and they were believed to incline towards friendship with Spain.² A vast number of minor states and princes were also represented, and nearly 150 envoys and ambassadors of different rank and importance took part in the consultations, either at Münster or Osnabrück.

Many of the minor German states at first were not represented. The Emperor claimed the right to make peace or war with foreign powers in behalf of the Empire and all of the states that composed it, and that at all events only the electors had the right to take part in such negotiations. But the French at once issued an open letter to the princes and free cities of the Empire, asking them to send their representatives to the Congress. They were bidden to consider what had been one of the chief objects of the war, the creation of some check to the efforts of the House of Austria to establish its power upon the ruins of German liberty; efforts, the signs of which could be seen in rights abolished, laws violated, magistrates despoiled, and electors and princes put under the ban of the Empire. If they now suffered the Emperor to exercise

¹ Letter of plenipotentiaries to Brienne, Sep. 10, 1644. *Nég. Sec.* ii., 136.

² *Nég. Sec.*, iii., 13.

his illegal claim of making peace or war for them, their liberty was gone.¹

Both the matter and the form of this letter were offensive to the Emperor. It asserted a right in the members of the Empire which, if it had existed, had long been dormant, and it was asserted in language which seemed unnecessarily offensive.²

It was, however, received with eagerness by the German states, and most of them responded, after more or less delay, by sending ambassadors to Münster or Osnabrück.

The Congress, in the meantime, although now formally assembled, proceeded with the same deliberation with which it had convened. The wording of the powers granted by the different governments to their plenipotentiaries was subjected to a carping criticism.³ Matters which, if all had been zealous for peace, could have been arranged in a day, occupied the mediators until November. When, at last, these were satisfactorily arranged, the mediators required from all parties a preliminary statement of their demands. Such a request was especially embarrassing to Sweden and France. They were anxious for large territorial acquisitions. Yet, in a war nominally undertaken for the oppressed states of the Empire, and the oppressed members of Protestant creeds, they would be exposed to open scorn if they now admitted that their chief motive had been the lust of conquest and a desire for their neighbors' lands. For the Emperor and the Spanish the task was much easier, and their propositions were promptly given the mediators. They demanded that all parties should abandon their conquests, and peace

¹ Bougeant, ii., 52-54. Nég. Sec., i., 247-250, 597, 606. It is also printed in *Gazette* for 1644, 354-360. Grotii Epis. Ined., 138.

² An appeal to the states of the Empire, and especially to the free cities, was strongly favored by Mazarin. "The imperial cities" he wrote, "are now what is most important in Germany, because they principally have money, lands, and munitions of war." *Lettres de Mazarin*, i., 619. Letters of similar effect to those of the ambassadors were sent by Mazarin, himself, to many German cities. *Letters*, i., 708-712. Nég. Sec., 250-273.

³ *Négociations Secrètes*, i., 144-152, 274-280, etc.

should be made by the restoration of all things to the condition established by former treaties.¹ Such a proposition was simple and specious, and while all knew that by no possibility would it be accepted, it avoided any expression upon the real questions which were to be decided. It was idle to suppose that France and Sweden would surrender all the advantages of fourteen years of successful war, and this was expected by no one. They, on the other hand, were reluctant to say how much of their gains they were resolved to hold, and they submitted propositions which stated only that they must wait for the deputies from the German states, that they might decide with them what should be demanded for the interests of all. These documents were criticised by the adherents of Ferdinand and Philip as a mere apology for propositions, and proofs of the bad faith of the allies.²

Further and more definite statements were accordingly demanded by the mediators, and with this demand the allies felt bound to comply. Avaux and Servien favored a proposition which would be so magnanimous as to excite the admiration of Europe, and yet of such a nature that it would surely not be accepted. All the conquests made during the war were to be surrendered upon the condition that Germany should be restored to the condition in which it was in 1618. The allies could thus claim that they asked for no personal advantage, if only Germany could again be what it was, before ambition and bigotry had turned it upside down. At the same time, this magnanimity would be entirely safe. The Emperor and his allies would never consent that Germany should be restored to its situation before the window-fall at Prague.³ To agree to that would take from the Duke of Bavaria his hard-won electorate, and also the Upper Palatinate, which he had received in discharge of Austria's debt. It would declare Bohemia again an elective kingdom, undo what had been accomplished by the persecutions of Ferdinand and the Jesuits, and restore the hated house of the Palatine to all its former power.

¹ *Ibid.*, 318, 321.² *Ibid.*, i., 303, 309.³ *Nég. Sec.*, ii., 186.

But Mazarin and the Swedes hesitated at so bold *leger-demain*.¹ The Emperor might meet it with equal insincerity, and accept the terms offered, and it would then be difficult to escape gracefully. It was decided, therefore, that a request should be made for the reasonable satisfaction of the two crowns and their allies, without specifying what would be deemed reasonable.

There was variance, also, now, and during all these negotiations, between Sweden and France, on the subject of the religious settlement of Germany. It had been from no desire to protect Lutherans and Calvinists from oppression, that France had taken up arms against the Emperor. Though Richelieu had overthrown the Huguenot party more upon political than upon religious grounds, and though he was too great a statesman to alienate a large and valuable portion of the French nation, he was still a strong Catholic. If the overthrow of the Protestant party in Germany had not involved an enormous increase of the power of the Emperor, it would have met with no hindrance from France. Richelieu's successor was a man of less religious belief, but still he was a cardinal of the church, and Anne of Austria was a fervent and bigoted Catholic. Avaux, a chief plenipotentiary, was equally strong in his convictions, and the French constantly attempted the incompatible tasks of obtaining greater independence for the members of the Empire, without allowing greater privileges to the professors of the reformed faiths. It was desired, Brienne wrote the plenipotentiaries, to fortify the Catholic party, if this would not strengthen the House of Austria, and it was with pain that consent was given to the advantages to be secured the Protestants by the treaty.² It was in vain that the Swedes reminded the French that their German allies were Protestant allies; that the endeavors begun under Richelieu, and continued for fifteen years, to build up a Catholic party in opposition to the Emperor, had for fifteen years been unsuccessful.

The proposition suggested by the Swedes was that the

¹ *Ibid.*, *et passim*.

² *Nég. Sec.*, t. ii., 2d part, 229.

Protestant religion should be established wherever it had existed before the war in Bohemia, and that Lutherans and Calvinists should be restored to their country and their property, under whatever pretext they had been deprived of them. But the French ambassadors remonstrated with energy that the war in Germany had not been undertaken as a war of religion, and could not be regarded as such, and the Swedes at last consented to ask only that the differences between Evangelical and Catholic parties should be terminated by just and Christian means, so that the grievances that had so long divided them should be forever quieted.¹

On Trinity Sunday, 1645, the propositions of the allies were at last submitted. Separate in form, but, except as to matters of religion, similar in substance, they demanded a perpetual peace, universal amnesty, and the restoration to the princes and the states of the Empire of all their ancient rights and liberties, including the right of suffrage on all questions of war and peace. All things in the Empire were to be restored to the condition in which they were in 1618, notwithstanding subsequent confiscations or changes. In the future no king of the Romans should be elected during the lifetime of the Emperor, as that was a method of perpetuating the imperial dignity in one family, and excluding from it all other princes. All conquered places or territories were to be surrendered, provided only that due satisfaction was given the two crowns and their allies for the fatigues, losses, and expenses which the war had caused them.²

These propositions were received by the Imperialists with great disfavor. It was said that they sought to overthrow the constitution of the Roman Empire, to fetter the liberty of the electors which they professed to restore, to annul the peace of Prague, to reëstablish the Palatine, to afford impious advantages to the Calvinists, while, by con-

¹ See Correspondence of Brienne, Avaux, and Servien, 1644-5. *Nég. Sec.*, t. ii., 1st and 2d parts, *passim*, and especially t. ii., part 2, despatch of Ambassadors, May 13, 1645, 257-261.

² Bougeant, ii., 269-285; *Négociations Secrètes*, 372-374.

cealing the indemnity they demanded, they left the way open for any requests, however monstrous and unconscionable. "These propositions of Sweden," said Dr. Volmar, "were more insupportable than the icy breezes of their frozen North."¹

A formal response to them was long delayed, and, in the meantime, the questions continued to be decided by the sword, with the advantage chiefly on the side of the allies. The effect of Turenne's check at Marienthal was overcome by Condé's bloody victory at Nordlingen, while in the Low Countries and in Catalonia the French arms were fairly successful.

By the autumn of 1645, the answer of the Emperor was ready. The deputies of the various members of the Empire were called together to consider it; a recognition of their authority which had long been refused, and which made the enthusiastic declare that on that day German liberty was born again. By this response the demand for universal amnesty was agreed to, but the condition of Germany was to be restored as it existed in 1641 instead of 1618. That a king of the Romans should only be elected after the death of the Emperor, was declared to be contrary to the rights of the Empire and to the Golden Bull, while as to the satisfaction to be given to the allies, it was rather the Emperor who might justly insist that restitution was due him, and this his representatives would expect and demand.

Both parties were as far from agreement, after a year and a half spent in counter-propositions, as on the first day that the Pope's nuncio set foot in Cologne. All knew that neither France nor Sweden would make peace without some accession of territory, and that they regarded this as of more importance than any question of religious or local rights. For France to make any such demand was not, however, altogether easy. From the beginning of the war it had been steadily proclaimed that she had taken up arms for no purpose of selfish aggrandizement,

¹ *Négociations Secrètes*, i., 400-405.

but solely for the protection of the persecuted states of Germany. Mazarin had written to the magistrates of the city of Colmar in 1644, that he wished them to bear testimony, that the king of France would spare neither the blood nor the money of his subjects, in putting the states of the Empire in the condition in which they should be by their constitutions; that this was the sole end which he proposed for his arms, without design or thought of deriving any advantage from so much blood lost and treasure spent, except the safety of his neighbors and allies, and the glory of having saved them from the oppression under which they suffered.¹ But when peace was to be made, it was manifest that the territory to be annexed to France would be a more important question than the safety of her allies.

Sweden had been more consistent. She had long announced that she must have some possessions in Germany granted to her, but there was much coyness in stating the amount to be demanded. Even the French could obtain no clear statement of how much would be necessary to satisfy their ally. Avaux asked why they made a mystery of that which was in the mouth of all the world. Public report gave Alsace to France, and Pomerania to Sweden. "The voice of the people is the voice of God," replied Salvius, apparently content, but Oxenstiern added: "Why should we not have also the archbishopric of Bremen?" The great province of Pomerania extended over two hundred miles along the Baltic, and with Bremen at the mouth of the Weser on the German Ocean, would have been accessions to Sweden sufficient to make it the greatest maritime power in Northern Europe.

It was not until January, 1646, that the two powers agreed upon the demands they would make. They were sufficiently large to remove any doubts as to whether their interference in German politics had been disinterested. France asked for the whole of Alsace and certain adjacent cities, and also that the Emperor should not interfere with

¹ *Lettres de Mazarin*, i., 709, 710.

her possession of Lorraine, which had been justly forfeited to her by the repeated treasons of its duke. Sweden demanded Pomerania, Bremen, Verden, and various other bishoprics, or Silesia would be accepted in exchange for part of Pomerania. These formidable requests were received by the Imperialists with much complaint, and were considered with much deliberation.

In the meantime the French embassy at Münster had received a dignified if not an important accession. Avaux and Servien had been jealous and unfriendly from the beginning of the embassy, and their undisguised enmity was a serious inconvenience in the performance of their duties.¹ Relations such as theirs seem to breed dislike, and the ambassadors of many of the powers were equally inharmonious. To allay these bickerings by the presence of an ambassador of higher rank, as well as to gratify a powerful and uneasy subject, the Duke of Longueville was sent to Münster as the chief plenipotentiary of France. He had small experience in such labors, but his rank and wealth would add lustre, and perhaps restore peace, to the French embassy. After a long delay, which was said to be caused by his wife's reluctance to leave Paris, the duke arrived at Münster in 1645.² The arrival of so elevated a personage aroused numerous questions of etiquette. Contarini and the electors quarrelled so bitterly as to the order of their carriages at the duke's entry, that the Venetian threatened to abandon his mediation. Chigi avoided the quarrel by inducing Longueville not to make a formal entrance into Münster, but his entry, though made unofficially, none the less surpassed that of the other ambassadors in the magnificence of his followers and equipages.³

The duke was joined, in the summer of 1646, by Mme. de Longueville, who at Münster began her political life. She had been unwilling to leave Paris, notwithstanding

¹ These bickerings are constantly referred to in Mazarin's letters, and their correspondence on their controversies is found in *Négociations Secrètes*, i., 75-109, *et passim*. See also *Dis. Ven.*, ci., pp. 138, 193, etc.

² *Carnets*, i., 114; vi., 54. *Nég. Sec.*, ii., 2d part, 87.

³ *Nég. Sec.*, ii., 87, 90.

the dignity of the position she was to hold.¹ There was no time when Paris, for the French of rank and social prominence, more entirely contained the best of what the world had to offer. The taste for the country has always been more English than French, and it existed less in France two hundred years ago than now. The brief seasons spent at the chateaux in Normandy or Provence were little but temporary exiles from the pleasures of the world. The Louvre, the salon of Madame de Rambouillet, the society of the Hotel of Condé, the gorgeous *fêtes* of the Palais Cardinal, the persiflage of Voiture, the stirring dramas of Corneille, Importants plotting conspiracies, stately and decorous first presidents discussing the privileges of Parliament, ladies of the Court casting innuendoes at the relations of the pious queen and her favorite cardinal; in such things was a joyousness of life which could nowhere else be found. For the loss of such pleasures, the excitements and changes of foreign life and society no more compensated, than the views from the chateau windows or the ride through the ancestral forests. The desire for change, for travel, and for new phases of society, is one of the many products of modern unrest. Madame de Longueville saw little gain in leaving the polished society of Paris for a motley assembly of ambassadors, who could talk to her only in Latin, German, or bad French.

She received such honors on her journey as befitted her rank. Governors, at the head of their garrisons, met her, and offered her the keys of their cities. Turenne reviewed and manœuvred his army of veterans for her amusement. When she entered Münster, she was accompanied by the gentlemen and equeries of Avaux and Servien, by forty pages and valets, gorgeous in silver lace, fifty gentlemen superbly dressed, fifteen Swiss with their velvet caps surmounted by floating plumes, together with a company of soldiers, trumpeters, and valets. Fourteen carriages of the ambassadors, each drawn by six horses, closed the procession, which was saluted at the public squares by

¹ *Carnets, supra.*

repeated discharges of musketry.¹ Though her attractions made her the centre of society in Münster, the time had not come when Madame de Longueville herself was to take a leading part in making peace or waging war.

Shortly after the Duke of Longueville, the Count of Pegnaranda arrived as first ambassador of the Spanish king. He, it was claimed, owed his brilliant position to the beauty of the young girl he married, but such a cause of favor was not without its trials. His wife was kept at the Court, and the count was long refused permission to return to her.

He was, the French ambassador wrote Mazarin, a crafty and malignant spirit, who covered with apparent sincerity continued dissimulation and trickery.² The Count of Trautmansdorff also arrived at Münster, and took the leading part in the negotiations on behalf of the Emperor. After vain endeavors to detach Sweden from her ally, the territorial demands of France were at last considered. The negotiations concerning these were only a long huckstering, the one party gradually offering a little more, and the other asking a little less, like an Eastern vendor of trinkets chaffering with his purchasers. The French showed, however, great firmness in their demands for new territory. If those were satisfied, it was intimated that there would be every disposition to agree on all questions of religion, or as to the regulation of the states of the Empire. Trautmansdorff offered first Lower Alsace; then all of Alsace, to be held as a fief of the Empire; then to be held in absolute sovereignty; then various towns without Brisach; then Brisach dismantled; at last Brisach fortified. Finally, Philipsburg was added to Alsace. Alsace, Brisach, and Philipsburg, the Bavarians said, were worth as much as half a kingdom, but the French were resolved to abandon their demands for a few other places, only upon receiving these great possessions.³

¹ For this see *Gazette*, 1646, page 690, and *Voyage à Münster*, July, 1-78.

² Response of Servien to the Memoir of Mazarin of August 21, 1648.

³ *Nég. Secrètes*, t. iii., 1-300, 450-456.

The news of the cession of Alsace was received with great exultation, for "the Court of France had long sighed for it as for a new promised land." There was some uncertainty in what manner it should be held. It was not wholly distasteful to allow it to remain a fief of the Empire. This would make the king of France, as Landgrave of Alsace, a member of the Empire. His representatives could sit in the imperial diets, and he might hope to be regarded as an eligible candidate for the imperial throne; but it was decided at last to hold the province in absolute sovereignty, and make of it a part of the French kingdom. A pecuniary indemnity was to be paid by France to some of the German nobles, whose rights were affected by this cession. The limits of France had been extended to its most ancient boundaries, the ambassadors wrote to the queen, with much exultation, and little historical accuracy.¹ But then, as now, France was identified with the Empire of Charlemagne, which had truly comprised Alsace and the shores of the Rhine, and this has been one of the many historical mistakes which have had a large influence on the desires and wars of nations.² The French were successful also in their demand that the affairs of Lorraine should not be considered by this Congress. That province, they said, had been conquered in a most just war, and should be left to settle its own affairs with France, and they insisted that representatives from its duke should not be received at Münster. He was left to protest against the abandonment of his rights by the Empire.³

When this agreement was reached, in September, 1646, peace seemed near at hand, but two years elapsed before it was attained. The demands of Sweden were as troublesome as those of France, and gave rise to as much bargaining. The Swedes wanted Pomerania, but to grant them this province was to deprive the Elector of Bran-

¹ Lettre des Plenipotentiaires à la Reine, 17 Septembre, 1646. *Nég. Sec.*, t. iii., 300.

² See Grotii *Epistolæ*, 742, and many references in the correspondence of Richelieu and Mazarin. ³ *Nég. Sec.*, t. ii., 2d part, 109; iii, 297, *et pass.*

denburg of his rights over it. He was willing to receive in exchange for these rights the province of Silesia, which was taken by the strong hand of his descendant a century later. Silesia, however, belonged to the Emperor, and Ferdinand's piety did not prevent his preferring to compensate the elector with church lands, instead of from his own patrimony. If the hereditary estates of the House of Austria were not touched, he cared little for the possessions of St. Peter.¹ The Swedes demanded, also, the bishoprics of Bremen and Verden, and various cities. They insisted that the status of 1618 should be reestablished, and that the Protestants should receive redress for their wrongs, and should have in the future full and secure religious privileges. The fortune of war still favored the Swedes, and inclined them to increase rather than diminish their pretensions, but the French ambassadors, having obtained satisfaction of their own demands, were eager that Sweden should also make terms, and a final peace be signed.² Fortune and circumstances might change, and much less favorable terms be secured. Mazarin had learned wisdom from large experience at Roman gambling tables, and he wrote Avaux that it was no little skill to quit the game when a winner, for one made his gain sure.³

Mazarin was resolved that the alliance with Sweden should not be continued indefinitely for ends which were of no interest to him. The French ambassadors were instructed to inform those of Sweden without bitterness, but with firmness, that France was no longer in condition to continue the war in Germany, either for the interests of the Palatine, who might be thankful that he was to receive any thing, or for any unjust advantages to the Protestant party. While they had faithfully resolved to come to no peace unless Sweden had just satisfaction, yet it had been

¹ Despatch of Longueville, *Nég. Sec.*, t. iv., 76, January, 1647.

² See letters and despatches contained in *Nég. Sec.*, t. iv., for 1647-8. Contarini was written at Mazarin's request: "Che la guerra intrapresa per solo interesse de Stato, non potra per quello de Religione rendersi lunga."—*Dis. Ven.*, cv., 26th Sept., 1646.

³ *Lettres de Mazarin*, ii., 308. See also ii., 292 and 293.

stipulated that the French should defend the Catholic faith, and preserve it in all conquered places in the same condition as it had existed.¹ Moreover, Mazarin wrote in the spring of 1647, France was no longer able to furnish the usual subsidy or to bear the excessive expenses which had thus far been incurred. The great disbursements she had made, the labors, fatigues, and perils of the army in the last campaign and the past winter, had no other purpose than to procure due satisfaction for the crown of Sweden, but the war could not be carried on indefinitely only that her pretensions might be increased.²

Amid the wrangles over territorial gains, the religious questions, from which the war had arisen, were not wholly forgotten. A large body of representatives from many of the minor German states had little to ask, except whatever advantages could be gained for the religious creeds to which they belonged. The Protestants complained that the rights secured them by the Peace of Augsburg had not been respected. In Catholic states they suffered constant molestation. They were annoyed by unjust decrees, pronounced by courts composed almost wholly of Catholics. The Aulic Council, in which only Catholics sat, assumed to pass on religious as well as on civil cases, and deprived Protestants of their dignities and their domains. The children of ministers were stigmatized as bastards, and were even denied Christian burial. In some Catholic states, Protestants were constrained to abjure their faith, or to leave their homes, with the necessity of selling their property at ruinous sacrifices. Even the new Gregorian calendar, which they were obliged to use, disturbed the order of their religious services. They de-

¹ Mazarin wrote at the treaty of Ulm: "We must take care that the Duke of Bavaria is not so much enfeebled that he will be of no more importance to his friends than his enemies, and you know how important it is to hold in check the Swedes and the immoderate plans they have in favor of the Protestant religion."—*Lettres*, ii., 871.

² *Lettres de Mazarin*, ii., 392-400. In a letter of April 20th, vol. ii., 425, Mazarin speaks of the favorable effect produced upon the Swedes by these remonstrances, and that they had consented to an arrangement of the affairs of the Palatine.

manded that courts should be created, composed equally of members of each religion, from which justice might be obtained for those of their faith. To all the evangelical states, to the free cities and the nobles, the right should be given to regulate religion in their territories, and to repair all that had been done contrary to its interests since 1618. Those bishops or clergy who left Catholicism to embrace the confession of Augsburg, should have the right to preserve their territories and their jurisdictions unaffected by their change of faith.¹

Such demands, which involved an equality between the two religions, were little relished by the Catholics either of Germany or of France. That renouncing one's religious creed and profession worked the loss of his dignity and ecclesiastical revenues, they answered, was a principle established in all Catholic states, recognized by the Peace of Augsburg, and regarded by the Imperial Chamber in all its judgments. Frauds and false professions had been resorted to by the Protestants to obtain these prelatures and other dignities; they could not now complain that their conscience was forced, because no tenderness of conscience compelled any renegade ecclesiastic to take with him his broad lands and liberal tithes. Let him leave the lands and wealth that ancient piety had devoted to the true church, and confess himself a Protestant priest, without trying to hold, also, the income and dignity of a Catholic bishop. Instead of complaining that they had been despoiled by unjust judgments, the Protestants had best return to the Catholics all that they had filched from them since the treaty of Passau. Ferdinand's edict of restitution, of which they complained, was intended to terminate the quarrels and disorders which raged in Germany over ecclesiastical lands, and the Emperor's power to issue it could not be denied. If any changes were needed in the administration of justice, it was a matter to be discussed in a German diet, and it should not be used to embarrass the Congress by its manifold difficulties.²

¹ Bougeant, vol. ii., 428-434.

² Bougeant, ii., 435-445.

While the negotiations for peace with the Emperor were dragging over years, still less progress was made towards peace with Spain, and its accomplishment at last became hopeless. Ambassadors from Spain had met at Münster, but they had done little except wrangle over their titles and their protocols.¹ The Emperor had been obliged to proceed in the negotiations without his Spanish cousin, but the Spaniards, who were in danger of losing the support of the Empire, had devoted their energies to alienating Holland from France.² The negotiations at Münster had been quickened by the victories of 1646, but the Hollanders, who were apprehensive of too great an increase of the power and territory of France, were only strengthened in their desire for peace with Spain. By 1647 it was apparent that they would soon make separate terms.

The loss of such allies seemed to be counterbalanced by the defection of the Duke of Bavaria, the chief supporter of the Emperor and of the Catholic powers. The French had long endeavored to detach Bavaria from the imperial cause, but the duke had been constant to his friends. He was alarmed, at last, for the safety of his own domains, and in 1645 he sent his confessor to Paris to carry on negotiations in his behalf.³ Mazarin would have been glad to treat with him, but such dealings were sure to be known, and to excite suspicion among the allies of France. The cardinal knew that in duplicity he was not superior to the Duke of Bavaria.⁴ The coming of this secret ambassador had been shrouded in mystery, and it had been insisted that it must be carefully concealed from Bavaria's allies, but as the secret had also been disclosed to Austria, the alleged intention to desert the Empire was not free from

¹ "You should make the King of Poland and the Duke of Bavaria," Mazarin wrote the ambassadors, "detest the obstinacy of the Spaniards, who cannot resolve on peace, and who continue deaf to the voice of heaven, which plainly declares its wish by the ill success it gives their arms."—*Lettres de Mazarin*, iii., 110. ² *Lettres de Mazarin*, ii., 293-298, 835.

³ *Lettres de Mazarin*, ii., 140, April 7, 1645.

⁴ "Principe molto sagace, poco sincero," the Venetian ambassador says of Bavaria.—*Dis. Venez.*, xcvi., 549.

suspicion. The duke was therefore told that his negotiations must be carried on at Münster, and there he reluctantly sent a representative.

After Condé's victory at Nordlingen, his desire for peace became stronger. He was especially obnoxious to the Swedes, for they regarded him as the bitterest enemy of the Protestant party, and a man equally able, wily, and unscrupulous. They were eager to drive him to the wall, but the French were careful not to overthrow the leader of the Catholic party. Avaux wrote Mazarin after the battle of Nordlingen, that while continuing the war against Bavaria exposed the interests of France to a chance of injury from defeat, a victory would cause the duke's ruin, and increase the hardihood of the Protestants and Swedes.¹ But no sooner had Turenne fallen back after this unproductive victory, than the duke eluded all demands of the French, and persevered in his alliance with the Emperor. The next year again saw his territories ravaged by the enemy, and at last, on March 14, 1647, he made a treaty with France and Sweden, by which he was to abandon the support of the Empire, and be freed from the invasions of the allies.² The Imperialists declared that Maximilian's desertion was perfidy and high treason, but the Swedes distrusted his sincerity, and begrudged his immunity from the ravages of the war he had provoked and fostered.³ Still, it seemed that the loss of so great an ally would compel the Emperor to conclude a peace, but Bavaria soon returned to the cause that was dear to him.

The summer of 1647 was not a fortunate one for the allies. Holland withdrew her coöperation, and though she did not make peace with Spain, she became practically neutral. Encouraged by this, in the autumn of 1647, the old duke, now seventy-four years of age, broke the truce

¹ Avaux to Mazarin, August 27, 1645. Mazarin, in a letter of April 26, 1647, *Lettres*, ii., 889, recapitulates all that France had done for the Duke of Bavaria to secure him his Electorate and the Upper Palatinate.

² *Lettres de Mazarin*, ii., 417-421. Dumont, *Corps Dip.*, vi., 377-386.

³ *Nég. Sec.*, iv., 83

he had so recently made, and his troops again joined those of Austria.

But the end of the long negotiations was approaching. Early in 1648 Holland made its separate peace, but the effect of this was overcome by Condé's victory at Lens, which showed that France, single-handed, was more than a match for Spain. The troubles and dissensions between the regent and the Parliament were beginning, but their extent was not foreseen, and Wrangel and Turenne led the allies into Bavaria, and laid waste that province.¹ Infirm and terrified, the old duke fled from Munich, and saw his capital in peril, and his possessions wasted by fire and sword. The war seemed to be ending where it began. The Swedes invaded Bohemia, and Little Prague was captured by them. Twenty-eight years after the defeat of the Elector Frederick at Weissenberg, and the conquest of Prague by the Catholic army of Ferdinand, the new city was in turn pillaged by the Protestant army of Königs-marck. Twelve million francs' worth of booty, it was estimated, was stolen or destroyed by a rapacious soldiery.² The old city was besieged by the Swedes, and it was said that Charles Louis, the Prince Palatine, would be declared King of Bohemia in its ancient capital, where his father had been crowned almost thirty years before.³

The effect of such successes was to hasten a conclusion of the treaty, and both the Emperor and the Duke of Bavaria were at last eager for peace. Avaux was not allowed to see the end of the work in which he had taken so active a part. After twenty years of diplomatic service, he was recalled in disgrace, and ordered not to appear at Court. No public reason was assigned for this act, but alleged neglects of duty and his ill-concealed hostility for Mazarin had caused his overthrow.⁴ Longueville soon wearied of

¹ The French had been reluctant about again attacking the Duke of Bavaria, but the Swedes insisted, and Mazarin did not think after his last perfidy that they need offend their allies to spare him.—Turenne, 417. Let. de Mazarin, iii., 64, 78, 86. ² Bougeant, iii., 424. ³ Bougeant, iii., 490.

⁴ Aff. Etr. All., 98. Letter of Lionne to Servien, Jan. 28, 1648. Let. de Maz., iii., 108.

every thing, and he had already returned to France, hardly concealing his belief that the cardinal did not wish that any peace should be made. If such had ever been Mazarin's views, they were not his views now. In 1648 he wrote to Servien, to whom the entire negotiation was then entrusted: "It is impossible that at any time I should desire peace more than I always have, but it may well be that the state is in more need of it than heretofore. You know the former, and you can perceive the latter by reflecting on what has occurred in this kingdom during the last few months. * * * The exterior seems fair, but the interior is corrupted, and we shall do ourselves the harm that the enemy has not accomplished."¹ Servien pressed the negotiations with energy and skill. The demands of Sweden were satisfied. France exerted herself to obtain satisfactory compensation for the Elector of Brandenburg, whose successors were to become more dangerous enemies than the House of Austria.

The Protestants demanded 1618 as the date to determine the relative position of their faith and that of the Catholics. The latter desired 1630, when the victories of Ferdinand had obtained for them so great gains. 1624 was at last agreed upon as a compromise. The conflicting claims of Bavaria and the Elector Palatine were satisfied. When terms had been fixed at Osnabrück, where the representatives of the Protestants were assembled, and where negotiations at the last were chiefly carried on, they were submitted to the plenipotentiaries of the Emperor for signature.

¹ *Lettres de Mazarin*, iii., 173. Letter of August 14, 1648. He writes further: "It is a miracle that affairs can proceed with the obstacles we make ourselves. Credit is gone, our resources destroyed, the public purse closed. You must see the necessity we have for peace at once, and if the things^a that are important and essential are established, we must not in future be so particular. It is not the enemy that gives me apprehension, but the French themselves." See *Lettres de Mazarin*, ii., 440, June 22, 1647. In this letter Mazarin claimed, with much emphasis, that his desire for peace had been consistent and constant. On June 8, 1647, vol. ii., 437, 438, he presses the Duke of Longueville to continue in the embassy, but without success. In May, 1648, he tells Servien to make a peace as soon as possible. *Lettres*, iii., 123.

Though peace was now decided on, they delayed completion of the great work. Responses from the Imperial Court were waited for, and when they came it was announced that by some accident they were in a cipher to which the ambassadors had not the key. Let them apply to the nuncio of the Pope, said the ambassador of Savoy, to get for them the key of St. Peter.¹

The nuncio was unwilling to confirm the result of his long mediations. Innocent X., indignant at what he deemed the sacrifice of the interests of the church to the ambition and greed of the Protestants, ordered Chigi to enter a solemn protest against the treaty. He himself afterwards declared that the treaties of Münster and Osnabrück, which allowed to heretics the full practice of their heresy, and abandoned to them the lands which had belonged to the true faith, were infinitely prejudicial to the Catholic religion, to the divine worship, to the privileges and immunities of the Apostolic Roman Sec, and of the churches of the Empire, and were to be forever null, void, and reprobate.²

The Spanish had made separate terms with Holland, and the endeavor failed to restore peace between France and Spain as a part of the treaty of Westphalia.

Notwithstanding this, on October 24, 1648, the two treaties of Münster and Osnabrück were signed by the representatives of the Emperor, of France, Sweden, Bavaria, Brandenburg, Hesse, and all the German states who had taken part in the negotiations.³ On October 25th, the streets of those cities were alive with soldiers and citizens in festival array. Flags floated from every important place. The booming of cannon, the ringing of the peals of bells in the old German churches, and the chanting of the *Te Deum* within, announced that the

¹ Bougeant, iii., 488, 489.

² Bougeant, iii., 631, 632. Vol. xvii., Bullarium. Corps Dip., vi., 463, 464. Mr. Bryce has referred to the importance of this treaty on the Empire in his interesting and valuable "Holy Roman Empire," 344.

³ The treaties of Münster and Osnabrück are found in Corps Dip., vi., 450-490, and in Bougeant, t. iii., 507-631.

Peace of Westphalia had closed twelve years of negotiations and thirty years of war.

By the two treaties, which were regarded as forming but one, it was sought to regulate the political and the religious status of the Empire, as well as the claims, not only of France and Sweden, but of almost every prince, count, and free city, for compensation and redress, or for new acquisitions. France received Alsace with some reservations, and with an acknowledgment that certain parts of it still depended on the Empire. The French rule was there established, and under Louis XIV. the entire province became wholly French. For two centuries Alsace remained a portion of France, extending that kingdom to the coveted line of the Rhine, and becoming as thoroughly French in feeling as Orleans or Dauphiny.

Brisach and Philipsburg were added to the cession of Alsace. The bishoprics of Metz, Toul, and Verdun had been seized by France in 1552. Her full and complete sovereignty over them was now formally recognized.

Sweden received even more valuable accessions. Western Pomerania and the bishoprics of Bremen and Verden gave her an extensive and valuable territory on the Baltic and the North Sea. It commanded the mouths of the Oder and the Weser. It was broken by large and safe harbors, and occupied by many flourishing commercial cities. With it Sweden seemed in position to become the great maritime power of Northern Europe. Such she was not to become, but from other causes than unfavorable position. Unlike France, Sweden held her German possessions as a member of the Empire, and was entitled to representatives in the German diets.

Brandenburg was liberally compensated for the surrender of its rights over Pomerania, by what it received from the spoils of the church. It was given the bishoprics of Halberstädt, Minden, and Camin, and the reversion of the archbishopric of Magdeburg, and its position was strengthened as the first Protestant power in Northern Germany. Saxony, Hanover, and the Palatine had all

lost in power or prestige during the war, but the aspiring House of Brandenburg was slowly developing into the power, which two centuries later would succeed to Austria as the head of Germany.

Few questions had been more discussed during the thirty years of war than what should be done with the Palatine. By the ill-judged ambition of the Elector Frederick, in accepting the crown of Bohemia, the war had first assumed large proportions, and his entire overthrow and the conquest of the Palatinate had been its earliest stage. His electorate and the possessions of which he had been despoiled had been given the Duke of Bavaria, and to them he clung obstinately, while their return had long been demanded by Frederick and by his son, Charles Louis. It was settled by the treaty that the Duke of Bavaria should retain the Electorate and the Upper Palatinate, but for Charles Louis a new and eighth electorate was created, and the Lower Palatinate was restored to him.

In the internal changes of the Empire, the desires of Richelieu were largely fulfilled, and the hopes of Ferdinand II. were disappointed. Such power was granted the members of the Empire that it became, not a centralized kingdom, but an assemblage of independent cities and princes. To the electors, princes, and states of the Roman Empire, was secured the right to deliberate and vote on all matters of the Empire, on questions of declaring war, imposing a tax, providing for soldiers, constructing fortresses, making peace, or forming alliances. All these matters must be arranged in a free assembly of all the members of the Empire, and the right was preserved to them of making separate treaties and alliances with each other or with strangers. Frequent diets were to be held, in which the free cities were also to have a voice and vote. The abolition of some of the duties and tolls between these innumerable states afforded some relief to commerce, which had suffered almost as much from the ill-advised greed of petty sovereigns as from the plundering armies of Mansfeld and Wallenstein.

As the war had arisen from long-smouldering religious controversies, these were regulated with the most minute detail. January 1, 1624, was fixed as the day which should determine the rights and limits of the two religions. What the Catholics possessed then they should be allowed to hold, and what the Protestants held then they might keep in peace. The treaties of Passau and Augsburg were confirmed, but the endeavor was made, by a division of many offices and courts, and by regulations for mutual toleration, to establish the two religions on an equal footing. Calvinists and Lutherans were protected equally with the Catholics. The principle was still recognized, that it was for the prince to choose the faith of the country he governed, a right which belonged, also, to the free nobles and cities, and to all who depended directly upon the Empire.¹

But the exercise of this right was not to be accompanied by endeavors to proselytize the subjects of others, or by unreasonable impositions upon those who adhered to a different creed. Even in those countries where, on January 1, 1624, a Protestant or a Catholic had no right to practise his religion, should any one hereafter adopt the offending faith, he should have at least five years in which to leave, and he should be free from exactions on his property. It was agreed that, in the future, any ecclesiastic abandoning his faith must leave behind him his ecclesiastical revenues and possessions. In other words, what the Protestants had obtained of the lands and wealth of the Catholic Church they could keep, but they should take no more, and the ecclesiastical lands or offices which those of either party had gained from the other since January, 1624, were to be restored to the former faith. With what each religion then had it must rest content.

Restitution was to be made to those who had taken up arms with France or Sweden, except so far as personal property, crops, or buildings, might have been destroyed or taken for the purposes of the war. A gift of five

¹ See articles as printed in Bougeant, iii., 578-590.

million reichsdalles to the Swedish army to satisfy their greed ; a recognition of what had long been a fact, that the Swiss no longer formed part of the Empire ; together with a vast number of regulations for individual and local rights of property, jurisdiction, or religion, composed the other provisions of the treaties, which were of such length as to form a moderate-sized book of themselves.

The Peace of Westphalia is a turning-point in modern history. Its importance consisted more, perhaps, in the changes it recognized than in those it made. Like most treaties, it simply accepted a position of things which was due to the results of the war and the condition of public feeling. It marked the end of the religious wars in Europe, but that end had been reached, either by the entire success of one or the other creed, or because each had become too wearied or too indifferent to care for further controversy. In France, the Huguenots had become too weak to excite distrust ; Spain was wholly Catholic ; the United Provinces were wholly Protestant. In Italy there was no Protestant movement of strength at any time. In Germany the zeal for proselytizing had ceased. Ferdinand II. had been the last of the monarchs who cared to lead crusades for the extirpation of heresy. The first earnestness of the Reformation had abated. It had spread with such rapidity that it bade fair to embrace all of Germany. Then the Jesuits had led a counter-movement, and recovered much that had been lost. Now, both parties were exhausted with their struggles. Each was willing to tolerate, for neither feared any aggressive movement from the other. Freedom of conscience was not enforced by the treaty. Such an idea was equally distasteful to all. In Protestant or Catholic countries, those of the other faith could be required to abandon their creed or their country, but probably the desire to enforce such a right had ceased. The majority were willing to tolerate a minority, which desired peace and not proselytes. This situation was recognized and ratified by the treaty of Westphalia, and it was to remain the permanent condition

of Germany. Neither party obtained by the treaty all the advantages that had been hoped. Enormous gains that had been made by the Catholics from 1624 to 1630 had to be surrendered. On the other hand, the Protestants were obliged to submit to the great losses they had suffered before that time. Bohemia was left a Catholic state. Ferdinand's work of conversion in his hereditary dominions was not undone. In the College of Electors, the Catholics had now five electors instead of four, and the Protestants still had only three. If there had ever been hopes of that political and religious anomaly, a Protestant Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire, they were now abandoned. As beginning an era of toleration and of religious tranquillity; as the end of a century of relentless warfare over religion, the Peace of Westphalia seemed to usher in an epoch of comparative peace and good-will.

But its effect upon the political life of Germany was far less beneficial. The establishment of the power and separate rights of a multitude of petty sovereigns, meant that Germany's opportunity to become a nation was gone. Tyrannical and selfish as were the ambitions and purposes of Ferdinand II., his political views were wiser than those of his opponents. Had Ferdinand gained supreme power, he might, perhaps, have succeeded in extirpating Protestantism in Germany, and that would have been the greatest evil the land could have suffered; but, apart from that danger, if Germany must suffer from despotism it was far better for her development that she should have one despot than that she should have three hundred. For Richelieu to check the power of Austria and neutralize the strength of the Empire, was wise according to his light. For Germany itself this result was long fatal to its progress. In a country already depopulated by thirty years of war, a horde of little princes ruling over petty principalities restrained, and checked, and choked all national growth. For a hundred years Germany could hardly claim to have a history, either political or intellectual. Nor did any universal well-being atone for the

lack of more stirring achievement. There was no fowl in the pot ; there was no fresh thought in the brain ; there was only a princelet aping Louis XIV., and a peasant starving on half a black loaf. Austria was perhaps a less dangerous factor in European politics than she might have become, but this advantage was dearly bought by retarding the growth of the nation.¹

¹ The authorities from which the negotiations at Münster and Osnabrück can be traced are numerous. A vast amount of diplomatic correspondence, containing almost all the despatches and instructions of the French ambassadors down to 1648, and the most of the official proceedings of the Congress, is contained in four volumes called "*Négociations Secrètes Touchant la Paix de Münster et d' Osnabrüg.*" The three volumes of Bougeant, "*Histoire du Traité de Westphalie,*" are chiefly founded on the despatches of Avaux, and contain the most important propositions he submitted during the congress. *Lettres de Mazarin*, t. i., ii., and iii., contain all his letters on this subject which are not found in "*Négociations Secrètes.*" The despatches of the Venetian ambassadors, t. c.-cvii., contain much valuable information. These, with a few unpublished letters and despatches at Paris, furnish the authorities on which I have relied for the negotiations about this treaty, so far as they concern the history of France.



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